Radix Journal

Radix Journal

A radical journal

Category: Politics

Nation-States, the European Union and the Occident (2/3)

Below is the second installment of a three-part series on how we get from stato-national feeling to Pan-Occidental awareness. In the first part we discovered how Nation-States can be seen as “stepping stones towards globalism.” The third and last one will be about “reclaiming the Occident,” since there’s a misconception in New Right circles about Europe and the West being antagonistic.

Below is the second installment of a three-part series on how we get from stato-national feeling to Pan-Occidental awareness. In the first part we discovered how Nation-States can be seen as “stepping stones towards globalism.” The third and last one will be about “reclaiming the Occident,” since there’s a misconception in New Right circles about Europe and the West being antagonistic.


Before we get started for this second part, I would like to insist on something that isn’t always clear in nationalist movements: discarding Nation-States and emphasizing racial and civilizational kinship doesn’t mean believing in “some mythical Whitemanistan,” to borrow Matt Parrott’s phrase at Occidental Dissent, in the bygone days when that website was worth reading.

As I demonstrated in my article, Nation-States don’t only negate what is above themselves (the West & the White race) but also what is beneath them (ethnicities). What is really mythical is this vision of a homogenized nationhood that could be embodied by a State built on abstract and uprooted grounds.
But there is a more serious criticism in nationalist movements about White identity being “shallow” compared to national identities. I believe, however, that this idea, repeatedly asserted by Andrew Fraser (here and there, for example), is completely wrong.

Webzines like this one are precisely here to help people reconsider their false conceptions. If it is true that people keep defining themselves as members of nations rather than as members of a race or a civilization, then what are they actually talking about when they complain that “Britain/America/France/etc. is under attack”? Quite simply it is their racial and civilizational identity, period. They may not be aware of it, but the content of what they rightly say is threatened is purely racial and civilizational. Identical claims are made throughout the West that “our nation is under siege,” with the same phenomena denounced: third-world mass immigration, anti-White policies, multiculturalism, etc.
These phenomena are affecting the West as a whole, and must therefore be analyzed from a Western perspective. As Richard said in a speech he delivered in London in 2012 (from 27’00” to 27’30”): “Clearly, vis-à-vis the colored world, the third world, we are White people much more than we have ethnic identity.”

The problem now is that White identity is only acknowledged by enemies of Whites. When there are flashmobs in America, it is officially Whitey that is attacked, and not ‘Yankee.’ Our enemies know who we are, because they know who they are. More and more, they define themselves by race, because it is what matters today. Only Whites seem to refuse to accept this fact. I think this Pan-Occidental awareness is there, and it is just crying out to be given a name. This should be the role of people like us: White identity cannot only be a negative one, given by our enemies. It has to become a positive one, and only we can achieve that. As I told an American friend: if you go to a North African neighborhood in Paris, you won’t be seen favorably just because, being non-French, you’ve not colonized Maghreb. We have to throw our ‘national’ glasses away, for they prevent us from seeing reality.

Now we have to disprove a second misconception, common in nationalist circles, that the European Union is, by definition, “our enemy,” and that the remedy to its unproven threat would be more emphasis on Nation-States. As we’ll see, even if the EU was an actual threat, Nation-States would be of no help, since the EU is effectively run by its constituent States.

The European Alibi

In European nationalist movements, even those which stress the prevalence of European identity over national identity, the European Union is most of the time blamed for contradictory things: it is accused of being a “new Soviet Union;” of advancing “ultra-liberal” (in the continental, classical sense) economic policies; of being the first step toward a Global Government; and of being a kind of new Carolingian Empire dismantling Nation-States for the benefit of Europe’s main power, Germany. While political socialism and economic laissez-fairism are perfectly compatible, and this mix describes well Europe’s situation, the idea that “Brussels,” where the European Commission is located, is responsible for Europe’s plight is not serious, and I will show why here.

Clarifying this is all the more necessary, since there have been threats, mostly coming from the UK, to leave the EU, given the Union’s current situation. It would be, according to Britain’s ascendant UKIP a way for Britain to recover her sovereignty. But is Britain really dependent on the EU?
To answer this question, we have to analyze the European Union’s structure of power.

The EU is run by the States

• The highest political body of the European Union is the European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Europe, a mistake often made by stato-nationalists due to their ignorance of European institutions). The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government (presidential regimes send their president, while parliamentary regimes send their Prime Minister or the equivalent). It meets four times a year to define the European Union’s agenda.

• Then comes the Council of the European Union (again, not to be conflated with the Council of Europe, which has nothing to do with the EU), which shares legislative and budgetary authority with the European Parliament (more on that “august body” below). The composition of the Council of the European Union depends on the topic discussed: for example, when agriculture is discussed, it is composed of the 28 ministers of Agriculture of the member-States. The presidency of the Council rotates every six months between the States.

• The European Parliament is the least national of all the EU’s political bodies. However, even if its MPs seat according to the transnational groups they belong to (social-democrats, conservatives, environmentalists, etc.),they are still elected on a national basis. Thus, every important party of each member-State sends its own delegation to the European Parliament. National politics being still much more prestigious than European politics, national parties usually send second-rank figures. It is also a way to get rid of politicians who fell into disgrace at home. Unlike the European Commission, the Parliament has no legislative initiative.

• The European Commission, which “Euro-skeptics” often describe as the government of the European Union (which it is not), is simply the executive body of the Union. It executes the decisions taken by the Council of the European Union or the Parliament, knowing that these decisions stem from the European Council’s strategy. The members of the European Commission are nominated by the States.

As we can see, the European Union has no more power than what the States give it. But could a State be constrained or have its interests overridden by a majority of the Nation-States coalescing against it? In theory, yes, except that most delicate decisions of the Council of the European Union, those concerning foreign relations or security, require the unanimity of the States. Most other decisions require a qualified majority, knowing that a vote has to get a sufficient proportion of the States and of the European population to pass. Eastern European countries usually side with UK when it comes to restrictions of “sovereignty.”

And even when a decision is taken and it contradicts the will of one or several States, national governments often overlook European decisions. Much is said, in Europe, about national laws being mere transcriptions of European laws. It should be said, however, that even when European legislation is integrated into national constitutions, it is often disrespected.

Let’s take an important example: States which have adopted the Euro currency have in theory to respect “convergence criteria” to ensure the stability of the Euro zone. These criteria include inflation lower than 1.5% a year, a public deficit of less than 3% a year, and public debt restricted to 60% of GDP. Only Finns (Finland and Estonia) and Luxembourg comply with these criteria. In theory, States that don’t respect these criteria have to be punished; yet they aren’t, which tells us that when European politicians come back from Brussels and tell their constituency that they’re powerless in front of the “Eurocrats,” they’re not telling the truth. The truth is that European policies are pretty much what national politicians want them to be.

If the EU is really responsible for Europe’s current demise, how come that Norway, which doesn’t belong to the EU, is invaded to the point that 100 percent of the rapes, in Oslo, are committed by non-Whites? Would Britain really be better off if UKIP took power and managed to get the UK out of the Union? One of the arguments for leaving the EU is immigration restriction, but the European treaties on the matter were ratified by the States, and can be undone the same way (or, simply, not applied; the EU has no serious means to constrain a State to comply.)

And it should be noted that mass immigration began long before Europe was politically integrated. When Enoch Powell delivered his “Rivers of Blood” speech, in 1968, Britain wasn’t even a member of the ancestor of the EU, the European Economic Community (that occurred five years later, in 1973). If the UK left the EU, the problem would be unchanged. The EU is an alibi for national failures. Thus, petty nationalists are either ignorant of how the EU works or simply dishonest. I leave the choice to their responsibility.

Could the EU become a White Superstate?

During American Renaissance’s 2013 conference, France’s Bloc Identitaire’s president, Fabrice Robert, gave a speech on the future of Euro-American relations. After the speech came the time of questions and answers. The first question was raised by Richard, who had delivered a speech in the afternoon about the Ethno-State project.

Richard asked Robert if the EU could become a kind of White Superstate. This question was related to his own speech, in which he considered the idea of White Americans simply “going back to Europe,” as the ‘antifas’ outside the room were asking them to do.

I think this provocative question’s aim was twofold: first, to remind the American audience that White Americans have to get closer to Europeans, who are confronted with the same dangers as them, and second, to point out the benefits that Europeans could gain from a structure that embodies their common civilization.

The politicians and bureaucrats currently ruling the EU are globalists, and they see Europe’s unity as a mere step towards a World Government, but the tool they’ve created could be used in a radically opposite way: if a European awakening occurred, this tool could indeed be useful in shaping common policies actually halting immigration from the Third World, for instance.

This seemingly counter-intuitive idea that “globalists are doing a part of our job” will be the basis for the third and last part of this series, “Reclaiming the Occident.” There, we’ll see that the New Right is wrong when it tries to oppose Europe and the West, or the Occident. “West” or “Occident” is simply how Europe was called before the 16th century, when the term “Europe” took over. More recently, “Western Civilization” as a geopolitical concept has been used by Neo-Conservatives to push forward their globalist agenda. But they might not be aware of the forces they have actually unleashed in doing that. What I will suggest in my next article is merely to hijack their notion and use it to our own purposes.

This article was originally published at AlternativeRight.Com.

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Planet of the Apes

There is another type of monkey-rage that could be triggered by this unfair treatment. The white students, who are to receive harsher punishments for the same misbehaviour, might not see how this will benefit them in the long run. In their short-sighted adolescent minds, these youngsters will think they’re being picked on and will revert to some backward state of furious, hateful monkeydom. 

The frenzy for equality is motivated by a very primitive urge, so primitive in fact that even monkeys have it. You may have seen this video of an angry monkey on the Internet. Liberals watch this monkey and see him as proof that equality reflects an incontestable principle which is fundamental to human nature. “Even our primitive simian cousins can understand it, but those dumb conservatives can’t!

I can sympathise with our genetic relatives from further down the evolutionary scale, and with the monkeys, too. When my housemate leaves me to clean up his mess, rather than responding like a mature adult human, I grit my teeth, shake my monkey fists, and am overcome by that primitive state of monkey-rage that is aroused in those who sense injustice. I’m not proud of it, but I recognise that this impulse is in me, and it’s in other people, too.

A good manager understands that he should make his staff feel like they are being fairly treated and that this has a lot more to do with feelings than with objective reality. When your people feel like they’re getting the short end of the stick, they can descend into monkey-rage and that’s never productive. But modern politicians very rarely make good managers, a fact that will probably lead to some unfortunate consequences for the American education system.

In 2012, Barack Obama called for race-based discipline filters to be applied as part of his African-American Education Initiative. Such measures have already been enforced in a few districts, including Washington, DC, and will continue to expand. This means that teachers will be expected to enforce different standards of discipline depending on the race of the students. The “thinking” behind such lunacy is rooted in a monkey-rage response to the fact that Black students are statistically more likely to be disciplined by teachers than white students are. Compensatory measures are thus taken to soothe the seething mass monkey-rage of the nation’s liberals.

Even the mainstream media have criticised Education Secretary Arne Duncan, Attorney General Eric Holder and Barack Obama for what are essentially racial quotas in school discipline. It might be argued that this is a new type of unfairness, that African-American students will no longer get their fair share of educational discipline and that this will lead to new levels of inequality. Inequality means monkey-rage and no one wants to see that.

But there is another type of monkey-rage that could be triggered by this unfair treatment. The White students, who are to receive harsher punishments for the same misbehaviour, might not see how this will benefit them in the long run. In their short-sighted adolescent minds, these youngsters will think they’re being picked on and will revert to some backward state of furious, hateful monkeydom.

Is Obama trying to make a monkey out of America? If unfair treatment leads to monkey-rage, then treating unfair outcomes of authoritative discipline (both in and out of schools) with unfair legislation intended to redress the racial balance, will surely lead to more monkey-rage. The monkey in the experiment is sated when he sees that he gets the same piece of fruit as the other monkey. I finally overcame my rage when my housemate agreed to do his share of the chores. But will the metaphorical monkey cage of America ever know such peace? Surely equal treatment under the eyes of the law, from cradle to grave, from school to prison, is as close as we can get to fairness? Any measures taken as compensation for perceived unfairness are rendered valid only by existing perceptions of fairness, but these measures become unfair themselves when perceptions change. This isn’t really fair, it’s just monkey business. Monkeying around with the way teachers exact discipline on students throws a monkey wrench in the works of the educational system. Race is already a divisive issue in the USA, and this will only get worse while young people are made to feel painfully aware of how differently teachers treat them. If teachers can’t treat kids the same regardless of their race, then how can we expect them to treat each other fairly? After all, monkey see, monkey do.

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The New Libertarian Hegemony

For the past 20 years, non-aligned rightists in America—paleoconservatives, paleolibertarians, traditionalists, nationalists, et al.—have focused on the malevolent and all-powerful *neoconservatives* as their chief enemy. (And for good reason.) Readers of noted publications and websites have been treated to long chronicles of how the neocons undermined the “Real Right” in America. As we await a fresh recounting of the time Harry Jaffa scuttled Mel Bradford’s nomination to the National Endowment for the Humanities, I must point out that this familiar narrative is quickly becoming outmoded. The neocons no longer control the movement operationally or ideologically. In fact, they’ve largely been displaced by libertarians, who, in their way, are even worse than the neocons (yes, worse.)

For the past 20 years, non-aligned rightists in America—paleoconservatives, paleolibertarians, traditionalists, nationalists, et al.—have focused on the malevolent and all-powerful neoconservatives as their chief enemy. (And for good reason.) Readers of noted publications and websites have been treated to long chronicles of how the neocons undermined the “Real Right” in America.

As we await a fresh recounting of the time Harry Jaffa scuttled Mel Bradford’s nomination as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, I’m forced to point out that this familiar narrative is quickly becoming outmoded. The neocons no longer control the movement operationally or ideologically. In fact, they’ve largely been displaced by libertarians, who, in their way, are even worse than the neocons (yes, worse).

Put simply, the Dubya Era is over. Enthusiasm for foreign interventions to bring democracy to Third World nations has dried up among the GOP rank and file. Moreover, the desire for a strong state apparatus and the willingness to compromise with the welfare state is the complete opposite of what the conservative movement now advocates. The proposed intervention in Syria failed to get off to the ground largely due to Republican opposition, and many conservative legislators are now actually intent on eliminating some government programs (rather than just talking about it to get reelected).

So how is this a bad thing?

Besides the opposition to needless foreign intervention, the conservative movement is now more thoroughly libertarian than when it was a hodgepodge of neocons, paleocons, libertarians, and other political misfits. There’s no room for dissident thought, and the movement has become an unwelcome place for those who think differently about race and the future of America. And in a way, the libertarians’ ideology is far more removed from what identitarians believe than that of the neocons.

And libertarian power in Washington is growing with each passing day.

Edward Luce, a columnist for The Financial Times, sympathetically declared that “[t]he tide is rising for America’s Libertarians.” According to data provided by the Cato Institute, more than a third of Republicans now identify as libertarian, and almost a quarter of all Americans do.

Is this all because libertarians assure Whites that America will not turn into the hellish world of Elysium? Is it because libertarians promise to keep jobs here domestically and curtail immigration? Is it because libertarians craft policies that actually serve the interests of Middle America (unlike the two dominant parties)?

Sorry to burst to your bubble, but it’s none of the above. To Luce, it’s because they strike at authority like no other ideology does at the moment. In truth, the authority that libertarians oppose is not really state power so much as the power of tradition.

