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Imperiality vs. Imperialism

Editors Note:  By Israel Lira, Peruvian Political Theorist. Translated by Zero Schizo. Following Fernando Altuve’s thesis of the historicity of the State in his work “The Kingdoms of Peru”, we…

Editors Note:  By Israel Lira, Peruvian Political Theorist. Translated by Zero Schizo.


Following Fernando Altuve’s thesis of the historicity of the State in his work “The Kingdoms of Peru”, we cannot conceive of the State until the beginning of the Renaissance, and as we know it today, until the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). With this historical event, the bases for the concept of sovereignty was settled and was later used to give strength to another conception, that of the Nation, strictly linked to the State, insofar as this last term will mean the geographic community organized politically. On the other hand, sovereignty, evolved from being concentrated in the King, into founding its being in the popular will. With that being said, we cannot talk about the State before the aforementioned events, so that the proto-State organizations, will only receive the qualification of Political Units, in hope of not falling into an anachronism of categories.

Prior to the concept of State (whether it be in any of its three well-known forms of historical evolution, Absolute –1648– Federal –1776– and National –1789–) there existed Political Units called Empires. The following questions emerge: Is it the same Empire or Idea of Empire (Imperium) that we now call Imperialism? Could we talk about Imperialism in ancient times? We consider that, following Altuve’s thesis, such thing is imprecise and anachronistic, and that what we have in ancient times, as exclusive neologism contextualized and already scoped by us, is what we will call Imperialities, as the expression of the Idea of Empire (Imperium), and that Imperialism is a phenomenon which emerges from the decline of this idea in front of the rise of the State, so then, is a modern phenomenon. Regarding this:

“The loss of Calais in 1554 pointed out the beginning of the sea myriad by the English people, in front of a globalized worldwide space, it seemed obliged to launch itself to the conquest of the seas in the condition of pirates… With this conquest of the sea, with this active search for the taking of markets in contra-position to the taking of lands from the continental superpowers… Saxon Thalassocracy was born in the universal political order” (Febres-Lores, 1996:71-72).

Thalassocracy from the doctrine of the Mare Liberum, different from the territorial vision of the Hispanic Mare Clausum, is inspired by the image of Imperial Rome, of a plurality of peoples and dissimilar territories which conformed to a mosaic sorted by the civilizational role of the City (Febres-Lores, 1996). A vision beyond the Alameda of Hercules, and before the conquest, was also shared by the pre-Hispanic peoples, Aztecs, Mayas and Incas. Just to quote a close example, Quechua or Quechua Simi or Runa Simi is translated as the language of men and which fulfilled a civilizational mission in front of all of the other Andean peoples, product of the Tawantinsuyu* Expansion. Meaning, the Idea of Empire (Imperium) in general terms and as transversal historical category to different peoples, always brought with itself a main ideal of expansion of culture and civilization, while the commercial aspect was a mere factor, an accessory to the main one.

In consequence, the difference between Imperialism and Imperiality would be of teleological character. While Imperialism is a manifestation of thalassocracies or marine powers, the Idea of Empire or Imperiality is energized mainly by a universalist myth. In the same way, while Imperialism is a modern category of strict culture-dissolving economic domination, Imperiality is a category of ancient times of integrating cultural domination. Our ancestral peoples had it pretty clear in their civilizational vision, and were not estranged from the phenomenon of Imperiality.


Translator’s Note:

* Tawantinsuyu, also known as the Inca Empire in its original language (Quechua).


References

FEBRES-LORES, Fernan. (1996). «Los Reinos del Perú: apuntes sobre la monarquía peruana». Dupla Editores.


Bibliography

OSZLAK, Oscar. (1982). «Reflexiones sobre la formación del Estado y la construcción de la Sociedad Argentina». In: Desarrollo Económico, Revista de Ciencia Sociales, Vol. XXI, Enero-Marzo: Buenos Aires.

BANDEIRI, Luis María. (2007). «Patria, nación, estado «et de quibusdam aliis», In: Revista Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas Vol. 37, No. 106, Medellín – Colombia, Enero-Junio.

MORTON H, Fried. (1967). «The evolution of political society an essay in political anthropology». Random House studies in anthropology, AS. 7. New York: Random House.

SERVICE R, Elman. (1984). «Los orígenes del Estado y de la civilización. El proceso de evolución cultural». Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

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The coming decline of globalism or: How I learned to stop worrying and love multipolarity

Introduction As a nationalist in the west, it’s often difficult to find any reasons for optimism. A typical month may involve any combination of social media bans, deplatforming and physical…

Introduction

As a nationalist in the west, it’s often difficult to find any reasons for optimism. A typical month may involve any combination of social media bans, deplatforming and physical threats from society’s dregs, and there is seemingly little to show for the sacrifice by way of tangible victories. I might be forgiven then, for finding cause for optimism in the most unlikely of places. Looking to the East, the ascendant Chinese state is removing the last vestiges of western colonial rule and expanding its own rule over Hong Kong. In many ways, Hong Kong is symbolic of the western international order, it has little identity or culture to speak of beyond being a city state ruled by financial interests for financial interests. In fact, its lack of a real identity is precisely its identity, the kind of anti-identity that characterizes the spaces where neoliberalism finds its truest expression. The reintegration of Hong Kong is a demonstration that the processes that could create a space like Hong Kong – the seemingly unstoppable wave of liberal globalization and its inevitable effect of the destruction of traditional identities – can be reversed by a people united enough to commit to a rejection of the oligarch’s utopia.

All over the world, there are signals that the world is waking up to this possibility. The move toward the open society is suddenly seeming less like the inevitable progress of history, and more like a colonial project in service of the financial interests of a few, enforced by an increasingly toothless empire. Recently, Turkey announced the reversion of the gorgeous Hagia Sophia to a Mosque. Originally built as a Christian cathedral, it was turned into a Mosque after the Ottoman conquest of 1453 but became a museum in 1934 under Turkish Republic founding father Ataturk. Some western nationalists instinctively saw the decision to reconvert it to a Mosque as a huge symbolic defeat for their cause, but as a museum the Hagia Sophia had become another neutral halfway house of conflicting visions, open to international tourists to serve as a remnant of a time when things like religion and racial identity were things our ancestors spilled blood over. Its place as a museum was a symbol of Ataturk’s vision of a secular, westernizing Turkey. Its reversion to a Mosque is a rejection of this vision, another bold assertion of a primordial national and religious identity against the infestation of the identity-less, consumer friendly spaces of neoliberalism.

There are now real signs that globalization is coming to an end, and with it the means of its conquest – liberalism, feminism, secularism and materialism – will end too. Without the force of American unipolar hegemony and the expansive dominance of rootless international finance capital, tradition and identity can again assert itself. Here are five reasons why this writer is staying cautiously optimistic about the future.


The Rise of Populism 

In 1957, Karl Polanyi wrote of “The Great Transformation”. Polanyi analysed the ‘dis-embedding’ force of the free market as being in conflict with the traditional social orders from which it had sprung. Polanyi warned that this decoupling could lead to a backlash – in the form of a rise of populist politics – if it’s effects were left unchecked.

The 2016 dual victories of Donald Trump and Brexit reflected growing disenchantment among the working class in the west with the effects of globalisation and a desire to return to the “embedded liberalism” of nation states that had preceded the growth of globalism in the 1980’s. Since then, populist ideas – chief among them opposition to mass migration and free trade – have become increasingly popular. Indeed, Richard Haass, who runs the Council on Foreign Relations has made the admission that “The new bipartisanship is opposition to free trade … It will be extraordinarily hard to resurrect a consensus that could pass a trade bill.[1] Backlash to the migrant crisis in Europe, itself caused by the foreign policy adventures of the liberal elite, led to the growth in popularity of anti-immigration parties like UKIP and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party, and the election of Matteo Salvini as Deputy Prime Minister of Italy. As the spoils of globalism increasingly moves eastward, and the working class in the west face increasingly bleak prospects of debt, precarious job prospects, and the transition to a rentier economy, there is little reason to imagine the populist backlash against globalization will not continue to gather pace.


The end of American Hegemony 

Post World War 2 political order has been characterized by the dominance of unipolar American Empire. The distinct nature of American Empire compared to empires historically lay in its unique foundations as a liberal financial empire. As long as the US – the harbinger of the values of Zionism, liberalism and its offshoots of universalism, multiculturalism, and finance capitalism – has international hegemony, the ceiling on movements of national sovereignty and tradition is hopelessly limited. The values that have created a spiritual rot across the west are in a symbiotic relationship with American hegemony, each relies on the other for its propagation.

Nationalists and traditionalists should take solace in the realization that we are witnessing the disintegration of the Empire. Let us consider the signs pointing to this hastening decline. Before Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht seemed invincible. After the brutal conflict, they achieved few significant victories to speak of. If Stalingrad is taken as our symbol of a shift in the confidence of a formerly powerful entity, what is the Stalingrad Event for America? Whatever the Stalingrad of the United States will be remembered as, and indeed what is remembered may not be the true cause, it is likely that it has already happened. Perhaps it was as recent as the surrender to the Taliban in Afghanistan after almost two decades of conflict, the embarrassing realization against imperial hubris that the most powerful military ever assembled could not achieve an ultimate victory over Afghan peasants and backwards Islamic fundamentalists. Perhaps it will be remembered as Iraq, the conflict that first seemed like a sweeping victory for the US but descended into vicious sectarian conflict far worse than anything seen before US involvement, a conflict for which the main result seems to be a victory for Iran. Iran emerged as an arch-enemy of the American empire which, with the removal of the secular despot Saddam Hussein, won a key ally for its web of Shia influence across the Middle East. While it had seemed American foreign policy machinations were drawn inexorably to the eventual destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it seems doubtful the US, a country currently plagued by racial conflict and political polarization, would be able to muster the will to make war with a unified nation raised on a hatred of “The Great Satan”. Or perhaps The Empire’s last stand was Syria, where all the forces against the American project seemed to coalesce and deal a crushing blow to American imperialist ambitions in the Middle East. Not long ago, it seemed inevitable that whatever the future of Syria would be, it would exclude the Assad family. Now, the US has silently accepted defeat in this area as the new power brokers of Russia, Turkey and Iran negotiate the fate of this patch of the world without the direction of the US. 

While these three defeats have thrown into question the ability of the US to impose its will on the Middle East, what of the Truman Doctrine of containment against Socialism arising south of the American Border? Just as worrying is that the Empire can no longer even exercise its will over a state like Venezuela and other Latin American countries, which have chosen their own brands of socialism over the demands made by American capital. The lesson of modern conflicts, whether Iraq or Afghanistan or Syria or Latin America, is that an occupying empire cannot maintain control over a subject population dedicated to its independence.

Though the US still (for now) far out does every other country by the size of its military, it is easy to overestimate how much that reflects the capability of the US to do what the military is there for in the first place. Across the world, the forces of anti-Americanism have become increasingly emboldened by the realization that it is possible to give The Great Satan a bloody nose – and live to tell the tale.


The Bear and the Dragon

When it comes to the end of globalization, China is important for two reasons: the challenge it poses to American hegemony internationally, and the example its internal course of development sets. In a generation, China has risen from a poorly developed, agrarian nation to an economic behemoth that is now placed to pose a serious threat to the neoliberal order.

China has demonstrated that economic development and innovation can be achieved without democracy and liberalism. The one party state transitioned China from communism to a form of national capitalism in the late 1970’s, and has since charted a unique course of development, a course that flies in the face of the assertions of neoliberalism’s true believers.  Despite the best hopes of liberal universalists, there is no sign that the Chinese people in great numbers have any desire to adopt liberalism. We have been assured that democracy and individual freedom is necessary for economic innovation, yet Chinese state-backed companies like Huawei and Alibaba not only lead the way in innovation, [2] but are also proving capable of outperforming their competitors on the world stage.

China’s mercantilist economic system and protectionist development policies now pose a serious challenge to the WTO based world trading system, yet there is little they can do to stop it. The CCP governs in China’s interest, and adopting free trade policies simply isn’t in China’s interest. President Trump has also sidestepped WTO rules to wage a unilateral trade war with China, as well as imposing tariffs on allies like Japan.

The World Trade Organisation was founded in 1995 with the intent of opening global markets, expanding free trade and regulating commerce. International organisations like the WTO and IMF have become synonymous with globalization, yet their legitimacy and relevance is increasingly under question. As evidenced by the admission of European Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan that “The W.T.O. is facing its deepest crisis since its creation.” [3]

China also has the potential to offer an alternative to American led development for smaller countries, which has often come with unwanted political interference and cultural dominance. China, by contrast, seems to have little interest in the internal affairs of its trade partners. The Belt and Road initiative, which promises major infrastructural development for participating countries, is a prime example of Chinese led international development leaving US policy makers in the cold, and is the kind of bilateral regional development which could come to characterize this century.

Russia’s place as a hegemon is less secure. Their economy remains smaller than Italy’s, and they have struggled to diversify away from their reliance on natural resources as the basis for their economic growth. Culturally and militarily, however, Russia has charted an independent course of action, and their realist approach to dealing with western encroachment in Eastern Europe and the Middle East has yielded highly significant victories. Russia responded with the maximum of force and decisiveness in seizing Crimea following a US backed coup in Ukraine in 2014. Its entry on the side of Bashar al-Assad in Syria decisively turned the course of the Syrian civil war dealt a blow to the Zionist-American ambition to oust the strongman and carve up Syria to their liking. Russia’s transformation from a failed state of demoralized people subjected to the worst effects of liberal governance and privatization in the early 1990’s to the independent, religious and nationalist state it is today looks like a potential best case scenario for other western countries looking to what comes after globalization.


The Internet 

Not long ago liberal journalists and foreign policy hawks could hardly contain their excitement at the prospect of the growth of social media, the hopeful expectation that its spread would lead to a democratization of every corner of the world. The “Arab Spring” was celebrated as the first of its kind, an organic rejection of authoritarianism, in favor of democracy and liberalism, coordinated through social media platforms like Twitter. With the increasing accessibility of smartphones, people across the world could see the wonders of western values and co-ordinate to bring their own nations out of the barbaric remnants of the old world order. In their arrogance, few of the elites predicted that the same technology could lead to an emboldening of exactly the opposite tendency, a complete rejection of Americanism and its promises of material wealth, women’s rights, democracy. If anything, the pendulum swayed in favor of barbarism. The sight of an organisation like ISIS disseminating Hollywood style propaganda videos across the internet demonstrated the capacity for the internet to be used towards anti-liberal ends. Fewer still, imagined that the expansion of the internet might eventually be used to lead a revolt against the elites in the west. But this is exactly what happened in the run up to the 2016 election cycle, with the growth of the Alt-Right and similar populist movements on the internet. Allowed anonymity, people were free to break the taboos of the politically correct west and express their real sentiment on multiculturalism, equality and the makeup of the elites that despised them. The explosion of white nationalism on the internet has shown that the liberal consensus is not as robust as our increasingly out-of-touch elite had imagined.

While the Trump victory led to a backlash of censorship, culminating recently in the removal of thousands of pro-Trump and white nationalist subreddit forums and YouTube channels (including the rather milquetoast libertarian Stefan Molyneux), it seems the cat is already out of the bag. The growth of censorship free alternative platforms like Bitchute and Telegram, and the potential for a truly decentralized internet, means that despite the best efforts of the ADL, they will never be able to fully silence voices of dissent.

What’s more, traditionally trusted sources of media are hemorrhaging profits (and staff) [4] as they lose their prestige and become just another voice in the public square, increasingly drowned out by more trustworthy sources.

Nationalists can continue to be optimistic about the internet, with the firm resolve that we have the truth on our side and, as has been proven again and again, in a truly open space of ideas we usually win.


Crypto 

It is difficult to forecast the future of crypto-currency with any certainty, but it certainly at least has the potential to do to centralized banking what the internet has done to traditional media sources. The guardians of this system are increasingly fearful of the potential of crypto privacy coins like Monero to disrupt their power. [5]

Alongside internet censorship, financial deplatforming dealt a crushing blow to the last iteration of resurgent nationalism. It is difficult to organize any movement against the system when you are reduced to cash donations and postal orders as a means of fundraising, while the bravery and enthusiasm of would-be dissidents inevitably wanes when they realize speaking out will likely cost them financially. Crypto has the potential to change all that. Those supportive of the cause will be able to support full time activism and content creation by dissidents in complete anonymity, and the oligarchy will lose its main means of control over people’s lives. Not only that, but the pariahs of the international order now have a means to bypass the crushing sanctions that face those who challenge neoliberal hegemony. China is currently trialing [6] the first state backed crypto currency, the digital yuan, which has the potential not only to relieve countries like Iran from the financial tyranny of the US, but also potentially unseat the US dollar as the global reserve currency.

These developments are of special interest to dissidents in the west. In the future, not only will their countrymen be able to easily and anonymously support their struggle against tyranny, but more powerful enemies of Western hegemony will have a means to easily support anti-war nationalist movements in the west. With the rise of China there is the potential for a “Thucydides trap”, the idea that the rise of a new great power makes inevitable an eventual conflict with the existing power. If the seemingly inevitable cold war between the US and China (or Russia) heats up, they will have the potential to seriously disrupt the plans of the oligarchs by supporting isolationist national populists in western countries with the click of a mouse. This is a prospect that should give nationalists as much cause for optimism as it terrifies the stewards of the system.


Conclusion

In the short-term, it is easy to see why any optimism toward the future is dim. We went from a marginal voice on the sidelines to an energized movement with our message reaching unprecedented new audiences across mainstream platforms like YouTube during 2015-17. With our acts of truth-telling evading the ability of the elites to control its dissemination, they moved to increasingly marginalize us by swift acts of deplatforming, lockouts of payment processors to financially starve us, and draconian repression in the legal arena. This grave situation we now find ourselves in has, understandably, demoralized even our most sincere and committed of activists. Given the trends we see developing among the areas we outlined above, there is a potential ground for seeding an effective political resistance. The latent decentralization of technology becoming increasingly realized, the global pushback against American unipolar hegemony, and the desire for financial freedom from the plutocrats fueling the commitment to crypto against the dollar provides us with the tools and new political conditions for charting our own course. The prospect of a new world of decentralization and anonymity has understandably excited the imaginations of libertarian and anarchist political factions. It may then seem counter-intuitive for nationalists, who have so tied their fate to that of the nation state, to be optimistic about the move to techno-anarchy. But the potential becomes clear when we realize that our political project is to restore an organic social order, and in the vacuum left by decentralization, it is ripe for localism, traditionalism and identity to flourish.

But we cannot take optimism for victory with these new developments as a given but rather as an opportunity to reorient the way in which we engage in resistance and assertion of our own interests. The idea of trying to appeal to and reorient American hegemony is not only a backward strategy that leaves us playing in an arena set by our enemies but also a poor strategy on the grounds that the world is becoming increasingly less favorable to the stability of American-Zionist Empire. We must exercise creativity by forward-thinking and flexible use of the advantages that arise within rapidly changing political conditions across all networks of social, cultural and institutional transformation both domestically and globally. To this end, we have reasons to be optimistic but with optimism for our future, comes the responsibility and steadfastness to act on and awaken the dormant potentials for our advantage. To arise and meet this challenge is a moralizing endeavor in itself. 


References

[1] “https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/20/republicans-and-democrats-oppose-free-trade-in-2020-white-house-race.html” September 20, 2019

[2]”https://datacentrenews.eu/story/huawei-ranks-6-among-world-s-most-innovative-companies-for-2020″ July 3rd, 2020

[3]”https://financialpost.com/news/economy/with-world-trade-on-brink-of-vigilante-justice-canada-gains-new-clout” December 17, 2019

[4]”https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jul/15/guardian-announces-plans-to-cut-180-jobs” July 15, 2020

[5]”https://decrypt.co/34740/blueleaks-how-the-fbi-tracks-bitcoin-laundering-on-the-dark-web” July 7, 2020

[6]”https://national-justice.com/coming-challenge-almighty-dollar” May 16, 2020

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Authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism

Editor’s Note: This is an excerpt from the author’s forthcoming book “American Extremist: The Psychology of Political Extremism”. Central to both the modern American identity, to the problems the United States…

Editor’s Note: This is an excerpt from the author’s forthcoming book “American Extremist: The Psychology of Political Extremism”.


Central to both the modern American identity, to the problems the United States faces, and highly relevant to our previous discussion of false collective fictions (https://radixjournal.com/2020/05/myth-mental-illness-and-political-extremism/), is the notion of democracy.  Democracy, which in practice operates a whole lot less like a mechanism for political efficiency and a lot more like a blunt object to be wielded against ones foes, is to a degree, predicated on stymieing the execution of political will by a central authority.  Deeper than a mere political problem, the philosophy of democratization in all spheres continues to challenge Americans on a psychological level.  This rejection of authority can be found at every level of contemporary American life to such a degree, that one wonders whether anti-authoritarianism is itself a key psychological feature of the American population.  I probably would not have given this idea very much consideration were it not for a broadcast on the NPI/RADIX YouTube channel that aired on April 8th of 2020.  In that conversation, Richard Spencer discussed the cynical (if not outright hysterical) response of many Americans toward the federal government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.  Forced business closures and a federally imposed lockdown drew considerable outrage, as many Americans looked upon Trump’s response as a massive abuse of government power.  While I was not unfamiliar with anti-authoritarianism conceptually, upon looking into the literature available on the matter, I was quite surprised at the volume of writings on the subject.  Further investigation drove me to pursue this line of questioning even deeper.  While his insight did give me pause, I believe I have arrived at a different conclusion than the one proposed on his program, as it seems evident to me that reducing the psychology of the governed to either simple authoritarianism (as was done by researchers such as Theodor Adorno in the mid-twentieth century) or simple anti-authoritarianism betrays the fact that Americans struggle to find an actionable equilibrium between the two positions.

