As Corona-chan continues her world tour, more and more nations are drastically reducing their domestic everyday life. Some of them have even resorted to drastic measures.
Nietzsche, the Judeo-Christian Legacy, and European Unification Note I first wrote this essay in the winter of 2007, as part of my graduate study at Duke University. The course was…
Nietzsche, the Judeo-Christian Legacy, and European Unification
I first wrote this essay in the winter of 2007, as part of my graduate study at Duke University. The course was “Nietzsche’s Politics,” taught by Michael Gillespie in the Political Science Department. I have maintained the essay substantially as it was when I handed it in. Much honing has taken place, for clarity, flow, and depth, but the structure is unchanged.
I had first encountered Nietzsche’s writings in the year 2000 in my extracurricular readings while an undergraduate at the University of Virginia. Reading him marked a turning point in my life; indeed, I find it hard to imagine what my approach to thinking about society, politics, and religion would be without Nietzsche as educator. Writing isn’t just a form of communication, but a process of discovery for the author. Composing this essay some 10 years ago, I was moving beyond a raw, youthful understanding of Nietzsche’s critiques of Christian morality, democracy, and the modern age, and towards his deeper, in many ways, hidden vision for the transformation of the world. Everybody knows that Nietzsche said “God is dead”; few recognize why and how this catastrophe occurred; what the consequences will be; and how European man can overcome this event.
This essay is about politics. Nietzsche, of course, never put forth any straight-forward “political program,” though his works are littered with sharp opinions on the passing scene. He does, however, develop a meta-politics. This is not “political science” in the sense that it is used today, but politics understood from the standpoint of the transcendent. It is the European crisis—the end game of the Judeo-Christian legacy, the death of God—that births the “good Europeans” and “artist tyrants” who, Nietzsche expects, will rule the continent
Revisiting this essay now, it strikes me as unfinished. There are many tantalizing threads that should be followed further and more flesh put on the bone. I’m in the process of expanding it as part of a book, which will result in its doubling in size. I thought it would be appropriate, however, to publish the original essay as is, so as to give readers an understanding of my thought-process and development.
The Ethno-State has just now entered the popular lexicon, sparking predictable outrage, some productive debate, and no small amount of confusion. The term itself, along with many of its components, I borrowed from the American writer Wilmot Robertson. The deeper character of the Ethno-State, as I view it, is Nietzschean at its core. I hope this essay makes that clear.
Today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without realizing that he himself is the ultimate Jewish consequence
As a Saxon, [my mother] was a great admirer of Napoleon; it could be that I still am, too.
1. From Athens to Rome
The imperium Romanum . . . this most admirable work of art in the grand style was a beginning; its construction was designed to prove itself through thousands of years: until today nobody has built again like this, nobody has dreamed of building in such proportions sub specie aeterni. This organization was firm enough to withstand bad emperors: the accident of persons may not have anything to do with such matters—first principle of all grand architecture. But it was not firm enough against the most corrupt kind of corruption, against the Christians (AC §58).1
In this selection from one of the concluding aphorisms of The Antichrist (1888), Nietzsche’s most familiar tropes are fully mobilized: here we find his grandiose, shocking admiration of the powerful master-class . . . his aristocratic distain for Christians as rabble . . . his inhuman perspective in which the cultural achievement in Rome is worth a few “bad emperors” (and countless deaths) . . .
But while the passage might be characteristically “Nietzschean,” there is also much about it that is surprising. The Antichrist was conceived by Nietzsche as the first book of his planned three-volume Revaluation of All Values, what was to be the definitive statement of his philosophy. The fact that Nietzsche chose to image Rome—and specifically not Athens—in what is ultimately a kind of “political testament” goes against much that is taken for granted in Nietzsche scholarship.2 There is, of course, good reason for this. In Nietzsche first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), he posited the tragic age of Aeschylus and Sophocles as the unreachable standard of cultural achievement. Even if he later came to view many of his claims in this volume as “embarrassing” (BT P (1886)), it seems reasonable to assume that Athens remained for him a political icon.
Nietzsche’s most important writings on Greek culture came at a point in his life when he was most overtly politically engaged, and his attitude towards 5th-century Athens should be understood within that context. The Birth of Tragedy was written in the wake of German national unification, which occurred months before its publication. And at this time, Nietzsche was, effectively, a German nationalist; he distanced himself from militarism and was critical of the state, but he was a nationalist nonetheless. Nietzsche imaged Germany’s rise to greatness not only through military victory over the French but through a revived cultural spirit. He (in)famously claimed, “[F]or it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified”(BT §5); and for him, the political achievements of both 5th-century Athens and 19th-century Germany would be measured though their cultural output. In this line, it was Kant and Schopenhauer who were, in Nietzsche’s eyes, courageous enough to “critique reason,” to adumbrated aspects of existence outside Socratean rationality. They thereby introduced “an infinitely profounder and more serious view of ethical problems and art which we may designate as Dionysian wisdom comprised in concepts” (BT §19). They were, in this way, able to approach the tragic wisdom of Aeschylus. This new Weltanschauung would find expression in Wagner’s music-dramas—the combination of the Apollonian heroic outlook with Dionysian “infinite melody”—to be performed publicly at the annual Bayreuth festival.
On all levels, Nietzsche understood this new cultural project to be ethno-nationalist in character:
[W]e have the feeling that the birth of a tragic age simply means a return to itself of the German spirit, a blessed rediscovery after powerful intrusive influences had for a long time compelled it . . . being attached to the lead strings of a Romanic civilization (BT §19 [emphasis added]).
Anticipating the deification of German Kultur at the expense of Western, French Zivilization in the 1920s and ‘30s, Nietzsche here imagines the triumph of the German spirit as specifically anti-imperial in character; it would be a great throwing off of the legacy of Rome, Christianity, and the supra-ethnic, supra-national institutions that had defined “Europe” for two millennia.
By Nietzsche’s middle and late periods, much had changed. Far from being an ethno-nationalist, Nietzsche filled these writings with numerous barbs and insults against all things German. In terms of philosophy and culture, Nietzsche claims that the “origin of the German Spirit” is not Kant and Schopenhauer but beer-guzzling and “distressed intestines” (EH II: §1). Wagner and Bayreuth become an expression of decadence—an opera festival for philistines and the nouveau riche, not a rebirth of tragedy. Politically, he came to reject unequivocally Bismarck, Wilhelm I, and the Reich. In turn, Nietzsche’s stance towards the Greeks also changed. Although a deep admiration never waned, Athenian culture no longer served as a touchstone and cultural model in these writings. By his final productive years, Nietzsche had become almost disenchanted: with the exception of Thucydides, Nietzsche reports to have lost interest in the literature of ancient Athens. Historical models were dramatically redefined: “[The Greeks] cannot mean as much to us as the Romans” (TI X: §2). On one level, Nietzsche’s turn from Athens (and Bayreuth) to Rome is indicative of an interest in moving beyond the polis and ethnos (the two most fundamental concepts of Greek politics and cultural identity) in favor of imperial hegemony and a synthesis of European ethnicities. In a way, Nietzsche’s imperialism can be seen as an outgrowth of his earlier cultural nationalism: dreams of German unification were morphing into dreams of a German empire.3
On another level, Nietzsche’s transformation marks a move from art to politics—or rather a view that politics was the grandest genre of art of them all. A culture cannot be justified solely by culture, whether Attic Tragedy or Wagnerian music-drama; instead, Nietzsche begins to view culture as arising in the shadow of the state. The state itself becomes the centerpiece of all cultural, social, and intellectual development. Nietzsche remarks that “the grand style”—that is, the imperial political structure—is “no longer mere art but [has] become reality, truth, life” (AC § 59). Not Athens . . . not Bayreuth . . . but Rome.
2. Nietzsche and the Unpolitical
It is not difficult to cull sundry political opinions from out Nietzsche’s texts and discover what he thought about public intellectuals like David Strauss and Heinrich von Treitschke, not to mention Bismarck and the Kaiser. But then Nietzsche famously called himself the “last anti-political German” (EH I: §3), and he did not formulate anything resembling a political program or “pragmatic” agenda. Reconstructing such things risks wishful thinking or forgery. Where Nietzsche does sustain a discussion of politics, his “political philosophy” is often grandiose bordering on the fantastical. Unconcerned with the vagaries of parliamentary majorities or policy-analysis, Nietzsche instead focused on “Cesare Borgia as Pope” and the creation of a new aristocracy. At other times, when Nietzsche discusses politics, he seems to actually be concerned with something else. As Tracy Strong observes, “The one attempt Nietzsche makes at providing a unified perspective explicitly on politics . . . to our confusion, is essentially a discussion of music” 4. Still, as the above discussion of Athens and Rome reveals, politics are extremely important to Nietzsche and inform, if always subtly, his wider philosophy.
Throughout the 20th century, interpretations of Nietzsche’s political thought have, generally speaking, shifted between two poles—1933 and 1968. First, there is the Nietzsche of “will to power,” “the overman,” “the blond beast,” “the anti-Christ,” a thinker who is an opponent of democracy, the herd, and modernity itself.5 But on the other hand, there is the Nietzsche of immoralism, self-creation, “life as a work of art,” a thinker who becomes the forefather of Foucault, Derrida, and much of the postmodern Left.6 Both of these political interpretations seem equally right and wrong. The main problem is that associating Nietzsche with political movements with which he was never involved blocks consideration of his political philosophy on its own terms. Not coincidentally, these kinds of interpretations have also blocked serious consideration of what Nietzsche explicitly—though always elliptically—claims to be the “politics of the future”—Europeanism.
By 1887, Nietzsche was already speaking of himself and his equals as “good Europeans, Europe’s heirs, the rich superabundant, but also abundantly obligated heirs of two millennia of the European spirit” (GS V: §377).7 A year earlier, his disenchantment with nationalism was explicit and he had already formulated the basis of a supra-national project:
Owing to the pathological estrangement which the insanity of nationality has induced, and still induces, among the peoples of Europe; owing also to the shortsightedness and quick-handed politicians who are at the top today with the help of this insanity, without any inkling that their separatist policies can of necessity only be entr’acte policies; owing to all this and much else that today simply cannot be said, the most unequivocal portents are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily and mendaciously reinterpreted—that Europe wants to become one. (BGE VIII: §256)
German ethno-nationalism was expunged from Nietzsche’s consciousness. While in The Birth of Tragedy, he speaks of German particularism breaking out from under the “servitude” of “Romanic Civilization,” by his mature period, he stresses the need for a new supra-national order. Nietzsche discounts ethnicity and goes as far as to imagine the possibilities (and dangers) of a “new synthesis”—the mixing of the European races. During the writing of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche was a prominent member of the ideologically anti-Semitic “Bayreuth Circle” surrounding Richard Wagner (though it is not clear that Nietzsche ever shared all of their views). After his break, Nietzsche began to praise the Jews a ripe for the “mastery over Europe” and as powerful precisely through their “nomadic,” international culture (BGE VIII: §244, §251).
But even if it is uncontroversial that in Nietzsche’s mature thought he embraced a kind of Europeanism, the question remains of exactly why. Without doubt, Nietzsche did not support “Europe”—and reject ethno-nationalism and anti-Semitism—out of a sense of “liberalism,” “tolerance,” or “multiculturalism.” To the contrary, Nietzsche wanted the opposite of these things and even described the potential leaders of Europe as “tyrants” (BGE VIII: §242). Nietzsche was first and foremost a philosopher, and he adopted a political philosophy out of philosophic necessity. “Politics in the grand style” did not emerge from an ideology (at least in the simplistic sense of the term) nor from blind pragmatism. Instead, as I hope to demonstrate, Nietzsche forges his politics in the realm of the transcendental, as a response to a cultural and spiritual crisis on the continent—a crisis that affects not only politics but theology, epistemology, and aesthetics.
3. Politics of Crisis
In Ecce Homo (1888), Nietzsche mentions that his mother, Franziska Oehler, married his father in Eilenburg in 1813, the “great war year” in which Napoleon entered the city. Nietzsche relates that, “As a Saxon, she was a great admirer of Napoleon; it could be that I still am, too” (EH I: §3). It is certainly not a stretch to say that the empereur and his attempted unification of Europe represent for Nietzsche a manifestation of the imperial politics he most admired; and, in many ways, Nietzsche’s view of Napoleon encapsulates the way “great politics” functions within his philosophy. It is important to note that Nietzsche’s esteem for Napoleon should not be viewed as mere “hero worship” or as an example of “Great Man history.” Nietzsche never admired Napoleon for his skill in getting to the top, that is, for his “will to power” in the most individualistic and simplistic of meanings. Napoleon instead represents for Nietzsche a culmination of cultural energies: “The history of Napoleon’s reception is almost the history of the highest happiness attained by the whole century in its most valuable human beings and moments (BGE V: §199). As the French Revolution inaugurated the zenith of democratic leveling (and popular ressentiment), Nietzsche viewed Napoleon as a kind of “signpost to the other path,” that of the great and terrible aristocracy of antiquity and the Italian Renaissance. Napoleon was not important for Nietzsche as a “French patriot” and less so as a great individual; he held meaning as a realization of the spirit: Napoleon was “the problem of the noble ideal as such made flesh . . . the synthesis of the inhuman and the superhuman (GM I: §16).
Just as Napoleon embodied a cultural problem, Nietzsche formulates his definition of “great politics” around what he perceives as a European-wide spiritual and cultural crisis. In describing “why I am a destiny,” Nietzsche imagines “politics in the grand style” as encompassing both the terrible truth that Nietzsche’s philosophy announces to the world and the “war of spirits” that must follow:
For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded—all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. (EC IV: §1)
This is a particularly pregnant passage, and it is related to a number of concerns of this essay. For now, it is important to recognize that Nietzsche views “great politics” as emerging directly from a crisis of his age. In announcing the demise of the basic structures of European society, Nietzsche sees himself as unleashing “great politics,” a kind of combination of actual war and a contestation of value.
What Nietzsche views as comprising his “truth” against “the lies of millennia” is, at its core, his announcement that “God is dead.”
Those who only know one thing about Nietzsche usually know the half-truth that he loathed Christianity and was a militant atheist. While it is true that Nietzsche did present himself as “the Antichrist,” to say that Nietzsche was writing polemically against Christianity—like some proto-Christopher Hitchens—is to misconstrue him entirely. Nietzsche hardly thought that the Europeans of the future—perhaps led by a few “overmen” who had read Thus Spoke Zarathustra—could recognize the faults of Christianity and then simply “get rid of it.” To think so is to vastly underestimate the complexity—and, indeed, the ambivalence—of Nietzsche’s critique. Nietzsche did not view Judeo-Christianity8 and its legacy as mere “lies”—as the “opium of the masses” in Marx’s language or the “God Delusion,” to borrow a phrase from the self-styled “New Atheists.” He viewed Christianity much like a traditional conservative—as the most basic grounding of what has come to be called “The West.” To actually oppose Judeo-Christianity—as Nietzsche imagines himself as doing in the passage from Ecce Homo—is not only to risk catastrophe but also all assurance of a future. As I will demonstrate below, Nietzsche questioned the very ability of Europeans to think outside the confines of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Simply exiting Christianity, or transcendent thinking in general, was not an option.
Europeans had not simply “lost faith.” God is dead because the “the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable” (GS V: §343). Put into other words, the Human and Natural Sciences (“Enlightenment” in the broadest sense) pursued its “will to know” to the point that it shattered the religious basis of European societies. What remains most important about this conception is that Nietzsche specifically does not view Enlightenment and the “will to know” as emerging from a system of knowledge and values outside or alien to Judeo-Christianity. Nietzsche would never deny that the Sciences were often set opposed to the Church (and vice-versa); however, for him, the “will to know” lies at the center of the Judeo-Christian tradition.9 Moreover, as I will discuss below, “truth” functions within Judeo-Christianity in a way that differs in prominence and quality from other historical religions.
In this line, Nietzsche’s supra-nationalism—his Europeanism—is directly linked to his expansive view of the influence of Judeo-Christianity. It is specifically Europe’s struggle with its Christian legacy that generates “great politics” and the need for a radical transformation. Nietzsche claims that the Judeo-Christian tradition has “created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit the like of which had never yet existed on earth: with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals” (BGE P). It is this “tension”—Europe’s turning against itself—that can launch it into greater heights.
But even if Judeo-Christianity’s tension with the Enlightenment generates the European crisis, Nietzsche does not believe in the least that Enlightened politics—specifically nationalism, democracy, and liberalism—are well suited to address the problem. For Nietzsche, when a culture is in crisis, it must turn to “the grand style” in order to “unbend the bow.” Nietzsche seeks to construct a new kind of aristocratic politics that would not simply be “anti-Christian” but mark a transformation of the tradition. The “good Europeans”—the new masters and tyrants of the continent—will rise to power, not in polemical opposition to Judeo-Christianity, but by embodying the productive contradictions and antagonisms of its legacy.
I. Falling Apart / Coming Together
1. Shadows over Europe
Few thinkers have been as self-consciously hostile towards their age and milieu as Nietzsche. Fewer still have felt themselves to be so out of place, to have been literally born at the wrong time. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche presents himself as an epigone, as the (presumably last) “disciple of the god Dionysius.” This contrasts sharply with the forward-orientation in many of his other writings in which he claims to be a John the Baptist of “the philosophy of the future.” Perhaps Nietzsche is most honest when he critically admits that he is a product of his own age: “I am a decadent” (EH I: §2).
Without doubt, Nietzsche’s profound alienation from late 19th-century European culture had many personal causes: his various health problems, rejection by his peers, and the absence of adequate companionship being but a few. But far more importantly, Nietzsche’s particular animus towards European society resulted from the fact that he felt he knew his age all too well. More specifically, he believed himself to be fully aware of a cultural crisis beyond comparison, the consequences and implications of which would change utterly all facets of Europe. Being born both too early and too late, Nietzsche saw himself “stretched in the contradiction between today and tomorrow” (GS V: §343). As Cassandra, he foresees the coming catastrophe; as John the Baptist, he glimpse a new dawn.