Gay marriage does not increase freedom, it only increases the control the state has over relationships. Legalized hemp does not hurt the state, it raises more revenue for it and offers the masses yet another distraction from reality. No serious figure actually wants to eliminate free trade, but removing the few restrictions on it only increases the disenfranchisement of White America and leads to more dependence on the state as jobs disappear.

Do you believe that libertarians actually care about issues affecting White interests? Do you think that Ron and Rand Paul are secret White nationalists?

To be frank, the Pauls and the libertarians would rather accumulate Bitcoins and promote enterprise zones in Detroit ghettos than preserve their people. Who knows what Rand and Ron really think, but effectively they have the same views on race as your average Sociology professor.

Don’t believe me? Look at the policies that a prominent libertarian thinks “the Liberty movement” should focus on in 2014: Drug Legalization, Gay Marriage, Economic Choice, and Bitcoin. (Yes, these are the issues libertarians really care about.)

“Economic choice” that allows for more instant gratification, legalized weed that allows for more instant gratification, and gay marriage that allows for . . . well, delayed gratification, I suppose. Judging by this list, Libertarians are shouting “Bring Us the Last Man!” at the top of their lungs.

At least the neocons had some sense of a higher ideal and celebrated the warrior spirit (if only for Zionists). Instead, libertarians just want to make sure you can vegetate on your couch without fearing that “the feds” might ruin your good time. Ain’t that America?

Again, the great irony of this “libertarian” program is that its policies attack tradition much more than the state. Libertarians are no longer paleolibertarians; indeed, the paleolibertarians are no longer paleolibertarians. Lew Rockwell, the man who probably penned the Ron Paul Newsletters and published Jared Taylor on his website, now publishes shrill screeds about rising fascism. (Taylor has beeb scrubbed from LRC’s archive, so Lew can better refashion his image as a Catholic universalist.)

Ann Coulter was somewhat correct when she dubbed libertarians “pussies.” Instead of focusing on issues that matter to White Americans, like employment discrimination laws, they continue to focus on pot legalization. But, in a way, libertarians aren’t pussies; I believe that they focus on these issues precisely because they care more about attaining freedom from tradition and cultural mores than almost anything else. They really don’t care about employment discrimination laws—in fact, some libertarians think that one of the few responsibilities of the state is eliminating racism.

Even when you might hope that the libertarian love for freedom would lead them to allow discourse on racial topics, they, once again, manage to beat expectations! Alexander McCobin, the President of a large and well-funded libertarian group known as Students for Liberty, responded to Coulter’s “pussies” accusation by essentially reaffirming the label. He even included a helpful guide for conservative movement groupthink:

We know what’s up for debate, and so we also know what’s not. The justifications for and limits on intellectual property? Up for debate. Racism? Not up for debate. Deciding which government agencies should be abolished, privatized, reformed, or maintained? Up for debate. State-sponsored discrimination against individuals based on their sexuality? Not up for debate. Austrian versus Chicago economics and their responses to Keynesianism? Up for debate. Ann’s claim that liberals are out to destroy the family? That’s so clearly absurd that it’s in stand-up comedy territory.

So the next time you want to talk about the future of Occidental civilization with libertarians, please try to relate it to the causes of the business cycle.

It’s worth noting that McCobin’s group is currently engaged in promoting liberty in Africa by giving away the books of Frederic Bastiat and Milton Friedman. Maybe this will convince Somalis that they are actually living in a limited-government utopia! (Even David Frum, who in 2004 co-authored a book entitled “An End to Evil,” sounds more grounded in reality than your average DC libertarian.)

As we’ve seen, the neocons’ policies in the 2000s led to the creation of a small, though passionate, opposition within the Right; and the enemy-of-my-enemy mentality that prevailed allowed for a certain openness to radical ideas. It’s worth noting that Richard Spencer worked within the movement during the Bush era, and The American Conservative regularly published Steve Sailer.

But the libertarians seem to be the only group that has actually benefited from these years of opposition. And the examples of Jack Hunter and Jason Richwine illustrate this point.

Hunter, as it has been well documented, used to be quite open about his views on race and immigration. He was a columnist (under Spencer) at TakiMag, and there was no hint of political correctness about him.

In an emasculating and widely mocked confession in Politico, Hunter declared that he had only pretended to be a racist. While the assault on him last summer forced him out of Rand Paul’s office, Jack managed to recover and now has an editorial position at the conservative media site Rare. When he was initially attacked, libertarians took to social media to declare #GotYourBackJack, and Hunter still enjoys considerable support, in spite of his past truth bombs.

Why? Because Jack groveled, fully recanted, and proved his bona fides by providing off-the-shelf libertarian commentary. While he might have lost some of his standing, Jack remains a major player in libertarian circles due to the fact he’s now 100% politically correct. (His current message is that libertarians need to be pro-gay marriage, pro-weed, and pro-life to win over more voters.) Essentially, Jack’s survival strategy has been to become a political eunuch.

On the other hand, Jason Richwine has experienced a quite different fate. As a researcher for The Heritage Foundation, and co-author of its study of last year’s amnesty bill, Richwine found himself under attack over his Harvard Doctoral dissertation. In it, he merely pointed out that Hispanics, on average, have lower IQs than American natives and that their mass migration into the states would have a negative effect on America’s average IQ.) This is, in a way, far less radical than what Hunter had said when he “played” a racist.)

Richwine’s dissertation bore the seal of Harvard University, but that wasn’t enough to save him when he faced a brutal assault from both the Left and Right and was forced to “resign” from Heritage. Conservatives didn’t start a hashtag declaring they had his back, and he never received a cushy back-up job after he was purged. Richwine also never groveled, and his Politico op-ed, unlike Hunter’s, reaffirmed his past research in an articulate and unapologetic manner.

But the ideas Richwine raised are no longer allowed in conservative circles, and it is likely that he will never have a job connected to the movement again, despite his credentials and skill level.

The libertarian takeover clearly spells out to identitarians that the conservative movement is no place for us. The libertarians, in a way, hate us more than they do the progressives (with whom they share a common soul).

But with every development comes new opportunities. If anything, it is past time for identitarians to stop focusing on electoral politics and donating to candidates they think might be closet WNs. They aren’t. And even if they were, they would be banished immediately by both the system and the party that put them in power.

It is time for us to focus more on culture and building communities with racially conscious Whites that would allow us to embark on our own path. We cannot rely on Conservative Inc. to change its ways and to suddenly nominate Jared Taylor as the Republican candidate for President. It will never happen. And we have to develop our own strategy for supporting our cause.

Libertarians are not our allies, and they support the destruction of our identity. Why should we want to be in the same movement with these pussies anyway?

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When the Gods Hear the Call

Black Metal shares the fate of all complex and multifaceted phenomena that transcend their narrow genre identities and, similar to Hegel’s philosopher who is able to “grasp an era through thought,” are always ahead of their time, either by affirming, or by totally rejecting the spiritual foundations of the time period in which they live. Both require an ability to examine it from a distance. As the unquestionable product of Modernity, Black Metal paradoxically issues a death sentence to the Modern world. The latter is the case not only with respect to contemporary Christianity: it is the antithesis to everything that is believed to be of any value for an average representative of today’s Western society: from the conventional notions of the good and the beautiful to the metaphysical Being itself. In other words, Black Metal, at a glance, is the very embodiment of an active-nihilistic phase in a metaphysical process of transvaluation of all values heralded by Friedrich Nietzsche.
This is the second reason why Black Metal is mostly defined apophatically, that is to say, from negation. I have already mentioned the first reason for this: despite Black Metal’s prevalent description as a subculture, it is more accurate to define it as a counterculture the goal of which is to terminate the entire Modern era. Many sociologists would disagree with my assertion, because some of them share the idea that early Christianity was the only fully successful counterculture in European history, which overthrew the values of the previous era, whereas the adherents of Black Metal, both genre creators and ordinary fans, are totally integrated into the current social system, support its cultural codes, and never question that which is truly vital for its existence axioms. 

THE CONSERVATIVE-REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL OF BLACK METAL ART

I. Black Metal: a Subculture or a Counterculture? Methodological Foundations

Black Metal shares the fate of all complex and multifaceted phenomena that transcend their narrow genre identities and, similar to Hegel’s philosopher who is able to “grasp an era through thought,” are always ahead of their time, either by affirming, or by totally rejecting the spiritual foundations of the time period in which they live. Both require an ability to examine it from a distance. As the unquestionable product of Modernity, Black Metal paradoxically issues a death sentence to the Modern world. The latter is the case not only with respect to contemporary Christianity: it is the antithesis to everything that is believed to be of any value for an average representative of today’s Western society: from the conventional notions of the good and the beautiful to the metaphysical Being itself. In other words, Black Metal, at a glance, is the very embodiment of an active-nihilistic phase in a metaphysical process of transvaluation of all values heralded by Friedrich Nietzsche.
This is the second reason why Black Metal is mostly defined apophatically, that is to say, from negation. I have already mentioned the first reason for this: despite Black Metal’s prevalent description as a subculture, it is more accurate to define it as a counterculture the goal of which is to terminate the entire Modern era. Many sociologists would disagree with my assertion, because some of them share the idea that early Christianity was the only fully successful counterculture in European history, which overthrew the values of the previous era, whereas the adherents of Black Metal, both genre creators and ordinary fans, are totally integrated into the current social system, support its cultural codes, and never question that which is truly vital for its existence axioms.

As attentive readers of Ernst Jünger know, almost everything — no matter how “subversive” or “irreverent” — can be incorporated back into the system as “manifestation of freedom. Therefore, Black Metal may be considered only a subculture, which is exaggerated in many infamous parodies that reveal the infantile and ultimately primitive character of the self-proclaimed “true blackers” who cannot cope even with their parents. Undoubtedly, these observations are not groundless, and are basically endorsed within the movement itself, which developed its own ways of social regulation in order to expel the so-called “untrue” posers from their community, i.e., trendies and money-makers that appeared after the scandalous events in the early history of Black Metal.

However, I would like to emphasize the fact that the given survey is not sociological; otherwise, I would have to put a full stop right after stating that the Black Metal scene degraded a long time ago, which means that there is no place for wishful thinking. In other words, I will discuss not what Black Metal currently is, but what it is supposed to be according to the pioneers of the Black Metal movement and those who stayed devoted to the latter tradition. Therefore, I consider Max Weber’s Verstehende Soziologie (Interpretative Sociology) to be the only suitable sociological method that seeks to understand a certain cultural phenomenon from within, describes it on its own terms and operates within the notion of the ideal type. The latter gives the opportunity to avoid biases of positivist thinking and legitimately apply the heuristic mental constructs derived from the empirical data for the purpose of better analyzing reality. The most famous example of the ideal type is the “Protestant ethic” used by Weber as a key for exploring the emergence and the essence of capitalism in his renowned work Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), which provides a fruitful alternative to the popular historical-materialistic explanation of Karl Marx. Accordingly, our ideal type is called “Black Metal Art” or simply “Black Metal.”

As such, this method is quite akin to the philosophical-hermeneutical approach developed by Martin Heidegger and his disciple Hans-Georg Gadamer who rejects the very term “method” as a natural-scientific remnant in the Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences). According to Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation focused on the classic concept of the hermeneutic circle (“to understand the whole, we need to understand the parts and visa versa”), the task is not to find the way out of the circle, but rather to enter it correctly, since this circle is that of our existence. Put simply, we (“Dasein” as “Being-in-the-world”) always understand certain phenomena in this or that way, so our sole duty is to explicate our assumptions or, in Gadamer’s words, our “anticipation of perfection.” The latter is what I am going to do in this paper, although I have to admit that in some cases we deal with such a high level of self-reflection demonstrated by the Black Metal artists that the researcher gratefully turns into a mere commentator: consider the first-ever DVD “Opus Diaboli” released in May of 2012 by the Swedish band Watain to experience the difference between the interpretation of Watain’s vocalist E. and those given in most Black Metal documentaries, interviews, and thematic investigations. The vast majority of such sources still are very disappointing or insufficient.

II. Aesthetics and Metaphysics vs. Ideology and Politics of Black Metal. The Principal Directions within the Black Metal Movement

What is the starting point for this research? Since the times of Aristotle, it has been obvious that the shortest way to the essence of a thing lies in its definition. But, again, mostly negative definitions of Black Metal exist. They do reflect the greatness and intensity of this phenomenon but say little about its main idea. For example, the epochal and countercultural significance of the latter can be easily inferred from the well-known attempts to clarify the essence of Black Metal such as, “it is not another musical genre,” “it is not mere music,” and “it is not entertainment/business.” Another set of negative definitions due to the nihilistic orientation of Black Metal is also widely recognized: it is believed to be anti-religious, especially anti-Christian, antisocial, misanthropic, blasphemous, and so forth.

Likewise, all intellectual efforts to articulate what Black Metal is rather than what it is not usually end up with an appeal to a certain spectrum of moods and emotions (“dark,” “melancholic”), sometimes–to certain highly metaphoric concepts (“evil,” “ugliness,” “war”) or to Black Metal aesthetics known as part of the well-established phrase “Black Metal Art.” This expression, however, raises further questions since Black Metal is represented as l’art pour l’art only if the latter means something like Supreme Art that bears explicit occultist connotations, which is the very opposite of this approach. If not, one is welcome to enter endless debates regarding the basic principle(s) of Black Metal ideology, which are mostly centered on Satanism.

Depending on what one considers the object of negation or the enemy against whom the War is being waged (“Black Metal ist Krieg”), there exist different ideological trends within the general Black Metal movement, which regularly cause sharp disagreements between its members: radical nihilism and atheism that stand behind Satanist imagery and sometimes overlap with LaVeyan Social Darwinism; the Occultist trajectory, which is often connected with the Left-Hand Path; Theistic Satanism (the religion of Deus/Diabolus Absconditus) that borders on Gnosticism and similar teachings, on the one hand, and archaic Pagan cults, which may be linked to “Aryan Luciferianism”—on the other; variations of Heathenism, from Pantheism to Vedic hymns, which are mainly developed within such subgenres such as Folk Black Metal or Viking Black Metal, and even Christian “Unblack” Metal, not to mention other innovative Black Metal bands often focused on their own “philosophy.” Naturally, we may legitimately wonder which direction is more representative of the movement or, in contrast, should in no way not be associated with it as one that transcends the limits of this ideal type.

Another way to fill the gap between the apophatical definitions involves pointing out the mystical or even a religious feeling that is typical of the Black Metal Weltanschauung, its special “spirit.” A reference to this theophanic experience that underlies rational explanation, among others, can be found in the interview with the French Black Metal band Deathspell Omega:

Some of us had a religious upbringing indeed, and these obviously went through the initial phase of global denial, whereas others were raised under the sign of rationality. That we eventually all experienced a shattering theophany is something very hard to explain in rational terms. There’s of course cultural arguments, anyone who went through long universitarian studies has been given keys—and this despite the fact that most universities in the occidental world are actually strongholds of humanitarian egalitarianism—and we chose not to ignore these keys, whereas most people do as they prefer to remain in harmony with the current Zeitgeist.[1]

Such purely phenomenological descriptions could have dissolved genre boundaries, yet we feel that Black Metal has its positive core which strictly differentiates it from the related genres and may be formulated very simply. Therefore, even though only the National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) scene and its rarer leftist analogues are notable for direct political involvement, Black Metal as a countercultural movement with great ambitions but carefully guarded borders is political par excellence, political in Carl Schmitt’s sense of the distinction between the friend and the enemy, which translates into the ultimate degree of association and dissociation between “us” and “them.” A highly selective approach to potential membership in the Black Metal community, of course, is more eloquent than inherent in any genuine aesthetic formation, prioritizing artistic expression and detesting the rigid and external ideological clichés, whether political or otherwise.