Before we analyze the psychological divide between authoritarian and anti-authoritarianism in American consciousness, it would be prudent to consult the expert opinion on the matter.  Noted authors on the subject of anti-authoritarianism including Bruce Levine, Noam Chomsky, and William Kreml, generally agree on a definition of anti-authoritarianism which rejects both anarchic anti-authoritarianism as well as the kind of authoritarian submissiveness described by the likes of Theodore Adorno, Robert Altemeyer, and Erich Fromm.  In the view of the latter (and those who accept their hypothesis), authoritarianism – meaning, the individual who is prone to fascistic sentiment, and thus will submit to authority – is defined by characteristics such as:

  1. Submission to legitimate authority, 
  2. Aggression toward minority groups, 
  3. Adherence to cultural values endorsed by authorities, 
  4. Blind allegiance to convention,
  5. A tendency toward misanthropy, 
  6. A preoccupation with violence and sex, 
  7. Feelings of inferiority,
  8. Hostility toward creativity and artistic innovation.

While the psychological measurements devised to produce such findings (in particular the F-scale and the RWA scale) have been subject to much scrutiny, the conclusions drawn from these investigations have reached a degree of cultural saturation that no longer relies on the support of the academic community.  Contempt for politically authoritarian sentiment is now commonplace – not only among those well-situated members of the American economy, but all the way down the socioeconomic ladder as well.  To Richard’s point, it would seem the battle against authoritarianism has been won.  In the intervening decades, having exhausted opportunities for experimentally measuring right-wing authoritarianism (and still reluctant to examine left-wing authoritarianism) many researchers pivoted from understanding the psychology of the authoritarian to arriving at an accurate conceptual (and ethical) model of anti-authoritarianism.

For Levine and Chomsky in particular, anti-authoritarianism is not about a predisposition against authority, but rather, an antagonism toward illegitimate authority.  To this point, I will quote both.  Chomsky has said that, 

“When you stop your five-year-old kid from trying to cross the street, that’s an authoritarian situation: it’s got to be justified. Well, in that case, I think you can give a justification.”

Levine echoes this sentiment, 

“Anti-authoritarians question whether an authority is a legitimate one before taking that authority seriously. Evaluating the legitimacy of authorities includes assessing whether or not authorities actually know what they are talking about, are honest, and care about those people who are respecting their authority. And when anti-authoritarians assess an authority to be illegitimate, they challenge and resist that authority—sometimes aggressively and sometimes passive-aggressively, sometimes wisely and sometimes not.”

Levine and Chomsky both make rational arguments in support of a high-functioning and psychologically adaptive anti-authoritarianism.  Of importance is the fact that their stance directly opposes the chaotic anarchism which rejects all top-down and hierarchically organized models of authority (a position more commonly taken by communists, anti-fascists, and the anti-colonialism movement more broadly).

Less directly related (though perhaps still worth noting), are the findings of Cantoni, Yang, Yuchtman, and Zhang, who in a 2016 study set out to define the characteristics of the anti-authoritarian.  In a survey of over 1,500 university students in Hong Kong, the team found that anti-authoritarians are

“More risk-seeking, more altruistic, more reciprocal, and have a stronger preference for redistribution in a series of real-stakes dictator games.”

Furthermore, when examining the personality traits through an application of the five factor model, their investigation revealed that anti-authoritarians score higher on trait openness but lower on trait conscientiousness.  The same group scored higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test (based on the work of Shane Frederick and Daniel Kahneman, the CRT is a measurement of one’s ability to access “system 2” cognition), but also reported lower average GPA’s.  This was attributed to a pre-occupation with political movements engaged in anti-authoritarian action.  Cantoni et al also noted that,

Consistent with traditional, class-based models (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), students from poorer households and with lower anticipated future earnings are significantly more likely to be anti-authoritarian. Examining the demographic characteristics of students, one sees that older students are somewhat more anti-authoritarian than younger students, and that men are more anti-authoritarian than women. Interestingly, having a longer family history in Hong Kong is not strongly associated with anti-authoritarianism.”

It goes without saying that the historical, political, and biological differences that distinguish the United States from Hong Kong make any direction comparison or correlation in anti-authoritarian characteristics difficult, if not impossible, to do.  Nonetheless, it would behoove us to consider how these observations might lead to some insight as we continue our analysis in this work.  The common understanding of authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism tends to place the former in the category of the political right, while the latter is typically conceived of as a left-wing phenomenon.  In the American context, this may seem at least partly accurate, as psychometric testing has indicated that openness to experience predicts left-wing attitudes while conscientiousness predicts right-wing attitudes (Webster, 2018).  These findings have been corroborated in Europe as well, in particular Spain, Greece, Poland, Italy, and Germany (Vecchione, Schoen, Castro, Cieciuch, Pavlopolous, & Caprara, 2011).  Economically favorable attitudes toward reciprocity and redistribution have long been features of American left-wing politics, and so perhaps the findings of Cantoni et al do provide us with some corroborative evidence to confirm certain widely accepted notions of authoritarian (rightist) and anti-authoritarian (leftist) attitudes.  

Having presented these arguments, I feel it necessary to let the air out of the theoretical balloon I have just provided.  If we take the arguments I laid out in the preceding section as true (that the left-right divide is an inaccurate and misleading political construct), then perhaps the authoritarian-antiauthoritarian divide, too, is fallacious and harmful to our understanding of contemporary politics.  For example: Under Obama, the American Right decried him as an authoritarian fascist (among other things, e.g., crypto-Islamist, Communist, et cetera).  As we have seen throughout the Trump administration, the American Left has levied similar condemnations.  What does this tell us?  Are Americans hopelessly confused?  Is every political actor a fascist or a fascist-in-democratic clothing?  I believe that we can confidently say ‘Yes’ to the former, but ‘no’ to the latter.

What we have is the reality of democracy in action – one side of the political machine running roughshod over the other, at least until the temporarily dispossessed one gets their turn to abuse the governed.  More significantly, the democratic process obscures the true nature of authority, facilitating the interminable confusion in the minds of Americans as to what constitutes authority, and when precisely (if ever) it becomes ‘fascistic’.  Auctoriphobia, or the fear of authority, clearly emerges out of this confusion.  Not only does it emerge out of this confusion, but it also emerges as a result of the tragic and violent history of the preceding century; wars that claimed the lives of tens of millions, technological developments that stoked fears of ecological collapse, and the erosion of national infrastructure, to offer a view examples, have provided sufficient justification for anti-authoritarian sentiment.  We are now confronted with two important questions as relates to authoritarian and anti-authoritarian positions: What constitutes legitimate authority? (a question of perception), and how ought one conduct themselves in relation to authority? (a question of agency and ethics).  To orient ourselves in a healthful and psychologically adaptive way – that is to say, with clear-headedness and a maximum of free will – we must be able to understand this problem in a new way.

As I stated at the outset, the fundamental tension in the American political mind is of that between the authoritarian impulse and the anti-authoritarian impulse.  So should it be, as the question of authority is the most important question in virtually any human endeavor.  Authority, which for all intent and purpose might as well be another way of saying agency, is a matter of ‘right’ thought and ‘right’ action implemented in the ‘right’ circumstance.  It stands to reason, then, that authority is often about having the ‘right’ person in charge.  Without oversimplifying this problem inappropriately, we might say that he who possesses the will to act makes himself the authority.  Of course, authority can be secured through other means; hereditarily, meritocratically, anti-socially, to name a few.  Already, we begin to see the perceptual problem of authority, as not all people view each method as a legitimate path to the throne.  And even when a political actor rises to a position of authority through a conventional and generally accepted means, subjective perception may still deign to invalidate him.

In the home, in the classroom, at the market, and at the ballot box, Americans have proven to struggle mightily with the question of authority.  Parents fail to exercise their rightful authority over their children; teachers do not discipline their students; hedge fund managers, investment firms, and executive boards routinely engage in unethical and illegal conduct but frequently go unpunished (often, in fact, they are rewarded); and to the degree that Americans engage in the political process (which is far less than they ‘ought’ to), we find that they support the same policies and the same actors time and time again.  This is not to put the blame squarely on individual shoulders, as in each instance we find top-down initiatives which undermine the responsible demonstration of power.  Nonetheless, the point remains.  We can therefore say, and with a great deal of recent historical proof attesting to this fact, that Americans are deep in the throes of a crisis of legitimacy.  With neither the information necessary to make a proper evaluation of authority, nor even the capacity to adjudicate existent (or potential) information, we have been cast adrift in a sea of hopelessness and despair.  What we do have, however, is fear, anxiety, and resentment – and lots of it.  Supposedly unified by our shared American values, our freedoms, and our love of democracy (though not in actuality), the line between friend and enemy grows murkier with each passing year.  Though it should be said, there are things which unite us, just not in any productive or eusocial way.  We are united by the increased feeling of unease and uncertainty we experience; not just toward our present sociopolitical circumstance, but toward our very lives.  Here we see the problem of relation to authority, as our seemingly foundational antagonism toward the will to act renders us impotent in virtually every arena of American society.  Everywhere Americans look, they see failures of authority (often enabled by the very same authorities), thus producing a conceptual collapse whereby failures of authority anywhere become failures of authority everywhere. 

It has been said of scientific experimentation, though I know not by who, that “Everyone is a conservative in the area they are most knowledgeable.”  This was meant to express the deep hesitation specialists in a given field of study have toward making grand extrapolations.  Their expansive knowledge affords that rare gift of foresight; one can only stretch a set of data so far before it reaches its natural limit.  Co-opting this statement and applying it to the realm of the political, I would add the following “…and an authoritarian in the area they are the least knowledgeable and most fearful.”  Take the issue of gun control, for example.  Well-practiced and disciplined acolytes of the pistol or the rifle generally seek to retain control of their ability to act on this privilege and to preserve the culture of liberty around firearms, while those with less experience often seek swift and decisive action to limit it.  It follows that ambiguity and uncertainty may be the centrally driving forces behind the desire for authoritarianism.  But authoritarianism is not simply an expression of powerlessness or fearfulness; it is a recognition of the need for a central force which can act judiciously, particularly (though not exclusively) in those circumstances where there is insufficient information, and thus requires cool and measured action.  Perhaps we could say that the ambiguities (which inevitably crop up around important social issues like barnacles on the side of an ocean tanker) demand a capable authority, one who will not engage in endless and doubt-filled discussion, thus problematizing necessary action and prolonging suffering.  The correct attitude towards authority is one that recognizes it as both an inevitable and necessary feature of social organization.  Authority and authoritarianism are too often used as synonyms for oppression and violence, and are therefore used to indicate the badness of a person, party, or ideology.  Rarely do we think of it as the solution to our problems.  Once more, we suffer a problem of perception.  

Let us think a little bit more about this dichotomy between conservatism and authoritarianism.  Conservatism to a great degree is an instinct toward retention, often an impotent and stationary impulse, and as Freud noted in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, possibly even an instinct toward self-annihilation, or a reaching back to a state of non-existence.  Certainly its inability to confront the problems of change and expansion indicate a death of one kind or another (something that modern conservatives are increasingly aware of).  Authoritarianism thus is progressive; it is a willful and vital stance which seeks assertion, dominance, security – yes – but more importantly a securing of desire, of some thing, be it an object or a goal.  It is not merely a means for securing one’s own welfare or the welfare of the group, rather authority is the psychosocial means by which we may express our will.  The juxtaposition of these two instincts (1) the instinct to conserve, or preserve in stasis and (2) the instinct to progress and secure desire remain a psychological and political problem that has not yet found resolution within the American mind.  Necessarily this tension produces cognitive dissonance whereby the pursuit of something as novel as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” is met with an equal force of “No, not too much of any of these, please.”  A society such as ours, built on ideas like breaking from tradition, limitless expansion, and geographic conquest is itself an expression of the paradox of authority and non-authority.  Even a cursory reading of the disagreements between America’s neophyte aristocratic order reveals this fact.  A commonly understood insight of psychology is that the stand-off between two opposing impulses creates a mental fissure by which action is rendered impossible and will is denied.  Such is the circumstance with which we are presently confronted.


For now, let’s turn away from the abstract and look at the problem of anti-authoritarianism and how it is expressed differently by our two subjects, the conservative and the progressive.  A fundamental and mutual misunderstanding made by conservative and republican types as well as progressive and democrat type (who both draw their historical and philosophical worldviews from the same liberal foundation) is that – from both perspectives – the other appears as a totalitarian despot, who, being unreasonable, dishonest, and stupid, seeks the domination and eradication of the other.  Both fail to recognize, particularly as their anxieties are intensified by interested parties in the politico-media complex, that they are both the sons of the same father.  Both see undue privileges bestowed upon the other, and each seeing themselves as solely and uniquely suffering the oppressive tyranny of their oedipal persecution.  It is a sibling rivalry par excellence. 

The conservative liberal is the yin to the progressive liberal yang, not being fundamentally distinct from one another in any meaningful sense, merely separated at birth.  For the progressive, the exercise of authority (for example, in the classroom or in the bedroom), stifles and necessarily suspends the realization of identity and the pursuit of happiness.  And for the conservative, an interventionist authority (perhaps at the gun show or in the marketplace), suspends autonomy, and self-reliance, themselves necessary for the pursuit of happiness.  Both seek permissiveness in those areas where their identities find realization and their values find expression.  Government, or the father, is never seen as a wise king, instead, he is always and forever the mad tyrant.  Where the conservative and the progressive lock hands, however, is in the righteous use of authority against external opponents – the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians.  Authority expressed within the domestic boundaries is an insufferable oppression, but when directed outwardly, it is felt as a gleeful nigh-orgasmic expression of a will to life.  “Yes he may be a tyrant, but he’s our tyrant.”

Building on the ideas set forth earlier in this chapter with regard to the mythic formation of the mind, the conservative has a peculiar antagonism toward authoritarianism predicated on his own mythologized self-concept.  The conservative, ever the rugged individualist, is therefore fiercely opposed to collectivism.  Being that the conservative is fundamentally liberal in his self-concept and his relation to the world, authoritarianism represents the final result of collectivism, to which he as a liberal is fundamentally opposed.  His opposition is rooted in the fear of self-destruction, of becoming absorbed into the horde, the mass, if collectivist authoritarianism were to emerge.  The right-liberal (or conservative), who most clearly has inherited the frontier myth of the American man, is unwilling to sublimate his internal drives to an order which would threaten his petty frontier psychology.  ‘Petty frontier psychology’ in this case would be understood as having the meaning of a smaller, more individualist and self-serving ambition.  Originally, the frontier was a place of limitless expansion – a physical terrain fraught with uncertainty and great danger.  It was a real place where the true test of man’s conquering spirit could be found.  But that place no longer exists.  Still, the myth lives on.  The ideology of the conservative frontiersman, not cleanly extinguished, has been abstracted from the physical terrain and transposed into the space of concepts and intangibilities (the free market, the stock trade, et cetera).  The market is the new conservative frontier where much can be gained and much can be lost, but at a comparatively less costly expense.  No longer will the conservative lose his wife, his children, or even his own life, but rather he may lose his accumulated wealth and – should the danger prove sufficiently great – other material (his home, private property) and social (status, respectability, prestige) goods.  Though the right-liberal may tell us that collectivism and authoritarianism are morally wrong not because of an a priori philosophical justification, if we scratch the surface we find that the true cause may be found in the threat posed to his tenuous self-concept and his grandiose social ambition.  And, of course, because we cannot truly assume that the American Girondin is in fact a monolith who may be reduced to a singular motivation, we may assume other factors exist which could explain his anti-authoritarianism.  Perhaps, he shares the historical anxieties associated with authoritarianism which are more clearly typified by his Jacobin brother (as we shall see in the following paragraph).  

The progressive on the other hand – sensitive primarily to concerns regarding social welfare and guided by his self-imposed moral responsibility to those with fewer protections – regards authoritarianism as a danger for its supposed historical implications (persecution and genocide).  Authoritarianism being something that only an evil person participates in, the progressive looks to history and sees those great villains, Italy and Germany specifically, as proof of this belief.  For the progressive, authoritarianism is not a true ideology or political system, but rather a collective hysteria predicated on the irrational scapegoating of a benevolent minority.  His moral axiom (protect the little guy) thus indicates to him that authoritarianism is wrong because it is rooted in the unjust persecution of endangered minorities.  In the case of Germany, those minorities were homosexuals, gypsies, Jews, the mentally and physically infirm, while in modern America, what constitutes an endangered minority is far more expansive (women, Muslims, immigrants, Blacks, Hispanics,  et cetera).  The historical factors at play (and the veracity of said historical claims) are of little consequence, what matters, is that someone is being persecuted.  By the progressives own logic, for centralization to occur and a politic of authoritarianism to settle in, there must be a scapegoated minority, and they must be extinguished for the good of the collective.  Authoritarianism is the means by which the mad tyrant, empowered by his brainwashed thralls, exercises his deranged will.  

So while the conservative fears erasure of the self, the progressive fears erasure of the other, who owing to his otherness is ontologically ‘first’ or ‘higher’. We might observe this in a Christian way, that because the last shall be first, the authoritarian must always be denied.  The relation to the other is interesting as it clearly differs in conception between the conservative and the progressive.  A number of studies conducted in the last twenty years attests to this difference.  In 2008, Oxley et al observed differences in threat sensitivity, noting that,

In a group of 46 adult participants with strong political beliefs, individuals with measurably lower physical sensitivities to sudden noises and threatening visual images were more likely to support foreign aid, liberal immigration policies, pacifism, and gun control, whereas individuals displaying measurably higher physiological reactions to those same stimuli were more likely to favor defense spending, capital punishment, patriotism, and the Iraq War.”

It should be noted that the researchers did not label the collected policy positions as Conservative or Liberal due to their relatively limited testing of political ideology (for example, they did not assess for positions on economic issues).  Sinn and Hayes (2016) compared Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory against the Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory and found that the “individualizing” (harm and fairness) moral foundation of liberals was better understood as a “universalizing motive” that consisted of a “broader set of moral commitments” and a “broader sociality than ethnocentrism”, while the “binding” (authority, respect, purity) moral foundation of conservatives was better characterized as an “authoritarian motive” typified by threat-sensitivity and outgroup antagonism.  Inbar et al (2011) found a positive relationship between disgust sensitivity and political conservatism, which held when controlling for demographic variables as well as the “Big Five” personality traits.  And finally, in 2017, Mendez reviewed personality, evolutionary and genetic, cognitive, neuroimaging, and neurological studies, arriving at the conclusion that

“Evidence [exists] for a normal right-sided “conservative-complex” involving structures sensitive to negativity bias, threat, disgust, and avoidance.”

To the best of my understanding (and there exists a not-so-inconsequential amount of literature to the contrary), the conservative has a stronger sense of self-preservation, aversion to contamination by pathogen, and is therefore more troubled by issues potentially caused by the ‘other’ (such as immigration, diversity and inclusivity mandates, marriage equality, et cetera).  Therefore, ontologically speaking, the ‘other’ is second because the conservative must be first.  With full view of both conservative and progressive lines of reasoning, we arrive at a differing-yet-convergent psychological justification for anti-authoritarian sentiment.  

But is it true that Americans are genuine anti-authoritarians?  We must understand that the most important aspect of this entire phenomenon is how a liberal worldview requires compartmentalization and rationalization among its adherents; full-blown, decadent and permissive 21st century liberalism doesn’t ask the individual to sublimate himself, much less repress any aspect of himself.  All ideas are given equal weight, all values are sanctioned, all actions are laudable, all pursuits are capable of commoditization, and all modes of being are good.  Of course these cannot all be true simultaneously, nor can such a worldview be sustained indefinitely.  And thus, compartmentalization and rationalization become necessary as the limits of the natural world collide with liberal ideology.  The sociopolitical realities of war, sex, race, religion, family, history, morality, class, and their intermediated negotiations increasingly puncture the thin veil of liberal thought, especially as America – for all its technological and material splendor – diminishes in global significance.  Without the prestige and comfortable living standard afforded as a result of being the uncontested leader of the free world, the house of cards noticeably begins to lose its stability.  As these tensions emerge, neurotic and obviously contradictory justifications fill the gaps like cheap glue.  

In truth, the ‘authoritarian’ is the shadow in the soul of the American liberal (conservative and progressive, alike).  And while it may be the force that performs acts of evil, this does not preclude either type from identifying with or enacting residual or latent authoritarianism when a situation of sufficient self-servingness emerges.  As has been pointed out earlier, there are times when life demands acts of authoritative will from us.  It is an unavoidable result of living as material beings that must suffer, and toil, and strive in this world.  The solution to this severing of the conscious from the unconscious finds itself in the execution of some ego defense which resolves the dilemma.  Whether it be through denial, compartmentalization, rationalization – some technique will be applied which will soothe the pain of self-betrayal.  

There is also, of course, the fact that political and philosophical identities are no different from the mask worn by attendees of a masquerade; they are a form of role play which facilitates the navigation of social realities.  So in those circumstances where we are not talking about the true believers who have a deep psychological need to explain their inconsistencies to themselves, we see that in both the conservative and progressive type a kind of childishness – the childishness of one who has been caught in a lie or some other impropriety who, upon being discovered, merely declares “You got me!” and laughs at the silliness of having been taken seriously in the first place.  Not everyone treats the idea as an object of the real, far from it, they are regarded by many (if not, most) as a fanciful and irreverent device which is more a problem of life than a means through which will and action can find their realization.  This psychological fact complicates the ideals of democracy and egalitarianism, and in fact, fatally undermines the liberal worldview.  Taking this into account we can characterize psychological and political liberalism itself as a Kleinian phantasy, a device of the mind through which the individual can interact with the world, but always at a distance, and always with the aid of a litany of ego defenses.  

And so, once more I ask, is the average American anti-authoritarian?  The answer is that every man serves a master, even if that master resides within his own mind.  It is on irrational grounds that we choose our authorities, no matter how coherent or logical the contrivances we make may be.  America’s ongoing crisis of legitimacy has perhaps created a fair-weather anti-authoritarian sentiment, but it is with the wind to be certain.  Different American institutions have burned all their credibility in the minds of different sects of America; those institutions that manage to retain their credibility only do so, again, in compartmentalized ways.  Left-liberals revere the institution of science, but not in its entirety.  Particularly for more extreme liberals and progressives, whole disciplines (e.g., behavioral genetics) are written off entirely.  Right-liberals revere the institution of the church, but not in its entirety.  The Christ that exists in the minds of many Christians today could not be any farther from the man found in the New Testament.  There is nothing Christian about the prosperity doctrine, and yet, many right-liberals conveniently reject the anti-materialism of Christianity in favor of the abundance afforded by capitalism.  When Obama was in office, many right-liberals suddenly became cynical, data-crunching statisticians who took the government’s reports on unemployment and job growth with the tiniest grains of salt.  This was not so when Trump took office.  Many left-liberals were riotous zealots in their opposition to George W. Bush’s warmongering.  Not so, when Obama took office.  Even NPR in 2011 and The Washington Post in 2013 took notice of this fact, asking “Where did the anti-war Left go?”  Americans are not anti-authoritarian, they merely want their authorities.  Only now the country is too big, too bloated, and too divided to provide a universally legitimate authority figure.  As we have seen with the recent coronavirus pandemic, Americans may not be as comfortable with authoritarianism as say, China is, but it would be a far cry to argue that a true anti-authoritarian sentiment rests deep inside the American soul.