An exact and concise description of the European crisis is difficult to put into words simply because Nietzsche develops this theme in a wide variety of manifestations. For the purpose of this essay, it is useful to look at a particularly poignant image of the crisis from the middle of Nietzsche’s career—his announcement of the “death of God” and the formation of “shadows over Europe” (GS V: §343).
It is of great importance to understand that Nietzsche’s famous announcement that God is dead is actually far more anthropological and phenomenological than it is theological. In Werner Dannhauser’s words, Nietzsche practices “historical atheism”: “The saying that God is dead implies that God once existed. God existed while one could believe in God; God is dead because belief in God has become impossible.”10 The vital questions thus become: Why did God die? and Who killed him? Nietzsche’s full formulation is that “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him [emphasis added]” (GS, §125). We killed him not simply through our loss of faith, for fervency comes and goes and can be lost and regained. Saying “scientists” or “atheists” killed God is equally unsatisfactory; for science as mere technical mastery does not touch the soul. God died over the course of the series of tumults that cut off European man from the transcendent. Copernicus removed him from the center of the cosmos . . . Galileo discovered that natural laws hold in the celestial spheres just as much as they do on Earth . . . Darwin demonstrated that man emerged from out of brutality and death . . . Individuals and specific discoveries are not important, as no single person killed God. And Nietzsche does not posit an aggressive “atheism” as a motivating factor; to the contrary, the scientists mentioned above were inspired by Christian faith. But to go on believing in the Christian God in the face of the modern experience was, for Nietzsche, a sign of childishness, denial, and cowardice. Nietzsche does not view natural “Enlightenment” as the highest form of wisdom, but he never underestimated its immense, catastrophic power.
Though the bad news has not yet been heeded by all, Nietzsche (and a select few) grasp that the death of the Christian God will be followed by the collapse of “the whole of our European morality.” Furthermore, the end of faith will instigate a “sequences of breakdown,” culminating in the destruction of the institutions and values based upon the Judeo-Christian moral system. The 20th century will witness nothing less than the eclipse of the sun.
In making such claims, Nietzsche might seem to have much in common with the pessimism of many conservatives of the late 19th century (and today), who viewed the end of faith as equally disastrous, and sometimes in equally grandiose terms. Yet Nietzsche’s perspective on the death of God is wholly different than that of such figures. Firstly, Nietzsche viewed the coming catastrophe as necessary; even if all of Europe does not yet recognize it, there is no hope for a Christian revival, for such a thing would inherently ring hollow. Nietzsche would not have been surprised by the decent of mainstream Christianity into self-esteem doctrines or community organizing.
Secondly, while the death of God is a disaster, Nietzsche sees it as containing great potential benefit. As stressed by Michael Allen Gillespie, what Nietzsche most opposed in Christianity is that it leads Europeans into believing that, after the collapse of Christian morality, life in general would have no meaning. But Nietzsche instead envisioned other types of men who, although disturbed by the death of God, accept the dilemma and learn to view it as an opportunity for a cultural transformation.11 In this line, Nietzsche’s tone in this aphorism moves from despairing to rhapsodic. The “shadows over Europe” lift to reveal a “new dawn,” and Nietzsche shifts to a new set of metaphors, imaging the “death of God” as a starting point for great new voyages of the spirit. Writing as one of the “free spirits” who understands the positive aspect of the collapse, Nietzsche ironically entitles Aphorism §343 “The Meaning of our Cheerfulness.”
Such passages deserve serious criticism on many levels.12 First and foremost, as pointed out by Gillespie, one might counter that Nietzsche vastly overrated the degree to which the European world would sink into suicidal, nihilistic despair. Although the years 1914-1945 might seem a fulfillment of Nietzsche’s prophecy, “If the intervening years have proven anything, it is that bourgeois society can weather the death of God without collapsing into either passive or active nihilism.”13 But for the purpose of this essay, it is of greatest importance to stress that Aphorism §343 only represents one aspect of Nietzsche’s conception of the European crisis, and by no means does it express the great complexities and ironies surrounding the death of God. Indeed, as Nietzsche begins Book V of The Gay Science with an apocalyptic vision, he follows it immediately with Aphorism §344 in which he stresses the long-term continuity of Judeo-Christian culture. While “The Meaning of our Cheerfulness” images a “new dawn,” Nietzsche juxtaposes it with an aphorism that reminds one of the presence of the past. Nietzsche approaches this recognition of the long duré of culture through a discourse on epistemology.
2. Piety and the Will to Truth
In Aphorism §344, “How we, too, are still Pious,” Nietzsche first observes that the “scientific spirit” of rational inquiry is one of testing and scrutinizing established convictions: for example, “does a heavier body actually fall faster than a lighter one?” Science is ultimately a process in which “convictions” are destroyed; those that crumble under scrutiny are discarded, and those that hold are no longer mere convictions but “knowledge” and “truth.” In describing this spirit, Nietzsche, no doubt, has in mind Descartes objective in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641/47) to bring into question every single idea, perception, and premise in order to arrive at a firm ground for knowledge. This is certainly not anything that Nietzsche takes lightly; far from being an “irrationalist,” Nietzsche views the breaking down of conviction as the heart of any great philosophy:
[G]reat spirits are skeptics. Zarathustra is a skeptic. Strength, freedom which is born of the strength and overstrength of the spirit, proves itself by skepticism. Men of convictions are not worthy of the least consideration in fundamental questions of value and disvalue. Convictions are prisons” (AC §54).
But if science strives to knock down convictions, Nietzsche discerns a deeper, unspoken conviction undergirding the entire enterprise; it is one that is so pervasive and indispensable to science as a system that it can never be confronted directly: “We see that science also rests on a faith” (GS V: §344).14 This conviction is that “truth has value.”
The “value” of truth might seem self-evident; however, being that it is often the great liars and manipulators who come out on top, one should ask seriously: Why not deceive? Moreover, Why not allow oneself to be deceived? This is hardly facetious. Throughout his oeuvre, Nietzsche connects the acquisition of greater knowledge with pain.15 Some knowledge might have pragmatic value, and certainly Nietzsche would see “wonder” and “curiosity” underlying the “will to truth”; however, he views knowledge of the highest quality to be that which destroys the foundations of a culture and paralyzes an individual’s will to action. In his major treatise on historiography, Nietzsche associates knowledge with “the historical sense,” that is, scholarly historicism and boldly concludes that ignorance, forgetfulness, and the denial history is of great value to a people or culture:
No artist would ever paint a picture, no general would win a victory, no people would gain its freedom without first having longed for and struggled towards that end in such an nhistorical condition. Just as the man of action, in Goethe phrase, is always unscrupulous, so he is always ignorant too” (HSDL §1).
The man of profound knowledge might achieve a kind of power, but he is also prone to becoming a “Hamlet,” a man nauseated by knowing and thinking too much (see BT §7).
In Nietzsche’s mind, ”the value of truth” has a distinct origin, which I will discuss in the next section. Before this, it is useful to make some preliminary conclusions. Among these is the recognition that Nietzsche might not be as “postmodern” as is often thought. The idea that Nietzsche’s perspective on science is a refutation of truth and thus an assertion of “relativism” is doubtful. Zarathustra does not bring “relativism” to the world down from the mountaintop, but the terrible truth that God is dead. Any kind of defined system—whether it be Science, Christianity, or Buddhism—is based upon, in Walter Kaufmann’s words, “a number of primary assumptions from which [one] draws a net of inferences and thus deduces [the] system; but [one] cannot from within [the] system, establish the truth of his premises.”16 Nietzsche attempts a bold new experiment in which he turns the “will to truth” against those most fundamental assumptions—even against itself—and tests whether the whole system might hold, or not.
In that the search for truth is only rarely practical and usually proves deleterious, it can only acquire meaning through a system of value outside itself. It is Nietzsche’s radical conclusion in Aphorism §344 that it is the Judeo-Christian tradition that gave birth to the “will to truth—at all costs.” In a characteristic dialectical flip, it is Judeo-Christianity that birthed the sciences. It is in this way that Nietzsche ironically derives the title, “How we, too, are still Pious”:
[E]ven we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith . . . that God is the truth, that truth is divine. (GS V: §344)
It is thus exactly that which is most harmed by the will to truth that brought it into the world.
How religion would become so audacious as to value truth is a complicated story, and one that emerges from Nietzsche’s view of history and the place of the Jews, Christians, and national politics in the ancient world.
II. Peoples, Nobles, Slaves
1. Nations and their Gods
Whatever Nietzsche eventually thought of the German nation-state, all of his texts evince a certain esteem, even nostalgia, for ancient “peoples,” that is, historical races with their own culture and religion. As mentioned above, the Athenian ethnos was of central importance, but Nietzsche has similar reverence for other peoples of the ancient Mediterranean world and many across Europe and Asia. Nietzsche’s exact concept of a “people” is difficult to pin down. Obviously, the term is defined ethnically, and Nietzsche often uses “race” interchangeably with “people.”17 However, for Nietzsche, a “people is far more than a mere biological entity. Although never made explicit, Nietzsche’s anthropology was greatly informed by a kind of “theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.” In the words of Menahem Brinker, “A race is for him primarily a group of people united by their common life-experience which is interiorized and passed on from one generation to the next as cultural heritage and as inherited traits of character” 18. “National character” was forged over time.
Nietzsche’s concept of a people also had a prominent theological component: “A people which still believes in itself retains its own god. In him it reveres the conditions which let it prevail, its virtues—it projects its pleasure in itself, its feeling of power onto a being to whom one may offer thanks” (AC §16). Under a national god, a people would construct a formal morality and system of values that was informed by the conditions for their well-being and position in the world. As Zarathuatra exclaims in his speech “Of Self Overcoming,” “What [a] people believe to be good and evil betrays to me an ancient will to power” (Z II: 12). In the figure of the Hindu law-giver Manu—his thought expressed in his law book, Manu Smriti (circa 200 B.C.)—Nietzsche offers a concrete example of the legislator-cum-chief-cum-priest who forges a great people. Manu, who became revered in Hinduism as the forefather of the entire human race, succeeded in Nietzsche’s mind by raising his people to kind of cultural and religious perfection. After a long era of fragmentation and chaos, Manu took the best that was achieved in this period of “experimentation” and codified a single, timeless religion and system of values. Nietzsche describes Manu’s culture as reaching an “automatism of instinct” in which values had become unconscious. He created a “second nature.”
2. National Epistemology
Just as “peoples” are at the center of Nietzsche’s concept of theology and value, so are they of great importance to his major discourses on epistemology. More specifically, “a people” is directly connected in Nietzsche’s mind with his concept of the “will to truth” and the ways that this has manifested itself. Nietzsche’s most basic conclusion in this line is set down in Zarathustra in the aphorism “On the Famous Wise Men” (Z II: §8). Here, it is the “famous philosophers”—beloved by their communities—who, in claiming to have reached “truth,” have actually transformed the prejudices and superstitions of a people into dogma or philosophy. As he does throughout Zarathustra, Nietzsche encapsulates this idea in a striking image, and in this case, it is one that is highly satirical: the “famous wise man” is an ass pulling a cart. The “cart,” of course, represents “the people,” who are grateful to their ass-philosopher for his tireless efforts.
The sentiment that philosophers (or at least “famous” ones) are basically sophists and demagogues who “tell the people what they want to hear” is hardly new. However, this notion functions idiosyncratically within Nietzsche’s thought as a whole. Despite the obvious satire of the image, Nietzsche is not wholly opposed to “famous wise men.” As discussed above, Nietzsche has an irrepressible nostalgia for peoples who could write their “tables of good and evil” and were confident in themselves. For this, “famous wise men” and their “truths” were indispensable. In many ways, Nietzsche views the decadence and cultural barrenness of Europe as expressed by their inability to invent a new theology. In reference to the “strong races of Northern Europe,” Nietzsche laments that they never rejected the Christian God foisted upon them in the late Roman Empire, but instead allowed themselves to be defined by Judeo-Christianity: “[a]lmost two thousand years—and not a single new god!” (AC: §19).
National philosophers might have served their purpose; however, Nietzsche’s nostalgia has its limits, and he unequivocally rejects “national philosophy” as a worldview for Europe’s future. Nietzsche makes no effort to tell his age a quaint bedtime story or become Europe’s latest (or last) “famous wise man.”
Nietzsche’s sense that “national religions” (at least within the confines of Europe) are both impossible and undesirable has much to do with his understanding of the Judeo-Christian legacy. On one level, Christianity is for Nietzsche “just another religion,” and it shares much in common with the national religions. In this case, it is an expression of the will to power of the down-trodden within the imperium Romanum, and one can criticize it as such (as Nietzsche does at length in the Genealogy). But Nietzsche views this sociological insight as only of partial importance in assessing Judeo-Christianity and its impact on Europe.
From the beginning, Nietzsche claims that Christianity was, at heart, never a national religion, and its dynamic was always expansive and supranational in character. In Nietzsche’s words, Christianity was “not a function of a race—it turned to every kind of man who was disinherited by life, it had its allies everywhere” (AC §51). From this broad base of support in the ancient world, the Judeo-Christian legacy surfaced, in a variety of manifestations, and came to inform all peoples and classes of Europe (and beyond). Christianity thus lacked completely other religions’ basis in the sustenance of a distinct group, with its good and evil, high and low, sentiments and attachments.
But beyond this matter of scale, Nietzsche viewed Christianity as different in character from national religions. Much of this is expressed in the fact that Nietzsche views Christianity as possessing an epistemology radically different from the “national epistemologies” described above. More specifically, Judeo-Christianity has a “will to truth” like no other. In Nietzsche’s mind, much of this results from Judaism’s place in the ancient world. In order to properly understand Judeo-Christian epistemology, one must turn to the story of the Jews.
3. Judaism and the Jews
It is well known that Nietzsche was a fierce anti-anti-Semite. It was not particularly difficult for Nietzsche to take this position in the latter part of his career. Anti-Semitism was indelibly linked in his mind with Wagner and the Bayreuth circle, his sister’s poor choice in husbands, and pompous German nationalism—that is to say, everything which Nietzsche found most distasteful and felt that he had to overcome in himself. Nietzsche’s hatred of anti-Semitism culminated in his letter sent to Franz Overbeck, at the onset of madness in January of 1889, announcing that he was “having all anti-Semites shot.”19 But then, being an anti-anti-Semite doesn’t quite mean that he was a philo-Semite, nor does it quite tell us what Nietzsche thought of the Jews. Examined closely, Nietzsche’s depictions of Judaism and the Jews reveals that he was intensely ambivalent about both—a certain anti-Semitism and penchant for double-edged compliments are combined with an enduring admiration. In his view, the Jews are, at the same time, a strong heroic people, a slave-race most responsible for the decline of aristocratic values, and potential “good Europeans.”20
Nietzsche unequivocally admires the Biblical Jewish people, and uses rapturous language to describe the “Homeric” world of the Pentateuch: “great human beings, a heroic landscape, and something of the very rarest quality in the world, the incomparable naïveté of the strong heart; what is more I find a people” (GM III: §22). At this point in time, Judaism was a healthy and powerful national religion. Being that Jews and their political order were “in the right, that is, natural relationship to all things,” they were able to create their own table of good and evil and invent a God that expressed their strength: Yahweh in his original form “was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself: through him victory and welfare were expected” (AC: §25).
But as the Jews began to experience defeat and subservience—recast in historical terminology, in the period following the destruction of the First Temple (6th Century B.C.)—Yahweh began to lose his luster. In a striking admonishment, Nietzsche claims, “they should have let him go” (AC §25). That is, once Yahweh ceased to be a god of power and victory, the Jews should have been creative enough to make a new one. This was, of course, common practice throughout the Roman Empire, as gods were ordered, created, and destroyed within the federalist Pantheon.
Instead, Jewish political life began to be dominated by a priestly class, and Yahweh was re-imagined. If the Jews could not experience power in the real world, they claimed that “the good” was not found there but only in a new “higher” realm of morality. The god of the Jews became, in turn, an abstract demand, an “evil-eye,” a “morality.” The situation was made worse by the fact that the priestly class transformed the Jewish historical consciousness, empowering themselves and devaluing the Biblical age of heroes which Nietzsche so admired:
[I]n the hands of the Jewish priests, the great age in the history of Israel became an age of decay; the Exile, the long misfortune, was transformed in to an eternal punishment for the great age—an age in which the priest was still a nobody” (AC §26).
Judaism was further affected by the Jews’ conflicts with the Roman Empire, culminating in the destruction of the Second Temple (1st Century, B.C.). It is, indeed, this confrontation through which Nietzsche generates one of his most characteristic opposition, “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome: Rome felt the Jews to be something like anti-nature itself, its antipodal monstrosity as it were: in Rome the Jew stood convicted of hatred for the whole human race” (GM I: §16). “Judea against Rome” is the depiction not of too rival nations and national religions but of two completely opposed Weltanschauungen and moral systems: on one side, there is the aristocratic master-class, conscious of its own power, and able to subordinate and integrate rival nations into a stable, productive hierarchy; on other, there is a small, wretched tribe of people claiming no national power (as they had none), but then making a grasp for universal dominion.
4. Morality in the Grand Style
In Nietzsche’s reading, the Jews are “the most catastrophic people in world history” (AC §24), but not merely because they created a religion of ressentiment directed against the aristocratic Romans. For as a religion of a weak people, Judaism would hardly be unusual in this respect and would never have gained world-historical significance. The Jews were truly catastrophic in that they transformed the nature of religion itself.
In order to understand the new metaphysics created in Judaism, it is useful to turn to Nietzsche’s description of the formation of the conscience and the sense of guilt. Drawing on the fact that the German word “Schuld” refers to both “debt” (in the monetary sense) and “guilt” (in the moral sense), Nietzsche claims that, in the prehistory of mankind, the moral conscience emerged as an internalization of the punishment one received for failing to repay loans. The feeling of guilt is a means for man to punish himself by reproducing the fear and loathing of indebtedness in other contexts. Obviously, this had a class-dimension, for it is primarily the lower orders and weaker nations who experienced chronic indebtedness, and thus were more likely to develop the internalization. The Jews underwent an intensification of this process in that not only were they constantly in a position of subservience vis-à-vis “master” nations, but their culture became dominated by a priestly class that eagerly transformed “guilt/debt” into a exaltation of their weak and downtrodden state, the “ascetic ideal.”