At the same time, such Ukrainian Black Metal bands as Nokturnal Mortum, Kroda, Drudkh, or Hate Forest, which at present comprise one of the most acclaimed NSBM scenes in the world, if not the most, even though they may introduce themselves as simply patriotic and concerned with traditional heritage preservation (another esteemed Ukrainian one-man band Lutomysl was described in a recent interview by Pavel “Lutomysl” Shishkovskiy, who envies people “whose only problems boil down to the presence of Jews or blacks,” as NEONSDSBM [2]), can hardly be regarded as such that impose restrictions on ways of expression in order to meet ideological needs. Above all, they gained recognition all over the world owing to their musical masterpieces.

In a narrow sense, Black Metal as a total war against the Modern world cannot be free of the political implications either, although most crimes in the early history of Black Metal were committed due to personal, not political reasons [3]. Similarly, one may single out both the left-wing and the right-wing tendencies since the very birth of the Black Metal movement represented accordingly by Satanist Øystein Aarseth “Euronymous” of Mayhem, who sympathized with left-wing extremism, and Varg Vikernes of Burzum as a scholar of Old Norse religion, an adherent of Paganism, and an authoritative figure in the contemporary right-wing circles (among his influences are Knut Hamsun, Oswald Spengler, and Julius Evola), who distanced himself from Satanism and the whole Black Metal scene after its newcomers had started exploiting the original ideas and aesthetics invented by the pioneers merely for their shock value or for commercial purposes. Retrospectively speaking, it is no wonder that Euronymous was killed by Vikernes in 1993, which is regarded as “the beginning of the end” followed by the split and the growing commercialization of the scene (consider Nargaroth’s song “The Day Burzum Killed Mayhem”). On the other hand, I would not say that there is an irresolvable conflict of these two tendencies, or that there is no such metaphysical position that integrates them on a higher level.

Indeed, it is possible to oppose the Modern world and its symbolic incarnation, Christianity, both “from the Left” and “from the Right.” Furthermore, although liberation, nihilism, anti-clericalism (remember the famous Norwegian church burnings), etc. are mostly associated with the Left, even those Black Metal groups that stick to the Left-Hand Path (for instance, Polish Black Metal band Behemoth) do not necessarily correspond with the political Left, both classical and Cultural Marxism. Often quite the reverse is true, or they go beyond politics. This ambivalence is also visible on an aesthetic level: the “right-wing” symbols of the Empire, King, God, etc. are no less popular than the “left-wing” concepts of Homelessness, Void, Rebellion, and so on.

Benjamin Noys, who also addressed the issue of politics in the Black Metal movement, used as a case study the interview answers by Sale Famine of the French Black Metal band Peste Noire[4] which was not an accident. Famine, who believes that left-wing Black Meal is contradictio in adjecto, underlines the chthonic and, as a result, the nationalist character of Black Metal and glorifies “the dark European past,” declared the synthesis of both approaches in a very transparent manner:

Black Metal is the musical memory of our bloodthirsty ancestors of blood, it is the marriage of Tradition, of old racial patrimony with fanaticism, with the rage and the rashness of a youth now lost.” [5]

Likewise, Famine describes his nationalism as fundamentally twofold, “temporal” and “spiritual,” which correlates with being a citizen of France (“medieval,” “rural”) and of Hell (“Sieg Hell!”)[6]. Noys fairly draws a parallel between this focus on the chthonic aspect of Black Metal and the telluric grounding of Carl Schmitt’s Partisan. Finally, searching for the roots of this ambiguity in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy is also absolutely correct: the greatest European nihilist was simultaneously the greatest elitist, aristocrat, and traditionalist who looked ahead to the beginning of the new Golden Age. That is why Nietzsche referred to himself as “the first perfect Nihilist of Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself”[7], that is the first anti-nihilist as well.

In addition, Nietzsche was the greatest aesthete and stylist who erased the very distinction between form and content by making even the superficial details ideologically relevant and meaningful. The latter sheds light on the reasons why the expression “Black Metal Art” means something incomparably deeper than, for instance, “Black Metal Ideology” or “Black Metal Politics” and has the potential to reach a metaphysical level. At this point, an appeal to the Conservative Revolution—another complex cultural phenomenon that has much in common with Black Metal—becomes inevitable.

III. The Grand Invocation: the Conservative Revolution as an Act of Ushering the Gods Back into the World

Conservative Revolution and Black Metal are similar for at least two reasons. First, both have countercultural value. The only difference lies in the fact that what requires additional reconstruction in the context of Black Metal belongs to the explicit objectives of the conservative-revolutionary theory, which may be unequivocally derived from its name. Conservative Revolution was a broad ideocratic movement that evolved in Germany during the 20th century’s interwar period. It was also known under the name of the “Third Position” or the “Third Way” because it was impossible to classify it as ideologically Right or Left. Some of its principal players have already been mentioned: Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler, Edgar Julius Jung, Carl Schmitt, Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger, Julius Evola, Ernst Niekisch, Martin Heidegger, Armin Mohler, and others. The global aim of the conservative-revolutionary movement was formulated by Hugo von Hofmannsthal in 1927 as part of his legendary speech delivered to students in Munich. He argued that the Conservative Revolution is a phenomenon previously unknown in European history that strives to terminate not only the era of the Enlightenment, but also that of Renaissance and Reformation. In other words, its goal is to construct the New Middle Ages.

This necessity of revolting against the course of history was proclaimed in Julius Evola’s work Revolt Against the Modern World: Politics, Religion, and Social Order of the Kali Yuga (1934), which, to a great extent, was nothing but a radicalized and politicized version of the major text The Crisis of the Modern World written by René Guénon, the founder of integral traditionalism, in 1927. In the chapter called “The Doctrine of the Four Ages” of his work, Evola writes:

Although modern man until recently has viewed and celebrated the meaning of the history known to him as epitomizing progress and evolution, the truth as professed by traditional man is quite the opposite. In all ancient testimonies of traditional humanity it is possible to find, in various forms, the idea of a regression or a fall: from originally higher states beings have stooped to states increasingly conditioned by human, mortal, and contingent elements. This involutive process allegedly began in a very distant past; the term that best characterizes it is the Eddic term ragna-rokkr, “the twilight of the gods”… According to Tradition, the actual sense of history and the genesis of what I have labeled, generally speaking, as the “modern world,” results from a process of gradual decadence through four cycles or ‘generations.’[8]

In his later book Men Among the Ruins: Post-War Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist (1953), Evola defined Conservative Revolution as “the return to the starting point,” “to the source.” Naturally, in order to secure this grand historical coup, one has to rely on the means available in that very Modern world. This insight gave birth to the shortest formula of fascism “René Guénon Plus Tank Divisions,” which may be found in The Morning of the Magicians written by Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier in 1960. Indeed, back in 1921 Thomas Mann considered Conservative Revolution in his Russian Anthology as a political projection of Nietzscheism understood as a synthesis of “conservatism” and “revolution,” “freedom” and “bonds,” “faith” and “Enlightenment,” “God” and “the world” and compared it with the Russian messianic idea as two totally different phenomena united, although, by their common “religious nature, religious in a new vital sense that has a great future.”

Therefore, second distinctive feature of Black Metal and the Conservative Revolution comprises the fact that both movements are not only anti- and contra- but also meta-phenomena, which reject the narrow genre and political identities in favor of the higher goals. Conservative Revolution is always positioned as a metapolitical movement and, speaking in Ernst Jünger’s terms, as “the absolute revolution” that ruins tradition as form but thus realizes the sense of tradition. This is the so-called “metahistorical” and “dynamic” approach to Tradition written with a capital “T,” which was introduced by Julius Evola as an ability to sacrifice forms in the name of principles. Furthermore, another similarity between Black Metal and the Conservative Revolution is that both ideal types are portrayed as a special recognizable “style,” that is, ultimately as an aesthetic phenomenon.

The merger between the aesthetic and the political elements in the conservative-revolutionary movement, which was noted with displeasure by leftists who were always afraid of “irrationality,” Walter Benjamin, in particular, was undoubtedly carried out beyond decorative purposes in mind. It was aesthetics that was meant to be that magical key used to “re-enchant” the world and reintegrate the autonomous and disconnected fields of politics, science, religion, ethics and, again, aesthetics, which replaced the hierarchic medieval universe subordinate to one transcendental principle. However, conservative revolutionaries mostly spoke not of God but of gods in the plural; the generally acknowledged metaphor that signifies re-mythologization of the world is “the return of the gods” or “the return of the sacred,” which was especially anticipated by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jünger.

“Merely” waiting for re-sacralization of the world, however, is not a rule and corresponds only to the current phase of metaphysical transvaluation of all values. This phase was preceded by the active-nihilistic period of titanic domination, the reign of Prometheus, who symbolizes the elemental powers of technology. According to Ernst Jünger’s observation made in his essay “On Pain” (1934), we live in the time when the new orders have moved far ahead, but the new values have not become visible yet:

We conclude, then, that we find ourselves in a last and indeed quite remarkable phase of nihilism, characterized by the broad expansion of new social orders with corresponding values yet to be seen.[9]

This means that Übermenschals Sieger über Gott und das Nichts,” the Superman as a victor over God (the ruined old order) and Nothingness that replaced the latter, enters the final phase of the battle with Nothingness itself. At this stage, both Jünger and Evola developed the concepts of apoliteia, right-wing anarchism and the differentiated man that rejects the Modern world not out of nihilism, but because it does not meet the ideal of the new sacred order. Of course, this stage is temporary: Evola’s right-wing anarchist and Jünger’s Anarch are always ready to seize the opportunity to build a new Empire.
Structural similarities between Black Metal and the Conservative Revolution are also obvious. Armin Mohler, who published a monograph Conservative Revolution in Germany: 1918–1932 (1950), which started the tradition of academic investigation of the conservative-revolutionary movement, singled out five main directions within the latter, three of which became exemplary: Young Conservatives (Moeller van den Bruck, Edgar Jung, Oswald Spengler), National Revolutionaries (Ernst Jünger, Ernst Niekisch, Hans Freyer), and the völkische movement that made the greatest impact on National Socialism (the famous doctrine of “Blood and Soil”). Accordingly, Young Conservatives mostly developed the organic imperialist models; National Revolutionaries were on extremely good terms with the destructive forces of the industrial civilization, and the völkische resemble the contemporary Pagan Front.

In his profound examination of the conservative-revolutionary recollections in the Black Metal movement, Alex Kurtagic primarily emphasized völkisch ideas [10], which is justifiable. At the same time, I would say that the most representative of the Conservative Revolution was not the völkisch but rather the national-revolutionary movement. Its members, Ernst Jünger, in particular, elaborated on the main metaphysical sentiment of the Conservative Revolution, that is the unity of freedom and the necessity presupposed by the concept of German voluntarism, in the most detailed and accurate manner. This metaphysical standpoint corresponds with the Gnostic Anti-Cosmic trend in the Black Metal movement, which is also notable for strict dualism between one’s divine will and anything else (“Death against death”) and does not seek the sacred within the limits of this world. A well-known description of National Socialist metaphysics by Hendrik Möbus of the German NSBM group Absurd (“the most perfect synthesis of the Luciferian will to power, and neo-heathen principles and symbolism”) would also be relevant in this context, although he is more closely associated with the Pagan Front. Incidentally, his conversation with “Velesova Sloboda”[11] is the most interesting and professional discussion of the classic conservative-revolutionary topics by any Black Metal musician that I have ever read.

In conclusion, I would like to quote the words of Erik Danielsson of Watain about the revolutionary essence of true art and the necessity “to get deeper and deeper” while exploring the horizons of the genre:

If you want to do something groundbreaking in something as sinister as black metal—if you want to correspond with dark energies that exist beyond this world, you cannot have a mere interest in black metal. A passion for a music genre is not enough to change the course of musical history or the history of the world. To me, it’s not strange there aren’t more bands like us because individuals of that sort are very rare. If you have an extreme source of energy flowing inside yourself you either end up in prison, sharing a high place with a politician or you do what we do.[12]

It is difficult to disagree and overlook the parallels with the aspirations of the most devoted and bright members of the conservative-revolutionary movement. After all, Mohler’s academic research was nothing more than a way to gather the new extreme front in post-war Europe under an alternative name after discrediting the National Socialist project and any other movements dangerous for the system, including Black Metal in its purest manifestations. Is it surprising that one day the representatives of these metahistorical and countercultural directions will join their forces as the “contenders in the larger game”?[13]


  1. Ajna Offensive, Deathspell Omega Interview.  ↩
  2. Interview with Lutomysl at Orthodox Black Metal.  ↩
  3. Kevin Coogan, How Black is Black Metal?, Nachrichten Heute  ↩
  4. Benjamin Noys, “Remain True to the Earth!”: Remarks on the Politics of Black Metal, Hideous Gnosis: Black Metal Theory Symposium I; Edited by Nicola Masciandaro (Charleston: CreateSpace, 2010), p. 105–128.  ↩
  5. Nathan T. Birk, Interview with La Sale Famine of Peste Noire, Zero Tolerance  ↩
  6. Ibid.  ↩
  7. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power; Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale; Edited by W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 3.  ↩
  8. Julius Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World: Politics, Religion, and Social Order of the Kali Yuga; Translated from the Italian by Guido Stucco (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions International, 1995), p. 177.  ↩
  9. Ernst Jünger, On Pain (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2008), p. 46.  ↩
  10. Alex Kurtagic, “Black Metal: Conservative Revolution in Modern Popular Culture,” The Occidental Quarterly Online, republished at Counter-Currents.  ↩
  11. Hendrik M. (Absurd) im Gespräch mit der Redaktion von “Velesova Sloboda”  ↩
  12. Darren Cowan, Interview with Erik Danielsson of Watain at Blistering.com  ↩
  13. Ibid.  ↩
No Comments on When the Gods Hear the Call

The Old-Time Religion

Maybe that darkness will be lifted when Whites finally extricate themselves from decades of witless but safe obsessions like cheerleading for obscene wars, dancing to the demands of civil rights hustlers, acting as self-appointed watch-keepers over who is deemed a true “patriot,” presuming to be able to read the mind and intentions of God, and intruding into the birthing predilections of strangers

 

Elizabeth Wright (1937–2011) lived a life of self-imposed isolation and obscurity. For those who appreciate her writings, however, she is fondly remembered as one of the most remarkable conservative commentators of her generation. An African-American, and a libertarian and individualist, she nevertheless had a deep understanding of—and “tough love” for—Founding-stock Anglo-Americans. Her greatest insights were, indeed, those of an outsider—one who was out-of-step with the prevailing Zeitgeist and could thus view the White race (as well as her own) with critical objectivity.

For more than two decades, Elizabeth was Editor of Issues and Views, both in its newsletter and online manifestations. This article was originally published in September 2010 at Alternative Right, in response to Glenn Beck’s “Restore Honor” rally that had just been held on the Washington, DC, Mall. The piece is a critique of “Tea Party conservatism,” which was reaching its culmination at the time (and has since faded). But the essay bursts through this context by virtue of Elizabeth’s devastating insights into the psychology of White Americans. The “Tea Party” phenomenon, in her reading, was not simply a reaction to the 2008 stock-market crash or the election of Barack Obama; it was yet one more episode in an ongoing process, in which Europeans gleefully dispossess themselves through their participation in the reigning civic religion.