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The Mythoid of the Neutrality of Science

Editors Note:  By Israel Lira, Peruvian Political Theorist. Translated by Zero Schizo. In order to have myth, what is needed is that the culture in which it appears would be…

Editors Note:  By Israel Lira, Peruvian Political Theorist. Translated by Zero Schizo.


In order to have myth, what is needed is that the culture in which it appears would be a mythological one. This culture supposes a complex group of mythical categories, among them those of time, space and causality. Mythoid lacks the transcendental character of myth, it isn’t, above all, overlapped with the totality of the culture in which it works. It is, in certain sense, isolated and could even oppose essential aspects of a given culture, but possess the fundamental characters of myth. (Miro Quesada Cantuarias, 1986:84-86). As exposed, myth, understood as a fact or event which does not have empirical correlate, is differentiated from mythoid, by the socio-cultural framework in which it is produced, by which in contemporaneity we would talk more of the generation of mythoids than myths, given that our current culture is found inside of a logocratic (reason) framework eminently and not a mythocratic one.

Following the aforementioned, one of the mythoids of our contemporaneity is configured in the belief in the fact that science enjoys of an absolute neutrality in which scientific research (creation of explicative theories) and technological application (execution of theories already given to concrete cases) are not just one. Disconnected, but instead they are at the same time, estranged from external powers which could exert influence in them.

This mythoid has a clear origin in Popperian vision inside of the philosophy of science, in which precisely the separation between scientific research and technological application is made. For Popper (1970), scientific research has, as such, an intrinsic value which is guided by determined norms of methodological character that could have a moral content, insofar as the objective of the investigation is the discovery, and thus the results of such research also have that inherent value, but are neutral regarding the moral. That one could make good or bad use from the results of a scientific research a-posteriori is an entirely different thing. So, the scientist has two obligations, to follow the moral requirements of the very same scientific praxis (the scientist as scientist), and to limit himself to foresee the possible uses of his results and denounce its bad praxis (the scientist as citizen).

This Popperian approach, which is the traditional one, opposes the historic-sociological approach of epistemologists like Bernal (1939) and Richta (1971), where it is remarked that by the nature of the scientific research, the scientist –in effect– has a double responsibility, to follow the norms of the scientific method, but above all to involve himself in an active way in the changing of society in order for science to fulfill its role of serving mankind, insofar as one is conscious that scientific knowledge could be used both in order to liberate and in order oppress mankind. These are symptomatic facts which are derived from the lacking of the very same social system to which science serves. Meaning, scientific research and technological application are not separated concepts, but instead they keep an intrinsic relationship.

This last point is reaffirmed by the fact that in the praxis of scientific research, the search for some theories or others and the choice between them is not an entirely free enterprise, remembering Quintanilla (1978), regulated exclusively by the canons of objectivity and in service of truth, as the unmistakable reality is that the scientist is a wage worker whose priorities of research are given as such to an order of priority which is established by particular interests which are the ones who direct, what things can be researched and what things are left relegated, “to the extent, for example, that research devoted to a determined topic are financed and not others, etc” (1978:54). As was exposed, “it is clear that we must renounce the comfortable consolation or illusion that science, in itself, has guaranteed autonomy and value despite the wrong applications that would be made of it circumstantially or despite its historical insertion in an unjust society” (1978:56).


References

MIRO QUESADA CANTUARIAS, Francisco. (1986). «Ciencia y técnica [en América Latina]: ideas o mitoides», in: Leopoldo Zea (Ed.), América Latina en sus ideas. Mexico: UNESCO/Siglo XXI; pp. 72-94.

POPPER, K.R. (1970). «The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist» in P. Weingarther and G. Zecha (eds.), Inducfton. Physis and Ethics. Dordrecht, p. 22-326.

BERNAL, J.D. (1939). «The Social Function of Science». London.

RICHTA, R. (1971). «La civilización en la encrucijada». Madrid.

QUINTANILLA A. Miguel. (1978). «El Mito de la Neutralidad de la Ciencia: la responsabilidad del científico y del técnico». EL BASILISCO, Revista de Materialismo Filosófico. En: http://fgbueno.es/bas/pdf/bas10105.pdf

 

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The Metapolitics of America

America and France are the twin “proposition nations” of the Western occident. (This sibling rivalry explains much about the popularity of France-bashing and _l’antiamericanisme_ in opposing countries.) Their “national” days are unique in the world in that they celebrate historical events that were cast, at their very inception, as liberal advancements for all humankind. 

The Fourth of July is the centerpiece of American nationalism and identity . . . even if few remember what exactly they are celebrating.

But even in their comical ignorance, Americans seem sure that there’s an ultimate meaning to the Fourth: Freedom! . . . from . . . uhh . . . the South . . . er . . . the Nazis? . . . or whatever.

America, it is assumed, achieved independence from some sort of big, bad traditionalist oppressor.

Many nation-states celebrate “independence days,” which usually mark important or unlikely military victories over invaders or imperial powers. As memory gets mixed with myth, these events are imagined as popular liberations. Mexico’s “Cinco de Mayo,” which might soon displace the Fourth in prominence in the United States, is emblematic in this respect.

But the Fourth of July—as well as France’s Bastille Day of July 14—are holidays of an entirely different character (whatever surface similarities they might share with others).

America and France are the twin “proposition nations” of the Western occident. (This sibling rivalry explains much about the popularity of France-bashing and l’antiamericanisme in opposing countries.) Their “national” days are unique in the world in that they celebrate historical events that were cast, at their very inceptions, as liberal advancements for all humankind.

Today, of course, every nation-state on earth—from Nigeria to North Korea—mouthes some sort of “human rights” mumbo-jumbo. But the U.S. and France are exceptional in that they emerged as direct ideological expressions of the Enlightenment, and occurred at a critical moment in its history. One hundred years after the death of Spinoza, the French and American Revolutions marked the point at which Enlightenment values left the realm of philosophy (and what could be called the 17th-century “radical fringe”) and entered the realm of state-making and geopolitics. Both Revolutions would, in turn, occur some 125 years before the Great War definitively ended the Old Order. Every state thereafter would be “American,” the vestiges of aristocracy and monarchy persisting only as tourist attractions.

“The Rights of Man” . . . “the pursuit of happiness” . . . “inalienable rights . . . endowed by our Creator” . . . The great slogans and myths of 1776 and 1789 have a quaint ring to them today. They hail from an older phase of the Left, and thus have become, as it were, “conservative.”

These platitudes function like dogma and form the unexamined basis of political action and speech. This is most obvious through a familiar political shorthand; in the words of Congressman Paul Ryan, America is “more than just a place . . . America is an idea.” (As geography is thrown out the window, so is race, people, culture, history, and more.) Ryan’s meme is reiterated across the spectrum—from a rock star’s urgings that Americans be “one” with the world, to the inaugural addresses of Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama. Much of political discourse in America involves politicians accusing rivals of not believing in the American dogma hard enough.

To be an American is to be committed to liberty, equality, and individual autonomy—perhaps even to have left one’s home and people in the name of such principles. America’s highest ideal is, in a way, an anti-ideal—that the state shall not express a people’s spirit and history, a source of wisdom or tradition, or a vision of something greater, more dominant and powerful than an individual. The character of America is imagined as an endless tabula rasa or Etch-a-Sketch; it gets written on, but always returns to zero.

The “Founding Fathers,” as they are know, are revered not so much as martial heroes but as the wise designers of the world’s greatest legal mechanism. There seems to be no parallel in other Occidental cultures to the reverence of the Supreme Court, as a set of nine Talmudic Judges who, depending on your persuasion, will either divine the Constitution’s One True Law or else view it as a living will.

Other countries might have negative national consciousnesses. Germans, for instance, have internalized de-Nazification. But Germans remain, despite it all, self-consciously German. Americans, on the contrary, are nothing . . . they’re always starting over . . . they like to tell themselves they have an unbounded future, but only at the cost of never having a past.

One can be an American and also be Roman Catholic . . . a Muslim . . . a Buddhist . . . or a trans-gendered performance artist. American society is, indeed, encouraged to fragment into as many pieces as possible. So long as no identity, ideal, or meaning predominates over others; so long as every identity ultimately wants the same.

Religion in America, particularly Protestant Christianity, has rarely opposed this anti-identity; at critical moments, it has reenforced it. There is a “storybook” history to the many fanatics, who, choosing to abandon their homes and cultures, sought to create a “new Israel” in the New World. What we call “tradition,” they called “corruption” and “poison.”

One could imagine an alternative reality in which American religious institutions had opposed the 1776 Revolution (or at least had been highly skeptical of it), urging loyalty to mother country and mother church. Instead, the 18th-century pulpit was a place of revolutionary fervor. Jefferson’s Independence Declaration had resonated with—and was, indeed, continuous with—a whole series of “compact” beginnings for Christian Americans, who in a spirit of Hebraic separatism, desired to break with Europe.

The Europeans had been Germans . . . Gauls . . . Russians . . . Lombards . . . Britons before they were Christians. In their national consciousnesses, they could remember conversion experiences. Americans, on the contrary, were Christians before they were Americans.

One could counter that the American dogma is all rhetorical—that the Founders, some of the wealthiest men on the continent at the time, sought to secure an aristocratic order, that American society has been informed by ethnic, political, and monetary agendas, etc.

But to understand America, one must understand its outcome—that there are certain impulses and implications that only become clear later on (ironically, when the entity has reached its end point). Today, the United States has achieved the most robust and most popular civic religion that explicitly denies its racial, historical, and civilizational identity. This spiritual negation is more devastating than the displacement of the founding stock through mass immigration.


Our perspective is of living in America, without being of it. As we escape America’s assumptions, we can look upon the entity objectively.

A century and a half ago, Alexander Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States of America, was faced with the prospect of the victory or annihilation of his nation and fledgling state in what is now referred to as the American Civil War.

In his greatest address, “The Cornerstone of the Confederacy,” he did not speak (mendaciously) about “states rights” or any kind of Constitutional legality. He instead cut to the heart of the social order he was opposing. He stressed that the Confederacy was based on the conclusion that Thomas Jefferson was wrong; the “cornerstone” of the new state was the “physical, philosophical, and moral truth” of human inequality.

Ours, too, should be a declaration of difference and distance—”We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created unequal.” In the wake of the old world, this will be our proposition.

This article was originally published on July 4, 2014.

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The Next Great Awakening

With the rise of the BLM movement, we are not just witnessing protests and riots but the birth of an old/new religion. Summary The Black Lives Matter protests are best…

With the rise of the BLM movement, we are not just witnessing protests and riots but the birth of an old/new religion.


Summary

The Black Lives Matter protests are best understood as a religious revival, emerging from the United States but global in scale. This new religion is “Multiculturalism” and based on institutions and ideals outside traditional churches; however, its structure and sacraments strikingly resemble those of Christianity. It could even be considered a kind of heresy.

Religious revivals take place in the wake of wars and disasters, periods of elevated stress and widespread angst. They are spearheaded by and attractive to people who are relatively high in neurotic traits such as anxiety. Their disturbed mental states are, temporarily, alleviated by the religious experiences that take place through these revivals—with religion, more generally, being an adaptation that allows us to cope with an unpredictable and traumatic world.

Leftists and atheists, of course, proudly reject traditional religion and sexual morality, and we should appreciate the irony of a “religious revival” capturing their hearts and minds. However, as a group, leftists and atheists are high in mental instability—especially those who are young and female—and thus they are highly susceptible to the religious experience, if not religion as it has been historically understood.

Following the Industrial Revolution and the exploitation of fossil fuels, the world became immensely wealthier, healthier, and more comfortable, and the harsh Darwinian selection pressures that characterized previous ages subsided. One of the most impactful consequences of this is the dramatic decrease in childhood mortality. Thus, millions of people with high levels of mutations, who would not have survived childhood in previous times, walk among us in the postmodern age. These “spiteful mutants” have managed to bring about the collapse of traditional religion—which is associated with mental and physical health and evolutionary success. They have spread Multiculturalism as a religion in its place. The result is a Multiculturalist revival, where 70 years ago there would have been a Christian one.


Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion, too
Imagine all the people
Living life in peace
You, you may say I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you will join us
And the world will be as one
—“Imagine,” John Lennon


Interesting Times

The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement swept through the Western World beginning in May 2020 after the accidental death of African-American criminal George Floyd at the hands of a Minneapolis police officer. The initial result was widespread riots and looting by African-Americans in Minneapolis, followed by similar scenes in other places. But this quickly morphed into an ideological movement—under the already extant slogan “Black Lives Matter”1—in which a kind of anarchy swept through American cities, encouraged by Social Justice Warriors2 and, to a large extent, the leftist media and political establishment. A kind of hysteria appeared to take hold among White Americans, including politicians and even police officers.

Flagrantly breaking the “lock down,” which had been in action for two months due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Whites gathered in the streets and knelt in the name of George Floyd. Many police officers publicly engaged in this deferential behavior, often holding out their open hands to signify their willingness to make themselves defenseless. White Americans were filmed not just kneeling before Blacks but symbolically washing their feet.3 The riots were stated, by the media, to be “largely peaceful” even as buildings were aflame behind them or as White news reporters were physically attacked by rampaging mobs. There were calls to abolish the police and even for complete anarchy, under the slogan “No Justice, No Peace.”

The hysteria quickly spread to other Western countries. There were Black riots— assisted by White SJWs—on the streets of central London. White news reporters were attacked live on air. British police, in front of the gates of Downing Street, knelt before Black protestors rather than arrest them for breaking the lockdown and for rioting, as English Law demanded. Companies began to signal their support for “Black Lives Matter,” with those who were slow to do so being criticized as “racist” because, according to one slogan, “Silence is Violence.” In a BLM protest in Helsinki, the overwhelmingly White and female “protestors” didn’t merely kneel but lay prostrate on the ground in order to signal total submission and deference. Young females posted videos of themselves online renouncing their Whiteness, showing their “solidarity” with BLM. In one extreme case, a woman smeared herself in excrement as a sign of abasement.

Then came the attacks on statues and other public monuments. A statue of Winston Churchill in central London was graffitied with the word “Racist.” Britain’s Cenotaph war memorial was desecrated, and a young Black woman attempted to burn the Union Jack that hung from it. The statue of an 18th-century philanthropist and slave trader, which had stood in Bristol since 1895, was dragged down by a mob and thrown in the dock. Other statues that “offended” the sensitivities of the mob were preemptively removed, likely never to be re-erected, to prevent their destruction, including one of Belgium’s King Leopold, which stood in Brussels.

The streaming service HBO Max removed the American civil war epic Gone With The Wind (1939)—a film preserved by the Library of Congress as “culturally, historically, and aesthetically significant”4—after its romanticization of the South and depiction of African slaves was deemed unwatchable in the current climate. The chairman of Warner Media called the ban a “no brainer,” a curious choice of words.5 The BBC even removed from its streaming sites relatively recent comedies, made by liberal comedians only a decade ago, such as the light-hearted “Little Britain,” because “times have changed.”6


A New Religion

This wasn’t just mob rule and anarchy. On display was a religious intensity. And people were sucked into it. If the mob declared that you were not a “true believer,” you could lose your job, or perhaps even be subject to a police investigation. So, as more people exhibited their adherence to the Cult of George Floyd, an arms-race developed to indicate ever-greater fervor.

This eventuated in some White protestors “going Medieval” and actually engaging in self-flagellation—a grotesque spectacle but a seemingly inevitable culmination of the White guilt narrative.


What Causes Religiousness?

This was all so predictable. In April 2020, experts in the study of religion cautiously suggested that there might be some kind of religious revival in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, though they focused on what might happen in churches.7 There are always religious revivals after or during wars, famines, and pandemics. Why would the Covid-19 be any different?

In other words, we are witnessing another “Great Awakening.” But the religion of a significant portion of Western populations, and especially the young, is not Christianity. This new global religion of the 21st century is Multiculturalism. That said, Multiculturalism contains many elements of evangelicalism, both aesthetically and structurally, and perhaps could be viewed as Christianity’s latest mutation.

In order to understand what has taken place, we need to make sense of what religion is; why “mortality salience” is relevant to it; and how, precisely, religious revivals occur. Once this is clear, we will see that Multiculturalism is not just an ideology, partisan politics, or passing fad; it must properly be understood as a religion itself.

One of the key predictors of becoming religious is being confronted with your own mortality or that of your loved ones. No matter what an inveterate skeptic might say or write throughout his life, when told that his mother is in intensive care or his daughter has been in a car accident, there is a very strong possibility that, in private, he will beg God for help. “There are no atheists in foxholes,” as the saying goes. So-called “mortality salience” is an extreme example of the kind of psychological stress that appears to elevate religiousness. “Feelings of exclusion” seems to cause people to become more religious, too, as do periods of dramatic change, such as significant changes in government.8

“Religion,” in the widely accepted sense of the word, involves all of the key components of an evolutionary adaptation. Religiousness is around 0.4 genetic; it is associated with physical and mental health partly at the genetic level;9 it correlates with fertility; and specific parts of the brain are associated with it.10

There are likely a number of non-exclusive reasons why religiousness evolved. One is that it promoted pro-social behavior. Those who believed in a god who told them to behave in a pro-social way were less likely to be cast out or killed by the pre-historic band and were, therefore, more likely to pass on their genes. A related possibility is that it reduced stress in the face of danger or as we become aware of our own mortality. Those who felt that their life had eternal meaning and that a god was constantly looking after them would be less likely to become depressed and anxious and would be more likely to pass on their genes.11

Consistent with this, not only do people tend to become more religious at times of stress, they are more likely to have dramatic religious experiences, in which they do not merely vaguely feel that God is present but, as far as they are concerned, see Him and hear His reassuring voice.12 People who are high in neurotic personality traits are prone to depression and anxiety, these being manifestations of “mental instability.” Neuroticism seems to decrease considerably after one has undergone conversion and other religious experiences.13

Intrinsic religiousness—genuinely believing in god—is negatively correlated with Neuroticism.14 We can see this in the average churchgoer of the past century, a man who conforms to the belief system of his community, intellectually believes in a higher power, but likely doesn’t take his religion overly seriously nor does he worship with particular emotional affect. On the other hand, extrinsic religiousness—outward conformity to religion—is positively associated with Neuroticism. We can think of the fanatic or obnoxious scold, someone who wears his faith on his sleeve, perhaps even so devoted that religion negatively affects his welfare.

Being a “religious seeker” is also associated with Neuroticism. This involves going through phases of mental instability that are alleviated by an unusual and often very extreme forms of religiosity, which are duly abandoned during periods of sound mental health.15 Overall, it’s reasonable to argue that religiousness would have been selected for, because it promoted mental health, with the result that mental health and religiosity have become genetically related, due to both being simultaneously selected over a lengthy period of time.16

Religion also would have been “kin-selected.” You can pass on your genes indirectly by aiding your kin: your children share 50 percent of your genes, and more distant kin, such as nephews, share 25 percent. If a person were highly religious, it makes their kin more attractive, because of the associations between religiousness, pro-social behavior, and mental stability. This would help explain why some Islamic fundamentalists kill daughters who have dishonored the family. It is a way of signaling the family’s commitment to Islam and, thus, elevating kin selection.17 An ethnic group is, in the sense, an extended genetic kinship group and thus a means by which you can indirectly pass on your genes.18 It is has been found, using computer modeling, that groups that are highest in positive ethnocentrism (internal cooperation) and negative ethnocentrism (external hostility) tend to dominate others in the battle of group selection.19 There is evidence implying that religiousness is genetically associated with both kinds of ethnocentrism, because a part of the brain associated with ethnocentrism is also associated with religiousness.20 And the correlation between positive ethnocentrism and religiousness would make sense because a group would be more internally cooperate if it were high in pro-social traits and low in mental instability. But our key point is that religiousness has evolved, in part, as a means of coping with stress and mortality salience.


Why Are Women So Religious?

The high female presence both in BLM protests and in churches is obvious to anyone who has ever attended either. And this shouldn’t be surprising. Women are more religious than men, across cultures, in terms of how likely they are to believe in God and engage in collective worship.21 In the United States, Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, and Mormons are each 55 percent female. Some 70 percent of American women report an “absolute certainty” in their belief in a god, compared to 57 percent of men. American women are also much more likely to report that religion is important in their lives, and atheism is found twice as often among men than women (12 percent vs. 6 percent).22

This occurs because religion has been sexually selected for, too, as it is associated with being pro-social, rule-following (and thus not cuckolding your husband or abandoning your family and child), and with being part of a supportive group of co-religionists. These clear sex differences in the strength of religiousness will become significant later when we analyze the Black Lives Matter protests.

There are a number of probable reasons for higher female religiousness, one of which is empathy. Females are higher than in empathetic behavior, which involves being interested in people’s feelings and being able to detect their feelings from external markers, such as facial expressions.23 There is evidence that people who are high in empathy transfer this ability over to the world itself, meaning that they perceive the presence of a “mind” or “higher power” simply from looking around the world. Accordingly, low empathy—that is, stereotypical autism—is associated with atheism.24

Another reason may be adaptation to patriarchy. Females sexually select for male status because a high-status male is better able to invest in them and their offspring, meaning that both are more likely to survive.25 Until the Industrial Revolution, wealth and status strongly predicted completed fertility, and this is the case among pre-industrial peoples today. 26 If males must invest resources in the female in order to obtain sexual intercourse, then they want to be certain that the offspring in which they are investing their resources are actually their own. The result is a system of patriarchy in which females are controlled by males such that male paternity anxiety can be reduced. This system of patriarchy will tend to be promoted by the society’s religion as divinely ordained, possibly because patriarchal societies reduce paternity anxiety, meaning that they, in turn, reduce inter-male conflict, thus causing males to be more internally cooperative. And, again, as computer models have shown, societies of internally cooperative people are more likely to triumph in warfare with competing societies.27

This system of patriarchy, however, would mean that females would be strongly selected to be accepting of patriarchy and thus to be religious, as this is what the religion would promote.28 Consequently, there would be a religious “arms race” among females in order to obtain the highest-status males, especially in the kind of polygamous societies in which humans have lived for most of history, in which the highest status males monopolize the most desirable females. As such, we would expect females to be strongly prone to wishing to signal their virtue and, if religiosity were regarded as virtuous, to signal this. And they would be more convincingly able to signal it if they genuinely believed it.