Nietzsche relates that, as this process ensued, this painful internalization of guilt became simply too great for the slave to bear, and he and his society sought a means of discharging it. This could take many forms; Nietzsche views the primary one as entailing a grand reversal, a projection back of the feeling of debt onto the “creditor,” that is, the master. The Jews thus formed an entire metaphysics based upon ressentiment. The “transvaluation of all values”—that is, the valuing of the weak, shameful slaves as “good”—and the powerful, conscienceless rulers as “evil”—operated through this process in the latter days of the ancient world.
This great “reversal of guilt,” so to speak, is directly related to the Jews’ development of monotheism and a universal religion. In Nietzsche’ reading of history, it is the Jews and the original Christian slave-classes throughout the Empire that achieved the “maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness [des Schuldgefühl] on earth.” Nietzsche views this as expressed by a universalist theory and “the maximum god attained thus far” (GM II: §20), the one, true god—Yahweh. Not only did the Jews and Christians divorce their god from the attainment of worldly power, but in imagining a higher realm, they grasped at a kind of grand coup d’état. The refashioned Yahweh was above the gods of Rome and all other deities, indeed, he superseded them. The Jews were the inventors of what Nietzsche calls “the grand style in morality” (BGE VIII: §250). In this way, Nietzsche imagines a great clash of universal religions: on the one hand, Judeo-Christian monotheism, and on the other, the Imperium Romanum and its Pantheon.
In the struggle of “Rome against Judea,” Judea won. Nietzsche views this as happening mostly on a psychological level; put simply, the all-encompassing Judaic (and later Judeo-Christian) system entrapped the nobles and made them feel guilty about themselves, about their power, beauty, and dominance. Beyond the Roman aristocrats, Nietzsche sees the pre-Judeo-Christian world as replete with a host of figures who, “imbued with faith in their own perfection, went about with the dignity of a great matador”; these were the great masters who had confidence in their ability to achieve power and, it should be mentioned, were unafraid to be cruel. “Moral Skepticism”—that is, the “evil eye” and the unflagging criticism of the Judeo-Christian system—succeeded in drawing into question all of the noble man’s great strengths—pride, ruthlessness, ambition—and in “accusing and embittering him” to the point that he lost faith in himself (GS III: §122).
Nietzsche views this great “loss of nerve” as lamentable, for there is little doubt that he felt the great, cruel master-class to be the foundation of high culture in the ancient world. This being said, Nietzsche recognizes that the “transvaluation of all values” is at the heart of the sciences and the modern systems of knowledge. Indeed, Nietzsche views Judaism and Christianity as the first religions to fully systematize the potential of doubt and skepticism. The ancient Jew and Christian might originally pursue “truth” out of ressentiment, in the sense of “bringing the great down to size” or “looking up the skirt” of the Queen. But this is transformed into a call for knowledge for its own sake. As Nietzsche points out, it is no coincidence that the great philosophers have been social outcasts—Heraclitus, Socrates, Epicurius, Nietzsche (BGE I: §6). Ressentiment is the secret, guilty origin of philosophy. Moreover, with the expansion to universalism, the acquisition of knowledge becomes a duty, a painful binding of the self to achieve knowledge “for its own sake” and “at all costs.”
Furthermore, it is with man’s “turning against himself” that it becomes possible to enact a great transformation of values. In this line, it is the dynamic of Judeo-Christian ressentiment that gives substance to Nietzsche’s metaphor (quoted above) of the “taut bow.” “Turned against himself,” Judeo-Christian man is a strange, seemingly “unnatural,” being, but as such he begins to view himself no longer as an end but as a stage in a grand transformation:
[T]he existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself . . . was something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered. . . .[M]an . . . gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as if with him something were announcing and preparing itself, as if man were not a goal but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise.—(GM II: §16)
In describing the development of the systems of knowledge, Nietzsche returns to the image of the “taut bow” and “great politics.” Judaism gave birth not only to the universalism and value of truth that characterize European societies, but also to the capacity to transfigure radically these values.
As explored in the following section, this aspect of Judeo-Christian legacy is of particular importance in informing Nietzsche’s discussions of 19th-century European politics and his hope for supra-national integration.
1. The New Idol
Publishing in the latter third of the 19th century, Nietzsche couldn’t help but comment on the most important political development of his time—nationalism. In his mature period, Nietzsche’s stance towards the nation-state was almost uniformly hostile. (This might come as a surprise to those who associate him with German National Socialism.) In these discussions, Nietzsche is not interested in sovereignty or the state in themselves so much as their modern “republican” and “national-democratic” variations. In this line, the central political problem for Nietzsche is one of representation. Nietzsche (or Zarathustra to be exact) claims that the state exists through a central lie: “I, the state, am the people.” It is this equation and promise of representation that, after the collapse of “divine right” and absolutism, became the fundamental source of legitimacy.
Whereas healthy peoples are able to write their own tablets of good and evil, Zarathustra calls the modern state “the death of peoples” and, in an ironic reference to Hobbes “Leviathan,” “the coldest of all cold monsters” (Z I: §11). While a great legislator like Manu was a “creator”—he brought order to his culture—the modern state is an “annihilator.” It simply “takes,” its managers exist by taxing those below them. And it is a cold monster in that it “bask[s] in the sunshine” of the allegiance and men of actual achievement. And, to Zarathustra’s dismay, it has seduced the “great souls” of every nation. Here, Nietzsche certainly has in mind a figure like Wagner: after the events of 1848-49 he was a nomadic artist who radically rethought the operatic form; by 1876 and the establishment of the Bayreuth festival, he was “nationalized” and thus became “respectable” and “palatable.”
Keeping in mind Nietzsche’s esteem and nostalgia for the age of peoples, it is important to note that his critique of the modern state functions around a nation/state opposition. As mentioned above, Nietzsche’s mature work is filled with barbs against all things German; however, the moments in which he criticizes the German state are exactly those in which he allows himself to recognize the cultural achievement of the German people—even if he does this in the form of his signature double-edged complements.21 While in other works Nietzsche depicts Germans as lugubrious beer-guzzlers, vis-à-vis their state, they are a people of ponderous depths, fixated—perhaps to a fault—on a vision of the future (BGE VIII: §240). Germans famously have an identity crisis—“It is characteristic of the Germans that the question, ‘what is German?’ never dies out amongst them” (BGE VIII: §244)—but then this makes them philosophical. In light of Nietzsche’s political ideal of the good European, it is certainly significant here that he depicts the German soul as disposed to “cosmopolitanism” (BGE VIII: §241). In 1888—18 years after the founding of the Reich—he exclaimed: “‘German spirit’: for the past eighteen years a contradiction in terms” (TI I: §23). In a clear reference to the leader of the new Germany, Otto von Bismarck, Nietzsche speaks of “a statesman” who convinced the Germans to sacrifice their great virtues for the sake of a “novel and dubious mediocrity” (BGE VIII: §241). Bismarck was able to seduce the Germans through, in Nietzsche’s exact words, “Great Politics.” Far from being the merger of politics and the war of spirits that Nietzsche foresaw in Ecce Homo (EC IV: §1), Bismarck’s “great politics” is little more than pomp and circumstance, a parody of actual greatness. The great chancellor “piles up for [the Germans] another tower of Babel, a monster of empire and power,” and willing citizens “grovel on their bellies before anything massive” (BGE VIII: §241). Nietzsche holds his nose at this spectacle and refers to the process as the “spiritual flattening” of a people. In becoming citizens of the Reich, Germans forgo their spiritual boundlessness and learn “politicking.”
2. The Herd and the Tyrants
Like most critics of nationalism, Nietzsche is quick to place national formation within a particular historical context and deconstruct any claims the nation-state might have of being an organic outgrowth out of an ancient community. Far from representing an eternal Deutsch, Nietzsche views the Reich as a part of a European-wide spirit of secular republicanism. And despite Kaiser Wilhelm’s claims of divine sovereignty, he views the Reich as part of “Europe’s democratic movement” (BGE VIII: §242). In this line, Nietzsche generally criticizes the nation-state in much the same way that he criticizes the Enlightenment’s political offspring, democracy and liberalism. Democratic and republican politics seek to oppress the great individual exemplars of the human species and mark the lowering of tastes to suit the herd. Nietzsche takes this point very far, even speculating that democratization was actually a “physiological process” in which Europeans were quite literally getting flatter and flatter and more and more boring. Europeans are no longer a collection of peoples, but a homogenous mass.
This being said, Nietzsche is not merely an aristocratic conservative, lamenting the dumbing-down of tastes (though he certainly did lament the dumbing-down of tastes). Just as with the discussion of “shadows over Europe,” Nietzsche views this “mass-ification” of peoples as inevitable and irreversible; indeed, he attempts to glimpse a potential transformation taking place through (not against) the “democratic movement.” Indeed, Nietzsche provocatively imagines that the great leveling will eventuate in a “result which would seem to be least expected by those who naively praise [the process of democratization], the apostles of ‘modern ideas.’” For the new “democratic man”—in the form of either the “last man” described in Zarathustra (Z I: P: §5) or the “garrulous worker” in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE VIII: §242)—shall be, in status if not name, a slave. Slaves, of course, need Masters, much like cattle need cowboys. And this means that “in exceptional cases the strong human being will have to turn out stronger and richer than perhaps ever before.” The democratization of Europeans will be the opportunity for the “cultivation of tyrants.”
3. Who Leads Europe?
In the wake of 20th-century totalitarianisms, Nietzsche’s call for the cultivation of tyrants is undoubtedly unwelcome. As Jacob Golomb and Robert Wistrich observe, Nietzsche is not a proto-Fascist or -Nazi, but he is most definitely a kind of “godfather” of these movements. In their words, he was a “prophet of the spiritual vacuum that gave birth to the totalitarian abysses of the twentieth century. As such he remains profoundly relevant to our time.”22 But then, perhaps one could push Nietzsche’s “totalitarian” connection much further than Golomb and Wistrich would like. Both Hitler and Stalin might even seem to be an excellent candidate for the “artist tyrant” in that both sustained their dictatorship by replacing politics with the spectacle of power. Nietzsche, of course, never discusses things like a “one-party-state” or the “Führer principle”; however, in his unpublished writings, which were collected as The Will to Power (1901), he did specifically speak of “international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race” (WP §504). Furthermore, in stressing the need for fearless new conquerors, he rhetorically asks, “Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century?” (WP §465).23
Nietzsche never published any statements like this in his lifetime, and it is irresponsible to treat them uncritically as definitive components of his philosophy. Nevertheless, the questions that such a statement evoke are serious and invariably color any reading of Nietzsche’s political philosophy. Without doubt there is a certain racial, eugenicist component to Nietzsche’s vision of the new Europe; however, it is of vital importance to look very closely at exactly how Nietzsche depicts his projected tyrants and masters of Europe. Nietzsche might be notorious for writing positively about the “blond beast” and the “noble races” (GM I: §11),24 but ultimately both of these figures are part of Nietzsche’s vision of “pre-history,” of the half-forgotten memory of man. They are not the Masters of Europe, who will arise after the death of God.
Nietzsche ultimately never details who the Overman (Übermensch) is, much as Marx remained poetic and elliptical when he described communism. That said, he offers glimpses . . .
It is useful to begin this discussion with the figure of the “good European.” Nietzsche is most explicit about what he means by this term when he discuses the role of the Jews in modern European society. Nietzsche’s portrait of the Jewish people is, in many ways, familiar: he writes of them as wandering without a home, still alienated from the European national communities even after the wide-spread liberal reforms improving their treatment. Their alien status has certain benefits, however, for in being excluded from national life, the Ashkenazim maintain their own distinct cultural traditions and remain, in Nietzsche’s words, a people “aere perennius,” more enduring than bronze.
With this in mind, Daniel Conway has suggested that the European Jews stand for Nietzsche as a kind of political alternative, a living critique of his grand vision of a renewed Roman Empire: “Despite his bold, Europhilic swagger, he feared that they [the Jews] may have succeeded in formulating the optimal strategy for promoting cultural advancement in late modernity.”25 This claim is highly useful in that it is, in my view, a misreading of Nietzsche’s position towards the Ashkenazim, but then it brings to the fore an important point. It is certainly true that Nietzsche saw the value in being the outsider; all great philosophers are outsiders, including Nietzsche himself. Furthermore, Zarathustra speaks directly to the lonely and disposed in his call for the creation of a new spiritual order: “You that are lonely today, you that are withdrawing, you shall one day be the people: out of you, who have chosen yourselves, there shall grow a chosen people—and out of them the overman” (Z I: §22). It might seem that here Nietzsche is calling for a kind of “Jewish” good European, the Good European as a wandering nomad. Those who have “chosen themselves” will form an ironic “chosen people.”
Nietzsche undoubtedly desires to empower those who stand against the modern world; however, in this scheme, they are not to remain “free spirits” for long. In the above quotation, Nietzsche does not imagine the alienated as forever standing apart, but as ultimately triumphing, as giving birth to a higher stage of humanity, and thus laying the foundations for rule. Similarly, what Nietzsche admires in the Jews’ “optimal strategy” is not their apartness in itself, but their potential to achieve “mastery over Europe” (BGE VIII: §251). Indeed, Nietzsche scolds the Jews for trying to assimilate into national cultures. Were these indestructible, nomadic people not capable of much more, for better and for worse? In making such claims, Nietzsche does not reveal himself to be a kind of “Jewish supremacist,” so to speak. The Jew, who has survived persecution and attempted annihilation—survived even national assimilation and who has built international networks—are an image, at least in part, of what a “Good European” might be.26 But the Ashkenazim’s international culture and “morality in the grand style,” which has been developed into a variety of ethical philosophies, make them particularly well suited for the governance of the continent.
In no better way does Nietzsche express that his political project amounts to a “transvaluation of all values,” for it is the wanderers and nomads who were, as physical types, those to whom Christianity would most likely appeal in the ancient world, and furthermore, those who would most likely succeed in crafting a religion of ressentiment against the nobility. The lonely and dispossessed are poised to become a new master class.
Immediately following his paean to the imperium Romanum quoted at the beginning of this essay, Nietzsche offers a glimpse of his ideal of the man who might sit on the throne. His language here is grandiose and deserves to be quoted at length:
I envisage a possibility of a perfect supraterrestrial magic and fascination of color: it seems to me that it glistens in all the tremors of subtle beauty, that an art is at work in it, so divine, so devilishly divine that one searches millennia in vain for a second such possibility […] Cesare Borgia as pope. Am I understood? (AC §61)
The imagery is meant to shock, and Nietzsche’s effusiveness expresses his glee in blasphemy. But then Nietzsche intends “Cesare Borgia as pope” to be taken seriously, and such an image connects to many components of his wider political thought. In installing Borgia in Rome, Nietzsche means to attack the Judeo-Christian tradition “in the decisive place, in the very seat of Christianity, placing the noble values on the throne”; going further, he seeks to bring these values “right into the instincts, into the lowest needs and desires of those who sat there” (AC §61). A polemical or merely blasphemous opposition to Christianity—in which case he would image a “sultan in Babylon” or the like—is nowhere to be seen. To the contrary, Nietzsche seeks to re-constitute the entire Judeo-Christian legacy. The “instincts” and “lowest needs and desires” of the Jew or Christian are transformed into the foundation for a new aristocratic order. Just as the “good European” marks a kind of reversal of the tradition of Jewish ressentiment, so Nietzsche imagines the coming tyrants as an upside down version of the greatest of all priestly classes.
Bergman, Peter. 1987. Nietzsche, “the Last Antipolitical German.” Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Brinker, Menahem. 2002. “Nietzsche and the Jews.” In Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Conway, Daniel W. . 2002. “Ecce Caesar: Nietzsche’s Imperial Aspirations.” In Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard Nikolaus, Graf von. 1925 . Adel, Praktischer Idealismus. Wien and Leipzig: Pan-Europa Verlag.
Dannhauser, Werner J. 1987 . Friedrich Nietzsche. In History of Political Philosophy, edited by L. Strauss and J. Cropsey. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Gillespie, Michael Allen. 1999. “Nietzsche and the Anthropology of Nihilism.” Nietzsche-Studien (28):141-155.
Golomb, Jacob, and Robert S. Wistrich. 2002. Introduction. In Nietzsche: Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Kaufmann, Walter. 1974 . Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Middleton, Christopher (ed.). 1996 . Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967 . The Will to Power. Translated by W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books.
———. 1974 [1882/87]. The Gay Science. Translated by W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books.
———. 1982 . Daybreak. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1982 [1883-84]. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin Books.
———. 1982 . The Antichrist. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin Books.
———. 1982 . The Twilight of the Idols. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin Books.
———. 1990 . “History in Service and Disservice of Life”. In Unmodern Observations, edited by A. William. New Haven: Yale University Press.
———. 1992 . The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, The Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: Modern February.
———. 1992 . On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: Modern Library.
———. 1992 . Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is. Translated by W. Kaufmann. Edited by W. Kaufmann, Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: Modern Library.
Salaquarda, Jörg. 1996. “Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition”. In The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, edited by B. Marnus and K. M. Higgins. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schrift, Alan. 1995. Nietzsche’s French Legacy. London and New York: Routledge.