~Richard B. Spencer


Now that the dust has settled on that overhyped, fevered Glenn Beck rally, what have we learned? Is it clearer than ever that no sober knight will come riding in to bring the enlightenment that some of us thought the Tea Partiers might have offered? It appears that the expectations surrounding those initial enigmatic stirrings, which made one almost believe that the furor was about more than just anger over political issues, have been extinguished. Was it all just a momentary aberration?

As it turns out, White conservatives don’t want to take the lead in preserving what remains of this country’s now tenuous White, Anglo-Euro culture. To take on such a responsibility would make them even more vulnerable to the racial bullets and daggers they have been ducking for years.

If Beck’s rally taught us anything, it’s that nothing has changed in the White middle-class mindset and that fear of the “racist” label continues to rule as strongly as ever. We’ve now learned for certain that such Whites are determined never to put the name to their fear and anxiety. If anything, they are fighting all the harder to bury even deeper the visceral knowledge of what is going on in this country and the inevitable future that is on its way. Christopher Hitchens’s assessment of the August 28 mass meeting is correct, when he claims that Beck’s tepid event was “a call to sink to the knees rather than rise from them.”[1] (If Hitchens, of all people, gets it, who could miss it?)

Even as other groups gradually dispossess them in the country whose political system was constructed by their forebears, conservative Whites persist in their obstinate assertion that their apparent discontent is “not about race.” What hogwash. Of course it’s about race and culture. Why shouldn’t it be? No matter how assiduously they deny it, resentment is growing over the ever-looming fact that this country, due to swiftly altering demographics, will no longer be the product of those Founders. And reality informs us that the ruling law, that is, the Constitution (or what’s left of it), soon will be openly renounced by competing populations that never have had even the remotest historical connection to the notions set forth by those Englishmen.

No one has to look far abroad to see what is on the horizon. In their guts these conservatives know what’s coming, as their unnamed enemies pick up the pace in the drive to usurp political power. What were mere hints just two decades ago have grown into loud trumpet blasts. And along comes Glenn Beck who offers these perceptive, yet reluctant conservatives a way to feel better about things. According to his prescription, all they have to do is Believe and Pray.

After watching that half-baked celebration of Martin Luther King Jr., and the determined laundering of his well-documented leftist convictions, how could one not conclude, like Ross Douthat, that “Beck’s “Restoring Honor” was like an Obama rally through the looking glass,” that these conservatives wished to be “cosmopolitan and young-at-heart, multicultural and hip”?[2] Nobody wants to be known as “square,” whatever squareness entails at any given time. Remember how conservatives used to laugh at and rail at political correctness? Now, they’re the ones who don’t want to be depicted as “incorrect.”

My observations of these Whites lead me to agree with Paul Gottfried, who astutely argues, “Whites would desert the GOP in droves unless their party continues to make an effort to be PC.” And further, he claims, many Republicans would not vote for a party that was “not marching in lockstep with the media in expressing horror over America’s evil racist, sexist, and homophobic past.”[3]

Whites of all political stripes, no matter which political label they give themselves, have been sold on the unique wickedness of America’s past racism that surely had to be the most grievous sin ever committed by mankind. Hence, the Glenn Beck carnival of repentance.

Beck picked up on this peculiar self-flagellation, and his soap opera rally was customized to meet the needs of this constituency. It seems that the unconstitutional Brown v. Board of Education court decision, the deceptive Civil Rights Act, forced busing (which tore apart whole school districts around the country), a national holiday for a Black preacher, and endless, ever-evolving new perks and goodies to benefit Black elites, have not quite made the grade of cleansing those past sins.

And so, to prove that they possess no resentment over the decades of social strife that has plagued our society, in August, the good conservatives took to D.C., where they engaged in a ceremony to worship a 19th-century President, who could come up with no better solution to his nation’s problems than a war that brought about the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of his fellow countrymen, and a Black man who specialized in emotional oratory.

One has to wonder who these people are who will march on Washington to “restore” the country’s “honor,” as the rally’s theme boasted, yet are in the forefront of supporting some of the most dishonorable acts engaged in by their country’s interchangeable governments. Just what is special about the moral convictions of these advocates, who fervently sermonize on such issues as patriotism, war, family life, religion, the nature of government ad nauseam?

On the subject of race, as we’ve seen, conservatives are savvy on this score and have learned that one way to deflect the scurrilous charge of racism is to celebrate the icons and infinite memorabilia of the civil rights movement, while keeping a contingent of Black people on hand to be prominently displayed at public events. Who said these savvy Whites couldn’t be condescending?

On the other hand, Whites are given little choice in this matter since, at the mere hint of the formation of any kind of all-White entity, Black and liberal elites will come charging in. Even if such an organization is inadvertently all-White, it must first be accused of loathsome, racist motives, so that it can be monitored. No matter how benign the group’s objectives, if White men are its creators, then it must be put under surveillance and ultimately neutralized.

When the new group’s leaders relent, we find a quid pro quo in place—the intruding Blacks get the benefits of prominent positions and other perks, while the Whites now have cover from any other such intrusions and accusations. We saw this game successfully played against the Promise Keepers[4] and, now again, very blatantly applied to the Tea Parties.

The Whites who resent the blackmail flee, while the rest remain comfortably ensconced, adapting to the politically correct reality of the times. Whites, it would seem, must not be left to their own devices. Before taking back the country, is it possible that they will first take back the right to organize among themselves?

But don’t feel too sorry, too soon for these conservatives, who greatly influence the country’s political direction through the national leaders and ethos they inflict on our society.

Take a look at how they feel about big government that they rail against so vehemently. It’s fine as long as it’s out there doing what government should be doing—that means making war. War making, you see, in the mind of the conservative patriot, shows how tough we are. And although we’re not supposed to care what the rest of the world thinks of us, it’s imperative to earn the world’s fearful regard when it comes to our toughness. It matters not who rules in DC, or how many of our young soldiers needlessly die in worthless battles, as long as the message is sent abroad that we’re the biggest, baddest country on earth. We’re the USA! USA! USA!

Conservatives are dedicated to one of their favorite little war slogans, which is designed to justify why our troops are “over there.” When Pat Buchanan or Ron Paul comes along and reverses this little ditty, explaining that the terrorists are “over here” only because we’re “over there,” he gets drummed out of the corps, for “pacifism.” Woe to even the most faithful conservative, if he appears to diss the USA’s abominable wars of choice.
When Iran’s President Ahmadinejad is quoted making negative remarks about the leadership of the United States, primarily due to this country’s toadying relationship with Israel, that’s reason enough to urge the U.S. military to bomb and kill millions of innocent Iranians. Don’t say nasty things about the USA or its Middle East client state, OR WE’LL KILL YOU!

Is this the mentality that worried Founder John Jay, who did not see leaders as being trustworthy initiators of war? In The Federalist Papers, he claimed that some leaders will make war even “when their nations are to get nothing by it,” and spoke of leaders harboring motives such as “personal ambition, thirst for military glory and revenge for personal affronts.” Jay warned about a nation putting itself in situations that “invite hostility or insult,” that could lead to “pretended” causes of war. And he was not impressed by the superiority of so-called republics as opposed to monarchies, believing that republics were just as “addicted” to war as monarchies. “Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter?” he asked.

But what did he know? Obviously, not as much as our sanctimonious conservatives, who cheer as 19-year-olds are sent off to prove their mettle, while offering opportunities for these stay-at-home warriors to engage in “support the troops” grandstanding. For all their noisemaking about restoring the Constitution, it is easy to suspect that these impostors look upon the Founders and their document as quaint and outdated as do most liberals.

And who isn’t impressed with how well these conservatives have taught us about family and commitment? What outstanding models they have given us. At the moment they are apoplectic over maintaining marriage for opposite sexes only, yet these are the people whose foremost political philosopher, Newt Gingrich, just married his fourth wife, making a mockery of that institution. (Will the fifth be the charm?) By the way, this mountebank of “family values” was the fourth husband of his previous wife No. 3. (How many broken vows does that make?) Could homosexuals, who claim to be “married,” dilute the significance of marriage any more than this?

Chosen as Leader of the conservative camp by acclamation, this Talking Hero is looked upon as the fount of wisdom to those who seek to teach the rest of us how to think and behave.

These deluded crusaders, in striving to exonerate their other leader by acclamation, Sarah Palin, from the charge of irresponsible parenting, could only shrug and come up with a pithy, new catchphrase: “Life happens.” As if we didn’t know that. With the advent of Palin, American youth are once again blessed with yet another fine conservative role model.

And what about immigration? Can we really expect to see these conservatives carry through on their stances against illegal immigration? Don’t count on it. Is there any chance that today’s conservative reformers will take the next step in calling for a moratorium on all immigration, the “legal” kind as well? Is there among some of them, at least, a sense of urgency to stem the tide of endless, unchecked floods from abroad? But then again, is it likely that people who worship at the pedestal of Martin Luther King would understand the meaning of such terms as “cultural suicide” or “death of the West,” or care about the transformation that is taking place around them?

Libya’s late leader Muammar Gaddafi used to laugh at the foolish Europeans, who have encouraged the immigration of millions of Third World aliens, and offers Europe’s leaders a financial deal to keep more of the mob out of that continent, are American conservatives taking notes?

As literally tens of thousands of African refugees in boats try to reach Italy, the Libyan navy has been instrumental in keeping them out, thanks to an agreement with the Italian government. “We don’t know,” the bemused Gaddafi is quoted as saying, “if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent or if it will be destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions.” And then he comes right out and says it: your continent is turning into Africa.

Why should Europe turn into Africa? Why should Europeans want to live in a negrified Europe? Or an Arabized Europe? Why?

The good White conservatives in the U.S., although possessing an instinctive understanding of such questions, would be terrified to entertain such thoughts publicly, or even privately. Better to take one’s lead from the huckster Glenn Beck and play it safe, than to express the anxiety to which they dare not put words.

As one Dutchman observes, “This isn’t Holland anymore,” nor is it France or England or Germany. And soon it won’t be America anymore. In one country after another, clueless Europeans have already begun the process of dispossessing themselves via politics, as immigrants eagerly run for political office, thereby amassing power and influence over the native residents.

Is there something in Europe’s water that compels the Whites to submit to this updated form of conquest? Who are voting Black immigrants into political office in Sweden? The native Whites. Who just voted an African into office in Russia? The native Whites. At what point do Whites take responsibility for their ongoing demise or, as Paul Gottfried puts it, for going “soft in the head?”

It is true that, in order to achieve the quasi-religious goals at the heart of the multiculturalists’ vision for America, heavy doses of brainwashing have been perpetrated on the public via school systems and throughout the media. The major targets have been youth and, most especially, White youth, as they have had their opinions and beliefs pummeled in “multicultural workshops,” and “sensitivity training” sessions. No one can deny that this 30- to 40-year campaign of re- education has been successful.

A recent caller to a New York overnight radio show is almost a stereotype of the proud, de-racinated White man. The de-racinated Zero. He described growing up in Missouri, in the midst of what sounded like a predominantly Anglo population. Years later, when he visited New York City, he claims that this was his first encounter with assertively ethnic people. There he discovered Greek sections of town, Italian sections, Chinese, etc.
It seems that this did not rest well with him, since he was used to calling himself simply “American,” and could not comprehend any reason to expand his ethnic identification with a hyphen. The Zero Man always resents the use of hyphens. Not for him that Greek-American, Italian-American, Polish-American stuff. He’s just a plain, old “American,” disaffiliated from any specific cultural lineage and expecting everyone else to disaffiliate themselves as well.

This caller sounded as if he would be uncomfortable if described as an “Anglo-American” or “British-American.” Mr. Zero probably would be uncomfortable, but why should a Chinese-American attempt to erase his Chinese ancestry to accommodate the deracinated notion of what constitutes an “American?”

The Founders did not seem to think of themselves as Zeros, yet misleading hype continues the fiction that this country was formed in a vacuum by people who shared no heritage. If this were so, why did John Jay thank Providence for giving this country to “one united people,” who were “descended from the same ancestors?” Who establishes anything, that is expected to take root, with someone else’s progeny in mind?

Western countries are now being inundated with populations of foreigners who actively discourse on who they are, and they’re not going to let you forget it. As masses of Muslims bring their distinctive customs, laws and disciplines to Christian countries, and push the envelope to acquire even more privileges, Westerners are waking up to the folly of having thrown open their borders to an alien civilization. At one time, Europeans understood from past experience what was at stake, as they protected themselves, for centuries, from further encroachment by Muslims, and their American cousins instinctively understood that there were limits to “assimilation.”

But that was yesterday. Today, Muslims learned that, this time around, there was no need to attempt a siege of Paris with guns or swords. Instead, they are able to hold hostage entire streets in that city, while they perform their Friday prayers in public. It’s a sort of in-your-face dare to the foolish Frenchman. The authorities must defer to this illegal activity, or risk the kind of chaos for which Muslims in France are already well known. Not only will there be no banning of the burka, there will be no imposition of unwanted rules, as Muslims let the French government know just who’s boss.

“We have been in darkness for a long time,” intoned Glenn Beck the night before his big rally. “We have been standing in spiritual darkness for decades.” Yes, one could say that, but not for the reasons you cite, Mr. Beck.

Maybe that darkness will be lifted when Whites finally extricate themselves from decades of witless but safe obsessions like cheerleading for obscene wars, dancing to the demands of civil rights hustlers, acting as self-appointed watch-keepers over who is deemed a true “patriot,” presuming to be able to read the mind and intentions of God, and intruding into the birthing predilections of strangers.

At some point these misguided conservatives must turn their attention away from delusions and focus on the explicit needs of their own race, instead of fearing to deal with the unspeakable—that is, diminishing as a group into minority numbers—60 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent. It will certainly mean stepping into a more dangerous zone (and Whites do like to play it safe), but there’s not much time left to muster the courage, if they truly want to preserve (or, more accurately, rescue) the core of that which the Founders set out to establish.

If these Whites ever get their priorities straight, who knows what they might accomplish? Perhaps they might begin by ceasing to expend so much energy on admonishing others for opting not to have children and, instead, begin a crusade among their own people to raise the birth rates of Whites. Wouldn’t it be remarkable if there were a reversal of what now appears to be the inevitable?

Such an appeal to procreation could not be based on those ugly harangues about “sin” and “murder,” in which conservatives love to indulge, but on a sense of pride and a concern for the future custodianship of this country. Of course, White reproductive rates might never be able to outstrip those of the Muslims and other Third Worlders, but a sound, restrictive immigration policy would go a long way towards evening up the demographics. If they fail to turn their focus to such realities, just who do these conservatives think are most likely to work at preserving the foundational institutions of the country they supposedly yearn to “take back?”

At his rally, Beck told over a quarter of a million hopeful Whites that the emergence of the Tea Parties and similar entities of discontented citizens is evidence of “the beginning of the Great Awakening in America.” Would that were so.