Why is Religiousness Associated With Mental Health?

It is also clear to anyone that has ever attended a BLM protest that many of those involved—with their stereotypical unnatural colored hair and screams of righteous fury—are not mentally well. By contrast, females in churches appear sober and under control.

Why should traditional religiousness be associated with mental health? The answer lies in its evolutionary history. In understanding the evolution of religion, it is worth noting that it is a combination of a variety of traits, which would have been adaptive in pre-history.

1. Agency Over-Detection. We have a cognitive bias towards detecting the presence of an agent behind events. Following the “Smoke Detector Principle,” it is adaptive to assume the worst and get it wrong—such as to assume that that noise over there was a wolf rather than just the wind. This helps to explain why we might see evidence of god in the world.

2. Pattern Over-Detection. We are evolved to over-detect causation. This is adaptive because those who under-detected it would have put themselves in danger of being wiped out or not been able to analyze and understand the world around them.

3. Follow the Leader. We are evolved to form strongly-bonded groups and obey authority. By working as a team with a leader, groups are more likely to survive in the battle of group selection.29

Religions will vary in the extent of the prominence of each of these factors. This means that although religiousness is generally adaptive in an evolutionary sense of promoting individual and especially group fitness, it is quite possible for maladaptive forms of religiousness—which do not promote genetic fitness—to manifest. Some devotees might be, for example, too extreme in their obedience to the leader or in their pattern over-detection, such that adhering to such a religion is harmful for its followers. An obvious example of this would be suicide cults—such as the notorious Jonestown—in which devotees are so inclined to follow their leader and so inclined to over-detect patterns that they accept a mentally ill man’s paranoid worldview and kill themselves, completely destroying their genetic interests.30 Membership of such groups is associated with other maladaptive traits—such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—whereas traditional religiousness is genetically associated with mental health.

The relationship between religiousness and sound mental health makes sense if we delve a little deeper into how religiousness has been selected for over time. This will also be highly relevant, later, to understanding the nature of the Black Lives Matter movement. As I have discussed in my study “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There is No God,’”31 we were under conditions of harsh Darwinian selection until the breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution, which began in around 1800. The resulting improved public health and living conditions meant that child mortality has fallen from around 50 percent in 1800 to 1 percent today.32 High child mortality ensured that the surviving population was very strongly adapted to its ecology. Babies with mutations that made them unfit—such as those leading to a poor immune system—were purged from the population every generation, meaning that it overall had a very low “mutational load.” Under these brutal conditions, traditional religion—based around the collective worship of a moral god—was adaptive, meaning that it came to be selected for in tandem with other adaptive traits, which thus became genetically connected.

With the break-down of harsh Darwinian selection, we would expect the population to display increasing evidence of mutational load. This would be observed in secular increases in the prevalence of partly genetic medical conditions.33 We would also expect the development of all kinds of deviations from this delicately balanced Darwinian religious norm—deviations that would be maladaptive in terms of group and individual selection and that would be attractive to people with maladaptive traits, such as mental illness. Religious suicide cults, such as Jonestown and Waco, would exemplify this process. These religious deviants would have high mutational loads and likely be people who would not have survived childhood under harsh Darwinian conditions.

How do we know that such people would not have survived? In that the brain is 84 percent of the genome, it is an enormous target for mutation, meaning that those who have physical mutations can be expected to have mental mutations as well, which would direct them towards deviations from the most adaptive form of religiousness. Consistent with this, it has been found that, in modern samples, collective worship of a moral god is genetically associated with physical and mental health and is negatively associated with other markers of high mutational load, including autism, physical asymmetry, and left-handedness. These are associated with atheism or religious deviations, such as paranormal belief. The inability to develop a symmetrical phenotype implies a poor immune system, because a person with a poor immune system would have to use disproportionately more of his bio-energetic resources to fight off pathogens, meaning insufficient resources left over to ensure symmetry. Left-handedness is an accepted marker of “developmental instability.” If the brain develops symmetrically, people will tend to be right-handed. Failure to do so implies mutational load and, thus, left-handedness is associated with many examples of poor physical and mental health.34

So, with the nature of “religion” and its connection to mortality salience understood, let us now turn to making sense of “religious revivals.”


What Causes Religious Revivals?

Religious revivals appear to occur when the kind of situation that would lead to a period of religiousness in an individual—such as stress and mortality salience—are experienced relatively suddenly by a substantial portion of a society. There will be variation in the nature of the revival, depending on the kind of people who are impacted. But, in general, dramatic change and a period of difficulty can be expected to lead to a religious revival of some kind. These can be charted throughout history and, interestingly, there is often a time lag separating the period of stress from the revival itself.

Christian evangelists are constantly attempting to create revivals, traveling to different communities and preaching their message of conversion and redemption. However, they only seem to be able to create mass revivals during, or just after, periods of significant distress.

An examination of British revivals during the 20th century is consistent with this pattern. The first major revival of the twentieth century took place in Wales between 1904 and 1905. At the time, South Wales was ravaged by industrial unrest and unemployment in a society in which there was no welfare state. Accordingly, Welsh workers, many of whom were already heavily influenced by Methodism and were facing serious hardship and the realistic possibility of destitution.35 Interesting, there was no religious revival during World War I in the UK, nor during the Spanish Flu pandemic that immediately followed it36. There were, however, various revivals during the 1920s. The lack of communications at the time meant that it was more difficult than in the 1950s for these to become national phenomena. A major revival in East Anglia in 1921 focused around socioeconomically deprived fishing communities, which were under considerable distress even compared to ordinary people recovering from the Great War. The following year, there were revivals in other parts of the country, most notably in fishing communities in northeast Scotland.37 There was no major revival in Britain in the 1930s, other than in the deeply conservative Hebridean islands off the north west of Scotland in 1939. This year was a time of elevated distress due to very real possibility that Britain might go to war again.38

There was no major revival in the UK during World War II itself. The next Christian revival, and a concomitant reassertion of conservative attitudes, came after the War, and especially in the 1950s. There was a revival in the Hebrides in 1949, in which large numbers of people, who had not previously been especially devout, underwent religious experiences and became more involved in their church and in which those who were already religious became more fervent. According to revival leader the Rev. Duncan Campbell (1898-1972), in late 1949, in the village of Barvas on the Island of Lewis, he conducted a night-time meeting at which:

Three o’ clock in the morning came and God swept in. About a dozen men and women lay prostrate on the floor, speechless . . . We left our cottage at 3am to discover men and women seeking God. I walked along a country road and found three men on their faces, crying to God for mercy. There was a light in every home; no-one seemed to think of sleep.

At 5 AM that morning, 14 buses full of people arrived from all parts of the island and even from the island of Harris. People at these meetings fell into trances, fainted, swayed and collapsed to the floor.39 Campbell felt that he had been inspired by the Holy Spirit to go and revive the Outer Hebrides and, given the stressful conditions of the time, people were extremely receptive to religious-fervor in a ways that they otherwise wouldn’t have been.40

Wartime rationing did not cease until 1954, so it could be argued that it was only at this point that “normal life” finally reasserted itself.41 In an era of mass-communication, a spark was needed to set off a nationwide revival, and this came in the form of American pastor Billy Graham (1918-2018), as witnessed in his British rallies, which took place between 1954 and 1955. The postwar religious fervor was such that it has been estimated that roughly 21 percent of the London population attended a Billy Graham rally, while up 73 percent of the Glasgow population did so.42 In 1955, 100,000 people packed a Glasgow stadium to attend a single service conducted by Billy Graham.43 I am not aware that the relationship has been quantitatively tested, but, as a rule of British Modern History, religious revivals seem to manifest in areas of elevated mortality salience as a consequence of impoverishment or, directly, famine and other highly stressful phenomena.


What Kind of People Have Religious Experiences?

What was happening, in terms of individual and mass-psychology, during these revivals? As we have discussed, quotidian, stable religiousness—in which you are religious all the time—is correlated with sound mental health. Even religious people who are mentally healthy, however, go through periods of stress and mortality salience in which they may become more religious. They may even undergo forms of what is known as a “religious experience.”

Religious experiences are profound psychological experiences in which a person may be overwhelmed by a feeling of God’s love and even hear God’s voice or believe to have seen Him. In making sense of these kinds of experiences, American neuroscientist Andrew Newberg and colleagues argue that the mind has two effective systems, calming and arousal. When either of these systems is pushed to their extremes, through meditation or hyper-arousal—both of which can be achieved via religious services—they argue that it is dangerous for the body. Accordingly, the other system hits in, leading to alternative states of consciousness and intense psychological experiences.44 British biologist Richard Dawkins has suggested that they may be provoked by the way in which stress makes us highly instinctive, and thus prone to religious belief anyway. Dawkins also argues that we are also evolved to over-detect agency: as mentioned above, if we mistake a distant rock for a wolf, we have lost nothing, but if we make the opposite mistake, we may be killed. Accordingly, at times of very intense stress, we are much more likely to mistake some unidentified sound as the voice of God and, at the same time, find that our calming system would hit in. This would lead to an intense religious experience combined with feelings of relief and joy.45 Undergoing mild religious experiences—known as “spiritual” experiences—is about 0.3 heritable. Undergoing intense religious experiences is approximately 0.66 heritable.46 This high heritability might imply that the ability to undergo a religious experience is extremely beneficial, in evolutionary terms, because it combats stress and, due to its profound nature, keeps you low in negative feelings for a substantial period of time afterwards.

However, we must distinguish between the “religious experience” and the “conversion experience”—and also between being “religious,” being “hyper-religious,” and going through a phase of being intensely religious. American psychologist William James (1842-1910) distinguished between the religion of the “sick soul” and that of “healthy mindedness.” The religion of healthy mindedness is characterized by relatively mild religious experiences. The religion of the “sick soul,” however, is marked by a dramatic conversion experiences, which occur at times of intense stress.47 Those who lead religious revivals—people such as Billy Graham—can be regarded as constantly “hyper-religious.” As already noted, this is associated with either schizophrenia or with being a severely depressive personality. Psychological studies of those who lead religious revivals have found that most of them display evidence of these pathological traits. They require, for example, the absolute structure and order which fanatical religiousness provides in order to allay their anxiety and frequently undergo intense religious experiences.48 Such is the nature of revival “leaders.” It may be beneficial for a healthy society to be able to maintain a very small percentage of such lunatics, precisely because they are able to inspire fervent religiosity in other people and religiosity is traditionally a means of promoting ethnocentrism. In this regard, it has been noted that tribal shamans tend to the same kinds of psychological characteristics as modern-day charismatic leaders.49

But what about the followers, and those who become followers during a revival? What is their psychology? Religious revivals are characterized by the “conversion” type of religious experience, in which a person undergoes a kind of psychological breakdown and, to some extent, adopts a new identity, for example as a “Christian” or as “real Christian” in a way that they somehow were not prior to the revival.50 They, consequently, go through a transient phrase of hyper-religiosity. Transient hyper-religiosity is associated with high Neuroticism,51 while bipolar disorder and bouts of depression also predict periods of extreme religious fervor, as does schizophrenia.52 Schizophrenia, and its milder forms, is also elevated at times of stress, just as is anxiety.53 There is a range of severity to schizophrenia-type conditions. Mild symptoms are summarized as “schizoid personality.” This is characterized by anhedonia (the inability to experience joy) and apathy. More severe is “schizotypal personality,” where the schizoid symptoms are accompanied by social anxiety, paranoid ideation, unconventional or paranoid beliefs, and, sometimes, psychosis. Diagnosable schizophrenia is a particularly severe manifestation of these characteristics.54 Having undergone a conversion experience has been found to be associated with having been, prior to that experience, high in anxiety and other Neuroticism traits.55 When people suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress, which is associated with high Neuroticism, they can develop a very specific kind of religiosity known as “spiritual struggle” or “negative religious coping.” Those who undergo this believe that God is punishing them for their sins, plead for God to intervene in the world, and project hostility towards out-group members. “Positive religious coping” can cross over with this, insomuch as it involves conversion, but this also involves the belief that God has forgiven you and that you are purified of your sins.56

So, people who are high in Neuroticism—and even under the harsh Darwinian conditions prevalent until 1800, there would have been population variance in this trait—are more likely to become part of religious revivals. They will feel stress more acutely and will, accordingly, be more likely to become extremely religious in the aftermath of periods of intense societal distress. Females score higher than males in Neuroticism. For this reason alone, we would predict that females would play a noticeable part in religious revivals.57 Consistent with this, studies of religious revivals in the U.S. have found that “white and black women were among the most visible participants at religious revivals, where converts wept, wailed, writhed, and fainted as they received God’s grace.”58 Neuroticism tends to decrease with age in males. But in females, Neuroticism decreases with age until adolescence and at that point, it increases, possibly due to the adaptive need to worry about one’s children. This can be seen most obviously among university students, where females in particular tend to suffer mental health problems of various kinds that they will often have recovered from by the time they are in their mid-20s.59 Neuroticism, in women, begins to decline in early adulthood.60 For this reason, as well as due to their higher general religiousness, we would expect females in their mid-teens to mid-20s to be attracted to religious revivals. In line with this prediction, there is detailed data on those who “came forward” to receive God’s forgiveness during Billy Graham’s British rallies. In London, 65 percent were female and 50 percent were under the age of 19. In Glasgow, 71 percent were women and 73 percent were under the age of 30.61

Even those who are not sufficiently Neurotic to undergo religious experiences can be expected to be influenced by a religious revival if it appears to be sufficiently popular. Neuroticism predicts extrinsic religiousness, that is, religious outward conformity.62 People who are high in Neuroticism will fear being judged negatively or even being ostracized for failure to conform, meaning that they may fake religious fervor even if they don’t actually feel it. This means that religious revivals that become particularly prominent can envelop people who are far lower in Neuroticism than those who are, as they see it, “slain by the Holy Spirit.” Accordingly, popular revivals can generate a kind of group hysteria and thus appear far more popular than they really are. This is obvious when we consider how so many celebrities felt compelled to jump on the bandwagon of Black Lives Matter.


The Religion of Multiculturalism and Mental Health

So, with the nature of “religion” and “religious revivals” clear in our minds, we can now explore the “religious” nature of the Black Lives Matter protests. There are obvious parallels between 20th-century religious revivals—such as that that spear-headed by Billy Graham—and the Black Lives Matter revival. The leaders of the movement are extreme “liberals”—with this being clearly associated with mental instability, where conservatism and traditional religiosity are correlated with mental stability.63 The “revival” has taken place in the wake of a period of elevated mortality salience; in other words, it is a response to stress. Those who are drawn into it are politically liberal themselves, with this being associated with mental instability.64

In many respects, Multiculturalism can be argued to be a secular “replacement religion” for Christianity—and perhaps even a kind of Christian sect. The same argument has been made with regard to Marxism and even some kinds of Romantic Nationalism.

1. Dogmas

Traditional Christianity is based around a series of dogmas that you must accept in order to be regarded as a Christian and achieve salvation. These dogmas are sometimes logically incoherent—such as the Trinity—or require the acceptance of truth-claims that cannot be proved or are, on any reasonable basis, extraordinarily improbable. However, you signal your intellectual submission to the religious community by accepting these. This can be regarded as their purpose; they are tests of loyalty. In much the same way, Multiculturalism requires that you accept dogmas that are empirically inaccurate or patently nonsensical, such as that there are no race differences in intelligence or that everyone is “equal.”

2. “The Last Shall Be First.”

Christianity also tends towards idolizing the “marginalized.” It preaches that “the last shall be first” and encourages its followers to empower those who are supposedly marginalized, and humble themselves, embracing a kind of sacred poverty. Similarly, Marxism idolizes the dispossessed in the form of the “worker”; Romantic nationalism worships the “peasant”; and Multiculturalism, as espoused by Whites, idolizes non-Whites, and the more different they are—culturally and genetically—from Whites, the more they are worthy of reverence. There is evidence that humans—being evolved to tightly structured groups—have two fundamental instincts: one towards climbing the social hierarchy and the other towards equality, as groups that are relatively equal tend to avoid collapsing into discord.65 Thus, religions that preach “equality” can be highly psychologically attractive, especially to those who are not close to the top of the hierarchy or who fear they will not be able to get there. This is consistent with evidence that males who are physically strong—and thus who would have been more likely to ascend the prehistoric hierarchy via winning fights and being sexually selected for—are more likely to hold conservative views that specifically favor hierarchy and inequality.66

3. Self-Abasement and Guilt

The third key point that Multiculturalism has in common with Christianity, though not with pagan religions such as Hinduism, is the salience of “guilt.” In general, “guilt” and “shame” both function to make people “know their place,” and thus conform and behave in pro-social, cooperative ways. Accordingly, a group that adopts a religion imbued with these feelings to an optimum degree would be likely to out-compete other groups.

Christianity is a religion to which “guilt” is extremely important—“central to the biblical message” as one theologian has put it.67 According to Christian dogmas, humanity is “Fallen” as a consequence of its “Original Sin.” In other words, God is perfect and all-benevolent, whereas humanity is inherently sinful and bad, living in a sinful, Fallen world. Indeed, it was cast down into this world from Paradise as a punishment for its wickedness. The only way humanity can gain salvation and forgiveness is to admit how sinful it is and humbly worship God and follow the commands of His Church. Worldly success is, in a sense, something for which you should feel guilty—unless you are certain that God has blessed you with this success—because it implies that you are insufficiently humble; you are failing to sufficiently repent for your wickedness.

In much the same fashion, the Church of Multiculturalism tells its adherents that they are burdened by the Original Sin of Whiteness. White people are presumed to have treated people of other races in abominable ways, with images of slavery, the Holocaust, Jim Crow, and the like acting as symbols of their primal deeds. Whites must repent for their Original Sin by empowering those who are not White, such that racial “Equality” is attained. In the same way that wealthy people in Christian societies are “privileged” and must engage in charitable works to assuage their “guilt,” White people have the “privilege” of being “White”—not only being wealthy but enjoying that wealth at the expense of non-Whites, whom their ancestors brutalized, enslaved, or murdered. “Privilege” is the source of “guilt,” which must be assuaged through acts of humility and penance, potentially including not producing White children and adopting non-Whites instead.

Shame, though less obvious, is also germane to Christianity and its replacement religions. Those who refused to conform to Christianity could be “shamed” as devil-worshippers who might bring God’s anger on the community, and shunned accordingly. Those who do not “take the knee” for George Floyd or who remain silent, instead of publicly stating their support for Black Lives Matter, can be shamed as possible “racists;” with this term of abuse implying that you are not an adherent to the religious community. You are “Other.” This is because membership of the community is based around adherence to dogmas, not around blood-bonds, as is the case with pagan religions and with many forms of nationalism.68


A New Kind of Awakening

The key difference between the Church of Multiculturalism and Christianity is that there is no god—no non-physical existence. Moreover, Black Lives Matter represents an extremely “spiteful” form of religiosity, in the sense that there doesn’t appear to be any “forgiveness.” In Billy Graham rallies, you could “step forward” and be forgiven for your sins. In Black Lives Matter rallies, it doesn’t matter how many times you “take the knee,” there can be no forgiveness for your sin of being White. You must simply learn to live with the guilt, slightly assuaging it ever so often by campaigning to empower non-Whites.

As previously discussed, we can conceive of two distinct kinds of religion: those which are selected for under centuries of Darwinian conditions—that tend to involve the collective worship of a moral god—and those which deviate from this norm. Due to the way in which mental health and religiousness were co-selected under Darwinian conditions as we have explored, this “traditional religiosity” is now positively associated with mental health, while deviations from it—such as New Age affectations or belief in the paranormal—are associated with anxiety and depression, either on-going or periodic. People who are high in mental instability can be expected to become highly religious in the wake of a crisis and being low in traditional religiosity as well as fervently left-wing correlates with being high in mental instability

Accordingly, we would expect such people—self-identified “liberals”—to become extremely religious (in terms of their religious deviation) in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, and this is what we appear to be seeing. In previous situations of gravity, the overwhelming majority of the British population was Christian and believed, to varying degrees, in its doctrines. This would have meant that the relationship between being a traditional Christian and mental stability would have been much weaker than is now the case. It also meant that the revivals were Christian in nature, because this was the religious belief even of the kind of mentally unstable people who tend to undergo intense religious experiences. As already noted, a specific form of religiosity has been found to manifest among mentally unstable people suffering from high levels of stress—“Spiritual Struggle.” Those who felt the Holy Spirit during this revival would be, in general, relatively high in Neuroticism, something that would be soothed, temporarily, by their religious experience. Usually, their Christian zeal would be temporary. It would no longer be psychologically required once the period of stress was over and recovered from, by which time the factor that was elevating their anxiety to intolerable levels would have dissipated.

In 2020, especially for younger people, their religion is Multiculturalism and not Christianity. Christianity is now the religion of a shrinking minority. Consequently, we would expect some variant on the kind of revival outlined above to occur in the wake of Covid-19, especially among such people. Its leaders, as with Christian revivals, would be mentally unstable people. However, many of the “followers,” caught up in the revival, would be prone to mental instability and would be going through a particularly acute phase of anxiety. As with a Christian revival, these feelings would be alleviated by the collective experience—in this instance of “Black Lives Matter”—in which they would feel a sense of certainty that they were morally superior; that they were better than most (“racist”) people; and that they were part of creating a paradise on Earth. Once the anxiety-reducing feelings this induced wore off, such people would no longer be subject to acute mortality salience and then they would return to being much less fervent believers in the Church of Multiculturalism.