Strong, Tracy B. 1988 . Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. Expanded ed. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
Wolin, Richard. 2004. The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism, from Nietzsche to Postmodernism. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Yovel, Yirmiyahu. 2002. “Nietzsche Contra Wagner on the Jews.” In Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Throughout this essay, I use standard parenthetical documentation for all of Nietzsche’s works. An abbreviation of the title is followed by the section and paragraph number (when available). A Preface to a volume and the Prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra are both signified by “P.” Nietzsche is a writer fond of the italicized stress, and, unless otherwise noted, all emphasis in selected quotations is identical to that in the original.The works referenced are as follows: The Antichrist, AC (Nietzsche 1982 ); The Birth of Tragedy, BT (Nietzsche 1992 ); Daybreak, D (Nietzsche 1982 ); Ecce Homo, EH (Nietzsche 1992 ); The Gay Science, GS (Nietzsche 1974 [1882/87]); On the Genealogy of Morals, GM (Nietzsche 1992 ); “History in Service and Disservice of Life,” HSDL (Nietzsche 1990 ); Twilight of the Idols, TI (Nietzsche 1982 ); The Will to Power, WP (Nietzsche 1967 ); and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Z (Nietzsche 1982 [1883-84]). ↩
- In the critical literature, there are countless volumes detailing Nietzsche’s relationship towards the Greeks of the 5th century; there is no single monograph dedicated to Nietzsche’s view of Rome and the Imperium. ↩
- Peter Bergman. Nietzsche, “the Last Antipolitical German” (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 90. ↩
- Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, expanded edition (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1988 ), 202. ↩
- Much of this can be directly linked to the fact that Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Nietzsche beloved sister, was in charge of Friedrich’s literary estate after his death and was the moving force in establishing the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar. To Friedrich’s dismay, Elizabeth had married a one Bernard Förster, an anti-Semite equal parts German Nationalist and proto-Hippie. (He actually took Elizabeth to South America to found a utopian Commune, “Germania,” beyond the reach of Jewish greed.) During the 1930s, Elizabeth assiduously tried to gain the favor of the Nazi regime and rather brazenly misrepresented Nietzsche’s views on Jews, Germans, and German nationalism.Still, this is far from the whole story. That Mussolini read and admired Nietzsche and generally thought of his politics—even in his Socialist days—as “Nietzschean” is indisputable. There is no evidence that Hitler ever read Nietzsche even though he publicly praised him. Other Nazi theorists, most notably Alfred Rosenberg, were clearly well versed in Nietzsche’s writings. ↩
- Alan Schrift offers an overview in Nietzsche’s French Legacy (London and New York: Routledge, 1995. ↩
- The Gay Science was first published in 1882; however, Nietzsche added Book V, in which this quotation appears, in the 1887 expanded edition. ↩
- Throughout this essay, I use the term “Judeo-Christian” to signify that, far from viewing Christianity and Judaism as divergent or even opposed, Nietzsche perceived Christianity specifically as the consequence of Judaism and the means by which Judaism expanded globally. Nietzsche specifically referred to Christ as the “seduction and bypath to precisely those Jewish values and new ideal” (GM I: §8); he saw Judaism as having influenced Christianity and the Churches so deeply that it had become imperceptible: “today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without realizing that he himself is the ultimate Jewish consequence (AC §24).It is worth noting that here I specifically disagree with Walter Kaufmann’s views on “Judeo-Christianity” in his Nietzsche. Kaufmann sought to distance Nietzsche from Nazi and proto-Nazi thinkers, specifically Alfred Rosenberg and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who denounced Christianity on account of its Jewish origins. In attempting this, Kaufmann misreads Nietzsche in claiming that he viewed a great separation between the religions in the sense that “Christianity is envisaged as the dross of Judaism” (Kaufmann 1974 , p. 299). ↩
- In claiming that Nietzsche viewed that Enlightenment and Science as emerging from the Judeo-Christian tradition, I have relied on Jörg Salaquarda’s “Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition” (Salaquarda 1996). ↩
- Werner J. Dannhauser, “Friedrich Nietzsche” in History of Political Philosophy, edited by L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987 ). ↩
- Michael Allen Gillespie, “Nietzsche and the Anthropology of Nihilism,” Nietzsche-Studien (28) 1999, 141-155. ↩
- At least in The Gay Science, Nietzsche’s “new dawn” seems to lack all semblance of content. While Nietzsche might hope for a life after God to be ruled by “overmen,” a society ruled by philistine “last men” seems just as (if not more) likely. Although such a comparison is intrinsically unfair, Nietzsche’s “new dawn” seems similar to Lenin’s belief that, after the fall of the bourgeois-Christian world, a radical elite could construct a new “socialist man.” Millenarian dreams of a Tabula rasa seem always to crash on the rocks of durable institutions and a persistent human nature.
- Gillespie, op cit. ↩
- In his discussion “On the Prejudices of Philosophers,” Nietzsche reiterates the point: “What in us really wants ‘truth’? […] Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?” (BGE I: §1). ↩
- Nietzsche associates not just knowledge but the even more basic concept of memory with pain. For “learning,” pain is indispensable: “[T]here is nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole of prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. ‘If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily the most enduring) psychology on earth” (GM II: §3). ↩
- Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974 ), 79. ↩
- It is important to remember that Nietzsche does not use “race” in its modern supra-ethnic meaning, e.g. “the white race.” As correctly pointed out by Brinker, Nietzsche’s “race” clearly indicates an ethnic-cultural population: e.g. the Jews are “the purest of the European races.” (BGE VIII: 251) (Brinker 2002). ↩
- Menahem Brinker, “Nietzsche and the Jews,” Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, Edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1999). ↩
- Christopher Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996 ). ↩
- Yirmiyahu Yovel: “When Nietzsche attacks the anti-Semites or defends the Jews, he was aiming at real people—the actual community of the Jews, and anti-Semitism as a contemporary movement. By contrast when dealing with ancient priestly Judaism, Nietzsche treated it as a psycho-cultural category latent in the Protestant Christian Church of his day, which Nietzsche, as a “genealogist” of this culture, wished to expose. Contrary to many anti-Semites—and also to the trend of Jewish apologetics—Nietzsche did not project his critique of ancient Judaism into a political attitude against the Jews of his day. This break allowed him to be at the same time—and with intense passion—both an anti-anti-Semite and a critic of ancient priestly Judaism, the fountain of Christianity (Yovel 2002).” ↩
- Nietzsche’s reconciliation is expressed by the fact he even allows himself to once again wax poetic about the majesty of Wagnerian music (§240), something surprising in light of the vitriolic attack in The Case of Wagner (1888) just two years later. In the following aphorism (§241), he actually calls this a “sample” of the good European’s “relapse” into “some hearty fatherlandishness,” “old loves and narrowness.” ↩
- Introduction, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002). ↩
- Both of these selections from The Will to Power are quoted and discussed at length by Richard Wolin in The Seduction of Unreason (55-56), in which he generally argues that Nietzsche was far more than a “godfather of Fascism” and that he anticipates the obsessions with race and power-politics of Fascist and Nazi ideology. Postmodernists who were inspired by Nietzsche are, in Wolin’s mind, guilty by association (Wolin 2004). ↩
- Walter Kaufmann discusses these terms and their misreading and misuse in his translation of On the Genealogy of Morals (pp. 476-77, footnote 3). ↩
- Daniel W. Conway, “Ecce Caesar: Nietzsche’s Imperial Aspirations,” Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, edited by J. Golomb and R. S. Wistrich (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002). ↩
- Count Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the “Pan-European League,” who sought to unite Europe and was inspired by Nietzsche, described Jews as a “core around which a new spiritual nobility would group itself” (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1925 , 51, my translation). ↩
This interview about Donald Trump, the question of identity, geopolitics, Islam, and other issues originally appeared in a French publication Europe Maxima. Richard was interviewed by Thierry Durolle.
This interview about Donald Trump, the question of identity, geopolitics, Islam, and other issues originally appeared in a French publication Europe Maxima. Richard was interviewed by Thierry Durolle.
Europe Maxima: First and foremost, thank you for answering my questions. To begin this interview, could you introduce yourself and the National Policy Institute to our readers?
Richard Spencer: The National Policy Institute is an independent non-profit think tank dedicated to the heritage, identity, and future of people of European descent in the United States and around the world. I am the President and Director of The National Policy Institute and Washington Summit Publishers. I am also the founder and Editor of Radix Journal, RadixJournal.com, and a co-founder of the recently-launched AltRight.com.
Europe Maxima: You are considered by the media as a kind of showcase or spokesman of the now-famous Alt Right. We know that the Alt Right is more of a nebula of different tendencies rather than a homogeneous movement. Where do you fit in this Alt-Right nebula?
Richard Spencer: I coined the term “alternative Right” in 2008 in order to differentiate myself from the failures of mainstream American conservatism. I saw the latter as a purely reactive form, seeking to preserve the status quo as opposed to focusing on passing down key aspects of our ancestral traditions to future generations. I have been referred to as the intellectual vanguard of this movement.
Today, Alt Right is, indeed, an umbrella term to describe those seeking the way out of Liberal Postmodernity dominating the United States and Europe through various means: culturally, socially, politically. Alt Right’s current diversity is a natural state in its early stages of development, as we consolidate our message and improve our communication with likeminded counterparts outside the U.S.
Europe Maxima: Several protagonists of the Alt Right seem to be influenced by the French Nouvelle Droite and particularly by Guillaume Faye and Alain de Benoist. As far as you are concerned, you invited the latter in 2013 to talk about the identity question. What did you learn from the French Nouvelle Droite and do you believe that its influence is that important among Alt Righters?
Richard Spencer: The so-called French New Right has left a tremendous impact on the Alt Right, as have earlier renditions of the Right in continental Europe: from Friedrich Nietzsche to the Conservative Revolutionary thinkers in the interwar period. One of the reasons for this influence is the fact that continental Europe has a rich tradition of right-wing intellectuals as compared to the United States, which has, relative to its population, few. Apart from a number of notable exceptions, today, the Right in the U.S. comprises neoconservatives, libertarians, and paleoconservatives, who either fail to address key questions of identity or do not go far enough in doing so.
Europe Maxima: Except the Nouvelle Droite and some famous thinkers like Julius Evola and Oswald Spengler, we don’t really know American thinkers who influenced the Alt Right. Could you name a few?
Richard Spencer: Some of the notable thinkers of recent times in the U.S. include Sam Francis, Patrick Buchanan, Murray Rothbard, and Paul Gottfried. In various ways, these thinkers criticized Washington’s foreign policy of chaos led by neocons and liberal interventionists, questioned the decline of the West, and examined questions of identity.
Europe Maxima: The Lügenpresse depicts you as a neo-Nazi and a white supremacist whereas you consider yourself a race-realist. Does this mean you want a « nice white country » or that you would accept living in a multicultural country as long as there is no racial and cultural mixing between its communities?
Richard Spencer: I consider myself an Identitarian. I have also repeatedly stated that to move forward, we must discard all ideologies of the past.
Proponents of Liberalism (even those who self-describe as the mainstream Left) refer to anyone who opposes them by using emotionally-charged keywords, including “Nazi.” This shows the power of such keywords to shut down rational discussion, but also the fact that globalist elites and their supporters have been in a state of hysteria about the slow paradigm shift toward identity-focused populism since Brexit and, especially, since Trump’s election and inauguration.
If you look at recent violent protests during Trump’s inauguration or those in Berkeley, you will notice that those who have been attacked—both verbally and physically—are not only people like me, with bold and radical ideas, but also mainstream conservatives wearing red Trump hats. This means that our attackers do not differentiate between us. The explicit nature of this friend/enemy distinction is good: our opponents are hostile and even violent, which should convert more open-minded people to our message.
Europe Maxima: Is race, as a concept, more than simple biological materialism to you? What would be the answer of the spiritual vacuity and nihilism the post-modern white man is afflicted by?
Richard Spencer: I do not subscribe to pure biological determinism. I believe that one’s identity is a complex interplay of nature and nurture: from one’s DNA to cultural and social interactions, and, of course, geography—the sense of rootedness in one’s native landscape.
Our European counterparts must understand the uniqueness of American development: our society is hyper-racialized because our history on this continent involved slavery, various waves of immigration, mainly from Europe and, more recently, from other parts of the world, segregation, and so forth. Whereas some older dwindling immigrant communities such as the Irish certainly exist, the majority of Americans of European descent is not only ethnically mixed but also self-identifies as simply White. This is both their reality in terms of self-perception and in terms of being the Other—when they encounter members of other groups.
In some ways, this perception is similar to Americans of African, Hispanic, and other backgrounds. Yet whereas these minority groups are encouraged to embrace their respective group identities through their own institutions and encouragement by the state, such as Affirmative Action in education, Americans of European descent do not have such mechanisms. It is true that up until recently, White Americans held social and cultural hegemony and did not need their own organizations. This, however, has changed: the combination of demographics, immigration, and Kulturkampf has left many Americans of European descent with a keen sense of dispossession.
Europe Maxima: For a couple of years in France, some people like Laurent Ozon created the concept/neologism “Remigration.” “Remigration” is the return of non-white French people to their countries of origin in a peaceful way thanks to bi-lateral state concords, for example. Do you believe something similar could be achieved someday in the U.S.A.?
Richard Spencer: The Alt Right is in the initial stages of political development. We must use our time wisely rather than biting off more than we can chew in outlining currently unfulfillable political goals. That said, I believe that we, as a group, must act solely in our own interests. By definition, this would leave out those outside it. In theory, this could be achieved by various peaceful and voluntary means. So I am not excluding concepts like re-migration from the list of possibilities.
Europe Maxima: What is your opinion on Islam?
Richard Spencer: In the best circumstances, we could both live and let live.
Framing the question of immigration—or mass migration—to Europe and the U.S. along the lines of Islam is incorrect. Islam is practiced in very different regions around the world: Indonesian Muslims are distinct from those in Lebanon and those in Nigeria. Saudi Arabia practices horrific beheading, while Tatar Muslims in Russians are largely secular adherents to generic Russian-European culture. Thus, this question should not only be framed along the lines of religion but also along the lines of ethnicity, culture, and geography.
That said, with some exceptions of historic, indigenous minority communities, large-scale Islamic migration has no place in Europe. At the same time, Washington and its European allies must stop the ongoing chaos and destruction they have caused in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia creating a seemingly never-ending flow of war refugees and economic migrants, which includes serious criminal elements and even terrorists. It surprises me that when the question of refugees is discussed, virtually no one—not even the self-described Leftist antiwar activists—mentions that the best solution, after ceasing to aid the so-called “moderate rebels” and helping in the struggle against global terrorism, is resettlement of refugees and, perhaps, aid in rebuilding in their own ancestral lands, not in Europe or the U.S.
But then one wonders if it will ever be “live and let live” with Islam, and not “live and let die.”
I’ve generally turned up my nose at the “Islam debates” of the 2000s. On one side, liberals (including George W. Bush) claimed that Islam was a “religion of peace”; on the other side, conservative supporters of Bush and the War on Terror claimed that Islam was a maniacal religion bent on installing Sharia Law in Oklahoma—which is why we should engaged in endless wars for democracy in the Middle East.
Needless to say, both sides are wrong and misguided. But as much as I hate to admit it, because I opposed the Iraq War so vehemently, the conservative side does contain a kernel of truth. Islam—at its full flourishing (for instance, Wahhabi or Salafi Islam—Islam as a political ideology)—isn’t some peaceful denomination like Methodism or religion like Buddhism; Islam is a Black Flag. It is an expansive, domineering ideology, and one that is directed against Europe. In this way, Islam give non-Europeans a fighting spirit and integrates them into something much greater than themselves. Islam is a “civilization” in Huntington’s sense, and a grave danger for European peoples.
Europe Maxima: Racial and cultural tensions are growing more and more in both of our countries along with a general despondency, mistrust towards the political and media elite and the rise of populism. According to you is it because of an economical and social crisis, a political crisis, a crisis of identity, a crisis of Meaning or even everything all together?
Richard Spencer: Current crisis in the West has multiple causes—both immediate and deep-rooted. The former is obvious: the warfare-welfare state creates crises abroad, accepting the results of those crises—migrants and refugees—at home, while benefitting globalist elites with transnational capitalist interests. This perpetual cycle occurs against the backdrop of moral and cultural degeneration: from entertainment culture to suicidal “tolerance.” Even if it were possible in certain cases, refugees cannot be assimilated because there is no viable culture to assimilate them to. The results are horrific.
Yet many critics of our predicament simply want to turn back the clock to the time of three of four decades ago, when things seemed reasonably “okay,” without asking difficult—fundamental—questions. This is wrong. After all, it was that seemingly comfortable time that set us on the trajectory that led us to where we are now.
Others trace the decline of the West to the era of the Enlightenment that spawned ideologies of Modernity; others yet—to the origins of Christianity; while thinkers like Heidegger go as far back as ancient Greece and the framing of Being.
So this time around we must ask ourselves these difficult questions starting with, “Who are we?” and “What is our place in history?”
Europe Maxima: Do you believe the concepts of Left and Right are still valid?
Richard Spencer: On the one hand, the political spectrum that everyone is used to is largely outmoded. After the collapse of Communism, Liberalism became the only remaining ideology of Modernity with global aspirations, in which both the mainstream Left and Right represent two cosmetically different versions of the same fundamental trajectory. This is why, for instance, you see many Identitarians who would self-describe as Right with a keen interest in the environment and conservation, i.e. issues traditionally associated with leftist “greens,” or they subscribe to anti-interventionist foreign policy—another putatively “left-wing” cause.
At the same time, in a somewhat abstract, semantic sense we can speak of an eternal Left and Right, where the former is about horizontal movement, destruction of existent norms, decentralization, whereas the latter is about eternity, vertical movement, centralization, consolidation, creative spirit, and monumentality. These semantic forms are cyclical.
Europe Maxima: Donald Trump finally became President of the U.S. What do you expect from him in terms of domestic and foreign policy?
Richard Spencer: My expectation of Trump remains pragmatic and therefore modest. At best, he will face inward in order to attempt to solve a multitude of domestic problems, while adhering to Realpolitik in international relations. I do not expect him to dismantle NATO—despite the fact that this alliance is a Cold War relic—contrary to the paranoid theories of his opponents. But needless to say, the alliance needs to be radically rethought.
For me, Trump is more important as a symbol of the kind of energies he has unleashed instead of his actual policies. He, for instance, recently nominated an Anglo-Saxon Protestant, Neil Gorsuch, for the Supreme Court. In practice, Gorsuch’s decisions will likely adhere to examining Constitutional law. Symbolically, however he represents the founding stock of America as a nascent state, whereas none of the recent selections have been representative thereof. Similarly, Trump’s comments, ranging from those about a reasonable relationship with Russia to explicitly questioning immigration, have provided hope for a future paradigm shift.