  1. Christopher Hitchens, “White Fright: Glenn Beck’s rally was large, vague, moist, and undirected—the Waterworld of white self-pity.” Slate, 30 August, 2010. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2010/08/white_fright.html (accessed May 1, 2012).  ↩
  2. Ross Douthat, “Mr. Beck Goes to Washington,” New York Times, 29 August 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/opinion/30douthat. html?_r=1 (accessed May 1, 2012).  ↩
  3. Paul Gottfried, “Outreach to Nowhere,” AlternativeRight.com, 28 August, 2010; http://www.alternativeright.com/main/blogs/district-of- corruption/the-outreach-to-nowhere/ (accessed May 1, 2012).  ↩
  4. The Promise Keepers, a not-for-profit charity, was founded in 1990 by a former Head Football Coach of the University of Colorado, Bill McCartney. His goal was to host mass, all-male religious revivals in football stadiums across America. Much like the Tea Party movement, the Promise Keepers were criticized by feminists as an organization of (overwhelmingly) White men meeting as men. Much like the Tea Party, the Promise Keepers had a vague agenda and fell over themselves denouncing racism and pursuing, in McCartney’s words, “racial reconciliation.”  ↩
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On the Bridge Between Two Interesting Years

“What we will likely see in 2014 will be an even more complete alignment of the mainstream Right on the Left, which will leave a bigger and bigger space for us.”

2013 In Retrospect, And My Predictions For 2014

All clichés aside, the world has become too unstable to make precise predictions for a whole year. Looking back at the one that has just finished, it seems that at any point of it, it was close to impossible to foresee what would happen a month or sometimes even a week from then.

Not only because history is, by essence, the realm of the unexpected— Edward Snowden’s confessions were sudden and unforeseen, but they nevertheless strongly affected the relations between the United States, its European satrapies, and the other world’s powers, chiefly Russia and China.

But even for phenomena that had begun much before, 2013 has been full of surprises. Take Syria. Western chancellories had been pushing since 2011 for a war on Damascus’s legitimate government, and 2013 looked like the “right time” for yet another war in the Middle East.

Bashar al Assad was promised to a fate similar to those of Saddam or Gaddafi, but Syria’s strongest ally, Moscow, managed to overturn the moral advantage in favour of the opponents of a war. The official —Western — narrative was that a brutal, oppressive Syrian military junta was massacring innocent “freedom fighters” by the thousands along with their wives and children. The truth — that if there had to be a “good side,” it was al Assad’s government and not the cannibal, Christian-slaughtering terrorists fighting on behalf of foreign governments — played a role in Putin’s moral victory against the pro-war coalition.

By the time when Putin published his decisive letter in the New York Times, the knowledge of the atrocities committed by the so-called “Free Syrian Army” was too widespread in the West for Western governments to gain wide enough support for a new Near Eastern entanglement. In that propagation of the truth, the Internet’s role was important, though not predominant.

Still, what a difference it made with much more evident manipulations that have occurred since the end of the Second World War. While the Western media and political elite were praising Mao when he died in 1976, those in the West who were questioning the official narrative were inevitably depicted as “conspiracy theorists.” Though the mainstream media keeps being dominant, its hegemony has begun eroding somehow.

Which brings me to the rough predictions I would like to make for 2014. If political repression against dissidents — even benign ones — is an indication, we will likely witness a worsening of the situation in the West. 2013 was an instructive year in that respect. In America, two important political purges occurred on the mainstream Right. Jason Richwine’s firing from the Heritage Foundation for daring to discuss the cognitive level of Hispanic immigrants to the United States proved to those who were still deluded about the Republican establishment that “Conservatism” will be of no help against the subversion operated by the egalitarian Left.

Jack Hunter’s resignation and vain apology after a media campaign revealing his “racist” past also proved that “Libertarianism” will, likewise, align itself with the Left on the selective “freedoms” it advocates: issues like gay marriage, cannabis legalization, mass abortion and euthanasia will be fine, but the disturbing questions raised by Murray Rothbard on the banking system or Hans-Hermann Hoppe on state-enforced third-world immigration and integration will somehow remain unanswered. For good.

As grim as these developments are, they offer an opportunity to our movement. The utter inability of mainstream “conservatism” to challenge the liberal Left’s intellectual and cultural domination means that increasingly, the only force standing in the way of the egalitarians will be us, and only us. Hence the growing interest of the mass media for White nationalism and traditionalism, as was illustrated last year by MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow’s report on the National Policy Institute and Richard Spencer.

What we will likely see in 2014 will be an even more complete alignment of the mainstream Right on the Left, which will leave a bigger and bigger space for us. As I had noted in an article entitled “Rearguard Action and Vanguard Politics” last year, which was dealing with the anti-gay marriage demonstrations in France, these obviously history-losing events led to the creation of more radical movements, especially since the more mainstream personalities dropped out as soon as they were attacked. Eventually, only the more radical were standing.

Here at RadixJournal.com, we’ll ensure that those right-wingers who have become uninterested in tepid publications like the National Review will find a new voice, eager to really deal with the issues of our age.

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Remaking the Right

Norman Podhoretz is something of an anomaly. His entire life has been centered around his Jewishness, but he sees himself as an outsider in the mainstream Jewish community. He shares a great many of the attitudes typical of that community, but draws different conclusions about how to navigate the contemporary American political landscape in a way that is “good for the Jews.”

Under Discussion: Why Are Jews Liberals? By Norman Podhoretz. Doubleday (2009), 337 pages.

Norman Podhoretz is something of an anomaly. His entire life has been centered around his Jewishness, but he sees himself as an outsider in the mainstream Jewish community. He shares a great many of the attitudes typical of that community, but draws different conclusions about how to navigate the contemporary American political landscape in a way that’s “good for the Jews.”

One area where Podhoretz is absolutely mainstream among American Jews is his sense of history. The first half of his recent book, Why Are Jews Liberal? lays out his version of the “lachrymose” theory of Jewish history in Europe and America in which the Diaspora has been one long vale of tears since the beginnings of Christianity. Whether or not this view of history is correct, the important point is that this is how the great majority of Diaspora Jews see themselves and their history. (My view is that many outbreaks of anti-Jewish feelings result from our evolved ingroup/outgroup psychology.)

This lachrymose view has major implications for understanding contemporary Jewish political behavior in the Diaspora. It proposes that, beginning with an unfortunate theological belief (that Jews killed God), Jews have been passive, innocent victims of marauding non-Jews. The lesson that Jews learned from the Middle Ages carries down to today:

[The Jews] emerged from the Middle Ages knowing for a certainty that—individual exceptions duly noted—the worst enemy they had in the world was Christianity: the churches in which it was embodied—whether Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox or Protestant—and the people who prayed in and were shaped by them. It was a knowledge that Jewish experience in the ages to come would do very little, if indeed anything at all, to help future generations to forget.

Jews were thus wary and mistrustful (at the very least) of all manifestations of Christianity. But the demise of Christianity as the central intellectual paradigm of Europe didn’t improve things for Jews. During the Enlightenment, anti-Jewish ideologies smoothly morphed into non-theological views in which Judaism was a superstitious relic that prevented Jews from shedding their attachment to their people—in Podhoretz’s words, “giving up their sense of themselves as a people whose members were bound together across national boundaries wherever they might live.”

The Enlightenment implied that Jews should accept the atomized individualism implied by the modern nation state. As Count Clermont-Tonnere expressed it in addressing the French National Assembly in 1789, “The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals… . The existence of a nation within a nation is unacceptable to our country.”

In the 19th century, Jews began to be seen by their enemies as an economically successful alien race intent on subverting national cultures wherever they lived. Podhoretz is squarely within the Jewish intellectual mainstream in his attack on the idea that Jews and non-Jews are biologically different and in competition—“the new racist rationale [that] manifested itself in the portrayal of a war between Aryans and Semites as the central drama of history.” For example, Ivan Aksakov, a leader of Slavophiles in Russia, viewed Jews as a competitive threat intent on destroying Christianity:

The Western European Christian world will be faced in the future, in one form or another, with a life-and-death struggle with Jewry, which is striving to replace the universal Christian ideal by another, Semitic ideal, also universal, but negative and anti-Christian.

Even in the United States—the “golden land” as seen by Jewish immigrants—there was exclusion and antipathy from “the upper echelons of the WASP patriciate.” In America, Jews were excluded by WASP elites, and Christian forms of anti-Semitism (e.g., Father Coughlin) remained strong through the 1930s. Isolationists such as Charles Lindbergh also tended to see Jews as an interest group aiming at getting America involved in war with Germany. (Podhoretz refers to Lindbergh’s famous speech as “notorious.”)

Jews concluded, as they had ever since the political Left and Right came to be defined, that their enemies were on the right. But the main lesson Podhoretz draws is that over the centuries, Western intellectuals produced a variety of Christian and non-Christian anti-Jewish ideologies, each with the same result: Irrational hatred toward Jews. So it’s not just Christianity, but European civilization itself that is the problem for Jews.

And, although Podhoretz doesn’t explicitly make this move, it’s a very short jump from blaming the culture created and sustained by Europeans to the idea that Europeans as a people or group of peoples are the problem. Ultimately, this implicit sense that Europeans themselves are the problem is the crux of the issue.

Podhoretz generally underplays the reality that Jews tended to make alliances with elites wherever they lived. The main exception to this is an important one: The situation of Jews in Russia from around 1880 to the Bolshevik Revolution. But even here, Podhoretz fails to note that most Jews were better off than most Russians, and he fails to acknowledge legitimate, often-stated concerns by the authorities to protect the Russian farmers from Jewish domination of the rural economy and to protect the nascent Russian middle classes from Jewish competition. Most importantly, he fails to discuss the very large rate of natural increase among fundamentalist Jews in Eastern Europe in a situation where they had overshot their traditional economic niches. The result was widespread poverty among Jews and attraction to messianic ideologies of Zionism and, most importantly for the history of the West, Marxism.

As Podhoretz notes, Jews, even when wealthy and powerful, had always been attracted to the Left much more than their non-Jewish counterparts. But the result of this Jewish population explosion and widespread Jewish poverty in Eastern Europe was that the tradition of Jewish opposition to national cultures—well known and commented on at least by the latter part of the 19th century—was now embedded in an ideology of Marxist revolution—often combined with Zionism. Podhoretz’s background places him firmly within these two most important strands of 20th-century Jewish intellectual life.

These Marxist radicals emigrated in droves to the United States and other Western countries. In a few short decades, this politically radical Jewish sub-culture became not only the dominant political culture among American Jews, it became a major force on the intellectual and political left generally. In this Jewish subculture, being merely a socialist was considered “right wing.” The very strong Jewish identity of these Jewish leftists—Podhoretz among them—reminds us once again that a strong Jewish identity is and was entirely compatible with an ideology of Marxist universalism.

Podhoretz grew up in this mindset and, by his account, he remained a radical until the late 1960s. His central intellectual question is why Jews remained on the left despite what he sees as changes in what’s good for the Jews.

Podhoretz sees being on the left as good for the Jews for most of their history in America. In the early 20th century, the enemies of Jews were the “conservative upholders of the old order”—WASPs who prattled on about the importance of retaining ethnic homogeneity during the era of WASP ethnic defense that culminated in the 1924 immigration law. F. Prescott Hall, founder of the Immigration Restriction League, wrote, ”It must be remembered … that … our institutions were established by a homogeneous community, consisting of the best elements of population selected under the circumstances under which they came to the New World.“ And some of the enemies of the Jews were concerned with Jewish competition—“the Hebrew conquest of New York,” as Henry James phrased it.

Is the Left good for the Jews?

In presenting the case that circumstances have changed so that it is now irrational for Jews to be liberals, Podhoretz has one or two paragraphs on the idea that affirmative action is bad for Jews (not likely), the role of the Left in quelling debate on IQ other issues related to diversity on college campuses, and on alleged anti-Semitism by radical Blacks during the 1960s. Then he devotes 160 pages on the relative failure of the Democratic Party, and the Left generally, to protect the interests of Israel. It’s not hard to fathom what his real concerns are.

But despite his labors, the case is unconvincing.

Podhoretz certainly doesn’t have any difficulty finding anti-Israel attitudes on the left. For example, he devotes an entire chapter to Gore Vidal’s “The Empire Lovers Strike Back“ article that appeared in The Nation in 1986 – “The most blatantly anti-Semitic outburst to have appeared in a respectable American periodical since World War II.” Vidal’s article included this quote discussing Podhoretz and his wife, Midge Decter: “Although there is nothing wrong with being a lobbyist for a foreign power, one is supposed to register with the Justice Department.”

But whereas there was “complete silence from the left” regarding Vidal’s indiscretion, William F. Buckley is praised for not only condemning Vidal but also for expelling Joe Sobran from National Review.

The problem for Podhoretz is that there are also anti-Israel views on the right. Indeed, Podhoretz goes to great lengths to show that Buckley and National Review didn’t do enough to condemn Pat Buchanan for his “Amen Corner” column and his culture war speech at the 1992 Republican Convention. And because of failure to condemn Buchanan, there was “great damage to the prospect of a significant move by Jewish voters in a more conservative direction.”

So how are Jews to choose between the anti-Israel voices on the left and those on the right? One consideration is that, although there are anti-Israel voices on the left (Podhoretz would label them ‘anti-Semitic’), with the exception of Jimmy Carter’s activities after his presidency, he doesn’t provide any examples from within the Democratic Party (which, after all, is by far the most important institutional embodiment of the Left in the U.S.) Does the fact that Carter allowed certain anti-Israel resolutions to go un-vetoed at the UN and that since his presidency, Podhoretz sees him as “openly and virulently hostile to Israel” constitute reasons why Jews should not support the Democrats today? Indeed, Carter was prevented from speaking at the 2008 Democratic convention by Jewish activists, notably Alan Dershowitz.

What about Bill Clinton? Podhoretz notes that Clinton helped himself by tapping the “strongly pro-Israel” Al Gore (also a Democrat!) as vice-president, but then showed his true colors by appointing Warren Christopher as Secretary of State and Anthony Lake as National Security Advisor. (Both committed the sin of favoring withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.) Podhoretz doesn’t seem to think it relevant that in fact Israel was never under serious pressure to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza during the Clinton years.

Although tough talk on settlement expansion characterized the early Obama administration, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has “dramatically changed her tone,” praising an offer of Israeli “restraint” on settlement expansion, whatever that means. Now we learn that Mahmoud Abbas has withdrawn his candidacy for president of the Palestinian Authority because he feels betrayed by the Obama administration.

Recently Congress approved by a lopsided margin a resolution calling on the Obama administration to “oppose unequivocally any endorsement or further consideration of the ‘Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ [i.e., the Goldstone Report, a scathing indictment of Israeli actions during the Gaza invasion of 2008–2009] in multilateral fora.” Democrats voted for it by a margin of 179 yea to 33 nay, while Republicans voted for it by a margin of 165 yea to 3 nay votes.

Podhoretz is correct that Republicans in Congress are more likely to be slaves to the Israel Lobby—for reasons to be discussed below. But in any case, there are certainly no signs of a groundswell of anti-Israel sentiment among the Democrats.

On the other hand, examples of anti-Jewish or anti-Israel attitudes on the right are quite close to the Republican Party. Exhibit A is Buchanan himself.  And then there’s George H. W. Bush and his “I’m just one lonely little guy” up against “something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill”—said in the context of attempting to get Israel to freeze settlement activity by delaying a housing loan guarantee to Israel. And then there’s Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker who is widely reported to have said, ”Fuck the Jews, they don’t vote for us anyway.”