We would expect any such revival to be more pronounced among Multiculturalists than among Christians. Social Justice Warriors are irreligious and liberal, both of which correlate with mental instability. “Christians” are conservative and religious, both associated with mental stability. Accordingly, in a world in which remnant Christianity is associated with sound mindedness, a Multiculturalist revival in the wake of a pandemic becomes far more probable than a Christian one—though there still may be a Christian one of some kind in the near future. We would expect this Multiculturalist revival to be elevated among young people—because people go through a period of relatively high mental instability when they are young adults—and, in particular, among young females, because females are more religious than males and they are more prone to depression and anxiety. Multiculturalism is the “new religion”—the “new morality”—and thus females would be evolved to want to signal the extent of their adherence to it, being ultimately psychologically adapted to polygamous societies in which they must compete for the highest status males by strongly signaling their religiosity and sexual faithfulness.69 Females are also evolved to a patriarchal society in which decisions tend to be made for them by their fathers and husbands. With the breakdown of patriarchy, it has been argued that we would expect females—especially young females—to make particularly maladaptive decisions.70 These would include strongly aligning with a religion that seeks to destroy their ethnic group and effectively encouragers them to be childless.

It should be noted that, in relatively religious societies, females tend to be more politically conservative than males, seemingly because females are more religious and the religion promotes “traditional” values as the will of God. However, when the influence of traditional religiousness breaks down, the female propensity towards higher empathy—and thus leftism and anti-traditionalism—begins to manifest. In 1992, in Britain, women born in the 1920s were more conservative than men of the same age. However, women born in the 1960s were less conservative than males of the same age.71 These younger women, no longer as influenced by traditional religious ideas, tend to promote leftist ones—including altruism towards competing ethnic groups—with a kind of religious zeal. One commentator astutely termed them “The New Church Ladies,” evoking the subterranean religious quality to so much of contemporary female discourse.72

Traditional religiousness took the female propensity to strongly believe in God and engage in religious worship and focused this into an adaptive form of religiosity in which God promoted group-selected values. With the breakdown of this religion, we are left with females tending to be religiously fervent and high in generalized empathy and thus attracted to Multiculturalism and leftism. Females are also higher than males in Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism, and, thus in social conformity.73 So, for this reason as well, we would expect them to be more heavily involved in the New Church into which younger females have been inculcated.

It has been observed that highly educated young people—those with post-graduate degrees—are significantly over-represented among Black Lives Matter activists.74 One possible explanation for this—beyond the fact that university Humanities and Social Science departments are increasingly indoctrination factories for leftist ideas75—is that there is a positive relationship between Neuroticism and academic success at university, especially when this is combined with high Conscientiousness (impulse control and rule-following).76 This is possibly because anxiety acts as a motivator towards diligence or because Neuroticism means you desire greater certainty about the nature of the world and believe you can attain this through higher education. In that Neuroticism predicts extrinsic religiousness77—that is, outward religious conformity—we would expect non-SJWs who were relatively high in these traits to be drawn into this dominant, public revival due to their fear of not conforming, leading them to compete to strongly outwardly conform.


Anarchic Religious Awakenings

The other difference between the British religious awakenings in the 20th century and Black Lives Matter is the anarchy involved: BLM activists flagrantly breaking the law, engaging in dangerous behavior, rioting, inciting perpetual disorder (“No Justice, No Peace”), and engaging in iconoclasm by toppling statues and desecrating memorials. In this sense, a clearer comparison can be found in the Peasants War that took place in German-speaking states in the 1520s, in the early days of the Reformation. There are multiple reasons why the Reformation began when it did, but one of them was a period of elevated mortality salience. There had been severe famine in Germany between 1515 and 1520.78

Reports indicate that violent Protestant mobs would strip Catholic Churches of their valuables and destroy their idols. As with Black Lives Matter, educated people were heavily over-represented among early Protestant iconoclasts—they were mainly the so-called “middling sort.”79 The Protestant leaders would oppose iconoclasm, publicly stating that idols should only be removed with permission from the proper authorities. But, as has occurred in Britain in 2020, the Swiss authorities preemptively removed icons as a way of halting public disorder and also as way of appeasing Protestant leaders. In June 1524, all Zurich churches were closed in order to prevent a maelstrom.80

In other words, Black Lives Matter is a particularly pronounced religious revival. In the 1520s, this occurred, in part, due to particularly difficult conditions. In 2020, it may be that the cause was moderately difficult conditions plus a growing percentage of young people who, partly for genetic reasons underpinned by increasing mutational load, increasingly suffer from depression and anxiety and, therefore, cannot psychologically cope with what would have been historically regarded as quite normal levels of mortality salience. Contemporary young people are increasingly in a situation of “evolutionary mismatch” where—under the influence of modern, anti-traditional ideologies, over-parenting, and education— they are decreasingly socialized as children in the manner that was the norm under harsh Darwinian conditions. This has been shown to lead to severe behavioral problems in non-human animals,81 and we will explore this issue in more detail below.

Furthermore, far superior communications—social media and instantaneous reactions to events around the world—mean that what may otherwise have been isolated patches of revivalism have been globalized, impacting much larger numbers of people. And there may also be an extent to which these riots are in the interests of some powerful individuals, who are themselves fervent adherents to Multiculturalism or who desire a subservient population that will not challenge them. If the population is depressed and demoralized, this subservience is clearly better accomplished. Accordingly, the riots—which could be crushed if so desired—are permitted to run their course. It is as if ordinary people are being told: “Look what we can allow to happen to you if you elect the wrong people or vote the wrong way in a referendum.” Afraid of offending the righteous mob—and their high-level sympathizers—even leaders who oppose leftist disorder dare not act decisively. Again, comparisons to the iconoclasm of the early English Reformation leap to mind. Iconoclasts were permitted to “get away with it” during the periods when the Protestant faction, most notably led by Thomas Cromwell (c.1485-1540), wielded the most influence at Court.82

All of this leads us to a final question. How have we reached a situation where so many people—including many in positions of power—wish to destroy their own extended kinship group?


BLM and the Spiteful Mutants

Christianity, even the zealous kind of the Reformation, was an adaptive form of religiosity. Thus, a key part of it is “forgiveness”—after publicly confessing your sins and wavering of faith. With the breakdown of Darwinian selection, we see an increasing deviation from this religious evolutionary norm, including religions that are maladaptive, because they are ultimately nihilistic and lack doctrines that allow a person’s highly negative feelings during times of stress to be fully expunged. This is what we see with Black Lives Matter—the ultimate logic of which is that Whites should simply feel perpetual shame throughout their lives with no hope of it being alleviated, other than in a very mild and brief way via “taking the knee.”

Young people have been inculcated with this maladaptive religion due, in part, to the breakdown of traditional Christianity, which, like all religions that survived under harsh Darwinian conditions, tended to take behavior that was adaptive in terms of group selection and turn this into the will of God. As discussed above, as child mortality collapsed, we had more and more people who would not have survived under harsher conditions—due to their high mutational load—who had mutations of the mind that caused to hold beliefs that would be highly maladaptive if held by even a small percentage of the group—anti-natalism being only the most obvious. Due to our being a highly eusocial species—that is, interacting in a “hive mind”—we are heavily influenced by those around us. In this way, it has been found that depression can spread like a contagion. If you are around a person who is depressed then you are more likely to become depressed yourself, a condition which is negatively associated with fertility.83 As a result, these mutants— spiteful mutants84—helped to spread their maladaptive ways of thinking even to non-mutants, gradually undermining adaptive institutions, such as traditional churches, and replacing them with their Church of Multiculturalism, a church which is now clearly adhered to even by the leadership of the Church of England.85 Having taken over the state’s organs of power, such as the education system and the media, they could then inculcate young people into the New Church, alter the evolutionarily adaptive methods of socialization traditionally imposed on them, and push them—and with them, the entire super-organism—to think and behave increasingly contra to their genetic interests.

This became possible when a “tipping point” is reached, whereby about 25 percent of the population advocated anti-traditional ideas. Experiments have shown that when this happens, people perceive the new worldview as the way forward and begin to abandon the old one en masse.86 With our evolution to obedience and following the leader and the mob, this can sometimes result in a misfiring of our adaptations such that we start to engage in behavior which is not in our evolutionary interests. This is particularly likely to be the case if we are subject to “evolutionary mismatch;” if we are placed in an ecology to which we are not evolved. We are evolved to a pre-industrial ecology, so we can expect to find ourselves increasingly maladapted as the ecology increasingly deviates from this. We will engage in behavior which would have been adaptive under previous conditions – such as following the crowd – but this will be decreasingly adaptive as the crowd is increasingly evolutionarily mismatched, mutated and influenced by spiteful mutants.

In 1954, this tipping point had not yet been reached in Britain. People forced themselves, for fear of ostracism, through so-called “effortful control,”87 to believe in traditional Christianity, meaning that the revival was Christian and adaptive in nature. Around 1970, the tipping point was reached. This is demonstrated by the fact that evidence of mutational load – in the form of autism, which is associated with paternal age – did not predict atheism in the 1950s, but by the 1970s it did predict atheism. By the 1970s, in the U.S., having an older father predicted atheism in a way that had not previously been the case. This is because Christianity was so strong during the earlier period that autistics, who tend not to be religious as we have already noted, forced themselves to conform to the dominant religiosity. By the latter period, the tipping point had been reached, so they no longer needed to conform.88


The Toppling of Evolutionary Success

The Church of Multiculturalism, and its Black Lives Matter conversion rallies, is a Church with “spiteful mutants” as its priestly class. Under harsh Darwinian conditions, only those with adaptive cognitive biases survived childhood, because maladaptive cognitive biases were under-pinned by mutation, and those with high mutational load would likely perish before reaching adulthood. With the extreme relaxation of these conditions, these “spiteful mutants” walk among us in significant numbers. These are people who are programmed to behave in a way that is highly maladaptive in evolutionary terms—which results in the destruction of group and even individual fitness—and to persuade others to do likewise. All of the doctrines they advocate involve, if accepted, essentially being a “failure as an organism”:

  • life has no meaning so you may as well not have children;
  • put the interests of other ethnic groups above your own and so reduce the extent to which your own genes are passed on;
  • have few or no children to assist non-human animals and their genetic interests over your own.

The toppling of “racist” statues by the Black Lives Matter mob can be perceived as tearing down the “old gods,” those whom European people have venerated as heroes. These statues have traditionally been erected to honor highly group-selected people who have promoted the genetic interests of Europeans by expanding their territory and leading their ethnic group to victory over rivals. In a sense, the statues are sacred, they are idols; objects of worship. To tear them down is a way of asserting that the religion that they represented no longer has any power, is no longer sacred, simply because the idols that embody it can successfully humiliated.

In 1520, Spanish explorer Hernan Cortes (1485-1547) destroyed every Aztec idol that he could and desecrated the temples. He noticed that it left the Aztecs demoralized and less able to put up a fight.89 So, this leaves the worshipers in a state of confusion in which the previously certain, uniquely real system by which they made sense of the world—and in which they played an integral and positive part—is an under assault. They feel confused because they have got used to this system, and the comforting presence of these statues, and they feel demoralized and anxious. Any significant change can cause this by virtue of elevating anxiety about the unknown.90

This, alongside the symbolism of the system that gives their life meaning being attacked, leads them to feel depressed and looking for new certainties. But what if the certainties offered are nihilistic and tell you that you are inherently evil and should debase and even destroy yourself, never able to be forgiven for your and your ancestors’ sins? This is the ultimate message of the Death Cult that is the Church of Multiculturalism. It is, therefore, no coincidence that it attracts the same psychological types who are attracted to literal suicide cults. Indeed, a Black Lives Matter Suicide Cult, in which young White women kill themselves to repent for their racist sins, would not be beyond the realms of possibility.


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  76. James McKenzie, Mahdad Taghavi-Khonsary, Gary Tindell, “Neuroticism and Academic Achievement: The Furneaux Factor as a Measure of Academic Rigor,” Personality and Individual Differences, 29 (2000): 3-11. ↩︎
  77. Hills, Francis, Argyle, and Jackson, “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation,” op cit. ↩︎
  78. Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 15. ↩︎
  79. Lee Palmer Wandel. Voracious Idols and Violent Hands: Iconoclasm in Reformation Zurich, Strasbourg, and Basel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14. ↩︎
  80. Bridget Heal, “Visual and Material Culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Protestant Reformations, ed. Ulinka Rublack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 603. ↩︎
  81. See Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, Radomir N. Pestow, and Heitor B. F. Fernandes, “Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191; and John Calhoun, “Death Squared: The Explosive Growth and Demise of a Mouse Population,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 66 (1973): 80-88. ↩︎
  82. Julie Spraggon, Puritan Iconoclasm During the English Civil War (Woodbridge, Suffolk, The Boydell Press, 2003), 4. ↩︎
  83. T.E. Joiner, “Contagious Depression: Existence, Specificity to Depressed Symptoms, and the Role of Reassurance Seeking,” Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 67 (1994): 287-296. ↩︎
  84. M. A. Woodley of Menie, M. Sarraf, R. Pestow and H. Fernandes, H. Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations. Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191. ↩︎
  85. See Edward Dutton, “Imagination—It’s An Illusion, Quarterly Review, May 25, 2018, accessed June 20, 2020. ↩︎
  86. Damon Centola, Joshua Becker, Devon Brackbill, Andrea Baronchelli, “Experimental Evidence for Tipping Points in Social Convention, Science, 360 (2018): 1116-1119. ↩︎
  87. K. MacDonald. Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions. Psychological Review, 11 (2008): 1012-1031. ↩︎
  88. M.A. Woodley of Menie, S. Kanazawa, J. Pallesen, and M. Sarraf. Paternal Age Is Negatively Associated With Religious Behavior in a Post-60s But Not a Pre-60s US Birth Cohort: Testing a Prediction From the Social Epistasis Amplification Model. Journal of Religion and Health, (2020). doi: 10.1007/s10943-020-00987-9 ↩︎
  89. Victor Davis Hanson. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2007), 175. ↩︎
  90. Ara Norenzayan and Azim F. Shariff, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-Sociality, Science, 322 (2008): 58-62. ↩︎

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The Hidden Meaning of the Uncharted Video Games

The Uncharted video game franchise is a flagship of the Playstation brand, having sold more than 41.7 million copies. They’re among the most impressive, lavishly produced, movie-like video games ever…

The Uncharted video game franchise is a flagship of the Playstation brand, having sold more than 41.7 million copies. They’re among the most impressive, lavishly produced, movie-like video games ever made. The player’s avatar is a globetrotting treasure hunter clearly inspired by Indiana Jones. Just as Indiana Jones was co-created by Steven Spielberg, Uncharted was co-created by the Jewish Neil Druckmann, and these aren’t the only things they share in common.

Druckmann is an Israeli whose family immigrated to America when he was eleven-years-old. In college he co-created his first video game, an 8-bit demo called Dikki Painguin in: TKO for the Third Reich (which appears to be a hack of Act 2, stage 1 of Ninja Gaiden 2). It stars a cartoon penguin fighting Germans in World War Two. Suffice to say, Druckmann’s Jewish identity has informed his game design from the very beginning.

Druckmann’s first video game starred a cartoon penguin fighting the German National Socialists.

Druckmann joined Naughty Dog – the Sony-owned subsidiary that created the Crash Bandicoot games – in 2004 after meeting its co-founder Jason Rubin at an industry conference. Rubin is also Jewish, so perhaps that played a part in his hiring.[1] Rubin has since left the company and Druckmann is now vice president. Yet despite being born in Israel and repeatedly referencing the German National Socialists in his video games, Druckmann has attempted to downplay his ethnicity.

In an interview with The Frame Druckmann said, “I see myself as a pretty progressive person and yet (as a writer) my default (character) is a white, straight, christian [sic] male. That’s interesting because I’m Jewish and yet that’s the norm for me right now.”[2] He’s right, that is interesting considering he surreptitiously casts Jews in leading roles! For example, the protagonist in Druckmann’s The Last of Us is evidently Jewish. This detail is never explicitly emphasized in the games’ surface narrative, but was confirmed in an official holiday illustration.

An official holiday greetings card published on Naughty Dog’s official Twitter account shows The Last of Us’ Joel in a Hannukah sweater.

Like his peers in Hollywood and advertising, Druckmann has been keen to insert a radical left wing agenda in his stories. He inexplicably decided that an interracial lesbian romance between teenagers would appeal to his largely “White, straight, Christian male” audience, and doubled down with The Last of Us Part 2 (just released this month). In addition to promoting homosexuality, the company has hired a transsexual actor and made his/her character a transsexual, and one of the antagonists has been made more muscular since she was originally revealed, in order to be more “trans friendly.” In the aforementioned interview with The Frame, Druckmann confirmed that his games will feature fewer heterosexual White men moving forward:

“When you make a game, you have these different pillars that you’re trying to balance. It’s graphics, it’s gameplay, it’s story and you’re trying not to let any one pillar overwhelm the other. . . Recently, I realized that there’s this other pillar of diversity. That’s just as important as any one of these other pillars. I’ve kind of empowered people on the team that have made this their top priority. . . Can this be a person of color? Can this be a woman?”[3]

Incredibly, the above examples merely scratch the surface of the subversiveness of Druckmann’s games. What follows is an analysis of the four main Uncharted games (not including the PS Vita sequels or spin-offs), where we find clear examples of Jewish Esoteric Moralization (JEM), a subset of what mythologist Mark Brahmin calls Racial Esoteric Moralization (REM).

Abby, a character in The Last of Us Part 2, was “beefed up” in order to be more “trans friendly.”


What is Jewish Esoteric Moralization?

JEM is a bit like Joseph Campbell’s The Hero’s Journey but with archetypes specifying racial groups. Whereas Campbell’s framework applies more or less universally, JEM encodes an incredibly specific racial subtext that champions Jewish men in resource competition with vilified White/European men. Often the battle is over sexual access to Aryan women. We refer to these groups as Semitic and Aryan (or Dionysian and Apollonian) respectively to clarify that this isn’t just a religious division.

That Jews have hidden a complex symbol language from us is not without precedent. The reader will no doubt be aware that they successfully hid the existence of the Talmud from their European hosts for hundreds of years, and are experts at crypsis. However, it should be stressed that not all Jews are cognizant of the symbol language or would necessarily identify with its message. Indeed it appears that Jewish women are as benighted as Gentiles, as they are often the target of hatred and rejection in the JEM.

If every Jewish work of art was as obvious as Portnoy’s Complaint, The Graduate or Meet The Parents, even the dullest of Gentiles would catch on. With JEM, Jewish artists enjoy(ed) the freedom to subtly communicate and reinforce their worldview, safe in the knowledge that Whites would be blind to it. Take, for example, this ill-informed piece about Uncharted 2 celebrating its supposed reinforcement of White endogamy. As will be demonstrated, precisely the opposite is true. Fittingly, the blinding and/or blindness of their enemies is a common motif.

Sometimes even non-White actors/characters portray an Aryan or Semitic cipher to camouflage the true meaning of a work. Brahmin emphasizes the importance of researching names when examining esoteric art, as they’re often the key to identifying who is who. This is what we’ll be doing with Uncharted, as names cognate with Biblical and mythological archetypes (God Masking), or that describe animals, plants, elements, colors, and other descriptors, can tell us if a character is Semitic or Aryan. For example, Apollo, Ares/Mars, and Zeus/Jupiter are archetypes that personify the Aryan male.

Today anti-White hostility is readily apparent in the media, but if you want to know when crafty Jewish authors are giving you the middle finger behind the curtain you must read Brahmin’s groundbreaking thesis at The Apollonian Transmission and in his upcoming books. It will open your eyes to a whole new world. The following analysis assumes you’re completely new to JEM, so you can pick it up as we go along.

Naughty Dog vice president Neil Druckmann accepts awards for best writing in a video game at the 2014 and 2017 Writers Guild Awards for his work on The Last of Us and Uncharted 4. It must be easy to win awards when you’re part of a secret club!

I’m confident that Druckmann is Naughty Dog’s resident esotericist after having studied his work. It’s possible that none of his coworkers know about the subtext discussed below, but multiple Jews have held key positions on his titles. I bring this up not to suggest some sort of Jewish conspiracy (besides, perhaps, the oft-observed ethnic networking), but rather because JEM is more likely given the circumstances. For example, lead writer Josh Scherr and lead designer Emilia Schatz are self-identified Jews. Several others have names and appearances that suggest Jewish ancestry (such as co-president Evan Wells).

Druckmann is curiously absent the third installment, Drake’s Deception, but I will touch upon aspects that appear to retain his signature. It follows that he made contributions given his involvement with the franchise. My guess is that he helped lay the groundwork but refused to put his name on it due to artistic differences with writer/director Amy Hennig, whom he later allegedly ousted from the company.[4] When he replaced Hennig as writer/director on the fourth game he scrapped much of her work, causing one of the key voice actors to quit due to “weird changes” to the script.[5]


Nathan Drake, a crypto-Jewish hero

The Indiana Jones of the Uncharted games is Nathan Drake ( Morgan). Note that on its own, a Biblical or Hebrew name does not guarantee that a character is a Jewish cipher in the JEM. The given name Nathan means “he gave,” while the longer Nathaniel means “god gave.” This is similar to the meaning of the Hebrew name John (lit. “graced by Yahweh” or “Yahweh is gracious”), the patronymic surname of Indiana Jones (lit. “son of John”). In other words, Yahweh has favored our protagonist.

Ironically, the Old English surname Drake is what gives Nathan’s racial identity away; it’s a byname meaning “snake” or “dragon.” Ostensibly he adopted it after his childhood hero Sir Francis Drake, similar to Jones’ adoption of the nickname “Indiana.” Yet the serpent is one of the most important animal symbols in Jewish art – vines and dragons are variants of it in the JEM – and these identify Semitic (or Judaized) figures.[6] Incidentally, Indiana Jones’ ophidiophobia (“Why does it always have to be snakes?!“) serves as an irreverent in-joke to cognizant Jews.

The surname Morgan isn’t mentioned much in the games. It appears to be a reference to Morgan le Fay of Arthurian legend, particularly “the unpredictable duality of her nature, with potential for both good and evil.”[7] Indeed Drake’s penchant for murdering hundreds of men over the course of his adventures makes him the posterboy of what Clint Hocking terms ludonarrative dissonance. Druckmann has addressed and rejected this criticism,[8] as Drake’s real surname is an esoteric admission that he was never intended to be a paragon of morality.