Europe Maxima: As the name of our website suggests, we defend the greater Europe. What is your opinion on both Europe as a civilisation and as a (pseudo) political and economic structure names the European Union?
Richard Spencer: If you look at maps of, say, the Holy Roman Empire in the past and the European Union today, there will be quite a bit of an overlap. What this demonstrates is that there is a vast spiritual, geographic, and ethno-cultural entity that we could refer to as Greater Europe. Yet the form of this entity has been filled with different content throughout history. Today, the European Union is a symbol of all that is wrong: from its massive bureaucracy to its culturally destructive policies. What this means is that the form needs to be filled with correct content in line with true European identities and traditions.
I’ve expressed skepticism of “Brexit,” as well as all forms of ethnic nationalism, that is, nationalisms that view fellow Europeans as “The Other.” Whether we like it or not, the fault lines of the 21st century—and beyond—are racial and civilizational. We must address issues and crises on this level; in this sense, we must think and act racially. How exactly this Identitarian spirit would express itself in terms of political structures remains to be seen.
If you listened carefully enough to the din of broken glass and shrill Leftist lamentations, you’d have heard another sound this weekend: the death rattle of Antifa.
“What’s equality? Muck in the yard,
Historic nations grow, from above to below”
W.B. Yeats Three Songs
If you listened carefully enough to the din of broken glass and shrill Leftist lamentations, you’d have heard another sound this weekend: the death rattle of Antifa. The cheap assault on Richard Spencer, along with the damage wrought in Washington DC, does not mitigate the fact that so-called ‘anti-fascism,’ in all meaningful respects, has been dying since the mid-1990s. What we witnessed in the weekend that has just passed was the desperate actions of a spent force. What occurred was disgraceful, and we should challenge it, but we shouldn’t be unduly disturbed about future prospects. Nor should we exaggerate the threat these people pose, or our response to it. In its death agonies, Antifa has been as noisy as it was in life, and this noise may have caused the less well-informed to conclude that there was vitality yet in this old hag. The perceptive, however, will have noted that this noise only slightly masked the increasing senility of an obsolete movement that has struggled, staggered, and gasped its way to the pyrrhic victory of a cheap-shot and a few burnt trashcans. In this new era, the age of Trump, Brexit, Nationalist murmurings across Europe, and the rise of the Alt-Right, anti-fascism is politically dead.
No autopsy is required. ‘Anti-fascism’ was born with the defect that would ultimately carry it off; a deformation of its vital systems that for long periods rendered it heavily dependent on its adversaries for political oxygen. Part of this deformation arose from its internal divisions. On the one hand, a substantial element of Antifa activity consists of the peaceful, democratic type. These are the misguided vicar’s daughters and soccer moms who are inveigled into organizing, attending, or donating to ‘anti-racist’ demonstrations, music concerns, or similar public events. We witnessed much of its constituency in the Women’s March that followed Trump’s inauguration. This element has always been ideologically lightweight, and participates less out of ideological convictions than it does out of vague moral twinges and panics. The other element of Antifa has always been smaller, but is the one we are perhaps more familiar with. This is the revolutionary anti-fascist or crypto-Bolshevik wing, consisting of Trotskyists, Marxists, Anarchists, and Jews. Its members possess a tangled mess of often conflicting ideologies that are nevertheless set aside in the name of confronting the perceived fascist threat. The latter element has always frightened and disillusioned the former. The tensions between the two have marred the history of anti-fascism, which witnessed several fractures, and failed attempts at even the most basic form of ideological unification, from the 1970s to the 2010s.
The pathology of anti-fascism, present from its birth, is that it has all the hallmarks of a particularly weak parasite. Here is an entity that is conceived purely as an anti-ideology. Its stated primary foe was ‘the Fascist,’ who was understood to lie behind all societal ills. Since actual Fascists were difficult to find after 1945, and organizing explicitly against them was thus liable to have one regarded as a paranoid eccentric, ‘anti-fascists’ hastily added ‘the State’ as a secondary, quasi-substitute for the real thing. If ‘Fascists’ couldn’t be found, they would have to be invented. Language about ‘the Fascist State’ thus became ubiquitous in these circles. Eventually, this mode of language became endemic on the Left. All political movements to the right of modern liberalism were perceived, and labelled, as quasi-Fascistic, and ‘anti-fascism’ would thus provide itself with something to mobilize against. The problem, of course, was one of linguistic economics. As the Left flooded the verbal ‘market’ with its currency, this currency underwent a dramatic deflation in emotive value. The Left’s incessant invocation of ‘Fascism’ led to the term’s precipitous and irreversible decline. Anti-fascism, in the fulfilment of its pathology, began undermining the strength of its own propaganda.
The in-born pathology of anti-fascism extended to its tactical capacities, which were also stunted and retarded from birth. Anti-fascism’s founding tactical principle was that it would oppose with violence any attempts by ‘fascists’ to organize at street level. For a time, there was some vitality in this tactical emphasis. From the 1960s to the early 1990s Antifa was sporadically engaged in violent activity against Nationalist groups throughout the West and, particularly when one considers running battles with Britain’s National Front, one could argue that there was a kind of ongoing ‘battle for the streets.’ However, by the early 1990s Nationalism became aware that it had allowed itself to be relegated to the fringes of political discourse where, along with its opponents in Antifa, it became trapped in futile turf wars that made little impact on national political trajectories. There was an internal revolution in Nationalism that led to the influx of greater numbers of ‘quality’ people, and the adoption of policies, aesthetics, and approaches that began to cut into the ‘mainstream.’ Nationalists began winning electoral victories, appearing on television, and creating their own media.
Anti-fascism at first claimed a kind of victory. With much aplomb it claimed to have conclusively ‘won the streets’ and, according to many an Antifa screed, the spineless fascists had fled the field. It was only during the late 1990s that Antifa realized that it hadn’t won anything, and had been caught on the wrong foot. If the primary weapon in your tactical arsenal is street confrontation, and your opponent is enjoying unprecedented success precisely because they have abandoned street confrontation, one might expect that a tactical change would be necessary. However, anti-fascism’s stunted development led instead to stagnancy and confusion. Nationalism had gone places that anti-fascism couldn’t or wouldn’t follow. Anarchists, a sizeable proportion of the Antifa cohort, were ideologically and temperamentally disinclined to participate in parliamentary and traditional politics. Militant Antifa was thus even more starkly contrasted with its non-violent allies, and even less likely to find acceptance in mainstream society. Antifa tactics were redundant. It was thus symbolically significant when, in 2001, England’s Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) formally disbanded.
Other factions limped on, of course. In these foul residues, problematic ideological abscesses continued to fester. The movement continue to posture itself as being opposed to a ‘system’ it perceived as reactionary, ultra-conservative, and anti-working class. It escaped many on the far-Left that anti-fascism was itself reactionary by nature, being entirely dependent for stimulus on the actions or moves of its opponents. Indeed, this was the conclusion of Nigel Copsey, scholar of fascism and anti-fascism, who described Antifa as a “reactive phenomenon” that could only manifest in accordance to stimulus. Further, while Nationalists, and others labelled as fascists, began advancing structured programs for social and economic change, Antifa could advance no vision, no position beyond reactive opposition. The assertion that Nationalists and others were ultra-conservative also began to ring increasingly hollow in an age when the far-Left influenced political outcomes to a greater extent than it has ever openly admitted. Marxism, in its cultural expressions, went mainstream. Mass immigration obliterated the efficacy of national borders. Social engineering led to the slow destruction of the family. In this context, the goals of Antifa and the ‘the State’ it claimed to oppose became indistinguishable. Antifa, more than Nationalists, had more to gain from ‘conserving’ the status quo. Nationalists, the alleged ultra-conservatives, increasingly distinguished themselves by their open desire for cultural revolution; a destruction of all that is, a revisiting of what once was, and the planned construction of what might be.
But perhaps the greatest of Antifa’s internal incoherencies was its claim to support the cause of the working-class. To be sure, Antifa was from its inception a diseased protrusion of the neurotic middle-class. In particular, it drew its lifeblood from pathological or alien elements in the upper middle-class. Always directed by middle-class intellectuals, who were frequently Jewish, Antifa was staffed by a motley of materially spoiled, attention-seeking youngsters, who sought in their Jewish or Russian gurus what they could not find from disinterested, career-minded parents. These spurned children would seek to destroy the material assets and values of the world of the hated parents, substituted now with the ‘Fascist’ or ‘the State.’ It goes without saying that the real world of the worker played no part in this drama. Bernd Langer of the Autonome Antifa, Germany’s largest anti-fascist organization, once admitted: “Most of the political activists have a middle class background, few workers are involved in the movement. They are rather the exception. The working class plays no role in the anti-fascist struggle.”
Similarly, when the Sydney Morning Herald sought out members of Australian Antifa for an inside look at the movement there, the journalist might have been persuaded by Leftist propaganda to expect to find a young dock-worker or manual laborer. Instead, and more predictably from our perspective, he found dialogue with a young, “gluten intolerant,” activist who had grown up in the wealthy suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, had been sent to an expensive university by his parents, and had developed a love affair with ‘Marxism’ at the behest of guru professors. Our young Anarchist apparently proceeded to explain his moribund political philosophy between sips of rose tea at a fashionable cafe, as he peered over a pair of designer spectacles. Antifa is the bastard child of Marx and Goldman Sachs, conceived in the Hamptons, and nursed on the psychiatrists couch.
These yawning gaps between Antifa’s proclamations of class war and the reality of its staffing, led in many instances to friction between the duped and the deluded. Particularly during the 1990s, there were conflicts between those who saw themselves as old-school class warriors and those who came from, or drew ideological succor from more newly emerged victimhood narratives. Unlike Nationalists, with their almost obsessive care for statistics, facts and news analysis, the far-Left was bogged down in barely penetrable theory and a reliance on emotional responses to perceived slights. Thus, even the most committed economic Marxist couldn’t prevent the inevitable descent of Antifa into what Nigel Copsey described as “a multicultural, middle-class mind-set, in which the deification of difference (race, gender, and sexual preference) had replaced class equality.” Anti-fascism thus found it increasingly difficult to posture as a movement with even tangential mass appeal, instead pigeon-holing itself as a mere movement of ‘victims.’ The middle-class ‘daddy issue’ set now found themselves joined by those with other resentments; the homosexuals wanting ever more attention and acceptance, the feminists seeking revenge on an explicitly male form of political expression, and the minorities nursing ethnic grievances and possessing an interest in weakening White identity politics.
Resentment can provide a certain amount of energy. But this energy is not inexhaustible, and is certainly not comparable to the drive that can arise from the pursuit of a higher vision. Once Nationalism largely ceased its public expression in the form of marches, anti-fascism switched its focus to the disruption of conferences and meetings. This is a tactic we were all familiar with. There has rarely been a major meeting of American Renaissance, the National Policy Institute, or the London Forum that has not in some form been protested against or otherwise disturbed by Antifa intrusion. However, the cost-benefit outcome of such actions have always been negative for Antifa. In a pattern very likely to have been replicated elsewhere, Copsey found that German militant Antifa comprised only around five thousand individuals who amplified their impact by travelling non-stop around the country to disrupt meetings. It goes without saying that a large amount of time and resources would be required to maintain such an effort, and this time and resources was most often wasted. While Nationalist meetings may be disturbed to some extent, this disturbance has rarely been serious. Few meetings have had to be cancelled. Nationalism has continued to grow, both in terms of numbers and political victories. While Nationalists maintain a focus on the ‘main event,’ Antifa has remained a side-show; a kind of half-time entertainment during conferences.
Another area which Antifa neglected, and which Nationalists have exploited to an unprecedented extent, was the sphere of the ‘counterpublic.’ Having abandoned the streets, and remaining excluded from mainstream media, it was Nationalism that truly embraced cyberspace. Here the limits of “physical space,” and hence “physical confrontation,” were truly thrown into sharp relief. As the internet grew, Nationalism expanded into new forms of intellectual space, pioneering both the political forum and systematic, alternative media. Increasingly, Antifa reliance on countering mostly non-existent marches, and holding concerts for migrants and other ‘victim’ classes, began to look dated. Meanwhile, by the close of the first decade of the new millennium, Nationalism was pioneering TV channels, publishing outlets, intellectual and mass-appeal webzines, and a plethora of podcasts ranging from the high-brow to the comedic. Antifa inherently lacked the creative power of its opponents, and its main expression turned to endless sober warnings to the mainstream that here was ‘fascism’ in new clothing. First they came in suits, then with cartoon frogs.
By contrast, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin hold little comedic appeal for the masses. Nor do such figures even evoke the kind of edgy discomfort that can be elicited by a gothic bogeyman of the type that Hitler, the ultimate Fascist, had been crafted to be. Since Communism eked out its last days with sputtering cars, and against the background scent of chemicals and stale soup, it is neither darkly attractive nor particularly intimidating. Like Antifa itself, explicit radical socialism is an anachronism; a joke perhaps, but one where the punchline made sense only in a prior age. Anarchists can sport t-shirts promising “An Ice Pick for Every Trot,” but this is a weak gallows humor. As Trotsky himself might have testified, jokes and even light dissent cost lives in the ‘worker’s paradise,’ and Leftists are notoriously thin-skinned when it came to the dogma of Marxist-Leninist theory. The Anti-fascist environment is one in which everything is taken seriously, and nothing more so than the anti-fascists themselves.
It is this extremely high level of self-obsession that gave rise to such tremendous shock when, in 2016, the Antifa’s proverbial sky began to fall. With great self-assurance, the radical Left and its fellow travellers in academia and the media asserted that Brexit would never happen. What the Left failed to realize was that, as long as the principle of the secret ballot remains, and as long as Nationalists or their ideas have any means whatsoever to influence the opinions of voters exercising that secret ballot, their monopoly of the media, the colleges, and ‘the streets’ will never be enough to end our politics or assure the victory of theirs. Having failed to learn from the Brexit experience, the same smugness asserted itself on the eve of an allegedly ‘inevitable’ win for Hillary Clinton in the US Presidential elections. We now live in the age of President Trump.
The outburst of juvenile violence which accompanied the Trump inauguration should not be taken as indicative of the health of Antifa. This is not a robust movement. It is floundering tactically, and its biggest mistake has been its misguided portrayal of Trump and his voters as fascists. The Left wins when the Alt-Right and the Antifa remain on the fringes of mainstream discourse and the mainstream remains under Left-liberal ideological control (via academia, the media, and political tunnel-vision). However, in its shock and rage at Trump’s victory, the Left has been unable to move away from a discourse that paints Trump and his very substantial bloc of voters as belonging to a homogenous Far Right. What the Left risk doing by pursuing such a strategy is reshaping the mainstream, essentially splitting it in two. Trump voters will be forced by Leftist hostility into buying into the narrative that they belong with the Alt-Right. In this scenario, Antifa and the Left do our work for us. Thus, while I agree that the assault on Richard Spencer was a huge story that deserves our attention, the bigger story from the inauguration weekend was the assaults that took place on Trump supporters unaffiliated with the Alt-Right. In scenarios like these, Antifa will act as recruiting sergeants for our cause. This is the definition of a movement that has failed in every possible sense.
To conclude, I might caution against the advice given by some in our movement that we should ‘take the fight’ to Antifa, or attempt to engage them once more on the streets. By doing so, we would validate their existence once more, and run the risk of again placing ourselves on the margins. Without compromising our values, we should continue to push as deeply into the mainstream as we can, and especially focus on forging links with Trump voters, Brexit voters, and right-leaning citizens throughout the West. As the Left continues to wail at its losses, it will continue to lash out indiscriminately. This will be to our benefit. For our part, we should focus on improving our security, while allowing the Left to show its true face to the people. Our priority is winning cultural influence and political power, not confronting small numbers of social effluent. And, rest assured, we will one day be in a position to drag this fading nuisance into the light and deliver to it a long-overdue coup de grâce.
 N. Copsey, ‘Crossing Borders: Anti-Fascist Action (UK) and Transnational Anti-Fascist Militancy in the 1990s,’ Contemporary European History, 25 (4), 707-727.
One of the most remarkable turn of events in America’s 2016 election has been the revitalization of the phrase “America First!” America First as a slogan has its origins in the pre-World War II America First Committee which was dedicated to keeping the United States out of that war. It was a slogan that energized many in the hinterlands against what they saw as a useless entanglement over foreign interests many thousands of miles away. Notable supporters of the Committee included future presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford along with cultural figures like Walt Disney, Frank Lloyd Wright and E.E. Cummings. It even included many leftists independent of communist marching orders like Norman Thomas. And of course, there was its most noted celebrity spokesman, aviator Charles Lindbergh.
One of the most remarkable turn of events in America’s 2016 election has been the revitalization of the phrase “America First!” America First as a slogan has its origins in the pre-World War II America First Committee which was dedicated to keeping the United States out of that war. It was a slogan that energized many in the hinterlands against what they saw as a useless entanglement over foreign interests many thousands of miles away. Notable supporters of the Committee included future presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford along with cultural figures like Walt Disney, Frank Lloyd Wright and E.E. Cummings. It even included many leftists independent of communist marching orders like Norman Thomas. And of course, there was its most noted celebrity spokesman, aviator Charles Lindbergh.
America First as a slogan gained a second life in the candidacy of Pat Buchanan in the early nineties, a figure who sought to shake off the moribund morass of the Cold War and return America to its earlier traditions. However, by this time a new America was emerging, one which was not only at war with the Old America, but was downright hostile to its history, traditions and very people.
Many involved with America First had radically different views of what America ultimately was, but what united them was an understanding that America was a nation with its own interests and its own people. The old America that they defended was, in many ways, birthed out of the tragedy of the War Between the States. The all-consuming fire that tore asunder what could be called the American First Republic was put back together after a painful process of radicalism and reconciliation between its formerly warring parts.
After the shameful and destructive excess of Reconstruction in the Old South was ended, a place was carved in American history for its formerly warring White nations. The valor and honor of the Southern cause was acknowledged, as well as its monuments and particular memory, while at the same time the nation was understood as one, moving ever towards the frontier.