Podhoretz bends over backwards trying to reassure Jews about anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes on the right. For example, he gets into his legal-brief mode when trying to exonerate Pat Robertson on charges of anti-Semitism because of “certain crackpot ideas originating in the eighteenth century about a conspiracy between Jewish bankers and Freemasons to take over the world.” One would think that such ideas would make Robertson completely anathema to Jews. But for Podhoretz, Robertson is okay because of his “unwavering support of Israel.”

Indeed, Podhoretz is willing to forgive pretty much anything if its accompanied by pro-Israel attitudes. In the same passage, he forgives Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn his views on the role of Jewish revolutionaries in bringing communism to Russia for the same reason. (To Podhoretz’s credit, he even acknowledges, “Solzhenitsyn’s ideas about Jewish revolutionaries were based on an uncomfortable historical reality.”)

Oddly, Podhoretz fails to mention Robertson’s claim that “the part that Jewish intellectuals and media activists have played in the assault on Christianity may very possibly prove to be a grave mistake… .

For centuries, Christians have supported Jews in their dream of a national homeland. But American Jews invested great energy in attacking these very allies. That investment may pay a terrible dividend.
In a 1995 Commentary article, Podhoretz defended Robertson even on this, noting that in fact Jewish intellectuals, Jewish organizations like the American Jewish Congress, and Jewish-dominated organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union have ridiculed Christian religious beliefs, attempted to undermine the public strength of Christianity, or have led the fight for unrestricted pornography. I couldn’t agree more.

Oddly, Podhoretz makes no mention of his defense of Robertson on these issues in the book under review – perhaps because he realizes that this is a bridge too far for the vast majority of Jews. However, he does note, “If you scratch a liberal organization like the American Civil Liberties Union or the United Nations Association, you will find Jewish members and Jewish money sustaining it, and if you scratch a Jewish organization, you will find a liberal agenda.” Jews also contribute 50–60 percent of the funding for the Democratic Party.

Without question, Jews fund the left in America.

One wonders if Podhoretz would take such a principled stand on other conservative issues like affirmative action, immigration, or big government – not caring about ideas deemed by some to be anti-Jewish (e.g., “the Jews control Hollywood”) as long as one opposes affirmative action or massive non-White immigration.
The answer would be no.

The good news is that someone like me could be rehabilitated within the Jewish community even though I do believe in the uncomfortable historical reality that Jews control Hollywood and that this influences the content of movies by, among other things, denigrating Christianity. All I would have to do is come out as rabidly pro-Israel.
Ummm, sorry, but I can’t go there. Different countries have different interests—a simple fact that escapes an unregistered lobbyist of a foreign government such as Podhoretz.

Grand New Party

I conclude that Jews reading Podhoretz are unlikely to be convinced that they are better off with the Republicans or by becoming conservatives. Podhoretz is correct that the Republicans are a tad more likely to be slavishly pro-Israel. But he completely ignores another uncomfortable historical reality – that neoconservative Jews have been very active in purging true conservatives like Buchanan from mainstream Republican politics and that the neocons have remade the Republican Party in their own image. Indeed, as he phrases it (without evaluating the evidence one way or the other), paleocons believe that neocons like Podhoretz are “liberals in disguise who … succeeded in kidnapping and corrupting the conservative movement.”

This brings us to the heart of the issue. Podhoretz’s enterprise is fundamentally a fraud.
His issue is not whether American Jews could ever stop being liberal. His issue is whether they could bring themselves to vote for the Republican Party if the Republican Party was better for Israel. It has nothing to do with liberalism or conservatism, Big Government or Constitutionalism.

And the best proof of this is that Jewish neoconservatives – by far the most important group of Jews who (at times) advocate voting for the Republicans – are not really conservatives at all. Their one and only concern has always been to steer U.S. foreign policy in the direction of Israel. They have consistently advocated liberal positions within the Republican Party and have only adopted conservative positions as “positions of convenience” designed not to imperil their larger pro-Israel agenda. The fact that the overwhelming bulk of Podhoretz’s book deals with support for Israel rather than any specifically liberal or conservative issue confirms this.

Exhibit A for this is immigration. Jewish neoconservatives have been staunch supporters of the most destructive force associated with the left since WWII – massive non-European immigration into America and other Western countries. As neoconservative Ben Wattenberg has famously written, “The non-Europeanization of America is heartening news of an almost transcendental quality.” Such attitudes typify the entire Jewish political spectrum, from the far Left to the neoconservative Right.
And when it comes to opposing illegal immigration, the neocons jumped on the bandwagon only after it became politically expedient to do so. Bill Kristol, whose comments in the Commentary symposium on Podhoretz’s book indicate that he doesn’t want to think too deeply about why Jews are on the left (my paraphrase: “Just keep on being Jewish and things will take care of themselves”), is a good example of a neocon who navigates Republican politics to achieve his more basic goal of supporting Israel. As John O’Sullivan noted regarding Kristol’s activism on an amnesty bill,

Kristol, representing many neoconservatives disposed to favor the bill, came out against it. He did so in part because it had serious drafting defects but, more importantly, because it was creating a bitter gulf between rank-and-file Republicans and the party leadership. That in turn was imperiling Republican objectives in other areas, notably Iraq.

Peter Brimelow says it best:

Kristol will return to immigration enthusiasm once he has helped persuade Bush to attack Iran.

In a passage that should be required reading for all Republicans, Samuel Francis recounted,

[T]he catalog of neoconservative efforts not merely to debate, criticize, and refute the ideas of traditional conservatism but to denounce, vilify, and harm the careers of those Old Right figures and institutions they have targeted.
There are countless stories of how neoconservatives have succeeded in entering conservative institutions, forcing out or demoting traditional conservatives, and changing the positions and philosophy of such institutions in neoconservative directions…. Writers like M. E. Bradford, Joseph Sobran, Pat Buchanan, and Russell Kirk, and institutions like Chronicles, the Rockford Institute, the Philadelphia Society, and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute have been among the most respected and distinguished names in American conservatism. The dedication of their neoconservative enemies to driving them out of the movement they have taken over and demonizing them as marginal and dangerous figures has no legitimate basis in reality. It is clear evidence of the ulterior aspirations of those behind neoconservatism to dominate and subvert American conservatism from its original purposes and agenda and turn it to other purposes…
What neoconservatives really dislike about their “allies” among traditional conservatives is simply the fact that the conservatives are conservatives at all—that they support “this notion of a Christian civilization,” as Midge Decter put it, that they oppose mass immigration, that they criticize Martin Luther King and reject the racial dispossession of White Western culture, that they support or approve of Joe McCarthy, that they entertain doubts or strong disagreement over American foreign policy in the Middle East, that they oppose reckless involvement in foreign wars and foreign entanglements, and that, in company with the Founding Fathers of the United States, they reject the concept of a pure democracy and the belief that the United States is or should evolve toward it.

So Podhoretz is exhorting Jews to defect from liberalism while his wife is deploring “this notion of a Christian civilization.” With conservatives like this, who needs liberals?[1]

In Commentary’s symposium on Norman Podhoretz’s Why Are Jews Liberal? historian Jonathan D. Sarna calls attention to the fact that “outside the United States liberalism is nowhere near so dominant a faith among Jews. In Israel, to take an obvious example, Jewish liberals and Jewish conservatives are fairly evenly matched.”

Actually, Israelis who might remotely be described as liberal are a distinct minority—the old Labor Party founded by Zionist socialists is on its last legs, accounting for only around 10 percent of the Knesset and functioning mainly to provide a fig leaf of respectability for the dominant ethno-nationalist Right.

Identification with the Left is not a general characteristic of Jews; it is, however, a definite phenomenon within countries in the Jewish Diaspora, indicating that in searching for an explanation of the attraction of American Jews to the left, one must also look to this Diaspora experience in Europe and other European-derived societies.

Thankfully, Podhoretz does not try to explain the Jewish attraction to the Left as resulting from a moral imperative stemming from the very nature of Judaism itself.

Such a self-conception remains strong among many Jewish liberals, including Deborah Lipstadt, who opines, “The Torah repeatedly instructs us to care for the ‘widow, the orphan, poor, and the stranger.’” Jewish advocates for non-White immigration sometimes use this rationale—Gideon Aronoff’s Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, for example:

Drawing strongly on Jewish tradition, we provide services to Jewish immigrants, refugees, and others in need—without regard for their religion, nationality, or ethnic background. We are guided by our Jewish values and texts. The Torah (Hebrew Bible) tells us 36 times in 36 different ways to help the stranger among us. This, and our core belief that we must “fix the world” (tikkun olam, in Hebrew), are the driving principles behind our work.

But the idea that the Jewish religion makes Jews into altruistic world-healers is an obvious non-starter, and not only because, as Podhoretz notes, the highly religious Orthodox are less prone to liberal attitudes than the rest of the Jewish community. More decisively, even the most out of touch among us are now becoming aware that Israel is an apartheid state dominated by the most extreme religious and ethnocentric factions of the Jewish community. The Palestinians are treated brutally and are dependent on the largesse from the rest of the world.

The morally uplifting Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and pretty much the entire organized Jewish community in the U.S., aid and abet Israel as an aggressive, racialist ethno-state, or at least they turn a blind eye to it. Whatever else one might say about it, the Jewish religion does not make Jews into moral paragons or champions of the oppressed. And it certainly doesn’t make Jews into champions of religious and ethnic diversity.
Podhoretz’s explanation is that liberalism has become the religion of American Jews—an irrational set of beliefs resistant to disconfirmation. As he notes, the same was true of the long Jewish love affair with Marxism, and it was certainly true of Jews in traditional societies.

Liberalism is not a “substitute for religion”: it is a religion in its own right, complete with its own catechism and its own dogmas … obdurately resistant to facts that undermine its claims and promises.

The idea that Jewish political ideologies and behavior have religious overtones is attractive. My book Separation and Its Discontents has two chapters on rationalization, apologetics, and self-deception among Jews, beginning with a quote from a famous Talmudic scholar describing the ideology behind an example of classic Jewish religious writing: “Things never are what they seem because they cannot be.” In traditional societies, Jewish scholars interpreted any and all historical events as conforming to the messianic hope of a return to political power and worldly riches in a restored Israel.

All religious thinking tends to be impossible to refute, while at the same time it promises to explain everything. The interesting thing about Jews, however, is that they have dominated several intellectual movements that masqueraded as “science” while nevertheless having strong religious overtones.

Podhoretz is quite correct that the powerful Jewish attraction to Marxism was fundamentally religious in this sense. I have made similar comments, not only about Jewish involvement in Marxism, but also in psychoanalysis and other movements of the intellectual left. These movements were centered around charismatic rabbi-like leaders, and they were constructed in a way that allowed them to explain everything and be impossible to disconfirm. As in all religions, dissenters (heretics) were simply expelled.

Therefore, I have no problem agreeing with Podhoretz that there is a strong streak of religious thinking among Jews—even among the “secular.” In my view, religious thinking has been highly adaptive throughout Jewish history because it resulted in a powerful ideology of the ingroup. No matter what happened, the fundamental rationale for group cohesion would not be threatened. Whether in synagogues during the Middle Ages, in Marxist cells in the 20th century, or at conventions of psychoanalytic societies, true believers make good group members. Nothing can cause them to waver in their allegiance to the group.

But the fact that Jewish identification has always had religious overtones—even among secular Jews in the 20th century—does not explain why Jews in the Western Diaspora are liberal—only that their belief systems are immune from conflict with empirical reality.

Moreover, contra Podhoretz, liberalism seems awfully compatible with Jewish self-interest. In America, both the Democratic and Republican parties are Israeli occupied territory. So it’s hard to see that Jews are being “irrational,” as Podhoretz claims, in not voting for Republicans. For rational Jews concerned only about Israel, it’s pretty much a toss-up.

The clincher is that, as Podhoretz himself notes, citing an academic study, Jews “back Republicans only so long as they adopted the liberal position on ’such bellwether issues … as immigration, abortion, gay rights and the separation of church and state.”

In other words, Jews have been opposed to the traditional culture of America and the West and are strong advocates for the displacement of Whites via immigration.

In attempting to understand this, a good place to start is John Murray Cuddihy’s classic, The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle With Modernity:

With the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumble and the shtetlach begin to dissolve, Jewry – like some wide-eyed anthropologist – enters upon a strange world, to explore a strange people observing a strange halakah. They examine this world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and the vindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continue unabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our own time.

In psychological terms, Jewish identity in the Diaspora is based on psychological mechanisms of between-group competition. A strong sense of Jewish identity has always been accompanied by negative attitudes toward non-Jews—ranging from the laws of cleanness in traditional Judaism (according to which anything associated with non-Jews was unclean) to the revolutionary hatred of the non-Jewish power structure by Jewish Marxists, to the adoption of values in opposition to the traditional culture of America and the West. These negative perceptions are exacerbated by the lachrymose theory of Jewish history accepted by Podhoretz and the mainstream Jewish community: It is not simply that Christianity is evil, but that Western culture itself is poisonous to Jews.

The implication therefore is that Jews will be much more likely than non-Jews to have negative attitudes toward the traditional culture of America and the West. Importantly, Jewish voters are liberal on all issues, from government power to welfare. But as Podhoretz notes, it is especially on social issues where Jewish liberalism becomes “unmistakable and undeniable.” A 1996 poll of Jewish attitudes indicated that

Jews are firmly committed to permissive social codes, sexual codes in particular. The gap between Jews and others in polls regarding non-marital sexual behavior, marijuana, and divorce laws is quite substantial: 58 percent of Jews had liberal responses on these items as opposed to just 31 percent of non-Jews. In like fashion, huge gaps separate Jews from others on abortion (86 percent vs. 44 percent) and control of pornography (71 percent vs. 45 percent).

There are similar differences even when controlling for socio-economic class. Not surprisingly, support for gay marriage and for Roman Polanski are good career moves in Hollywood.  Moreover, Jews are dead last among all American groups in “confidence in the military,” but they favor gun control laws more than any other American group. And Jewish antipathy to the culture of America and other Western Diaspora societies extends to hostility against the formerly dominant White Protestant elite. Podhoretz quotes sociologists Mark Lipsett and Earl Raab, noting that Jews “are more at ease with the kinds of people they find in the Democratic Party – their fellow ethnics with whom they grew up in America – than with the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants still predominant in the Republican Party.”

So it’s not just Christianity that keeps Jews away from social conservatism. Latino Catholics, Black Southern Baptists, and Asian Christians are much preferred to the formerly dominant WASPs, who represent the traditional American culture and erstwhile ruling class. It’s not really about religion but ethnicity and race.

Nevertheless, it is indeed the case that White Christians are an object of special Jewish hostility. In the Commentary symposium, Michael Medved describes Jewish atavistic phobia about Christianity as the religion of the outgroup: “Jews fear the GOP as the ‘Christian party.’” And Jewish hostility towards Christianity unites the most Orthodox and conservative Jews with the most secular and liberal.

It is the hostility of the outsider against the culture of the White majority. As a result, expressions of hostility toward Christianity have a special place of pride in the contemporary culture of the West. A good recent example is Larry David pissing on a picture of Jesus in HBO’s Curb Your Enthusiasm—an event which evoked yawns from the rest of the media.

The Moral Status of the Outsider

This status of being an outsider with deep historical grudges has grave moral implications. As Benjamin Ginsberg notes, the social marginality of Eastern European Jews made them useful instruments for the imposition of Soviet rule over reluctant populations, not only in the first genocidal decades after the Bolshevik Revolution when they acted as Stalin’s “willing executioners,” but also during the post-WWII period in the USSR’s satellite states (Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania). Throughout Eastern Europe after WWII, because Jews were outsiders and dependent upon Soviet power for their positions and even personal safety, they could be trusted to remain loyal to the Soviet Union.