The name Morgan has its own meaning which relates to Drake’s Jewish nature. It stems from the Old Welsh “Morcant” meaning “sea chief,” “sea protector,” “sea defender,” or “sailor/captain,” which may be a Biblical reference to Noah and Noah’s Ark. Indeed, both Uncharted 1 and Uncharted 4 begin with Drake aboard a boat, and water-based settings figure throughout the franchise. This is significant as water is an Aryan element in the JEM related to blood and admixture.[9] Hence the surname implies that Drake is the master or shepherd of the Aryan flock and that he’s a casanova among its female sheep (his “ark”). This interpretation is corroborated by plot details discussed next.

Nathan Drake, our crypto-Jewish hero, as seen in Uncharted 4.


Nathan Drake’s Aryan love interests

Before we continue, neophytes should understand one of the key themes of the JEM. Namely, Jewish authors such as Druckmann are encoding a “mating call” in their work, which is well illustrated in Uncharted. The objects of their desire are blonde, blue-eyed (Aryan) women. The Jewish obsession with blondes is well-documented,[10] and it is why Brahmin proposes that Judaism is a Semitic bride gathering cult. For example, the name “Indiana” is another Jewish in-joke alluding to sexual intercourse with the Greco-Roman goddess Artemis/Diana, the personification of the coveted Aryan female. Imagine the chutzpah of marketing a film/character to a mostly White male audience that covertly boasts of their racial cuckoldry!

In the first game Drake becomes romantically involved with an attractive independent journalist named Elena Fisher. Her given name is cognate with the Greek name Helena, which in the JEM is a reference to the unmatched beauty Helen of Troy.[11] Additionally, when paired with a Jewish suitor their relationship becomes an esoteric celebration of the proto-Jewish or Semitic infiltration of Hellenistic Greece. As such, this name is usually – but not always – reserved for Aryan women and Elena fits the phenotype exactly (though, inexplicably, her eyes will change from blue to brown or gray in the third and fourth installments).

Elena Fisher personifies the coveted Aryan female, referencing the legendary beauty Helen of Troy. Her eyes inexplicably changed from blue to brown-gray as the series went on.

 The surname “Fisher” may class Elena as Christian, where references to fish often connote Jesus Christ as the “Fisher of Men.”[12] Fish are also an Aryan aqueous resource in the JEM (one ingredient in the Consumption motif). If perhaps a bit of a stretch, Elena’s hunt for news scoops can be interpreted as a reference to the Goddess of the Hunt, Artemis/Diana. All things considered Elena is a distinctly non-Jewish love interest, while Drake is akin to the seducing serpent in the Garden of Eden. Drake even engages in “neg-ing” when he cruelly abandons Elena part way through their first adventure together.[13] When they reunite she eventually forgives the betrayal, accepting that his aloofness is part of his roguish charm.

The sequel takes place sometime later when their relationship is on the rocks. In Elena’s absence Drake has teamed up with a fellow thief named Chloe Frazer; she’s an auxiliary woman – and they rekindle their romance. Her given name is a cognate of Demeter/Ceres, the Greco-Roman goddess of agriculture, itself a common archetype in the JEM associated with Aryans and fertility.[14] This is emphasized by the surname Frazer, which is “the Anglicized form of the Gaelic personal name Frasach (meaning) the generous/fruitful one.”[15]

Chloe Frazer references Demeter/Ceres, the Greco-Roman goddess of the harvest. As an Indian-European mix (or the daughter of Saturn/Cronus, a Semitic deity), she’s not as desirable as a full-blooded Aryan.

 When Drake and Chloe unexpectedly run into Elena again mid-adventure, she’s accompanied by a cameraman named Jeff Wynis. Jeff is a potential rival for Elena’s affections, but he’s immediately eliminated when he’s shot and killed by some enemy soldiers. Thus we’re not terribly concerned if he was an Aryan or Semitic sexual competitor. What’s important is that with Jeff out of the picture, Druckmann has set up a love triangle between Drake, Elena, and Chloe. Given that Elena is a blonde, blue-eyed woman and Chloe is an Indian-European mix with black hair and tanned skin, no points for guessing who he ends up with. The bride gathering cult is, at its heart, a eugenics cult desiring Aryan features.

Chloe and Elena meet in Uncharted 2.


 Cassie Drake & the Cassandra of Greek myth

Drake and Elena have more adventures together in the third game, get married, and by the end of the fourth game have a daughter named Cassie. She’s an example of the Cassandra archetype,[16] a character from Greco-Roman myth who rejects Apollo’s romantic advances. To be clear, the JEM archetype differs from the prevailing “Cassandra metaphor.” The archetype is deployed to demoralize White men as Cassandra(s) reject them in favor of non-White sexual partners.

Hence Drake and Elena’s daughter Cassie, although just a child, has been set up to reject a White suitor in line with the archetype. This is the sort of subtle racial slights that Jews can incorporate into a story; should Cassie feature in future installments, I predict that she’ll be paired with a Jewish or non-White love interest.

In fact, there are two examples of the Cassandra archetype in the Uncharted series as Drake’s mother is also named Cassandra. Thus, we infer that she was an Aryan woman who chose to marry a non-Aryan man. This tells us that Drake inherited his Jewishness from his father, an arrangement not uncommon in the JEM,[17] which reinforces the notion that Jews are inherently admixed while simultaneously corroborating Brahmin’s concept of the matrilineal ruse.

Drake’s mother and daughter reference the Greco-Roman figure Cassandra, who famously denied Apollo’s advances. Note the subtly Jewish features of Cassie’s face. Her t-shirt shows a golden flame surrounding a blue lotus flower, an esoteric “blending” of the Jewish Fire God with an Aryan color symbol.


Sully the trickster & Sam the king maker

Drake’s mentor and father figure is the veteran thief Victor “Sully” Sullivan. His given name is self-explanatory, but the nickname Sully means “south meadow,” where the South is typically understood as a non-Aryan realm (in contrast to the Hyperborean North). The same designation applies to the East versus the West, hence “Sully” seems to be a Semitic ally.

This is corroborated by the meaning of the Irish surname Sullivan, which stems from the basic word súil (lit. “eye”). The latter half of the name is contested; in full it can mean “one-eyed,” “quick eyed,” “little dark-eyed one,” or “hawk eyed.” This ambiguity is actually handy from the esotericist’s point of view, as the name can reference multiple mythological figures to convey Sully’s personality and archetype.

If Sullivan means “one-eyed,” he’s likely channeling the one-eyed Norse god Odin. However, if the name means “hawk eyed,” Sully is posing as the Arthurian wizard Merlin (there’s a species of pigeon-hawk called the merlin). Indeed Druckmann may be intelligently referencing both of these figures, who, like Sully, are wizened tricksters. Frequent references to Norse myth (handed down to us from the Church) and Arthurian legend appear in the JEM, and these myths appear to hew closely to the symbol language. Later, we’ll see the odd reference built upon symbols from Incan mythology as well as Hinduism/Buddhism, but these are outliers/one-offs from my personal study of JEM.

Victor “Sully” Sullivan is Drake’s mentor and partner in crime, a trickster like Odin and Merlin. Note the encoded Ouroboros symbol on the door in the background ( see my analysis of Annihilation for how it relates to JEM).

Drake’s older brother Samuel is introduced in the fourth game. The sudden appearance of a down-on-his-luck older brother brings up an interesting motif in the JEM whereby siblings (especially brothers) may be racial rivals.[18] However, the name Samuel tends to be a Semitic identifier in the JEM so the Drakes don’t appear to follow this pattern. His Hebrew name means “God listened” or “God heard,”[19] suggesting God has answered Nathan’s prayers with Samuel’s reappearance.

The Biblical Samuel is the “king maker,” and Sam fits this role perfectly. Nathan has given up “treasure-hunting” (having married Elena) and is living a mundane existence; it is Sam’s return that coaxes Nathan into joining one last adventure. Sam surreptitiously collects some pirate gold during their quest, which is later used to purchase the company that Nathan works for (Nathan takes over as boss, becoming “king”). As a result, Nathan and Elena are set for life when they complete the treasure salvage in Malaysia that his former boss had been planning.

Sam, the “king maker,” rescues his brother from his life of doldrums.


The Frankish motif

In Uncharted: Among Thieves, Drake befriends an old German explorer living in the Himalayas who was originally hired by the German National Socialists to find the entrance to Shambhala. His name is Karl Schäfer, which reveals that he’s another Semitic cipher. Characters named Karl and its cognates compose what Brahmin terms the Frankish motif. His surname means “shepherd,” an occupation that aligns with Semitic archetypes such as Moses and Hermes/Mercury. As the latter was a “soul guide” to the Underworld or afterlife, Karl’s role is to guide Drake towards Shambhala, which is synonymous with Heaven or paradise.

It’s possible there’s another example of the Frankish motif in the third game, where we find the Englishman Charlie Cutter (Charles is a cognate of Karl). Despite his Anglo-Saxon name and appearance, Charlie is Drake’s trustworthy brother-in-arms. His surname, originally an occupational name for a cloth cutter, may also suggest a woodcutter. Wood is a symbol representing the Aryan as a consumable resource for the Jewish Fire God, wood that Charlie metaphorically “chops down” when killing foes.[20]

In the fourth game, we learn that Drake’s employer Jameson is married to a woman named Karla. It’s a minor detail for a character we’ll never meet, but it’s patterns like this that confirm the symbol language is at play. What’s important here is that these characters are Drake’s allies, which is why Brahmin suggests the Frankish empire was either Jewish, philo-Semitic, or inadvertently aligned with Jewish interests. We’ll see several historical references to anti-Semitic figures next, in the manner of Indiana JonesBelloq (a reference to the writer Hilaire Belloc).

Karl Schäfer and Charlie Cutter, possible examples of the Frankish motif. Note that Charlie wears black and green, Semitic colors in the JEM symbolism.


Antagonists in Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune

Atoq Navarro, a Peruvian Mestizos archeologist – and thus Drake’s treasure-hunting rival – is the main antagonist in the first game. His given name stems from Incan astronomy where a dark constellation called Atoq represents the fox.[21] The fox may function as a Semitic identifier related to the Teumessian Fox of Greco-Roman mythology, while the surname “Fox” and its cognates are also common Jewish names (note that Drake thinks Crash Bandicoot is a fox in Uncharted 4). In Incan mythology the fox is a thief that is said to have deceived the gods. Wikipedia states:

“(T)he deity Cuniraya Viracocha was angered by a fox and stated that, ‘As for you, even when you skulk around keeping your distance, people will thoroughly despise you and say ‘That fox is a thief!’ When they kill you they’ll carelessly throw you away and your skin too.’ In other narratives, the fox is said to have tried to steal the moon but the moon hugged the fox close which resulted in the spots on the moon.”[22]

These details are thematically appropriate. The latter anecdote arguably posits Atoq as a Semitic figure via an association with the Moon God Sin.[23] Alternatively the fox and Moon’s embrace dovetails with Atoq’s kidnapping of Elena, as she is associated with the Moon via the Artemis Daphnaia motif.[24]

“Navarro” is a Spanish and Sephardi Jewish surname, further hinting that he’s a Semitic figure. Thus we have what appears to be a Caducean Conflict wherein both protagonist and antagonist are esoterically indicated Jewish bride gatherers attempting to obtain El Dorado.[25] Essentially they are both after gold as a symbol of the Aryan’s blonde hair.[26]

The secondary antagonist is a man named Gabriel Roman. His given name is taken from the archangel, where, writes Brahmin: “Angels, in general, as figures, are Aryan with a few exceptions.”[27] The surname Roman ties him to the Roman Catholic Church.[28] Atoq kills him when he’s overcome by the corrosive power of the game’s MacGuffin, the cursed mummy inside the El Dorado sarcophagus.

Atoq Navarre and Gabriel Roman. Note Atoq wears black (a Semitic color) while Roman wears white and blue (Aryan colors).

The tertiary villain is an Indonesian treasure hunter named Eddy Raja. Raja is an Indian name meaning “king,” where names indicating royalty commonly identify Aryan characters in the JEM.[29] Thus despite his surface-level race, Eddy can be read as a historical reference to King Edward I, who famously issued the Edict of Expulsion in 1290. Hence he’s an inherently anti-Semitic villain! Indeed Raja manages to capture and imprison our hero, but Elena breaks Drake out of his prison cell (a bit like Oliver Cromwell “freeing” the Jews).

Eddy Raja is a reference to King Edward I. Note that he wears bright yellow and gold jewelry (Aryan colors/metal).


 Antagonists in Uncharted: Among Thieves

The main villain in the second game is a Serbian war criminal named Zoran Lazarević. Zoran is a common Slavic name, the masculine form of Zora, which means “dawn” or “daybreak.” It comes from the Zorya of Slavic mythology, “the two guardian goddesses, known as the Auroras. . . the Morning Star and the Evening Star.”[30] To wit, Druckmann is drawing a line between these Slavic goddesses and their Greco-Roman counterparts Eos/Aurora (the Goddess of Dawn), and Hesperus/Venus (the Evening Star). Indeed the Slavic name Zora is etymologically linked to Zohra, the Islamic name for the Planet Venus!

Saliently the masculine form of the name is linked to Lucifer (also the dawn-bringer and Morning Star). Brahmin argues that Lucifer is an epithet for Apollo,[31] implying Zoran is a god-masked Apollo. The smoking gun? Zoran’s official bio in Uncharted 4 informs us that he had a “love for the writings of Neitzsche,” whose philosophy famously proposed the Apollonian Dionysian dichotomy. That Apollo is repeatedly vilified as the personification of the “anti-Semitic Aryan” by Jewish authors is one of several reasons why Brahmin suggests we should embrace Apollo as our representative God.

The Serbian surname Lazarević is derived from the Hebrew name אֶלְעָזָר (Elʿazar or Eleazar), meaning “God has helped,” likely because Zoran manages to obtain the power of the story’s MacGuffin in the finale (though Drake still manages to defeat him). This heals Zoran’s burn scars which covered part of his face (an allusion to a fateful encounter with the Jewish Fire God, perhaps?). Alternatively the surname may describe Apollo as naturally gifted.

As a Serbian war criminal we can assume that Zoran is guilty of ethnic cleansing. This is likely a veiled criticism of the Apollo Cult’s eugenic Thargelia rituals, yet constitutes what Brahmin calls Conscious Ethnic Projection (CEP) given Israel’s crimes against the Palestinians. Indeed in December 2019 the International Criminal Court in the Hague announced that would investigate Israeli war crimes, which was predictably met with accusations of anti-Semitism.

Zoran’s name is a reference to “dawn” and “daybreak,” and the Slavic Goddess of the Morning Star, esoterically connecting him to Lucifer, and, by extension, Apollo.

The power of the Cintamani Stone of Buddhist and Hindu mythology is what heals Zoran. Here the stone is depicted as a blue orb in the center of a white tree referred to as the Tree of Life. The sphere’s blue coloration, which matches the sky and the Aryan’s blue eyes, indicates it is an Aryan power source.[32] This plot device strikingly communicates the bride gathering cult’s obsession with the Aryan as a rejuvenating genetic resource. Given its color, power, shape, and position within the tree, this MacGuffin is the physical manifestation of the Tiferet, the sixth Sephira on the Tree of Life representing the planet Jupiter in Jewish mysticism.

The Cintamani Stone in the Hindu/Buddhist Tree of Life, a stand-in for the Kabbalistic Tree of Life.

Zoran’s left-hand man is the treaure hunter Harry Flynn. He’s another Aryan villain: the name Harry (as distinct from Harrold) is cognate with Henry, ultimately stemming from the Old German “Haganrich,” where hagan means “enclosure.” Names referencing enclosures often indicate a god-masked Apollo, whose name originally meant “wall,” “fence for animals,” and “assembly within the limits of the square.”[33] Here we gain further insight into Indiana Jones’ rejection of his given name Henry; he is, in effect, rejecting the implied association with Apollo!

Things get even more interesting: The surname Flynn, which means “reddish” or “ruddy complexion,” is another Aryan identifier in the JEM related to Adam the Red.[34] In other words, the enclosure referenced with “Harry” is the Garden of Eden. Thus Druckmann has strongly corroborated what Brahmin calls the Eden Proof (feel free to pause here to read this essential article).[35]

Harry Flynn, an esoteric reference to Eden and Adam, strongly corroborates what Brahmin terms “the Eden Proof.”

 Zoran’s right-hand man is a black man simply named Draza. His race in the surface narrative appears to camouflage a historical figure, one Draža Mihailović, a Yugoslav Serb general who was convicted of high treason and war crimes by the Communist authorities during the Second World War.[36] As a staunch Royalist and Nationalist, the anti-Communist Mihailović is thus another villainous anti-Semite, from which we infer that Druckmann stands on the side of the Judeo-Bolsheviks and their unparalleled atrocities.


Antagonists in Uncharted: Drake’s Deception

Despite Druckmann’s supposed sabbatical from Uncharted‘s third chapter, we find what appears to be more JEM symbolism within it. The main antagonist is Katherine “Kate” Marlowe, the English leader of an over 400-year old hermetic Order. Katherine would follow JEM naming convention as a reference to Hecate/Trivia,[37] as “Kate” (and its cognates) are believed to stem from the latter half of “Hecate.” As the third aspect of the Triple Goddess, the old crone, Katherine is an older woman who personifies a corrupted, witch-like, and/or Judaized Aryan female. She metaphorically enters the Underworld when she’s consumed by quicksand in the game’s finale.

The game helpfully informs us that Queen Elizabeth I, Francis Walsingham, John Dee, Walter Raleigh, and Francis Drake belonged to Kate’s Order. This is an allusion to the Illuminati,[38] and corroborates Brahmin’s observation that the JEM outs historical crypto-Jews.[39] This also seems to apply to the game’s mention of T.E. Lawrence (a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia) whose surname is cognate with Stephen (these identify Semitic ciphers in the JEM). Here the age of the Order may imply an Aryan organization due to the symbolism of the number four, though typically the Illuminati/Freemasons are depicted as subordinate to Jewish interests.[40]

The surname Marlowe is a habitational name for someone who lived in Morlaix, Brittany, a peninsula in the northwest of France. This may indicate her family (or the Order itself) came with the Norman Invasion of England in 1066. Alternatively the name Morlaix sounds like mort lait which is French for “dead milk.” Jewish esotericists may imply “the milk has gone sour” or “has run dry” with such female characters.[41] Just as the crone represents the end of the life cycle, the implication here is that Zionist Freemasonry has “run its course” or has become corrupted.

As Katherine appears to have been consciously developed within the JEM framework, it seems likely that Druckmann conceived her. In contrast, Marlowe’s second-in-command is a man simply named Talbot, which means “messenger of destruction.” It seems to me that Talbot is one of Hennig’s creations, named in homage of David Talbot, the head of a similar secret society in Anne Rice’s The Tale of the Body Thief. Hennig had previously worked on games starring vampires, so it follows that she’d be a fan of Rice’s work.

Katherine “Kate” Marlowe is likely an allusion to Hecate/Trivia, a witch-like archetype in the JEM. Sister Catherine, seen briefly in Uncharted 4, is another example. She’s a strict nun who watches over the young Drake during his stay at a Catholic orphanage.


Antagonists in Uncharted: A Thief’s End

Druckmann was back in the driver’s seat for the fourth game. Here we find an imaginary villain named Hector Alcázar. In Brahmin’s estimation Hector – the legendary Trojan killed by Achilles – is a Semitic figure.[42] The Spanish surname is a word for a type of Moorish castle or palace, as well as a habitational name for someone from Spain, suggesting perhaps Sephardi Jewish roots (indeed Hector looks as though he could be Drake’s father!). Alternatively, it may suggest the infamous island prison Alcatras, as Sam supposedly befriended Hector while the two were inmates in prison.

It is my suspicion that Alcázar, as “Butcher of Panama,” is a historical reference to Manuel Noriega Moreno. “Moreno” is a Spanish, Portuguese, and Sephardi Jewish surname, possibly a derivative of the classical Latin “Maurus” meaning “Moor” (which would tie into the aforementioned meaning of Alcázar). Perhaps Druckmann is telling us that Noriega was a Jew. Alternatively Noriega’s ties to the United States intelligence agencies made him a puppet, an “imaginary villain,” just like Alcázar. This relates to Brahmin’s concept of the Caducean phenomenon.

The real villain is a White man named Rafe Adler. His given name (pronounced like “safe”) has multiple origins, the most likely being the Old Norse variant which means “counsel of the wolf,” or “wise wolf.” The wolf is an animal totem commonly assigned to Aryan characters in the JEM.[43] Here it is paired with a German surname that means “eagle.” This is revealing, as both the wolf and the eagle are among Zeus/Jupiter’s sacred animals. Thus at bare minimum Adler is a clearly defined Aryan villain, if not a god-masked Zeus (Zeus is an Aryan god hated for having exiled Saturn and Vulcan, the latter two being important Semitic deities in the JEM).

Nadine Ross and Rafe Adler in Uncharted 4.

A black woman named Nadine Ross is Adler’s accomplice. Her given name is of Arabic origin meaning “admonitory/messenger,” which is contradicted by its secondary meaning of “Showerer of blessings.” Thus she’s indicated as neither good nor evil, or someone between an ally and a villain. Indeed she does not seem terribly concerned with killing Drake, and would later star in the spin-off Uncharted: Lost Legacy alongside Chloe as her partner in crime.

Her surname may descend from the Gaelic word for “headland,” which is “a narrow piece of land that projects from a coastline into the sea.” This clearly relates to her paramilitary outfit “Shoreline.” It can also mean “a strip of land left unplowed at the end of a field,” which implies she is neither sexually penetrated nor inseminated, i.e. a virgin.

These clues imply that Nadine is a god-masked Athena Parthenos, virgin goddess of war (and one of Zeus’ children). More specifically, as a black woman Nadine appears to venerate Martin Bernal‘s (discredited) theory of “Black Athena,” which is based on Plato’s notion that Athena was originally inspired by the “war-like” Egyptian goddess Neith.