This was acknowledged from the Founding onwards; for instance, John Jay in Federalist no.2 states:
”With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people–a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.”
In 1921 then Vice President Calvin Coolidge would re-enunciate this similar spirit in an article for Good Housekeeping, writing:
There are racial considerations too grave to be brushed aside for sentimental reasons. Biological laws tell us that certain divergent people will not mix or blend. The Nordics propagate themselves successfully. With other races, the outcome shows deterioration on both sides. Quality of mind and body suggests that observance of ethnic law is as great a necessity to a nation as immigration law.
The title of his article? “Whose Country is This?”
Ultimately, the American nation of this time was defined by its White citizens, be they Yankee, Confederate, or Western. It was a tapestry reaching back to Plymouth Rock, Jamestown, and Columbus that provided a shared history and vision, and it was, for the most part, based on the history of its White citizens.
The settlement of the frontier led to the creation of what is now deemed “the American Heartland,” the breadbasket from whence America was fed and the yeoman collection of family farms birthed a vision of the “American Dream,” regardless of its fulfillment. The White men and women who went west formed the backbone of the America First Committee, along with many old stock Americans who were perturbed by foreign influence on American affairs.
The America First Committee was much maligned by many in the mainstream media of its day, as Nazis, Babbitts, or even Bolsheviks.
Things came to a head on September 11, 1941 when a man simultaneously derided as a “Nazi” and a “gopher Bolshevik” gave a speech to a Des Moines, Iowa crowd. Here, in the heartland, Charles Lindbergh made his plea:
” Men and women of Iowa; only one thing holds this country from war today. That is the rising opposition of the American people. Our system of democracy and representative government is on test today as it has never been before. We are on the verge of a war in which the only victor would be chaos and prostration.
We are on the verge of a war for which we are still unprepared, and for which no one has offered a feasible plan for victory–a war which cannot be won without sending our soldiers across the ocean to force a landing on a hostile coast against armies stronger than our own.
We are on the verge of war, but it is not yet too late to stay out. It is not too late to show that no amount of money, or propaganda, or patronage can force a free and independent people into war against its will. It is not yet too late to retrieve and to maintain the independent American destiny that our forefathers established in this new world.”
That “American destiny” that our “forefathers established” was at the crux of Lindbergh’s argument: that the destiny of America should be in the hands of Americans alone, and in particular, the historic American Nation bequeathed to us by the Founders. Not an abstraction, not an ideal, and sure as hell not an idea, but a people.
Of course, Lindbergh’s speech would go on to name another group of people, a group that could roughly be described by an American of his time as an anti-America. was one which sought to put various tribal, ideological and commercial interests ahead of those of the living historic America. In some ways, this was a milder form of a division that also occurred in that other “nation of the enlightenment,” France, which had similarly divided up into a France/Anti-France distinction.
Lindbergh went on to describe the groups as follows:
” The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt administration.
Behind these groups, but of lesser importance, are a number of capitalists, Anglophiles, and intellectuals who believe that the future of mankind depends upon the domination of the British empire. Add to these the Communistic groups who were opposed to intervention until a few weeks ago, and I believe I have named the major war agitators in this country.”
Of course, it didn’t matter that in the speech Lindbergh acknowledged the Jewish plight against Germany as “understandable.” It was enough to sink him and the movement. Just two months later Pearl Harbor would come, America would be at war, and the America First Committee would shut its doors and do their part for their country.
Even Lindbergh would fly in bomber raids over the Pacific. However, the America he fought to preserve started on a dialectical path that would forever change the nature of its people and its history.
The post-war Lindbergh serves as an interesting microcosm of the America he wanted to put first. He got involved in environmental activism preserving the natural beauty of his America.
Many of today’s largest immigration restrictionist organizations trace their origins to the nascent environmentalist movement with concerns about quality of life and a literal preservation of America as a place. Many old stock Americans were involved in this cause including not only Madison Grant and Lindbergh, but people like John Tanton, another American from the heartland who seeks to preserve not just America, but its people.
This impulse was even derided throughout popular culture. Thus, you have jokes like those of brash fraudster Gordon Gekko in 1987’s Wall Street who declaims, “That’s the one thing you have to remember about WASPs: they love animals and hate people.” Contra Mr. Gekko, it’s not hatred of people, just an indifference to an alien people. Indeed, among the groups who opposed the 1965 Immigration Act, which transformed the United States demographically, were the Daughters of the American Revolution, who if thought of at all now are just a prop to establish someone’s WASP identity in popular culture.
But America was a changing place after the war, and prosperity and progress were intermingled with battles for the soul of the American nation that reverberate to this day.
Post-war America was one of peace, prosperity and cultural hegemony, so much so that many refer to this era as “the American Century.” The generation that returned from the carnage of Europe and the Pacific eagerly started to enjoy the fruits of their victory: in the G.I. Bill, the massive infrastructure improvements, and most of all, in starting families. Between the end of the war and the beginning of the 1960s Americans gave birth to millions of children who would grow up in a much different America than the one we have today, and would go on to shape America in a vastly different direction than many of their predecessors.
The children of America’s soldiers came of age not only in an “American” era, but one dominated by mass forms of media, large corporations, and big government. The way mass media consumption of movies and television have shaped “boomer” attitudes towards their own history would come to have massive repercussions for the America of today.
Looked on from today, many complain that the boomer generation faced few if any conflicts; however, that is not exactly correct.
The boomer childhood witnessed some of the greatest feats of humanity, including our earliest voyages into space and our (so far) impressive discipline in not blowing ourselves into a cinder. At the same time, it was punctuated with “events” that gave them the feeling of history. I say events, because in the dawn of the mass-media age, history is never just “made” but is molded not just in its moments but for many years after. The two biggest of these events were the Vietnam War and the so-called “Civil Rights” movement.
The Vietnam War was more of a watershed for White America than the Civil Rights movement, even if it is hard to see it that way today. In addition to its literal battlefields, Vietnam served as a sort of opening salvo in the culture wars. While the descendants of Lindbergh’s America First coalition were largely yelling to “nuke Hanoi,” left-wing inspired youth largely staged massive draft protests and became known as “hippies” and founders of the peace movement.
Even the demonstrations were very different. Take for example one of the Vietnam War’s most well-known protesters: Jane Fonda.
There couldn’t be a bigger difference between Jane Fonda and Charles Lindbergh. Lindbergh was known throughout the world for his daring feats of aviation and engineering prowess. The man even started work on a heart perfusion pump when his sister-in-law came down with a condition. This in contrast with Fonda, who was a second-generation actor whose biggest claims to fame at that point included “Barbarella” and being amongst the radical chic set.
One has only to contrast the ways the speak against their wars, and of the America they represent:
”In the shadow of the Temple of Literature I saw Vietnamese actors and actresses perform the second act of Arthur Miller’s play All My Sons, and this was very moving to me- the fact that artists here are translating and performing American plays while US imperialists are bombing their country…I cherish the memory of the blushing militia girls on the roof of their factory, encouraging one of their sisters as she sang a song praising the blue sky of Vietnam- these women, who are so gentle and poetic, whose voices are so beautiful, but who, when American planes are bombing their city, become such good fighters.”
While the Vietnam War was a major tragedy on the part of America, the country that Fonda speaks of is very different than the one spoken of by Lindbergh.
For Fonda, America is Arthur Miller, Hollywood and its assorted causes. It is ultimately an idea and not a place. The tragedy isn’t just that Americans are bombing the Vietnamese, but that the Vietnamese are living closer to some fantasy of America than Americans themselves. For many who came of age at this time, their patriotism was essentially forged as one for a country as an idea, rather than a place built by a particular people.
This was a watershed stage in the decline of American consciousness. Where once it was asked to think twice about its foreign interventions by a hero, here it was asked to do so by a harlot.
Vietnam was the first time that White America felt a modicum of doubt about the way history was moving. The American South had tasted such a reversal of history before, giving it a kind of strangeness to the rest of the American spirit, but the post-war reconciliation that carried through the World Wars largely delivered an American South that was, to paraphrase Walker Percy, victorious and prosperous. That is, except for the vexing race issue.
The Civil Rights movement has gone down as the new Founding Epoch of America’s new post-1968 mythology. The “dream” of Martin Luther King Jr. has gone on to crowd out all other dreams of America, to animate a far different country than the one its original Founders intended.
More ink has been spilled on this era than almost any other by movement pens. However, what is usually missed is how deep the story of the Civil Rights Movement goes into the America of today. That’s because America now is largely a different country than the one most American right-wingers envision it to be.
The America of today declared its independence with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and has sought to bring in line the rest of its institutions by any means necessary.
But for an older generation of White Americans, the Civil Rights movement was less of a revolution in the very mythological underpinnings of the American state and more just another brokered peace. Just as there was reconciliation after the “brother’s war” between the states, so too did many White Americans see the passages of most Civil Rights legislation. In this way, all the programs initiatives and welfare of the past half century have been nothing more of a counterfeit peace offering that White America deludes itself into believing. That’s because unlike the truce between the warring factions of North and South which were united by “common ancestry, customs” etc. the irreconcilable differences between the different racial groups in America have almost always led to conflict.
Understanding the America that the boomer generation has constructed helps to understand what it is they want to preserve. The triumphalist narrative of their history is best represented in such popular schlock at Forrest Gump which depicts an idiot’s encounters through various nodes on the staircase to progress.
For boomers, America was less a place of ancestry and heritage and more of a place of potential. In particular, individual potential. Its why an old hippie can become a yuppie without batting an eye. Their America is one of narrow possibilities and potentials, not an America of blood and soil.
Thus, the radicalism of the sixties gave way to the American boosterism of the Reagan years. Supply-side economics made everyone a king, from the Huxtables to Family Ties. The America of Ronald Reagan represented the conservative entrenchment of the revolution begun in the sixties. It even had its own “shining city on a hill” speech.
We arrive in an America forged on the cliffs or Normandy, where it once was Plymouth Rock, and declaring its own independence and purpose in ordaining that “all men are created equal” (with the only dispute within that catechism as to what it is true equality actually means).
That most boomer of presidents Bill Clinton captured this spirit when he spoke about the coming racial transformation of America and said:
“We should be honored that America, whether it’s called the City on a Hill, or the Old Gold Mountain, or El Norte, is still seen around the world as the land of new beginnings…America is not so much a place as a promise, not a guarantee but a chance, not a particular race but an embrace of our common humanity”
This would become the new American dream of boomer America. An America where everyone could be another unique brick in the wall. An America that didn’t see any colors but red, white, and blue. It was an America that was built through orgiastic dreaming and even some good impulses, but it was a fantasy America that never existed.
I’m too busy being successful to worry whether some other race is out to get me.
— Bill Mitchell (@mitchellvii) December 28, 2016
America was birthed anew, and today we are living in it.
Pat Buchanan tried to build a new coalition around “America First” throughout the 1990s. It was largely a failure, but succeeded in questioning the contours of the new America in both foreign and domestic policy. His most lasting testament however might be that he elucidated the divide in America more clearly than anyone else in his famous “Culture War” speech of the 1992 GOP national convention.
”My friends, this election is about more than who gets what. It is about who we are. It is about what we believe, and what we stand for as Americans. There is a religious war going on in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.”
Buchanan was largely correct that America was now engaged in its own internal cold war. What was missing, however, was the fact that not only was there a grand cultural replacement going on, but also a demographic one. America was losing its historic, meaning White, character. The events of the following decade would only make this clearer.
On September 11, 2001, the certainties of this new America came shattering down in downtown Manhattan. The ‘end of history’ turned out to merely be its prelude. The attack by Islamic extremists on what was then the pax Americana sent shockwaves throughout the system with many trying to justify the horror that had just been broadcast to millions of people.
People were lectured about how our enemies hate us “for our freedoms” and a variety of the other various nostrums of the day. Many believe in this, because, having grown up with tales of America’s inexorable march towards the current year, no one could hate us for what we do. There was a right and a wrong, a Japan and a Pearl Harbor, a Bull Connor and a Martin Luther King Jr: and we had a “decider” as president.
It didn’t take long for America’s response to go south. Soon we were engaged in a war in Iraq, with soldiers largely coming from the rural south, America at home meanwhile was engaged in an orgiastic economic boom of “home ownership” whose hollowness would be laid bare.
But when many of those same men returned home, it was to empty homes. Most of them were foreclosed on in one of the largest economic downturns since the Great Depression. America, drunk on a mix of the prosperity gospel and anti-discrimination laws, at last found itself at a bust.
The “conservative” movement of this time was a largely moribund husk which mixed snake-oil evangelical outreach along with “MLK Was a Republican” style argumentation. In fact, it was argued that by their very existence Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice had shown that the color-blind society of boomer conservatives was not only real, but in practice.
The Bush years however, only managed to accelerate major trends in America. Its indifference to immigration and obsession with policy minutiae just moved the age of Barack Obama closer.
Obama’s eventual triumph in the 2008 election was the culmination of the America that was given birth in the sixties. The multicultural smart set finally had everything they ever wanted in a president. To quote the first lady “first the first time in my adult life, I am proud of my country.”
Obama was also perhaps the first presidential candidate of the left to articulate the internal cold war going on in America. At a campaign stop in Pennsylvania he decried rural mostly White Americans who “cling to their guns and bibles.” Cultural agitprop is largely used as a proxy for speaking in demographic terms. That’s the truce in our cold war: race is the identity that dare not speak its name, lest we have blood on the streets.
Today, writing from Trump’s America one assumes that today Michelle Obama couldn’t be sadder. Trump’s campaign revived the phrase “America First” in a way that Pat Buchanan’s just couldn’t do. However, what remains is the question of what “America” it is that Donald Trump wants to put first.
Usually the phrase is interpreted by those on the right as having to do with the American “heartland” and the rural people there who “cling to their guns and their bibles.” But this is begging the question, who are these people?
They are mostly White, older Americans who have felt deeply betrayed by the way their country has been run. In turn the inhabitants of the other America largely see this group as Kulaks to be liquidated on the march to progress.
For conservatives, the question “who are we?” is an unsettling one, because they’ve bought into an America not based on a people, but on “principles.” Unless it comes to grips with the fact that America was founded and largely defined by White men, the country it puts first will always be one born of the left.
For them, they must answer the question: whose America first? And they must answer before it’s too late.
The United States is a sick place. In 1958, famous poet Ezra Pound once noted that “America is an insane asylum,” and those words seem truer today than they did back then. Many Americans feel that the United States is in decline. Our culture has become too hedonistic, too materialistic, too degenerate, too apathetic and too nihilistic.
The United States is a sick place. In 1958, famous poet Ezra Pound once noted that “America is an insane asylum,” and those words seem truer today than they did back then. Many Americans feel that the United States is in decline. Our culture has become too hedonistic, too materialistic, too degenerate, too apathetic and too nihilistic.
Massive demographic changes are taking place that will permanently alter the fabric of society. Both men and women are fallen to a large degree from masculine and feminine ideals. Political Correctness has run amok and imposed a set of soft totalitarian speech codes upon our discourse. Our elites appear to be openly hostile to us.
Our media, which no one trusts anymore, is controlled by a therapeutic managerial state which seeks to modify our behaviors and thoughts through propaganda. If you have a problem with any of this then you are some type of thought criminal who needs to fired from your job, exiled from polite society, or sent off to be re-educated in the values of ‘tolerance’ and ‘diversity.’ If you are said thought criminal, then welcome to the resistance.
Finally, it seems that the winds are blowing in a new direction. We have identified the demon that is destroying our nation: globalism. Donald Trump built his entire presidential run on opposing globalism in favor of what he calls ‘Americanism’ – a type of civic nationalism.
This is a positive shift but it is not quite enough.
What is it about globalism that makes it so terrible? Sure, the off-shoring and outsourcing of labor overseas creates unfriendly economic conditions at home for some American workers. That is not the most damaging effect of globalism though. The most damaging effect of globalism is the free movement of labor across borders – that is to say immigration, mass Third World immigration. Importation of different ethno-cultural groups is damaging to our culture and our way of life. It deracinates and degenerates the traditional American nation – that is to say White people, people of European ancestry.
This has become more than just immigration with failure to assimilate – this is an invasion. Multiculturalism is just colonialism in reverse. We are being colonized. We are being replaced.
“But America is a nation of immigrants!” you hear our critics screech. America has been throughout most of its history a White nation. Sure, there were various ethnicities that came to the US: the English, the Irish, the Germans, the Italians, etc. Sure, there were many different religious denominations that came as well. These various Europeans all assimilated to an Anglo-Saxon culture.
The traditional American nation that existed up until 1965 was a White nation. Sure, there were a handful of other groups like Blacks or Native Americans that constituted about 10% of the population. It is important to note that even after having shared this continent with other races for centuries there has still not been any assimilation of these groups – only a desire to be separate from us.
People of European ancestry have come to define what it means to be an American. White Americans are the de facto American whereas all other racial groups are some type of hyphenated American. By replacing the traditional American nation, you replace America. It becomes something entirely different. It will never be the same either.
This is why Trump’s civic nationalism is not enough because it ultimately does not solve the most damning aspect of globalism. If anyone can be an American simply by filling out their paperwork properly then being an American is entirely meaningless. Even in Trump’s America, we will still find ourselves culturally and racially alienated from our own countrymen. We will still find ourselves living in an America which is changing for the worse.
Don’t get me wrong, I do admire Donald Trump. I admire him for clearing the way for our movement. He has given us a chance to breakthrough and try and save the traditional American nation.
The Alt Right is the sole authentic resistance movement of our time. Do not be fooled by other so-called revolutionary or populist movements as they only offer you false hope. As mentioned previously, the Trumpian ‘New Right’ of civic nationalism is simply inadequate along with the other names it is known by – Western chauvinism, cultural libertarianism, or the ‘alt lite‘. The Bernie Sanders movement was a promising populist movement on the political left that we saw in 2016. Sadly, their movement is entirely compatible with the design of the managerial state. In many ways, their populist demands will only increase the size and power of the managerial state as they demand more social programs while grumbling about the corporate greed of the 1%. Not to mention that their “anti-racist” rhetoric is entirely aligned with the multiculturalist agenda of the managerial state. Civic nationalism and left-wing populism offer phony opposition to the system.