This has been a pattern throughout Jewish history. Jews as outsiders in traditional societies allied themselves with elites – often oppressive alien ruling elites engaged in exploiting the people under their control. In the Commentary symposium, Sarna gives a rather tepid version of this, quoting historian Ben Halpern, “They depended for their lives on the authorities, on the persons and groups who exercised legitimate power.” Quite correct. Jews were protected by the government, but their outsider status also made them more willing to engage in unpopular activities, such as collecting taxes for rapacious elites with no allegiance to the people they ruled.

The self-conceptualization of Jews as outsiders certainly should not make the European-descended population of America confident about the Jewish role in future governments when they are a minority.

However, the Jews-as-outsider theory does not adequately get at the role of Jews as a nascent elite displacing previously dominant non-Jewish elites. The Jewish identification with the left should also be seen as a strategy designed to increase Jewish power as an elite hostile to the White European majority of America. As I have argued, Jewish intellectual and political movements have been a critically necessary condition for the decline of White America during a period in which Jews have attained elite status.

All of these movements have been aligned with the political left. As Democrats, Jews are an integral part of the emerging non-White coalition while being able to retain their core ethnic commitment to Israel. Indeed, the organized Jewish community has not only been the most important force in ending the European bias of American immigration laws, it has assiduously courted alliances with non-White ethnic groups, including Blacks, Latinos, and Asians; and these groups are overwhelmingly aligned with the Democratic Party.

Whereas the Democratic Party is becoming increasingly non-White (the last Democratic president to get a majority of the White vote was Lyndon Johnson in 1964), 90 percent of the Republican vote comes from Whites. In the recent off-year elections, Democratic candidates for governor received only about a third of the White vote.

America will soon realize that it is at the edge of a racial abyss.

Because the Republican Party remains an important force in American politics, Jews are well advised to retain an influence there as well. Republican Jews retain their core liberalism on all the key issues like immigration and culture by aligning themselves with the “moderate” wing of the Party. Like Podhoretz, Republican Jews are motivated mainly to keep the Republican Party safe for Jews, in their estimation, and to promote pro-Israel forces within the party. In general, Republican Jews have acted to make the GOP as much as possible like the party they left behind and to influence it to eschew nationalistic attitudes, especially self-consciously White or Christian identities.

At the end of the day, Podhoretz’s enterprise is an exercise in deception. He erects an image of irrational Jewish liberals who cling to liberalism as a set of religious beliefs completely beyond the reach of logic or empirical data. In fact Jewish liberalism is quite clearly a Diaspora strategy designed to obtain power for Jews at least partly by building coalitions with non-White ethnic groups. Moreover, he erects an image of principled, rational Jewish conservatives as true conservatives, while in fact they are leftists who have been a prominent force in elbowing out true conservatives within the Republican Party in order to pursue their pro-Israel agenda and make the Republican Party into something they deem safe for Jews.

Welcome to the Alice in Wonderland world of Jewish political thought.


  1. Indeed, it would be a good project to find out exactly what Jewish intellectuals think conservatives are. In the Commentary symposium, historian Jonathan D. Sarna labels Louis Marshall a “stalwart conservative.” In fact, Marshall (1856–1929) was a Republican, but, like the neocons, he cannot be called a conservative by any stretch of the imagination. Marshall was a director of the NAACP and a champion of minority rights. He was also the point man for the Jewish thrust for unrestricted immigration during the period. At a time when the population of the United States was over 100 million, he stated at a Congressional hearing on the ethnically defensive 1924 immigration law, “[W]e have room in this country for ten times the population we have”; he advocated admission of all of the peoples of the world without quota limit, excluding only those who “were mentally, morally and physically unfit, who are enemies of organized government, and who are apt to become public charges.”Obviously, Marshall, a Zionist, did not believe that the American majority had a right to defend their ethnic interests by controlling immigration policy. The neocons would be proud.  ↩

The article was originally published at AlternativeRight.com in 2010.

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The Intellectual Vacuity of the Old Right

“The Right has been the great vanquished of history. It has virtually lost every struggle it has engaged in. The history of the last two centuries for the Right has been one of continuous defeat. Such a succession of failures suggests that the superiority of its adversaries is merely based on the Right’s own weaknesses.”

This article first appeared at AlternativeRight.com. It was translated from French into English by Roman Bernard, with edits by Colin Liddell. It is a selection from Alain de Benoist’s responses to an interview on the French Right that appeared in the quarterly review Éléments at the end of 2005 (#118).The failure of the mainstream Right is well-known, and often commented on. But the failure of the “real Right” is more difficult to deal with, as the men concerned (one thinks of Enoch Powell in Britain) were most of the time well-meaning, courageous men, yet they failed. Most of the references to French history were removed so as to make this text understandable to a Pan-Western audience. This text, thanks to a remarkable psychological analysis of the “right-wing mind,” is first and foremost a way for us to question our own way of thinking, thus making us more “fit and brisk” for the battle of ideas. It is the ideal complement to William Pierce’s “Why conservatives can’t win.”

*** 

The Right has never been fond of intellectuals. Little wonder then that the phrase “left-wing intellectual” has for a long time been a tautology. For many right-wing people, intellectuals are just unbearable. They visualize them sitting on a chaise longue, of course, and view them as “sanctimonious types” who sodomize flies, split hairs and publish books invariably described as “indigestible” and “boring.”

This idea is to be found in very different backgrounds. For libertarians, intellectuals are inevitably “disconnected from reality.” For activists, intellectuals quibble while we face a “state of emergency” demanding action.

I have heard things like this my entire life. Granted, there’s a positive side to this attitude. Right-wingers show a real concern for concrete facts, a genuine wariness of useless abstractions or pure intellect, a desire to assert the precedence of the soul over the spirit, of the organic over theoretical “dryness,” the hope (always disillusioned) to go back to a simpler life, etc.

The Right is more sensitive to human qualities than to intellectual capacities. It likes to admire more than to understand. It asks for examples more than for lessons. It likes style, gesture, and panache. And it is not wrong in doing so. A society entirely made up of intellectuals would be unbearable.

But the problem is that when this attitude is systematized, it leads to the avoidance of any doctrine, to the rejection of any work of the mind.

The intellectual can be defined as the person who tries to understand and make others understand. The Right, very often, doesn’t try to understand anymore. It ignores what the work of the mind can accomplish. The result is that right-wing culture has today almost entirely vanished. It only survives in restricted circles, marginal publishing houses, and newspapers that only rightists believe are actual newspapers. The ostracism that it has suffered is not the only factor in this.

One can only be struck by the way the Right lost the habit of intervening in intellectual debates. If one takes the hundred books that have been discussed the most over the last half-century, one realizes that the Right hasn’t published a single review of these. It doesn’t interest the Right or concern it. The Right is uninterested in any author outside its landmarks. It doesn’t discuss or refute any of them.

On the dialectic of modernity, the evolution of the social dimension, the forces behind mercantile logic, and symbolic Imaginary, the Right has nothing to say. Why wonder, then, that it has been unable to formulate a critique of technoscience, a theory of localism or of social connection, a philosophy of ecology, or an anthropology of its own? It is simply unable to do that anymore. There have always been hundreds of theoretical debates on the Left, some insignificant, others very deep. Who can cite one single intellectual debate that has marked the history of the Right in the last half a century? On the Right, as far as thought is concerned, it resembles the Tartar Steppes or a flat-lining encephalogram signal.

Most right-wing people substitute convictions for ideas. Ideas can of course engender convictions, and convictions stem from ideas, but the two terms are different. Convictions are things in which one believes and which, because they are the objects of a belief, cannot undergo any critical examination. Convictions are an existential substitute for faith. They help living without the need for one to question their logical structure, their value relative to various contexts, or their limitations. Right-wing people make it a point of honor to defend their convictions in the manner of bible study.

The Right likes answers more than questions, especially if these are pat answers that abnegate the need for a philosophical outlook, as one cannot philosophize when the answer is preconceived. The work of the mind requires the learning of one’s mistakes. The right-wing attitude is rather to avoid considering its mistakes, and thus it never tries to correct these so as to go further; hence the absence of self-criticism and debate. Self-criticism is seen as a weakness, a useless concession, if not a betrayal. Right-wing people flatter themselves that they “regret nothing,” including the errors they have made. Debate, because it implies a contradiction, an exchange of arguments, is generally seen as an aggression, as something that one does not do.

The right-wing man proceeds with enthusiasm or indignation, with admiration or disgust, but not with reflection. Instead he is reactive; hence his almost always emotional reaction to events. What is striking is his naïve, if not puerile way of reacting, of always contenting himself with the upper layer of things, with the news anecdote, of taking a narrow point of view on everything, without ever going deeply to the causes. When you show them the Moon, many right-wing people look at the finger. History then becomes incomprehensible — what on Earth is Providence doing? — even if right-wing people constantly refer to it. Hence simplistic conspiracy theories, which can lead to real lunacies, abound. Social problems are always explained by shady manipulations of an “invisible conspiracy,” a “dark alliance,” etc.

As the Right is very little interested in ideas, it tends to bring everything back to people. Right-wing political movements are first and foremost associated with their founders, and rarely survive them. Right-wing quarrels are chiefly quarrels of individuals, with basically the same gossip, and the same slanderous accusations. In the same way, its enemies are never systems or even genuine ideas, but human categories presented as scapegoats (Jews, “metics,” “bankers,” freemasons, foreigners, “Trotskyites,” immigrants, etc.). The Right has a hard time apprehending a system devoid of a subject: the systemic effects of the logic of Capital, the constraints of structure, the genesis of individualism, the vital importance of the environmental threats, the forces unleashed by technology, etc. The Right doesn’t understand that men have to be fought, not for what they are, but in so far as they embody and defend harmful systems of thought or values. By preferring to take it out on individuals, disliked for what they are, the Right veers towards xenophobia or something even worse.

T
he Right has been the great vanquished of history. It has virtually lost every struggle it has engaged in. The history of the last two centuries for the Right has been one of continuous defeat. Such a succession of failures suggests that the superiority of its adversaries is merely based on the Right’s own weaknesses.

In the beginning, what was the best that the Right had to offer? I would briefly say: an anti-individualist and anti-utilitarian system of thought, together with an ethic of honor, inherited from the Ancient Regime. Thus it was opposing head-on the ideology of the Enlightenment, whose driving forces were individualism, rationalism, self-evident individual interests, and the belief in progress. The values that the Right claimed were aristocratic and popular at the same time. Its historic mission was to fulfill the natural union of the aristocracy and the people against their common enemy: the bourgeoisie, whose class values were precisely legitimized by Enlightenment thought. But this union was fulfilled only during very brief periods.

For the Right, Man is naturally social. However, it never forged its own consistent theory to explain community or social connectedness. Nor did it seriously explore opposition to the ideal liberal types, the autonomous individual and the “social man.” It has never been able to formulate a genuinely alternative economic doctrine to the mercantile system, either.

Instead of supporting the workers’ movement and nascent socialism, which represented a healthy reaction against individualism that the Right was also criticizing, it all too often defended the most dreadful human exploitation and the most unjustifiable political inequalities. It sided with the wealthy, objectively participating in the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the would-be “redistributors” and the “dangerous classes.”

There were exceptions, though rare ones. The Right’s theoreticians were more often led by their audience than leading it. Defending the nation, the Right rarely understood that the nation is above all else the people. It forgot the natural complementariness of aristocratic and popular values. When the workers’ right to an annual holiday break was passed into law, the Right railed against the “vacation culture.” It always preferred order to justice, without understanding that injustice is a supreme form of disorder, and that order itself is very often nothing but an established disorder.

The Right could have developed a philosophy of history founded on cultural diversity and the need to acknowledge its universal value, which would have led it to support the struggles in favor of autonomy and liberty in the Third World, whose peoples were prime victims of the ideology of progress. Instead of that, the Right ended up defending the colonialism that it had once condemned, while complaining about being colonized in turn.

The Right forgot that its only true enemy is Money. It should have considered everything opposing the system of money as its objective ally. Instead it gradually joined the other side. The Right was better equipped than any other force to reframe the anti-utilitarian values of generosity and selflessness, and to defend them. But, little by little, the Right acceded to the logic of interest and the defense of the market. At the same time, it fell in line with militarism and nationalism, which is nothing but collective individualism, something that the first counter-revolutionaries had condemned as such.

Nationalism led the Right to the metaphysics of subjectivity, this illness of the spirit, systematized by the Moderns. This estranged the Right from the notion of truth. It should have been the party of generosity, of “common decency [1],” of organic communities; but it all too often became the party of exclusion, of collective selfishness, and resentment. In short, the Right betrayed itself when it began accepting individualism, bourgeois lifestyles, the logic of money, and the model of the market.

Christian Socialism occasionally played a useful role, but it chiefly fell under paternalism. The social achievements of the “fascisms” were discredited by their authoritarianism, their militarism, and their aggressive nationalism. Corporatism led to nothing. Revolutionary syndicalism was killed by the “Fordist compromise,” which resulted in the integration of larger and larger parts of the working class into the bourgeois middle class. Most importantly, this kind of concern was never associated with a deep analysis of Capital. The condemnation of “Big Money” is insignificant when it refrains from analyzing the very nature of money and the anthropological impact of a generalized market system, with its reification of social relations and its effects of alienation.

As for the “Real Right,” it hasn’t ceased marginalizing itself and wasting away. More and more oblivious of its own past, all of its implicit system of thought can be summed up in a single phrase: “It was better before” — whether this “before” refers to the thirties, the Ancient Regime, the Renaissance, the Middle Ages or Ancient History.

This conviction, even when it is occasionally correct, nurtures an attitude that is either restorationist, which condemns it to failure, or purely nostalgic. In each case, the “Real Right” contents itself with opposing the real world with an idealized and fantasized past: the fantasy of the origin, the fantasy of a bygone age, and the irrepressible nostalgia of an original matrix revealing the incapacity to reach adulthood.

The aim is to try to conserve, preserve, slow, or hold back the course of events, with no clear consciousness of the inevitable historical sequence of events. The great hope is to reproduce the past, to go backward to the time when everything was so much better. But, as it is quite obviously impossible, the “Real Right” settles for an ethical attitude in order to make a statement. Politically, this “Real Right” has no more telos of its own to fulfill, as all its models belong to the past. It has reached a point where it doesn’t even know clearly the type of political regime that it would like to establish.

History becomes a shelter: idealized, reconstructed in a selective way, and more or less fantastical. History provides the reassuring feeling of having a stable “heritage,” of bearing significant examples that the Right can oppose to the horrors of present times. History is supposed to give “lessons,” although one never really knows what they are. The Right has not understood that History, which it reveres so much, can also be crippling. When Nietzsche says that “The future belongs to those with the longest memory,” what he means is that Modernity will be so overburdened by memory that it will become impotent. That’s why he calls for the “innocence” of a new beginning, which partly entails oblivion. People never have a greater hunger for history than when they are incapable of making it, and when history is happening without them or against them.

Hostile to innovation, the “Real Right” is unable to analyze the unseen situations of the future with its obsolete conceptual tools. It judges everything according to the world it once knew, which was familiar and thus reassuring, and confuses the end of this world with the end of the actual world. It faces the future with its eye in the rear-view mirror. The Right is unable to analyze historic events, to step back from the consequences and examine distant causes. It cannot establish the genealogy of the phenomena it deplores, nor detect the fault lines of post-modernity. It cannot understand anything in the current world any longer, the evolution of which it dismisses as an endless “decadence.”