Moreover these meanings imply Nadine is a lesbian: In the JEM symbolism, water represents the Aryan as an aqueous resource, so if “Ross” means something like “peninsula,” Nadine is posited as the hard, masculine, earthen element penetrating the sea. The sexual connotation of “unplowed field” still applies as fully compatible with lesbianism.[44] Athena mourned the accidental killing of her beloved friend Pallas by taking her name, becoming “Pallas Athena,” the implication being they were more than friends. Indeed an official holiday illustration depicts Nadine and Chloe blushing under the mistletoe.


The Jewish experience in microcosm

Often JEM takes the form of a parable where important historical conflicts are reduced to a microcosm. Let’s explore a simple example from Uncharted 4, when Drake spends some time in a Panamanian prison. This section of the game begins with a fist fight between him and a Spanish-speaking prisoner named Gustavo. “Gustavo” is the Spanish version of the Old Swedish name “Gustaf,” meaning “staff of the Geats.” To wit, Drake’s conflict with this “Spanish” thug is a parable of the Jewish struggle for dominance in Visigothic Spain reduced to a microcosm.

The fight is interrupted by a crooked prison warden named Vargas, who’s a minor villain. His is a Spanish habitational name stemming from a knight named Iván de Vargas who “distinguished himself in the (re)conquest of Madrid,”[45] allowing Christians to supplant Muslims at the center of the city. The reader will be aware that Jews opened the gates to the Moorish invasion of Spain, so Vargas is yet another reference to an historical anti-Semitic villain. Both Gustavo and Vargas will meet their demise as Drake escapes – effectively a “dunk” on Catholic Spain, which is a sore spot for Jews due to the counter-Semitic measures taken during the Spanish Inquisition.


Apollo versus Jesus in Uncharted 4

As we saw in Uncharted 2, names cognate with Henry often indicate a god-masked Apollo – Jewry’s archnemesis. This appears to be the case with Druckmann’s reference to Henry Avery, a legendary pirate, in Uncharted 4. In the game’s plot we learn that Henry Avery founded a pirate utopia called Libertalia with the help of eleven other legendary pirates. The “twelve pirates” who pooled their gold together are possibly the deities of the Greco-Roman pantheon related to the Zodiac.[46]

Henry tried to take the colony’s treasure hoard for himself, and poisoned the other pirates with the help of an accomplice named Thomas Tew. This may represent Apollo supplanting the other gods to become the most important deity. However, he failed: Thomas stabbed Henry in the back in an attempt to take the treasure for himself. In the finale we learn that Henry and Thomas killed one another.

Characters named Tom are often Christ figures in the JEM where the apostle “Doubting Thomas” is considered the “twin of Christ” (indeed Thomas means “twin” in Hebrew).[47] Thus the rise and fall of Libertalia, with its ill-fated Apollo and Christ figures, may be a parable of Christ’s victory over Apollo and the collapse of the Ancient Roman Empire.[48] Of course, Christ was crucified by the Romans and so Thomas Tew never made it out alive, either.

However, there may also be an encoded political message here. Note the similarity between Henry Avery’s pirate sigil and the Skull and Bones society’s logo. Iconography present in Henry’s mansion points to his organization being something akin to Freemasonry, which would apply to Skull and Bones. Also note that Skull and Bones was started by two key figures, and had twelve original members. Hence the game’s backstory may communicate that Skull and Bones was an Aryan movement attempting to rob America that collapsed due to the Christian beliefs of its members.

Skull and Bones (a.k.a. Order 322) is an important organization in American politics and one that seems to be referenced in films. Take the famous football scene from The Dark Knight Rises for example, in which a luxury suite numbered 322 explodes. The stadium where this scene was filmed does not contain a suite with that number, suggesting the detail is a deliberate reference. See also the Prescott family (i.e. Prescott Bush, a member of Skull and Bones) in Life is Strange.

Henry Avery, whom Drake refers to as a “paranoid psychopath,” has a golden harp in his mansion. The harp is one of Apollo’s symbols. Also note the sunbursts on the floor and the golden suns on the doors in the mansion, more Apollonian symbols. On the doors, beneath the sun, there’s an encoded Masonic compass which is missing its partner, the square.


Other JEM symbolism in Uncharted

There is much, much, more to explore, but for brevity’s sake I will highlight only a few examples. In many areas the correct path forward is subtly marked with yellow, which guides the player as if on a “yellow brick road.” Yellow, like gold, is an Aryan color corresponding with blond hair and the sun. Blue is also an Aryan color due to the Aryan’s blue eyes. Take note where blue and yellow are combined in props or costumes. Green,[49] on the other hand, is a Semitic color, while “purple is where an Aryan blue meets red, the color of vulnerability to admixture.”[50] Thus Drake wears a green shirt and Elena wears a purple shirt as they share dinner and a passionate kiss in Uncharted 4.

Costume colors matching the esoteric racial identities and themes appear in this scene from Uncharted 4.

 JEM number symbolism is also present (keep your eyes peeled for the number six), as is Hebraic gematria. For example, in Uncharted 4 the Saint Francis cathedral – the orphanage where Drake stays as a boy – is addressed 1016. In Hebraic gematria, 1016 corresponds to a Hebrew word meaning “what is redundant or overlapping.” This is a religious slight describing Christianity from a Jewish perspective. Other associations with 1016 appear in 366, where we find “Alliance” (describing Drake and Sam or St. Francis as a crypto-Jew allied with the Catholic church) and 456, “an orphan; a fatherless child” (reflecting Drake’s childhood).

The Saint Francis cathedral is addressed 1016, corresponding to meaningful Hebrew words via gematria.

Eagle-eyed players could have a field day sifting out all of the JEM tropes. Perhaps the most noteworthy motif is the franchise’s general focus on flashy water effects. Throughout the series, Drake will navigate river rapids on a sea-doo, infiltrate a tanker as it’s tossed about at sea, escape a sinking cruise ship, and so on. Ostensibly Naughty Dog’s designers wanted to show off the technical power of the Playstation with their visual effects wizardry. Yet as mentioned earlier, water (especially fresh water) is an important symbol representing the Aryan as an essential resource (Semites are a desert-dwelling people, after all).


What this means for Sony, Naughty Dog, and Amy Hennig

That Naughty Dog’s games contain Jewish Esoteric Moralization raises serious concerns about Druckmann’s leadership. Dissidents will certainly want to boycott the company, but what about the studio itself? Can straight, White, Christian men working under his regime truly expect fair and equal treatment, given his deep-seated racial/religious bias? How many non-Jewish employees have been passed over for promotion, simply because they’re the “enemy”? And has he made any passes at blondes working there, such as the actresses he hires to portray his characters?

Of course until JEM becomes a widely known phenomenon Druckmann can deny and deflect with exoteric alibis. Yet the scandal surrounding Amy Hennig’s departure from the company seems to be the clincher. As mentioned, despite her industry experience Hennig was allegedly “forced out” by Druckmann and Bruce Straley. This analysis reveals the likely motive: Her ideas were simply incompatible with the esoteric subtext Druckmann sought to insert! Hypothetically, he could rally his co-ethnic male peers to his side but had to leave her in the dark. And so he and Straley allegedly “stonewalled” her, which must have been personally and professionally devastating to her.

Three’s a crowd: Amy Hennig was allegedly forced out of the company by Neil Druckmann and Bruce Straley.

Hennig is a cut above most video game writers, but like most non-Jewish authors she probably thinks of her work as having no purpose beyond entertainment. It should be self-evident that the intricacy and purpose behind Druckmann’s work is, in its own way, impressive and imitable. If left unchallenged, he will no doubt become something like the Steven Spielberg or Stan Lee of video games. His other baby, The Last of Us, is widely acclaimed – despite its many shortcomings in game design – purely because of its production value and story.

Brahmin argues we must treat our own Art with the same care and respect because of its power to shape the culture and attitudes of our people. A “return to sophistication,”[51] both in how we write stories and interpret them, will inevitably require “the establishment of an agreed upon, shared symbolism.”[52] Race-conscious White writers can begin the process of moralizing our people by simply reversing the way in which Greco-Roman archetypes are deployed in the JEM (for some quick tips, click here). Applying Roman Interpretation to Jewish art is an education in itself that will yield many important building blocks.

Lastly, I feel Sony should send in a Japanese task force to radically restructure Naughty Dog from top to bottom. This likely won’t happen, but the debacle surrounding The Last of Us Part 2 and its bizarre political agenda would provide the perfect cover for terminating Druckmann’s employment. Hennig could be invited back as the lead writer/director, which would signal a return to form while pleasing stalwart fans. At the very least Sony should audit the software marketed by former Naughty Dog employee Andrew Maximov called “Promothean A.I.” to determine if he has stolen any of the studio’s intellectual property. Prometheus is, after all, a Semitic figure who stole fire from the Gods.


Notes and Citations

[1] Rubin directed the original Crash Bandicoot games, which are legitimately good, as well as the Jak & Daxter trilogy (which are solid if not spectacular). His games were more about fun than politics, and many fans have been unhappy with Naughty Dog’s direction since his departure.

[2] Michelle Lanz, “A peek into Naughty Dog game creator Neil Druckmann’s creative process,” the Frame, July 13, 2016

[3] ibid.

[4] Paul Tassi, “‘Uncharted’ Writer/Director Amy Hennig Reportedly ‘Forced Out’ At Naughty Dog,” Forbes, March 5, 2014 (archive link)

[5] Kyle Orland, “Alan Tudyk: I left Uncharted 4 over ‘weird changes’ to script,” October 20, 2015

[6] Mark Brahmin, REM: Racial Esoteric Moralization (Washington Summit, 2020) book #, chapter: “Garden of Eden Part II: The Jewish Serpent & Jewish Tree of Knowledge

ii. M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Garden of Eden Part III: Seth as Serpent Seed and Sargon of Akkad as Serpent

[7] Morgan le Fay, Wikipedia

[8] Chris Suellentrop, “‘Uncharted 4’ Director Neil Druckmann on Nathan Drake, Sexism in Games,” Rolling Stone, May 24, 2016.

[9] M. Brahmin, ibid., book #, chapter: “Baptism and Anointing: Symbols for Copulation and Sexual Interaction

[10] See also Yaron Ben-Naeh, “Blond, tall, with honey-colored eyes: Jewish ownership of slaves in the Ottoman Empire,” Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2006

[11] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Value of Homer

ii. See also Lena in Annihilation, Ellen Biederman in Deep Impact, a character originally named Helen in Super Bad, Ellen (“The Lady”) in The Quick and the Dead, Helena Harford in Eyes Wide Shut, and so on.

[12] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Homosexuality Part VII: The Aryan Jonah and the Pederastic Synagogue

ii. See the obvious Christ figure Spurgeon “Fish” Tanner in Deep Impact.

[13] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The ‘Neg-ing’ Jewish Husband and the Christian Wife

[14] See also Chloe Price in Life is Strange, Chloe in Deep Impact, and Josie Radek in Annihilation.

[15] Frazer, Wikipedia

[16] See “Names referencing racial cuckoldry against Aryans” in M. Brahmin, “Names Part II: The Importance of Names in REM, Common names & Exoteric Alibis

ii. See also Cassie in Annihilation, and Cassidy in Life is Strange 2.

[17] See also the admixed Leo Biederman in Deep Impact, whose mother is named Ellen (also a reference to Helen).

[18] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Aryans as ‘First Born,’ Jews as ‘Second Born’ & The Curse of Cain

ii. See Shaun and Daniel Diaz in Life is Strange 2 and Kain in Annihilation.

[19] See also Sam in The Last of Us and Sam Flynn in Tron: Legacy.

[20] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Semitic Fire Gods

[21] Marina Jones, “The Dark Constellations of the Incas,” Futurism, August 10, 2014

[22] Foxes in Inca mythology, Wikipedia

[23] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “‘Sin’ as an Original Jewish God?

[24] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Daphne Motif and the problem with Laurels

[25] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Caducean phenomenon

[26] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Star of David, Power Rings, Crowns and Gold

[27] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Racial Identity of Christ’s Parents Part II: The Annunciation Proof

[28] See also Roman Castevet in Rosemary’s Baby.

[29] See “Names Indicating Aryan Characters or ‘Aryan Identifiers'” in M. Brahmin, “Names Part II: The Importance of Names in REM, Common names & Exoteric Alibis

[30] Zorya, Wikipedia

ii. See also Zhora in Blade Runner as a reference to Venus.

[31] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Esoteric Apollo: Lucifer, an imperfect name describing an Aryan God

ii. See also CLU in Tron: Legacy.

[32] See color symbolism, M. Brahmin, “The Parabolist’s and Propagandist’s Quick Reference Guide for Creating A.I.M

[33] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Apollo, the Wall, the Enclosure, the Garden, the Assembly and the Eden Proof

ii. See also Henry in The Last of Us, Little Henry in American History X, and Coach Harris in Revenge of the Nerds.

[34] See “Adam the red,” M. Brahmin, ibid., book #, chapter: “The Garden of Eden Part I: Adam the Aryan Cuckold

[35] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Apollo, the Wall, the Enclosure, the Garden, the Assembly and the Eden Proof

[36] Draža Mihailović, Wikipedia

[37] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Underworld as non-Aryan, ‘Sacred Prostitution’ and Jewess as ‘Trivia’

ii. See also Kat in The Last of Us Part 2, Kat in DmC: Devil May Cry, Trinity in The Matrix, the Trent sisters in Rosemary’s Baby, Adele Lack in Synecdoche New York, Kate Marsh in Life is Strange, Karen Reynolds in Life is Strange 2, Caitlin Stanley in Deep Impact, Catherine Langford in Stargate, Kathleen “Kitty Kat” Cleary in Wedding Crashers, and the company ‘Cathi Sue’ in Heist.

[38] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Illuminati confirmed

[39] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Historical Crypto-Jews Identified in JEM and History as Propaganda

[40] See number symbolism, M. Brahmin, “The Parabolist’s and Propagandist’s Quick Reference Guide for Creating A.I.M

[41] Another tantalizing though perhaps unlikely association occurs in a local legend of Morlaix, which is home to the “so-called Duchess Anne’s house,” named for Anne of Brittany. She was Duchess of Brittany from 1488 until her death in 1514; readers will no doubt be aware of the significance of the number 1488 which is alluded to (perhaps) via this villain’s surname.

[42] See Hector, M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “The Value of Homer

[43] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Esoteric Apollo: the totem of Wolf as pseudo-praise

[44] A somewhat similar euphemism may be implied with the Marvel character Carol Danvers, where “Danvers” may mean something akin to “dyke.” See M. Brahmin, “Captain Marvel Part I: The Jewish Feminist Carol Danvers a.k.a Ms. Marvel

[45] Madrid (Middle Ages), Wikipedia

[46] See the number twelve, M. Brahmin, ibid., “The Parabolist’s and Propagandist’s Quick Reference Guide for Creating A.I.M.

[47] See Tom in 1917 and President Tom Beck in Deep Impact.

[48] See also Tron: Legacy.

[49] M. Brahmin, ibid., book #, chapter: “The Color Green, Robin Hood & May Day

[50] See “purple,” M. Brahmin, ibid., book #, chapter: “Captain Marvel Part II: The Christian Kree and The Jewish Skrulls

[51] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “A Return To Sophistication

[52] M. Brahmin, ibid, book #, chapter: “Myth and Symbol Language Part I: The importance of establishing an Agreed upon, Shared Symbolism

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Unconscious Cinema: Mulholland Drive

Tonight (June 13, 2020) on Unconscious Cinema, Mark Brahmin, Richard Spencer and Tyler Hamilton undergo David Lynch’s 2001 surreal neo-noir masterpiece “Mulholland Drive”. Tune onto the NPI/Radix channel at 7…

Tonight (June 13, 2020) on Unconscious Cinema, Mark Brahmin, Richard Spencer and Tyler Hamilton undergo David Lynch’s 2001 surreal neo-noir masterpiece “Mulholland Drive”. Tune onto the NPI/Radix channel at 7 PM MT for the premiere.

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Nostalgia, Nationalism & Woody Allen

Nostalgia is the great opium den of Nationalist circles where many bright and energetic minds in dissident politics go to escape modernity and embark on a quest of contemplation and…

Nostalgia is the great opium den of Nationalist circles where many bright and energetic minds in dissident politics go to escape modernity and embark on a quest of contemplation and yearning for what “could have been”. Is this something that can be fully separated from radicals in our movement? Maybe not completely, however, just like the addict in the opium den, so too, are nationalists being consumed in reverie over any time period that they never lived in, and in place of progression is a great wheat field image induced stagnation that breeds depression and resentment.

Third position ideas do require reflection on our past, which can justifiably create immense admiration, but if only for the purpose of moving forward. Jewish Filmmaker Woody Allen, seems to understand the negative effects of nostalgia and seemingly gifts us with his 2011 film, Midnight In Paris. A film that displays how this trance-like state of yearning for the past can seriously complicate your present. The only problem is Allen, I feel, is speaking to a very specific audience and that audience is us. Thus, he is careful to not encourage us too much and, as you will read below, I believe he has a more nefarious purpose for this messaging.


OVERVIEW OF MIDNIGHT IN PARIS

 Midnight in Paris, written and directed by Woody Allen, is a quirky tale of a screenwriter seemingly at an impasse. Gil Pender (Owen Wilson), is vacationing in Paris with his fiancee, Inez (Rachel McAdams) and her parents John and Helen. As we can see right off the bat, Gil and Inez couldn’t be more different than one another. Gil is very lackadaisical while Inez is explicitly high maintenance and intense. Inez’s parents have nothing but disdain for Gil and his ostensibly aloof and unserious personality. Gil is almost finished with his first novel about a man working in a nostalgia shop. Inez is not impressed or encouraging with this novel and wishes he would stick to screenwriting due to to his success in Hollywood. Inez is also annoyed at Gils’ insistence that they should live in Paris indefinitely due to his nostalgic euphoria over the Paris of the 1920’s.

Paul, who is a friend of Inez, and his wife happen to be in Paris at the same time as them. She admits to Gil she had a “crush” on Paul in college to which a clearly jealous Gil describes him as “Pedantic” and “Pseudo-intellectual”. Inez is clearly infatuated with Paul while Gil cannot stand him. Paul is a very dapper man who speaks with confidence and with every chance he gets, he tries to be the smartest man in the room. Even when he is contradicted by a tour guide about the artist Rodin and his tryst with his wife and mistress, Paul will not relent and keeps insisting he is right (and as the viewer can find out if they look into the life of Rodin, the tour guide was correct).

Gil and Inez have a night of drinking with Paul and his wife until Gil opts for a walk around the city of Paris alone to take the city it all in while Inez leaves with Paul and his wife in a taxi. Gil stops on his walk to figure out where he is exactly and as soon as the clock strikes midnight, a 1920’s vehicle pulls up in front of Gil. The passengers, also dressed from the 20’s, invite him to join them. It is at this point Gil is transported back in time to what he sees as the Golden Age of Paris. The 1920’s. This allows for an entertaining list of famous characters from the time to enter the plot such as Ernest Hemingway, Salvador Dali, Luis Bunuel, Cole Porter, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and more.

Every night Gil transports himself back in time to meet all these artistic giants of the 20th century while his wife spends her time with Paul and, supposedly, his wife. After Hemingway brings Gil to Gertrude Stein’s flat so that he may have his novel analyzed, he meets Adriana (Marianne Cotillard). They have an instant connection and Gil becomes conflicted with this new flame that he has in the past and his current fiancee.

After visiting an Antique vendor in the present day, he finds Adriana’s diary where she has written a passage about her love for Gil. This encourages him to go back in time once more so that they may communicate their feelings for one another. They do so,and as they kiss at midnight, a horse drawn carriage pulls up in front of them and a well dressed couple invites them in. They are then transported to the 1890’s which is the true Golden Age, according to Adriana. After she is offered a job to make costumes for the theater, she decides to stay but Gil cannot. He realizes that everybody is bored with the age in which they live and they won’t find their meaning by going back. He decides the present is where he should remain and they choose to part.

Once in the present, Gil realizes Inez may be cheating on him with Paul (a discovery made by Hemingway after he reads Gil’s novel; Gertrude Stein then relates to Gil that Hemingway could not believe the protagonist did not see his fiancee was having an affair right before his eyes with “the pedantic one”) and when he confronts her, she admits to doing so but that he needs to just “get over it”. Gil seems rather pleased and takes this moment to tell her he will stay in Paris and they are not right for one another. In the end, we see Gil walking, yet again, through the city of Paris and at midnight he bumps into a young beautiful antique vendor he met earlier in the film. They walk off together through the streets, in the rain, which is where Gil always felt happiest.


WOODY ALLEN & THE ARYAN

 What does this film mean, and more importantly, what does it mean for nationalists? In a way, Allen is giving an honest critique of reactionary thought. Not living in the now and spending ones time only in the past can produce untold unhappiness in the present. Gil is frustrated with how he is presently living. He dreams of a before time when to him everything was great. We see this many a time in politics. For a typical Republican, perhaps it’s America in the 50’s. To some 1930s Europe. To others medieval times and there are even those that believe that in the days of cavemen things were far more ideal. Which ever time one finds themselves pining for, Allen is telling the viewer that it is the present we should be focused in but how exactly is he portraying the present?

The film opens with a series of static shots that appear almost like paintings to display the very best of Paris. Throughout the film, the city is always ever present as another character in the story. While indeed very inspiring and breathtaking, it is obvious Woody Allen has only picked very select parts of the city. What we know of Paris today is that it is a shell of its former self. Even in 2011, during the films release, migrant hell holes burrowed their way into the city along with the trash that covers the streets. Culture in Paris is waning and the very best parts of the city are only preserved for the sake of tourism and not for the French soul. I doubt Allen is ignorant to any this. Quite the opposite. I believe this was a calculated decision on his part to ensure that we don’t spend much time in the past but to also accept our present as being more than sufficient, therefore we have no need to look to our future. As Nationalists, we are inspired by our past which Allen is more than aware, and as I’ve stated before we take elements from our Golden Age (whenever that may be) so that we may apply it to our lives in order to create a different future than the one that has been currently decided for us. Allen is careful to not encourage us too much. He wants you to stay forever in the present and to imprison your passion within the confines of a “this is good enough” type of attitude.