If you really want to challenge the status quo and speak truth to power then join the Alt Right. The Alt Right seeks to wage all-out metapolitical warfare against all enemies of the traditional American nation. We are identitarians and this is our concern. We seek to preserve and foster White identity – both here at home and globally around the world to all of our European brothers and sisters no matter where they may be.
Considering that the USA is the breeding grounds for globalism and has cultural hegemony that reaches every inch of this planet, we American identitarians find ourselves in the heart of Mordor. Our success here will very likely determine the future of all European people around the globe who find themselves in a very similar boat of being replaced in their own homelands by Third Worlders. Our movement is a global effort in alliance with European identitarians of all stripes. We must unite to destroy the great evil that is destroying our peoples.
We will halt the Third World invasion. We will reverse its colonialism. We will destroy the ideology of globalism. We will fight. We will win. We have no other option.
Ah, the late 90s. Rosie O’Donnell was “the queen of nice.” Ellen Degeneres was controversial, rather than the comforting television friend of housewives who want to watch Hillary Clinton awkwardly dancing to hip-hop. And Keith Olbermann was the guy from the Boston Market commercials, making fun of self-important, fashion-conscious poseurs by telling them to “eat something!”
Ah, the late 90s. Rosie O’Donnell was “the queen of nice.” Ellen Degeneres was controversial, rather than the comforting television friend of housewives who want to watch Hillary Clinton awkwardly dancing to hip-hop. And Keith Olbermann was the guy from the Boston Market commercials, making fun of self-important, fashion-conscious poseurs by telling them to “eat something!”
Now, the failed sportscaster who used to rhapsodize about the joys of “four ooey-gooey cheeses” has proclaimed himself the head of “The Resistance,” striking what is presumably meant to be a defiant pose wrapped in an American flag. Unfortunately, he looks more like a homeless man covering himself while he self-abuses and leers at passersby.
His facial expression is also hard to interpret. He’s vaguely angry but also ironically smirking, as if he knows he’s self-consciously posing as something he’s not. His shade from the 90s would doubtless bring him some mac n’ cheese so this troubled soul can “eat something!” and experience some succor.
Olbermann, who can boast of being replaced on Current TV by Eliot Spitzer, was given an Internet show by GQ. GQ also features the semi-literate screeching of Lindy West, the unearthly monstrosity whose presence on this planet, let alone at a men’s magazine, suggests a grotesque mockery of existence itself. After all, what sophisticated, masculine gentleman can’t conquer the boardrooms and boudoirs of America without having his worldview shaped by Olbermann and West?
Initially called “The Closer,” Olbermann renamed the show “The Resistance” after The Fall of Hillary. He stares angrily at the camera and gives what he imagines are revolutionary manifestos. The logo for the show also features the safety pin – or diaper pin – liberals have adopted as their logo. Thus, it’s a “resistance” movement, which won’t accept the rule of Trump, but it’s also a movement designed to make you feel safe and good and not make you do anything. For example, his big idea to delegitimize the Trump regime is the womanish, passive-aggressive tactic of not calling him president.
Yet this Kabuki theater is still interesting for what it tells about the Left today. And this kind of rhetoric has consequences even for the faux resistance fighters of Generation Tumblr.
Consider an unhinged performance where Olbermann grandly proclaims the Russians have performed a bloodless coup, “so far.” Thus, America is no longer a sovereign nation or a free people. (Of course, that part is true, but it has nothing to do with Russians.)
Olbermann casually tosses around words like “traitorous” and makes ludicrous comparisons to “Pearl Harbor.” Eventually, this ridiculous hysteric in an ill-fitting suit, who can’t even drive a car because of an “equilibrium problem,” urges “desperate measures” be taken. Otherwise, power will fall into the hands of “scum!”
Or as he puts it, “Russian scum!”
Assuming arguendo Olbermann still has what can be called a career, consider how quickly it would end if he applied this descriptor to a different nationality.
The government of Mexico quite openly meddles in American affairs through a vast consular network, encourages its nationals to become American citizens to defend Mexican interests, and proudly
proclaimed its determination to interfere in the recent election. Can we denounce “Mexican scum?” After all, we don’t have to look very hard to find actual evidence of their attacks on American sovereignty. And it’s a lot easier to show Mexico, rather than Russia, has designs on American sovereignty and territory.
What about “Arab scum” or “Muslim scum,” like the Saudi royals who have close ties with American officials, routinely violate Western laws, and purchase influence in American media organizations?
Or “Israeli” or “Jewish scum?” The Israeli government isn’t exactly shy about its espionage activities, nor about its close relationships to American politicians and pressure groups.
Nothing like this would ever happen. Only a White nation can be casually denounced as “scum” and an entire people dehumanized in the most extreme terms. And we don’t even need to address the absurdity of self-styled citizens of the world suddenly caring about concepts such as national independence or sovereignty.
“If we did it to another country, it would be described as an act of war!” continued Olbermann. Well, much of the history of Eastern Europe and the Middle East since the end of the Cold War has been precisely that, including many of the stupid color-coded revolutions designed to break down resistance to the Borg of international finance. If there is in fact a war, it’s one the United States, or, rather, those who control American foreign policy, deliberately started.
Indeed, the dominant theme of Vladimir Putin’s domestic and foreign policy is the desire to counter the State Department/Soros playbook of regime change. Banning NGO’s dependent on foreign money, organizing youth groups designed to co-opt opposition, and funding ‘independent’ groups such as the Night Wolves MC, which can be counted on as loyal auxiliaries, are all part of this effort. Both Assad and Putin are defending their legitimate governments from subversive movements funded by the United States. Considering the gruesome fate of Gaddafi, can anyone blame them?
But leave aside the ridiculous spectacle of Keith Olbermann, of all people, LARPing for a redux of Red Dawn. He clearly wants to bring the war home. Kellyanne Conway is a “fascist.” Trump has “no authority.” Republicans are “traitors.”
Ok… therefore, what? Do you start shooting people? Announce the dissolution of the Union? California is practically already in a state of rebellion when it comes to immigration laws. Olbermann supposedly once dated Trump supporter Laura Ingraham. Should he attack his ex-girlfriend? The punishment for treason is pretty clear, after all.
Absurd scenarios all. Olbermann is a poseur as surely as the fashion models he used to mock in his sandwich salesman days. But it’s likely someone will act on this rhetoric. People are already being murdered because of incitement about “white privilege” and Black Lives Matter.
And nothing he says is “extreme.” Years ago, Olbermann was a target for parody even by the likes of Jon Stewart or Saturday Night Live. But today, there’s nothing he says which is any different from what comes out of The New York Times, or Slate, or the Democratic Party.
If Donald Trump had lost the election and refused to accept the result, he could not be doing more to undermine American institutions than the mainstream Left is today. Conservatives are cheap dates. All Hillary would have had to say is “let’s work together” and the Beltway Right would have caved entirely. Even if Trump had openly said not to accept Hillary as President, no other Republicans or mainstream conservative media outlets would have joined him.
But leftists, with the vast institutional advantages they enjoy in huge foundations, organizations like the National Lawyers Guild providing support, and the mainstream media providing air cover and protecting activists from negative PR, are always ready to kick off street action. Already, we see the borderline gleeful reaction from Antifa and Far-Left groups who are going to LARP that they are fighting a real “fascist” regime. And organizations on the Far-Left are growing almost as quickly as the Alt-Right.
Sadly, we don’t have a revolutionary regime in power. What we have is a civic nationalist in alliance with clueless Republicans like Paul Ryan who see the present moment as just another opportunity to screw over their supporters by slashing Medicare.
But events may overtake everyone, even the Far-Left. Memeing Trump into a “Far-Right” God-Emperor is a two way process. The likes of Olbermann and the tens of millions of other leftists who think they are going to live out Rogue One or Harry Potter are playing with forces they do not understand and starting a process they will not be able to control. Throwing around words like ‘rebellion’ and ‘fascism’ to hysterical cucked Whites and furiously hostile non-Whites is asking for an explosion.
As long as the Trump Administration doesn’t completely cave on immigration policies (unlikely if Jeff Sessions gets in), there will be at least some confrontations between federal forces and emboldened leftists or angry minorities. What happens when someone takes a shot at DHS officers arresting deportees? When we see a new outbreak of terrorism after President Trump approves more pipelines? When Attorney General Sessions drops the hammer on the next Ferguson riot?
Ultimately, even the most extreme leftist Antifa is dependent on the normal suburban Whites they hate accepting the moral frame created by mainstream media gaslighting. In theory, philosophical conservatism admits the flawed nature of man, that he must be governed. In practice, nice, normal, conservative goofballs want to believe everyone is basically good and that all “Americans,” whatever their race, are all in this together. The best thing which can happen is for Normie America to be forced to witness how this is simply not true.
During the primaries, we saw how every protest led to increased support for Trump with Republicans rallying to the “strong man” when there is chaos in the streets. And unlike George W. Bush, Trump fires back at his opponents, rather than apologizing. We’ve already got supposedly mainstream figures appearing at events organized by the Revolutionary Communist Party and being livestreamed by the Huffington Post. The stage is all set for the Left to kick off the revolution for us. And on our side, we at least have the beginnings of a movement which won’t cuck and run.
The first test is weeks away. If the Inauguration is a peaceful celebration, Trump is legitimate and “normalized.” If it turns into a melee, the ride is just getting started.
SJW’s always project. We’re always told about how conservatism and nationalism is built on “paranoia” and “fear” by the same people currently screeching Literally Hitler will be President of the United States. When their entire political movement is built upon whipping up hysteria, eventually someone is going to take it seriously. Feeding these lunatics revolutionary fantasies is dangerous.
Of course, I doubt Keith Olbermann and those like him actually want to start a “rebellion.” I question even the most “militant” leftists of today. These subsidized puffballs wouldn’t last five minutes, and at some level they know it. But there’s now a significant chance their more excitable followers are going to start taking certain actions they won’t be able to retract. And once something like this is set in motion, it only ends one way.
At the end of each of Olbermann’s segments, he declares: “Resist! Peace.” Well, which is it? We’ll soon find out.
Over the past few weeks, I’ve been witness to one of the most shameful displays I’ve ever witnessed: the attacks on my colleague and friend Richard Spencer’s mother. Her enemies have steadily waged a war of lies, gossip, and fear designed to attack a family’s very structure and a community’s trust. I guess it really does take a village.
Over the past few weeks, I’ve been witness to one of the most shameful displays I’ve ever seen: the attacks on my colleague and friend Richard Spencer’s mother. Her enemies have steadily waged a war of lies, gossip, and fear designed to attack a family’s very structure and a community’s trust. I guess it really does take a village.
Mrs. Spencer and her husband have never been involved in the National Policy Institute or its projects. They are an apolitical couple with a very political son. But today, everything has become politicized, even our families. The message our enemies are sending is that you can only have a family, or love your son so long as they toe the party line. If you dare even go so far as to “love your son” as Richard’s parents have done, well I guess you’re just “collatoral damage”.
Those who have been whipped into a fervor take umbrage at the gall Mrs. Spencer has in merely owning a building, and speaking out against extortion are now starting to cry wolf. Help! Help! they cry, hordes of angry internet trolls are sending anonymous messages. Quelle horreur and call the National Guard!
What is really going on is that those who have attacked Mrs. Spencer know they are the guilty party. As the emails from Ms. Gersh show, these are acts of intimidation against a family whose only sins are community spirit and familial love. They know they are in the wrong, so they need to change the narrative.
By changing the narrative from defamation of character and willful attacks on a person’s livelihood to anonymous internet harassment, these people are simply attempting to change the victim in this story. Now instead of Mrs. Spencer, it is her very adversaries who are the ones being attacked. Even though they’re not the ones having to sell their businesses, being asked to denounce their children, or having their families torn asunder. No, it’s a few mean tweets and emails that make them uncomfortable. That’s the real problem.
After all, we too, get our share of anonymous threats. Almost every day I wake up to emails in the Radix Journal email account that are either copies of Richard Spencer’s address or some form of “We’re coming for you, we have guns and we’ll get you just like we did before.” Not to mention the hundreds of tweets and text messages Richard gets per week that are snide remarks at best and death threats at worst.
— (((Joshua Manning))) (@joshuamanning23) December 22, 2016
Even a Politico editor was brazen enough to call for violence against Richard, for which he was asked to resign.
As if they couldn’t stoop even lower, they’ve even started to attack Richard’s wife. Growing up I was always taught that attacking a man’s mother and/or his wife is just not cricket. But that’s the current year for you.
These moments, dreadful as they are, can be moments of clarity. They show the craven and callow depths those opposed to us are willing to go to. No, they can’t up and jail us(yet) but they can make our lives a living hell.
While they complain about our “millions of dollars”(I wish! donate here
!) in non-profits and alleged foreign connections, they rake in multi-million dollar endowments and can organize openly without a concern in the world.
Make no mistake, they’re doing this because what Richard is doing is having an impact. They’re frightened of our ideas having a fair shake, so they’re resorting to any trick in the book to keep our message down. Well, to Richard and his mother I can only echo the words of Nick Carraway in The Great Gatsby “They’re a rotten crowd…you’re worth the whole damn bunch put together.”
The Anglosphere stands transfixed by an elusive bogeyman: ‘right-wing extremism.’ And more than any other nation at the present time, the United Kingdom seems to be in the grip of a media-engineered moral panic bordering on paranoid hysteria. This same country, it should be recalled, banned Richard Spencer in June because he had the temerity to advocate for the founding of a White nation on lines similar to those of the State of Israel. Spencer also dared to suggest an ideal of racial self-improvement. In the view of the British Home Office, then under the authority of Theresa May (now Prime Minister), if Spencer continued making such suggestions on British soil it would not be “conducive to the public good.” Furthermore, and without any self-awareness of its own hyperbolic unreason, the same department claimed that Spencer’s positions amounted to the “fomenting” of “serious criminal acts,” “terrorist acts,” and “inter-community violence in the UK.” Spencer, according to this narrative, is an ‘extremist.’
Editor’s Note: This essay first appeared at the Occidental Observer here.
Neither man nor angel can discern
Hypocrisy, the only evil that walks
John Milton, Paradise Lost
The Anglosphere stands transfixed by an elusive bogeyman: ‘right wing extremism.’ And more than any other nation at the present time, the United Kingdom seems to be in the grip of a media-engineered social panic bordering on paranoid hysteria. This same country, it should be recalled, banned Richard Spencer in June because he had the temerity to advocate for the founding of a White nation on lines similar to those of the State of Israel. Spencer also dared to suggest an ideal of racial self-improvement. In the view of the British Home Office, then under the authority of Theresa May (now Prime Minister), if Spencer continued making such suggestions on British soil it would not be “conducive to the public good.” Furthermore, and without any self-awareness of its own hyperbolic unreason, the same department claimed that Spencer’s positions amounted to the “fomenting” of “serious criminal acts,” “terrorist acts,” and “inter-community violence in the UK.” Spencer, according to this narrative, is an ‘extremist.
Given such an assessment, one might expect that the aftermath of an average NPI conference would be a veritable war zone. One imagines minorities fleeing the disintegrating streets of Washington D.C., pursued by radicalized and frenzied militants in trendy three piece suits. All, presumably, against a cacophony of explosions and the distant drone of an Aryan war chant. Like many forms of madness, this strain of political dementia has its darkly humorous aspects. However, the political and cultural expressions of this socially-engineered panic are no laughing matter. In many cases, the legislative actions undertaken in such contexts are oppressive, tyrannical, and a dire threat to our most cherished freedoms. The myth of the ‘right wing extremist’ is ultimately a rather calculated tool, regularly employed with the sole aim of stifling White voices.
The myth is built on a foundation of disingenuousness and moral perversion. Ever-amplified, the myth of right wing extremism is regularly and artificially boosted by government and media, while violence arising directly from Leftist terrorists, or indirectly from Leftist pet projects such as mass immigration, prompts only silence, evasion, or logically gymnastic apologia. Even a cursory glance at the relevant statistics reveals a stunning neglect of the Leftist threat both historically and in contemporary contexts. According to a 2001 report commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy, Leftist extremists were “responsible for three-fourths of the officially designated acts of terrorism in America in the 1980s. From an international perspective, of the 13,858 people who died between 1988 and 1998 in attacks committed by the 10 most active terrorist groups in the world, 74 percent were killed by Leftist organizations.” (Editor’s note: At the November, 2016 NPI conference it was leftist antifas who assaulted Aryan Gondola, the cameraman for Emily Youcis, while shouting “die, die, die.” Many attendees were afraid to leave the building during breaks for fear of similar assaults and with the expectation that the police would do nothing. Thorborne Richardson recounts several other assaults by leftists at this event. And at last year’s NPI conference, an attendee was also assaulted by an antifa. Despite an arrest, no charges were filed.)
Hypocrisy is rampant. While affable, and clearly non-violent, figures like Richard Spencer receive continent-wide banning orders, highly volatile groups like Black Lives Matter are indulged with fawning press coverage, and treated with kid gloves by government, academia, and law enforcement. This despite the fact that while BLM may posture as having a purely political and community-based agenda, the same can also be said of those Black Leftist groups of the 1970s that gave rise to terrorist groups like the Black Liberation Army and the Republic of New Afrika. By indulging Black agitation, feeding Leftist paranoia about ‘rigged’ elections, and stoking a panic over the ‘extreme right’ folk devil, the media-government symbiote is stirring a witch’s brew of anti-White resentment that threatens to erupt at any moment.
In just one example of what can happen when these ingredients are brought together, one might consider what happened when the Black Liberation Army (1970-1981) joined forces with Leftist terror group the ‘Weather Underground’ (1969-1985), the brainchild of Jewish radicals John Jacobs, Eleanor Raskin, Mark Rudd, David Gilbert, and Kathy Boudin. In October 1981, in the village of Nyack, NY, Boudin and several Black associates, fuelled by a joint desire for ‘class war’ and the ‘appropriation’ of White wealth, robbed an armored Brink’s truck of $1.6 million. In the process, they murdered one Brink’s guard and critically injured two others. The 2001 report commissioned by the Department of Energy further recalls that, “At a police roadblock five miles from the robbery, they killed two police officers and wounded a third.”