How do we know Allen is speaking to us? Some subtle clues in his body of work, as well as Midnight in Paris specifically, give us an indication of who he is speaking to. One of the ways we can find these clues is through name recognition which you can learn through the work of Mark Brahmin and his work in Jewish Esoteric Moralization also known as JEM. Many Jewish filmmakers pick very specific names in order to indicate who is an “Aryan” and who is a “Jew”. Gil can be translated to a few different meanings. Foolish, simpleton, and happy (which can hint at a happiness out of ignorance) are among those meanings which makes sense when you view this blonde and blue eyed character in the film. JEM often portrays the Aryan figure as gullible and generally oblivious.

It’s not that Gil is an ignorant man by any means it is more that he is a bit unaware of his surroundings and can be easily manipulated. Two women in his life that are Jewish signifiers, Inez (Who’s father is a Jewish figure named John who is also a neocon) and Adriana (meaning black, which is a Jewish signifier), merely have Gil around for their temporary entertainment. Adriana, for example, writes in her diary that her reasons for loving Gil are that he is “naive and unassuming”. Paul Bates, being short for Bartholomew which is a Jewish signifier, even cuckolds Gil. The Jewish figure steals the Aryans woman away from him.

While there are several symbols and other names that we can delve into, the point is that Allen is giving, in my opinion, a direct message to the “goy”. Jews are very fearful of an inspired Aryan people which may lead to uprisings as we have seen in the past. Since film is possibly the most versatile art form in history, it would behoove one such as Woody Allen to not only entertain his audience but to also influence them in a way that he feels benefits him through subversive means.


CONCLUSION

Nostalgia, while being quite natural, can be a trap. Gil experienced this well enough. While its aroma can be alluring, it has been the great motivator of inaction among Nationalists currently. I cannot emphasize enough that we can, and should, look to days gone by to find inspiration and ideas that we can use or even update to create a future. But A movement must have vision. Vision requires forward thinking. There is no return to tradition and Nostalgia is by no means meant to be our end goal.

Midnight in Paris interested me because on one hand Woody Allen is acting as if he is giving us good advice on this matter. On the other hand, making sure we are stopped in our tracks. This is one of many ways our opposition tries to control us. The film is well done, entertaining, and quite funny. With that being said, Allen wishes to make you feel like you are progressing while in reality keeping you in a perpetual hamster wheel. It is all too Caducean. We need to spot this effect in every aspect of our lives. We need to break free of not only the prison our opposition has created for us but the one that we, as nationalists, construct for ourselves. Move forward. Not backward.

 

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How a society becomes extreme

Editor’s Note: This is an excerpt from the author’s forthcoming book “American Extremist: The Psychology of Political Extremism”. Extremism is a top-down phenomenon, meaning that it is something that originates among…

Editor’s Note: This is an excerpt from the author’s forthcoming book “American Extremist: The Psychology of Political Extremism”.


Extremism is a top-down phenomenon, meaning that it is something that originates among the powerful and then floats downstream through the various institutions of power and influence. It is a widely held belief that political change arises organically from the bottom, but many a great scholarly work (C.A. Bond’s ‘Nemesis’ and Christopher Caldwell’s ‘The Age of Entitlement’, for example) utterly demolish this faulty perception.  Nothing has ever occurred, whether we speak of the American Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, Mussolini’s or Napoleon’s rise to power, to use some recent examples, without the patronage of the upper classes.  The extremist capture of the United States is no exception.  Before we may begin, I must credit some of these insights to the work of Polish psychiatrist Andrzej Lobaczewski, who, after collecting several decade’s worth of work studying the psychology of totalitarian regimes (in particular the USSR), published them in 2006 in a book titled ‘Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes’.

In his book, Lobaczewski described a ‘hysteroidal cycle’ whereby the privileged classes transmit maladaptive attitudes and behaviors over the course of multiple generations, the final result of which is a phenomenon he termed ‘macrosocial dysfunction’.  Put succinctly, the dysfunctions of the few (the privileged classes) become the dysfunctions of the many (everyone else).  These hysteroidal cycles consist of alternating durations of ‘happy times’ and ‘unhappy times’, where, in the former, moral and psychological knowledge pertaining to issues of psychopathology is suppressed, while the latter represents an excavation and exploration of this previously forbidden trove of knowledge.  The subsequent recovery of this knowledge is then used to rectify problems created by the hoarding of this information.

Lobaczewski views social injustice as integral to the perpetuation of mass psychological dis-ease, seeing as, in his view, the upper classes necessarily exploit the lower classes in order to attain (and preserve) their wealth and good fortune (The happiness and prosperity of this first phase of the cycle itself may be predicated on the suppression and persecution of some minority group, or the under classes more broadly).  Through conversive and hysterical reasoning, these privileged classes selectively perceive information in such a way that they can more easily justify profiting from their ill gotten gains and marginalizing the moral, mental, and labor values of those they exploit.  Each subsequent generation suffers from a progressive “atrophy of natural critical faculties” (p. 170) which ultimately culminates in the censorship, persecution, and even genocide of those underprivileged classes, whose very existence challenges the pathological worldview of the privileged.

Control of the psychologically normal is achieved first by the embedding of a “pathologically hypersensitive censor” (p. 177) within the citizenry themselves.  These are in effect, ego defenses deployed by the upper classes who seek to preserve their own positive self-image.  It is these defects of the ego, in the form of “egoism, egotism, and egocentrism” (p. 177) which are the root psychological causes of what he terms characteropathic failings.  Moreover, not only will these privileged classes adopt pathological – and ultimately violent – attitudes toward those they rule, but they will even develop contempt and antagonism toward competing nations that adhere to a healthier and more psychologically integrated approach in their governance.  (We may easily look at the present day United States and see a manifestation of what Lobaczewski describes; the American upper classes regularly castigate their constituents for their moral failings, their lack of sophistication, et cetera, all the while decrying other nations which, however imperfectly they may be achieved, work far more diligently to protect and provide for their people.  Countries such as Hungary, Poland, Russia, Iran, and China come to mind immediately).

In Lobaczewski’s ponerological model, a society is comprised of two essential psychological types: The characteropathic and the normal.  Characteropaths are those individuals who suffer some biological condition (such as brain trauma) or genetic predisposition (for example, a personality disorder) and are thus given to a psychological disposition of evil.  Whether they are the progenitors of such evil or merely the lackeys who happily execute the evil will of others is of little consequence.  We may call these types maladapts.  The ‘normals’ are greater in number than the maladapts, and have an innate moral character in addition to a well-adapted psychological profile, but are often incapable of recognizing (or even properly resisting) this psychology of evil due to their naïve condition.

Any institution can find itself infiltrated by maladapts who then work to bend that institution to their will, which in turn signals a fertile ground for other maladapts and pathocrats to gain entry (pathocrats being defined as any political actor given to a psychology of evil).  It is the nature of the characteropath to exploit structural weaknesses in an organization so that he may overtake it, turning it to his own diabolical purposes.  Should he fail it would be his death; if the characteropath cannot ascend to the role of pathocrat, he would either wash out of society due to his own weakness and lack of social utility or be driven out by those members of polite society who have become wise to his game.  We may say then that subversion and domination are among the defining traits of the characteropath.  They are a biological type who cannot thrive under normal conditions – they must destroy what is good and healthy in order to live.  Fortunately for us, Lobaczewski argues that “the pathocracy’s dominance will weaken imperceptibly but steadily, finally leading to a situation where in the society of normal people reaches for power. This is a nightmare vision to the psychopaths. That the biological, psychological, moral, and economic destruction of the majority of normal people becomes, for the pathocrat, a biological necessity.” (p. 208).  The essential civilizational struggle, in Lobaczewski’s view, lies between ‘the normal people’ and the pathocrats; it is a conflict which has occurred in every civilization for as long as human societies have existed and will persist for as long as our species draws breath.

As I have noted already, Lobaczewski looks to the sciences of biology and genetics to find the origin of the characteropath.  It is of interest to note that Lobaczewski was among the last class of psychiatrists to be trained in these disciplines before the Soviets censored them and restricted the discipline to the study of Pavlovian concepts.  (Here we see a clear bit of historical proof for Lobaczewski’s argument).  While the science of psychopathology has progressed a great deal since Lobaczewki’s time as a student (and there still remains a great deal of disagreement over the proper diagnostic criteria for many of these conditions), I will reproduce his findings as he described them so that the reader may appreciate them in their full and unadulterated context.  Primarily, Lobaczewski connects the biological dimension of the characteropath’s psychopathology to a condition of schizoidia.  The schizoid is recognized by an acute hypersensitivity and characteristic distrustfulness; they are inattentive to the emotions of others, quickly adopt extreme positions, and retaliate harshly (and immediately) for perceived slights against them.  Typically eccentric, they are prone to projecting (“superimposing” in Lobaczewski’s words) “erroneous, pejorative interpretations of other people’s intentions” (p. 123).  In simpler terms, they are quick to malign others without sufficient reason for doing so.  They are drawn to moral causes, although they “actually inflict damage upon themselves and others” (p. 123).  Owing to their impoverished worldview, they are overly pessimistic and misanthropic with regards human nature.  Schizoids have a “dull pallor of emotion” and “consider themselves intellectually superior to ordinary people” (p. 124).  Interestingly, Lobaczewski points out that, demographically speaking, schizoids are represented most numerously among Jews (elsewhere, and repeatedly, Lobaczewski observes the overrepresentation of Jews among these pathocratic types).

However, we should not limit our concern to these dysfunctional individuals alone.  Exposure to these types who exhibit dysfunctional personalities can twist the minds of a normal person, capturing them in the vortex of their mental illness, not unlike a starship caught in the tractor beam of some intergalactic warmonger.  Proximity to characteropaths, then, is as great a risk to the average person as their mere existence is.  The pathocrat is a natural parasite who can only thrive in an environment that is explicitly hostile to the needs and demands of the average person.  As such, characteropaths frantically work to pervert the organizations they join by manipulating and distorting language so as to provide cover for their true intentions.  The characteropath sets himself up as an integral member of the institution, enshrining himself as a necessary priestly type who may then provide the ideological weight for the yet-to-be-adopted belief system.  Where these individuals (to use Lobaczewski’s phrase, “spellbinders”) are unable to directly influence and redirect the energies of a given organization, they will form alliances with more charismatic types who may themselves be less pathological, or simply possess an earthier charm and personal magnetism that allows them to capture the imagination of a people, even without any kind of intellectual or ideological acumen to support his campaign.

Often, these pathocrats are able to attract less dysfunctional types (Lobaczewski calls them “skirtoids”), who dutifully execute their dictates and assist in maintaining the new moral infrastructure.  These skirtoids “are vital, egotistical, and thick-skinned individuals who make good soldiers because of their endurance and psychological resistance.  In peacetime, however, they are incapable of understanding life’s subtler matters or rearing children prudently.  They are happy in primitive surroundings; a comfortable environment easily causes hysterization within them.  They are rigidly conservative in all areas and supportive of governments that rule with a heavy hand.”  (p. 136).  These psychopaths (pathocrats), often being physically incapable of enacting the methods they propagate through oral and written sophistry, are heavily reliant on these skirtoids and a third type, which he calls “jackals”.  These individuals are “hired as professional and mercenary killers by various groups and who so quickly and easily take up arms as a means of political struggle; no human feelings interfere with their nefarious plans.” (p. 136).   But Lobaczewski stops at the point of categorizing these types as fitting within either the skirtoidal or psychopathic dimensions of psychopathology, but rather suggests that “we should assume this type to be a product of a cross between lesser taints of various deviations.” (p. 136). Furthermore, he states “mate-selection psychology produces pairings which bilaterally represent various anomalies.  Carriers of two or even three lesser deviational factors should thus be more frequent.  A jackal could then be imagined as the carrier of schizoidal traits in combination with some other psychopathy, e.g. essential psychopathy or skirtoidism.” (p. 136).

It is critical for these pathocratic spellbinders to nudge the normal majority away from what Lobaczewski calls its “congenital instinctive infrastructure” (p. 60).  He repeatedly emphasizes the necessity for the “common sense” (p. 188) of the normal majority to prevail in order for a society to maintain its moral center and to thrive intellectually, creatively, economically, and spiritually.  To separate the majority from their common sense, the spellbinder employs the use of doubletalk as his chief strategy for nudging people away from their natural instincts.  The process of ponerization (the overcoding of a society’s moral structure from moral to immoral) necessitates a dual semantic layer, wherein the outer layer is used rhetorically against the target while the inner layer reinforces membership among those psychopaths embedded within the power structure.  In effect, these differing meanings serve to re-stratify the classes of a ponerogenic culture.  The spellbinders (and their collaborators) immediately recognize its hermeneutic meaning; it is only after prolonged exposure (and great labor on the part of the masses) that the targets of this ponerogenic speech are ever availed of its true meaning.  To put this in our current context, we may look at certain phrases (e.g., “Diversity is our strength”) and understand how the meaning differs depending on who utters it (diversity may be a strength for the spellbinder, but as Robert Putnam argued in his 2000 publication, “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community” it proves to be a problem for those outside of the spellbinding class).

I have made this point already but it bears elaboration: Innately these spellbinders are people who cannot function in a healthy society, and moreover, feel wronged by it.  As part of their paranoid ideations, they perceive themselves as marginalized and persecuted (although in a certain sense they are correct, given their predilection for manipulation and harm, the natural response is one of ostracism).  The narcissism and self-absorption of the psychopath leads him to create a kind of hero myth that justifies his own actions (if not to himself than to those he seeks dominion over).  By necessity, the characteropath casts himself as a savior – as one who has graciously taken up the causes of liberation and nobility.  This approach proves advantageous for him if he operates within a society where actual injustice is present and easily identifiable (which is usually the case).  Lobaczewski points out that these types construct ideological unions which are predicated upon 1) the exaltation of a wronged other, 2) the radical redressing of that wrong, and 3) the higher values of the characteropathic individuals who have usurped the organization.

Individual psychological failings (be they psychopaths, or abnormal and deficient in some other way) are then moralized into a revolutionary credo that gives them just cause for retribution, thus providing sufficient motivation to deny any self-examination.  Were this technique not so repugnant, one could admire its ingenuity; the moral wickedness of their conduct (which would surely be apparent to any outsider, were it stripped of its romanticism and paramoralisms) is neatly excused and then expelled.  Such a practice is especially important for counteracting the functional conscience in those with a more typical psychological profile.  The fact that true injustice does exist, and that this new ideology claims to resist it means that inductees into this new culture will be more easily swayed into rationalizing the spellbinder’s doubletalk, and never question its truer esoteric meaning.  Naturally, there is more to this story – and 21st century America is very different from the Soviet Republic of the last century.  I will address these differences in a moment.  For now, let us look once more at this phenomenon of spellbinding.

For the skeptical reader, we can dispel with the fanciful terminology and simply look to the very real circumstances we observe in our current situation.  Take the language of victimization and its myriad expressions – racism, sexism, xenophobia, transphobia, homophobia, islamophobia, ableism, to name a few.  Let us begin with the use of the term ‘racism’: Initially, the word was used to describe an irrational and seething hatred of other races.  Those noble of heart and sensitive to the plight of, say, African-Americans, knew in their souls that they did not harbor animosity toward Blacks and therefore willingly acclimated to the changing cultural and political dialectics.  But as per the hermeneutic tradition of the spellbinder, the term came to take on a new meaning – that of power and privilege.  The eternal revolt against racial discrimination required a new meaning for a new time, against a new generation of foes.  Now, to be racist no longer means being an unsophisticated bigot, full of hatred; instead, it means to enjoy the privilege of cultural, historical, and political continuity.  To be a racist in 21st century America is to hold power, unearned power, over the dispossessed other.   In one sense, that power is one of an unbroken continuity of being – but in a more immediate and political sense it is about institutional hegemony.  Whites, being privileged, now find themselves swimming in a racist undercurrent, where every action, every errant glance, each thoughtless utterance is actually a demonstration of sinister, unjustifiable power and racial superiority that must be deconstructed.  As the usage of this term and the ability to affect political and cultural change based on the desire to annihilate racism grows, more Americans find themselves scratching their heads at the new power this term wields.  “How is that racist?  That doesn’t make sense.  I don’t hate Blacks or Hispanics.”  And likely they don’t.  Only one no longer has to hate non-Whites in order to be racist, one merely has to exist in order to be racist.  The jargon of pathocratic psychopathy has thus emerged from its cocoon different, changed, and now more powerful than when it first appeared.

Sexism worked in this way too; the willful discrimination and marginalization of women meant something far different a few decades ago.  Whereas any social role that was denied to women was understood to be sexist, now any circumstance which affects women differently is evidence of sexual discrimination and oppression.  With such an elastic definition, instances of racism and sexism now explode with regularity.  Similarly with homophobia, islamophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, and the like, the spellbinding hermeneutics of prejudice grant more power to the characteropath and further oppress the normal and the psychologically fit.  Of particular insidiousness is the use of the suffix ‘phobia’; the use of a clearly understood medical and psychiatric terminology, ‘phobia’ has been grafted to a sociopolitical system of linguistics that overcodes an entire range of cognitions and affects, reducing them to a singular phenomena – fear – the use of which now paints anyone who demonstrates anything other than unflinching support (and submission) towards an underprivileged group could be considered fearful, despotic, and mentally ill.

A new meaning for millennia old biological and evolutionary normalcy’s was created to psychologically wound average people who are not nearly as Machiavellian and sinister as those spellbinders responsible for creating this new moral-linguistic landscape.  A whole range of emotional responses (e.g., disgust, confusion, reticence, self-preservation, et cetera) are no longer legitimated for anyone outside of the spellbinding class, and especially for those unwilling to subjugate themselves to it.  It is difficult to overstate the effect this has on the mind – by constantly changing the moral language and rules of social engagement, consciousness is split, and new sub-personalities are created which now exist in a constant state of conflict.  Not only do these terms create a new moral, linguistic, and affective landscape, but they also radically redraw the sociopolitical structure, creating new castes of privileged and unprivileged members, and allotting people to these new classes based on their willingness to conform to an ever-changing set of demands.

Another example would be the constantly evolving charge of anti-Semitism.  Clearly, it was once understood that claims of anti-Semitism were intended to characterize attitudes and conduct that were explicitly (and perhaps even implicitly) discriminatory or hostile toward Jewish people.  Presently, (and much like the plastic definition of racism) it is now used to designate any othering of Jews, be it negative or positive.  And so, folded into the original meaning of these terms (hatred and fear) is any impulse toward differentiation (another ‘common sense’ instinct as Lobaczewski would say).  Interestingly, the very use of the term is curious because it creates a cleavage in the Gentiles understanding of who precisely is a Semite.  Anti-Semitism is fundamentally about anti-Jewish sentiment, but the term Semite is a cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and racial designation that encompasses a far broader grouping of peoples than simply that of the Jewish individual.  Once more we see how spellbinders use language to fracture and limit the cognitive abilities of the average person.

The originators of these spells create the circumstances by which a healthy society is carved up under the new rules of engagement.  But as I have already pointed out, their progeny merely inherit this system of rules and logic, often without any insight into its genesis.  This phenomenon is not unlike the transmission of rituals and taboos, whereby people unthinkingly inherit these dictums but are oblivious to their intention, and so merely act on them in rote, unconscious fashion.  This is how psychopathic tendencies are transmitted intergenerationally – at first as an intentional means of control, and then merely as a commonplace and thoughtless habit, not unlike how one washes up after themselves.  The situation becomes far worse for the inheritors of this system, as they merely acquire these attitudes through the mechanisms of conditioning and modeling.  They are indoctrinated into a pathological worldview which dictates every relationship they enter, every career they take up, each choice and each breath.  Children don’t just inherit the material or biological traits of their parents, but also their ideological ones (particularly the farther one goes up the socioeconomic ladder, where the stakes are higher).  Of course, these conditions are guaranteed to degenerate over time, as the inheritors of this system possess none of the insight, none of the self-awareness of their forbears, and are subsequently left with fewer psychological tools with which to manage themselves or their pathological reactions.  While they may acquire their power second-hand, it comes with a litany of irrational and hysterical impulses which can neither be contextualized nor dissipated.  Heavy indeed is the head that wears the crown.  Naturally psychopaths wound themselves with their psychological contortions, ego defenses, and general anti-social conduct.  We understand very easily as well that they wound those who are made the targets of their pathology.  But what is less well understood is how those around them, their wives, husbands, children, nieces and nephews, too, are victimized by their pathological and misanthropic outlook.  Their impoverished psychological worldview becomes a mental prison that their kin rarely, if ever, escapes.  Worse still, those that do escape become permanent outcasts, as they – not unlike cult members – have broken out of an inter-generational cycle of psychopathy only to find little in the way of community outside of it.  However, it should be said that they often end up worse than cult members.  In many cases, these individuals lose affiliations of race, religion, social class, and more personally, blood relations.  It is difficult to quantify just which is worse for such individuals – the spellbinding that keeps them in a state of conformity or the ostracism they suffer as a result of breaking free.  Each outcome is tragic in its own way.

It is not uncommon to come across people (even in the online dissident sphere) who believe that the upper classes are made up of individuals with relatively typical psychological profiles.  This is not to say that they are just like us, but it is a kind of reflexive unwillingness to entertain the possibility – neigh, the existence – of evil.  Such individuals may rationalize away the failures of leadership or even identify with their plight.  There are some who believe in the existence of a One Weird Trick For Solving Political Strife, whereby all that is required to solve the problems confronting the over-class is to provide them with a better system or a better deal.  I cannot in good conscience endorse this worldview.  We simply know too much about the nature of the psychopathy and its prevalence among the leadership classes (Robert Hare and Hervey Cleckley have both written extensively on the over-representation of psychopathy among corporate and political leadership).  All of this is not to say that every leader is a dastardly, mustache-twirling loon, or even that every psychopath presents a clear and present danger to the social order (psychopathy is defined by a variety of traits, and it is not necessarily the case that the psychopath is malevolent; often they merely lack that positive social feeling more commonly found among the normal population), but what I am saying is that these individuals are not, by and large, a class to be reasoned with.  A sober analysis (such as the one I have provided) puts us in a superior position to organize and develop effective strategies for advancing our political aims, and not the aims of those who view us with contempt.


References:

Andrzej Łobaczewski, Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes, (Grande Prairie: Red Pill Press, 2006), 60, 123-124, 130, 136, 170-177, 188, 203

C.A. Bond, Nemesis, (Imperium Press, 2019)

Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Touchstone Books: Simon & Schuster, 2001)

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