In order to shed light on the hypocrisy underpinning the myth of the right wing extremist, and while not excusing violence in any form or from any quarter, the aftermath of the events described above need to be placed in some kind of comparative context. In particular, it should be noted that even this single act alone, perpetrated by the alliance known as the May 19th Communist Organization (M19CO), exceeded in violence the entire criminal career of a group known as The Order, also active in the 1980s. The media and judicial treatment of both groups in the aftermath of their respective criminal activities is incredibly telling.
Kathy Boudin, who was heavily involved and present during the Brink’s robbery, is now an adjunct professor at Columbia University, having previously enjoyed a stint as Scheinberg Scholar-in-Residence at New York University School of Law. Mark Rudd wasn’t involved in the Brink’s robbery, but was heavily implicated in the attempted bombing of a servicemen’s ball in March 1970, a prospect that was only averted because the device exploded prematurely, killing its manufacturers – Jewish Marxist terrorists Terry Robbins and Ted Gold, along with Diana Oughton, the gentile girlfriend of Weather Underground co-founder (and now retired professor of education at the University of Illinois–Chicago) Bill Ayers. Rudd went on to be a mathematics instructor at Central New Mexico Community College and is now retired. Eleanor Raskin is now an adjunct instructor at Albany Law School, and an administrative law judge at the New York State Public Service Commission. Other notable Weather Underground figures include Naomi Jaffe, a Jewish former undergraduate student of Herbert Marcuse who participated in the infamous Flint, Michigan War Council (1969) that plotted a series of bombings and murders, including those targeting judges and congressmen. Jaffe currently lives comfortably in New York where she directs an organization devoted to women’s issues and ‘anti-racism.’
Nor should we neglect to mention the later years of the Black terrorists. An excellent example is the early Black Panther Party leader Eldridge Cleaver. Cleaver, a compulsive criminal, once advocated for the rape of White women as “an insurrectionary act,” and having followed his own advice remarked that “it delighted me that I was defying and trampling upon the white man’s law … defiling his women.” He derided what he called “white pigs,” and added “we encourage people to kill them.” Cleaver died a free man in 1998. An extremist and criminal by any definition of those terms, he was never banned from entering Europe, and even lived in Paris during the 1970s, after his vision of living in Africa ended in an ignominious departure from Algiers. Rather than being subject to serious media critique, during their heyday both Cleaver and the Black Panther Party were the darlings of liberal intellectuals. For example, the composer and conductor Leonard Bernstein is just one member of the Left-liberal cultural elite known to have held Manhattan fund-raisers for them. Posthumously Cleaver would receive fawning academic tributes, the most absurdly bucolic emerging from a Professor Richard Rose of the University of La Verne, who described Cleaver as a “gentle spirit.” One is reminded of similar sentiments recently expressed after the death of Fidel Castro, a figure who ended a speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution with the words: “Socialism or death!”
Perhaps more important than the benign fates of these anti-White Leftist terrorists is the fact that their legacy has been one of rose-tinted recollection, white-washing, and ideological triumph. These terrorists produced a political theory that sought to pose every one of their criminal acts as an ‘anti-imperialist,’ ‘anti-racist’ struggle; and they were the first to articulate the formulation of White guilt-inducement known as ‘White privilege.’ Their comfort in middle age and beyond reflects the victory of the ideas they conceived in their youth; ideas that led to the theft of millions of dollars, at least seven major bombings, and the deaths of innocents. Expressed in simple terms, these terrorists and their contemporaries are triumphant because they convinced society, or at least its most influential elements, to adopt their terminology, their ideology, and their moral schema. Expressed in more complex terms, we might refer to the teachings of Naomi Jaffe’s mentor, Herbert Marcuse, who wrote that:
Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of social behavior, it is not only introjected – it also operates as a norm of ‘organic’ behaviour; the organism receives and reacts to certain stimuli and ‘ignores’ and repels others in accord with the introjected morality.(1)
The meagre judicial treatment of these terrorist figures, and their comfortable later lives, are thus both a sign and a symptom of the corruption of social morals and norms. The moral norms that currently prevail preclude a rational response to ‘stimuli’ like Leftist terrorism.
In the context of a society given over to a corrupted mentality, one would expect responses to vary not according to scale of violence and the extent of threat, but according to disturbances to the introjected moral schema. Rationality is dispensed with. In such a society, extremely violent Islamic terror can evoke less intense responses than threats from and toward abstract protagonists. We are all familiar with the side-stepping of Muslim bombings and beheadings in favor of public handwringing over ‘shared values’ and the putative need to guard against ‘hate.’ Note how the debate is lifted from emergency rooms and placed in the philosopher’s chair. Equipped with this understanding, we should not feel any sense of surprise that the fates of the ‘Weathermen’ contrast sharply with those of The Order, a smaller, less lethal, and less influential group whose members were afforded quite different treatment by the media, government and judiciary.
By espousing an ideology with White identity at its core, as opposed to the anti-White ideology of M19CO, The Order was in direct conflict not only with the law but also with the prevailing moral schema. Its fate would reflect that. The group’s leader, Robert Mathews, was surrounded by the FBI in December 1984. A decision was taken to fire incendiary rounds into the home in which Mathews had barricaded himself, resulting in him being burned alive. Of the remaining members, David Lane was sentenced to 190 consecutive years in prison, his main crime being that he denied the civil rights of Alan Berg, a Jewish talk show host. Lane was subjected to long periods of solitary confinement before dying in prison in 2007. Bruce Pierce was handed a similar fate, having been sentenced to 252 years on the same charges, dying in prison in 2010. Richard Scutari was given a 60 year prison sentence in 1986 and remains incarcerated. On a cultural level, matters are much the same. David Lane’s ‘Fourteen Words,’ impelling the survival of Whites and their progeny, are unable to be articulated in public. In stark contrast, the ‘White Privilege’ meme, concocted by the Weathermen, Black radicals, and their New Left associates, saturates every aspect of contemporary culture and politics.
To be clear, the argument presented here is not that the right wing extremist is entirely mythic or fictional because figures committing crime in the name of White identity have never existed. They have existed, but the facts tell us that they are both extremely rare and often very much disengaged from the heart of the movement. Despite recurrent breathless claims, such as Kurt Eichenwald’s Newsweek article claiming that right-wing extremists are more dangerous than ISIS, the reality is far different. FBI agent Michael German, who spent years undercover with White identity groups, and is certainly no friend of our ideas, has remarked that “There are millions of racists in the United States. There are hundreds of thousands of people who are with organized white supremacist groups. Very few actually commit acts of violence.” The argument presented here is rather that the ‘myth’ of the right wing extremist is always greater than the sum of his parts, whereas the Leftist extremist is always somehow less than the sum of his. Furthermore, because it is moral infraction more than violent threat that lies at its heart, the myth of the right wing extremist envelopes even the most non-belligerent advocate of contrarian ideologies. The violent Leftist, the anarchist, the Black ‘liberationist,’ on the other hand, is forever a ‘gentle spirit.’
Disinformation is crucial to the maintenance of the myth. The Southern Poverty Law Center is one of the world’s leading producers of propaganda in this regard, primarily through its Intelligence Report and Year in Hate and Extremism. In the words of Alexander Cockburn, SPLC President Morris Dees “has raised an endowment of close to $100 million, with which he’s done little, by frightening elderly liberals that the heirs of Adolf Hitler are about to march down Main Street, lynching blacks and putting Jews into ovens. The fund raising of Dees and the richly rewarded efforts of terror mongers like Leonard Zeskind offer a dreadfully distorted view of American political realities.” Such distortion is a defining feature of the myth of the right wing extremist. Faced with increasing violence from immigrants and ethnic minorities, interested parties in government, the media, and academia have been forced to heighten the level of distortion still further, in order to maintain the pretense that a greater threat emanates from the Right.
In recent weeks, Spencer-free Britain has had its introjected morality triggered continually by wave upon wave of engineered ‘news.’ The Guardian, a bastion of Left-liberal smugness, has been at the forefront in provoking a falsehood-fuelled social panic about the Right. In late November it led with a piece claiming that “a top counter-terrorism officer has said police fear the threat of far-right violence is growing and poses a similar danger to communities as other forms of extremism.” In actual fact, the officer in question responded to loaded questions in the wake of the death of murdered MP Jo Cox with only cautious and non-committal statements on the Right, and stated that “currently just under 10% of all Prevent [a government ‘anti-extremism’ education program] referrals relate to the extreme right wing.” It is understood that these involved teenagers engaging in stickering and handing out pamphlets. Far from posing a “similar danger to communities as other forms of extremism,” the officer further elaborated that “the overriding threat remains from Daesh-inspired groups,” that is to say, groups derived predominantly from the Guardian’s much-cherished immigrant populations.
Faced with a White identity movement that remains, frustratingly for its opponents, law-abiding and peaceful, we can expect an elaboration on existing tactics. The meaning and definition of words like ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ will themselves be expanded to encompass non-violent entities and individuals in an effort to drag them into hastily constructed spheres of illegality and, thus, deeper social opprobrium. The banning of Richard Spencer from the UK as an ‘extremist’ is an excellent case in this regard. Another is the prison sentence given to Joshua Bonehill for harassing a Jewish MP on social media.
The phenomena outlined above should be sufficient for us to dispense with any lingering hopes that the political and cultural contest we are engaged in is governed by ‘fairness.’ In this Great Game, the rules are constantly changing, the goal always elusive. I often feel that our victory will not be in the form of a majestic sweep to power, but will instead resemble the achievement of a victor marked by his powers of will and endurance. In this scenario, we drag ourselves over the finish line with bloodied fingertips. Despite the purity of our intentions, the merit of our cause, and the honor in our motivations, I fear that there will be sacrifices along the way. There will be more smears, more falsehoods, more libels, and more oppressions. Glory will come to he who can shoulder them and move ever forward. I opened with Milton. I’ll close with him:
Awake, Arise, or for ever be fallen
(1) Herbert Marcuse, ‘Essay on Liberation,’ 1969.
With the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States of America, we must all admit that we underestimated what was within the realm of possibility. If a reality-TV billionaire can take on the entire liberal-internationalist politico-media establishment campaigning on a national-populist platform, *and win*, then none but God know what else is possible.
With the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States of America, we must all admit that we underestimated what was within the realm of possibility. If a reality-TV billionaire can take on the entire liberal-internationalist politico-media establishment campaigning on a national-populist platform, and win, then none but God know what else is possible.
Our people have been in steady demographic decline since the first half of the twentieth century. Our politics and culture has only further degenerated since the catastrophic Second World War. And yet, now, over the past five years or so, we have witnessed stunning cultural and political gains for nationalists across the Western world, especially in America. If the politics continue to improve at this rate, I dare say we will touch salvation well within our lifetimes.
In this spirit, I make the following modest proposals which the Trump Administration, and any other patriotic Western governments, could pursue immediately to save both Western civilization and the people who produced that civilization. These proposals are all technically feasible, even if political feasibility may require some more time. They are:
- The creation of a “Greater-European League” including all Western and European countries, with regular summits of leaders and affirmation of their common interests and identity as one great family of nations.
- Systematic support for European governments in shutting down all Third World immigration, including support for existing patriotic European governments (notably the Visegrád countries).
- The shunning and undermining of all Western and European governments that violate patriots’ political rights and free expression. This refers especially to the criminal Merkel regime in Germany, that has, in cold blood, adopted policies which will lead to untold rape and terrorism against European men, women, and children.
- The abolition of NATO and its replacement by a defensive military alliance of all Western and European nations, including North America, Europe, and Russia. Such an alliance could include the creation of a ‘European Legion’ featuring the best recruits from the entire Western and European world, as a military organization to defend our people wherever they may live.
- The cooperation of Western and European nations in multilateral great projects so as to promote their common interests and collective sovereignty. Such projects could include the construction of high-tech walls along the southern European border, space exploration, and genetic research. To the extent possible, Western and European nations shouldpool and leverage their cognitive resources in this manner, thus maximizing our innovative potential (something particularly necessary given that China alone has a high IQ and a larger population than the entire Western and European world).
- The cooperation of Western and European nations to promote European consciousness and awareness of the primacy of shared ethnic-genetic interests among all our peoples. This could be achieved through educational and student exchange programs, the promotion of patriotic film and television shows, and a common lingua franca.
- The creation of a vast European-American Market, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, to foster economic prosperity, collective sovereignty relative to other economic and civilizational blocs, and interdependence among our own nations to lessen the likelihood of conflict and foster a community of interests.
- An official objective of raising the birth rates of indigenous Europeans and the European diaspora. All European and Western governments should regularly meet to monitor progress and share best practices to reach this objective. Given the scientific reality of heredity, the intellectually and physically best members of our people, in particular, should become conscious of their duty to perpetuate their line.
Many may question whether such objectives are feasible. I will only say: they are, technically-speaking, perfectly feasible. They not instituted only because our people and political leaders do not know that they are desirable. I say, to instill moral confidence: the fact is, many of our greatest thinkers and statesmen have argued for the basic solidarity of our nations on grounds of shared blood and civilization.
Over two millennia ago, the great philosopher Plato wrote in The Republic:
Greeks are bonded to one another by internal ties of blood and kinship, but interact with non-Greeks as people who are foreign and live outside their domain. [. . .] When Greeks and non-Greeks fight, then, we’ll describe this as warfare, and claim that they are natural enemies and that the term “war” should refer to this type of hostility. But when Greeks get involved in this kind of thing with other Greeks, we’ll claim that they are natural friends, and that in a situation like this Greece is diseased and in conflict, and we’ll maintain that the term “conflict” should refer to this type of hostility.
Are we Europeans – especially in the face of Africans and Asians – no less “bonded to one another by internal ties of blood and kinship”? If twentieth century Europeans had adhered to Plato’s advice might we not have avoided fratricidal wars and civilizational suicide?
Over a thousand years after Plato, Charlemagne united Western Europeans under the Catholic faith, thus ensuring with Orthodoxy that almost all Europeans shared in Christianity. Whatever one’s opinion of that religion, one great advantage of Charlemagne’s work was in giving most of Europe the same religion and the same elite language. He invited intellectuals from across the European world into the cultural center of his project, from Peter of Pisa to Alcuin of York, getting the critical mass of brains needed for the Carolingian Renaissance. Christendom enabled the aristocracies of all European nations to intermarry, all the while maintaining a de facto racial boundary with the Semitic world.
In the modern era, interactions with Native Americans, Africans, and Asians, led to the rise of racial consciousness among Europeans, a consciousness that was only further strengthened by scientific discoveries concerning genetics and heredity. A century and a half ago, long before the catastrophic world wars, the famous French writer Victor Hugo said of Germany and France: “There is between these peoples an intimate connection, an undeniable consanguinity. They stem from the same sources; they fought together against the Romans; they are brothers in the past, brothers in the present, brothers in the future.”
Hugo saw further still however. Speaking in the French National Assembly in 1849, he foresaw not only a European federation but economic union with the American republic: “A day will come when these two immense groups, the United States of America, the United States of Europe, placed one beside the other, extending their hand across the seas, trading their products, their commerce, their industry, their arts, their geniuses.” With similar far-sightedness, Russian President Vladimir Putin has spoken of the need for “a harmonious economic community stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.”
After the world wars, in which he had taken part in and despite the excesses of National Socialism, General Charles de Gaulle continued to assert the primacy of race as grounds for political cooperation:
For my part, I have, since always, but today more than ever, felt that which is common to the nations which inhabit [Europe]. All being of the same white race, of the same Christian origin, of the same way of life, bound between each other since always by countless relations of thought, art, science, politics, commerce, it is in line with their nature that they come to form a whole, having in the world its character and its organization.
But might not diaspora Europeans reply: Does European blood halt at mere geographical boundaries? Or does it not extend beyond the Urals, beyond the seas, spilling to all continents, the fruit of our explosive will and dynamism?
Today, President-Elect Trump – while more of an American populist than anything else – has frequently given expression to the European identity which he also shares in. He has asserted that it should be easier for Europeans to immigrate to the United States. He has professed a belief in genetics and good breeding, and shown pride in his “German blood” (“great stuff!”). He has denounced in no uncertain terms the slow death of Europe. Following an umpteenth rampage by murderous Muslims, Trump could only lament, in his inimitably unabashed and straightforward way: “France is no longer France.” The France Trump might have imagined growing up, is gone, increasingly Africanized and Islamized – leading only to the dismay one feels when a wrong you could not even conceive of is occurring. As of today, Trump’s Twitter account (that rival to the New York Times) has “liked” only 45 tweets. One of them is the following:
Daily Briefing: Minority babies are now majority in United States http://t.co/fheY8AUi
— Bill O’Reilly (@oreillyfactor) May 17, 2012
We have every reason to hope and to fight.
A final thought.
Despite the fratricidal butchery of the First World War, many of our forefathers retained an optimistic faith in their race and civilization. In 1927, the American pilot Charles Lindbergh crossed the Atlantic by plane in a single flight for the first time, causing a global sensation. Lindbergh’s spectacular feats then inspired the following futuristic vision in the Christian preacher Reverend S. Parkes Cadman:
We can be certain that what man shall accomplish in the future will dwarf anything he has done in the past. This little disk on my desk puts us in communication with half a continent. Who dare say what man will achieve by Christmas, 1977? It is permissible to speculate that five centuries hence Raphael’s Madonna will be surpassed; the theatre, God’s instrument for saving grace; the governments of the white race a federal unity resembling our own republic and free from its friction and provincialism
Can you imagine? That is how a Christian used to think! That is what the New York Times [sic!] could publish! The dream of a United States of Hyperborea! What a sight! How low we have a sunk! How he would weep if he saw the White race in 1977! Let alone 2016! How far we are from the mark! We, proud men of the West, seeing ourselves steadily reduced to minority status in our own lands, unconscious of our identity, ignorant of the good, which is indistinguishable from the true and the heroic. But we are Awakening! And by that alone, there are many centuries of work ahead of us.