The fact that it has constantly been vanquished often elicits a peculiar mix of meticulous irony, emphatic derision, bitterness, and con
niving snicker, so typical of the long reactionary lament. It also presents the mediocre apocalyptic motto “We are doomed!” With such a vision, we are always in “a state of emergency,” it’s always “one minute to midnight.” Before the “catastrophes” which face us, we are waiting for a “surge,” an “awakening.” The “silent majority”, the “real country” is being summoned. But all of this had already been said in 1895. During all this time, history has nevertheless kept going.

The most distinctive feature of the “Real Right” is a political and moral narcissism, founded on an immutable worldview, with two sides (us the good, them the evil), which is a simple projection of a fault line inside any of us. This dichotomy of “Us vs. the Others,” given as the explaining factor for everything, comes actually under this metaphysics of subjectivity that I have already mentioned, which legitimizes all forms of selfishness and exclusion. The Right talks a great deal about defending its “identity,” but it generally has a hard time defining this. Most of the time, its identity is about not being what it condemns. It is the existence of its enemies that defines the Right’s own existence, a negative existence, a contrario. The Right’s marginalization nurtures an obsidional mentality, which in turn sharpens its rejection of the Other. There’s something Cathar-like in this obsidionalism: the world is bad, let’s close the ranks of the “last square.” The titles of the Right’s bedside books are also telling: by the accursed, the heretics, the reprobates, the nostalgics, The Camp of the Saints; in short, the Last of the Mohicans. In a world of tribes, for which it has no sympathy, the “Real Right” is nothing more than a tribe of survivors, which lives in connivance and isolation. It has rites and passwords of its own, slogans and resentment, and every day sees itself being more and more isolated from an “outside” world that it rejects and demonizes, with no possibility of changing the course of events. What is left for it is to commemorate its own defeats, which it does with such perseverance that one is forced to wonder whether it secretly cherishes these defeats, as defeats are always more “heroic” than victories.

The Right has never prioritized the struggle against the system of money, which was its main enemy. First it fought against the Republic at a time when it had become obvious that a monarchy of divine right would never come back. After 1871, the Right devoted itself to the condemnation of the “Boches” (and even the “Judeo-Boches”), which led it, in the name of the “Sacred Union,” to legitimize the atrocious carnage of 1914-18, which engendered all the horrors of the 20th century. In the aftermath of the First World War, it committed itself to the fight against Communism and its “pagan savagery” (as Marshall Pétain expressed it). At the time of the Cold War, for fear of this same Communism, which it should have considered as a rival rather than as an enemy, the Right sided with the “free world,” thus giving its blessing to the American hegemony, the power of the bourgeoisie and the worldwide supremacy of predatory liberalism — as if the horrors of the Gulag justified the abominations of the mercantile system. This led the Right to support “Atlanticism,” to approve of the slaughter of the Vietnamese people, to show solidarity with the most pathetic dictatorships, from the Greek colonels and the Argentinean generals to Pinochet and his “Chicago Boys” [2], not to mention the torturers of Operation Condor, specializing in the assassinations of “subversivos” who were mostly only asking for more social justice. When the Soviet system collapsed, making globalization possible, immigrants providentially took over the statutory role of the “threat.” Conflating immigrants with Islam, then Islam with Islamism, eventually Islamism with terrorism, it now does that again with Islamophobia, a truly suicidal approach, and, what is more, absolutely inconsistent from a geopolitical perspective.

The “Real Right,” at the end of the day, is fundamentally unpolitical. The very essence of politics is foreign to it. In fact it confuses politics with ethics, the same way the Left conflates politics with morals. The Right believes that politics is a matter of honor, of courage, of sacrificial virtues, of heroism, that is to say, in the best case, of military qualities. It sees politics as the continuation of war by other means, which totally reverses Clausewitz’s aphorism. It doesn’t understand that politics is only an occupation, an art, something that aims to carefully define the best but not the ideal way of serving the common good — a good, by the way, that can’t simply be shared out. It doesn’t understand that politics is a way to arbitrate between contradictory aspirations stemming from human nature, to arbitrate between the needs of civic coexistence and the necessities of self-interest.

As for me, it has been more than a quarter of a century since I stopped considering myself belonging to any family of the Right, and since I stopped showing solidarity with it. There’s no mystery here: I have said it and written it many times. But for all that, I don’t consider that the Right is an uninteresting subject. Nor do I think that it is a despicable subject. When I criticize it — and I always hesitate before criticizing it, both because it is not fitting to shoot at such an easy target and because I don’t want to get involved with the mob — I am forced to generalize, and when one generalizes, one always risks being unfair. But I don’t ignore its merits. In the same way that its qualities have shortcomings, its shortcomings also have qualities. On many occasions, the Right was (and remains) admirable for its courage, its persistence, and its spirit of sacrifice. All these qualities, yet they have achieved such meager results!

I’ll add that I don’t recognize myself as belonging to any family of the current Left, which spares me the desire of wanting to be “admitted.” One can undoubtedly define me as a “left-wing right-winger,” or a man who has left-wing ideas and right-wing values. It allows me to agree equally well with left-wing men and with right-wing men every time they assert ideas that I consider fair. But, actually, I haven’t cared about labels for a long time.

I care all the less, since the Left-Right duo gets more and more ineffective as an analytic tool. What is the “right-wing position” on the American occupation of Iraq, and what is the “left-wing position?” There is simply none: on the Right as on the Left, this occupation has opponents and supporters. It is the same for all the problems of our times: European integration, geopolitics, ecology, the coming oil crisis, etc. The only thing that matters is what people think of a precise question, no matter how they position themselves (or refuse to) on the traditional political spectrum.

 

[1] In English in the original text

[2] In English in the original text

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Population Control

“We do not develop the surveillance society in the fight against insecurity, rather, insecurity is used as an excuse to justify the surveillance society.”

Many blame the police for its relative weakness, not to mention its inaction in the fight against insecurity, an inaction that is reflected by crime statistics. But this is misunderstanding the current function of the police. The current function of the police is not to fight insecurity. It is, which is quite different, to control and monitor people. Not just some people, as claimed by the authorities (offenders, criminals, terrorists, etc..), but all of them. Even if the whole country turned into a no-go zone, the surveillance society would keep functioning. The police also know very well what happens in these no-go zones (who does what, when, how, etc..). But it does not intervene. Insecurity is only a pretext. We do not develop the surveillance society in the fight against insecurity, rather, insecurity is used as an excuse to justify the surveillance society. The politicians’ fear, their real fear actually, is not insecurity, but the potential retaliations against insecurity. Against that, they are not kidding. The laws in this area are applied to their full extent. This is the only one area where they are applied, but here they are applied thoroughly. The slightest deviation in this area comes at a high price. Legislation on gun ownership and self-defense has also become very restrictive. The consequence is that acts of self-defense are now increasingly rare. Three years ago [in 2002] a 15-year-old schoolgirl, who was a good student, with no police record, killed her attacker, who was “well-known by the police,” planting him with a knife. The prosecutor incarcerated her at once. “Faced with such a serious act, it was hard not to mark the occasion,” he said. Indeed, this is exceptional. In general, victims do not defend themselves. This is what the prosecutor meant.

Éric Werner, Éléments #118, Autumn 2005, pp. 29-30 (translation Roman Bernard)

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The Great Erasure

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

This article first appeared in the print edition of RADIX Journal (Vol. 1 / 2012)

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

Some critics of “immigration” feel the term is euphemistic and prefer to label the phenomenon “invasion.” Guillaume Faye calls it “colonization.” Yet, although the use of alternative terminology is motivated by legitimate concerns with the scale, the permanence, and the non-assimilation associated with modern immigration in the West, neither alternative seems satisfactory.

First, the scale of immigration does not alter the nature of the phenomenon, as the definition of “immigration” still holds so long as it describes individuals moving from one polity to another for purposes of establishing residence. Secondly, length of residence does not transform immigration into something else, as immigration does not exclude, and, indeed, often involves, permanent relocation. Thirdly, assimilation is separate from, and not a condition for, successful immigration, even if it is so for integration. Furthermore, both invaders and colonizers can be immigrants, but immigrants are not necessarily invaders or colonizers (and they are neither if they appeal to the established sovereignty for admission, inclusion, and integration.)

Indeed, “invasion” is wide of the mark. In a geopolitical sense, an invasion is an aggressive military operation aimed at “conquering, liberating, or re-establishing control or authority over a territory, forcing the partition of a country, altering the established government or gaining concessions from said government, or a combination thereof.”[1] In a biological sense, the term still involves aggression. Modern “immigration” in the West, though it may have similar effects, and though some “immigrants” may be aggressive, is neither military in character nor centrally organized—save exceptionally and loosely—by either active or passive encouragement to emigrate and resettle in a specific polity or territory.

“Colonization” is much closer to the mark, but still not on it. The term refers to the establishment of colonies in one territory by people from another territory, but colonies can comprise colonists or colonials, the latter of which is linked to colonialism. In colonialism, a metropole claims sovereignty over the colony, deliberately changing—when the territory is already inhabited—the social structure, government, and economics of the colonized territory. “Immigration” is not “colonization” in this sense. Arguably, “immigrants” into the West have increasingly sought to gain or exert control over the social structure, government, and economics of their host countries, but they are not—save with one exception, mentioned below—subjects of a metropole with a deliberate policy of colonization. The “immigrants” issue from multiple metropoles, which are uncoordinated, geographically dispersed, may be rivals or enemies, and in all but one case operate no policy of colonization, officially or unofficially. Moreover, the so-called “immigrants” are not even coordinated among themselves, beyond temporary subjection by some or exploitation by criminal gangs of human traffickers.The “immigrants” are impelled, not by a single-minded desire to establish or join a colony, but by a variety of individual motives, mostly involving escape from danger or poverty in their native territory and a desire for safety and (above all) economic betterment in a prosperous metropole.

The term “colonization,” however, is not entirely inadequate, for modern “immigration” in the West still involves exogenous strangers colonizing Western polities. This is because, while different from colonialism, structurally the phenomenon remains related to it. A more apt term for the phenomenon of “immigration” would be “settler colonialism,” which can involve settlers from multiple metropoles whose behavior and consciousness is very similar to that of our modern Third World “immigrants”; but the term remains problematic, since it describes projects like Israel today, South Africa up until the early 20th century, and what eventually became the United States, from the 17th century through most of the 19th. Nevertheless, “settler colonialism” is structurally most similar to what is discussed in this essay, however, and provides a sound theoretical basis for what I propose to call, for the purposes of distinction, “settler colonization.”
In this essay, I will first provide a description of settler colonialism as it is currently theorized. I will then show how settler colonialism closely describes modern “immigration” in the West. Next, I will indicate how the Western experience with modern settlers from the Third World differs from that of past settler-colonial projects. Finally, I will suggest possible strategies for combating settler colonization in our hemisphere.

Settler Colonialism

Edward Cavanagh, editor of the Settler Colonial Studies journal, and Lorenzo Veracini, author of Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview[2], define settler colonialism as follows:

Settler colonialism is a global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present. There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends. Not all migrants are settlers; as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settlers come to stay. They are founders of political orders who carry with them a distinct sovereign capacity. And settler colonialism is not colonialism: settlers want Indigenous people to vanish (but can make use of their labour before they are made to disappear). Sometimes settler colonial forms operate within colonial ones, sometimes they subvert them, sometimes they replace them. But even if colonialism and settler colonialism interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other.

In his book, Veracini also ascribes to settler colonialism distinctive characteristics:

  • Settler colonialism creates a dual division between itself, exogenous Others, and indigenous Others; these can be either virtuous or degraded.
  • Settler colonialism is always virtuous, always forward-moving, conceiving itself and its activity in terms of improvement and progress. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous, but can be either elevated or degraded, while exogenous Others can be selectively included or segregated. However, settler colonialism more easily includes exogenous Others than indigenous Others and routinely fantasizes about exchanging indigenous Others with exogenous Others.
  • Inclusion and exclusion operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operate concurrently, without a need for consistency. Yet, while borders are internally porous, they are externally impermeable: settlers can go out, but indigenes cannot get in.
  • Settler colonialism involves the settler self undergoing coeval processes of indigenization and exogenization.
  • Settler colonialism thus converges with the original society, but the line is never crossed because the distinction needs to remain.
  • Settler colonialism dominates in order to transfer (remove); colonialism dominates in order to exploit.
  • Settler colonialism tends to underestimate the indigenous in various objective and subjective ways, making the indigenous invisible.
  • Settler colonialism, accordingly, subjectively conceives areas to be annexed or opened for settlement as vacant.
  • Settler colonialism sees itself as ultimately, if not immediately, autonomous, and therefore resists interference from the metropole; colonialism is subordinate to the metropole.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by an exclusive interpretation of peoplehood, a specific understanding of sovereign capacities and their location, even though settlement itself is messy and most people move individually, “without a conscious determination to establish a new, ideal, society, and with no specific understanding of their own sovereignty.”[3]
  • Settler colonialism sees the settler colonial setting as charged with a special regenerative nature.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.
  • Settlers come to work and live in peace and see themselves as escaping from violence; a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one.
  • Settler colonialism disavows its violent foundation, but peacefulness coexists with violence.
  • Settler colonialism suffers from “ongoing concerns with existential threats and a paranoid fear of ultimate decolonization.”[4]
  • Settler colonialism has a linear structure, whereas colonialism has a circular structure: for one, the literary metaphor is the Aeneid, for the other, the Odyssey; one involves non-discovery, since settlers simply reproduce their society; the other, discovery, since the discoverer reports back to the metropole; one involves non- encounter with the indigenous (they are invisible, shadows, undercounted, deterritorialized, sojourners, part of the landscape), the other encounter (through exploitation).
  • Settler colonialism, because it deterritorializes the indigenous and denies their state-forming capacity, can be superseded only by itself, ending with the complete elimination of the indigenous. In this case, the end is negotiated from within, including complicated and dubious processes of “national reconciliation.” The alternative ending is settler exodus or expulsion. In this case, there is never equality or any subsequent relationship between the indigenous and the settlers; settler colonialism is a winner-takes-all scenario: either the indigenous or the settlers disappear. Colonialism, on the other hand, ends with state formation (by the indigenous), and its end is a negotiation between states (the colonizers’ and the indigenous’).
  • Settler independence accelerates the process of nation-building and hence the process of erasure of the indigenous. Even well-meaning acts of reconciliation and incorporation entail the erasure of indigenous forms as it occurs in the context of settlers’ forms.

Settler Colonization in the West

As has been noted, critics of “immigration” in the West have noted its unprecedented scale, its permanent character, and the non-assimilation/non-assimilability of Third World “immigrants.” Among the characteristics of settler colonialism is that settlers come to stay and do not appeal to the established indigenous sovereignty, but rather deny it and seek to remove it in order to replace it with a reproduction or regeneration of their own society. Implied in settler colonialism is scale: settlers may arrive as individual immigrants, but the process of reproduction, removal, and replacement necessitates sufficient scale successfully to neutralise, overcome, and eliminate indigenous resistance.

In Western Europe this is most apparent in the continuing growth of Islamic formations by immigrant Muslims, who, now numbering in the millions, found and daily operate their own structures in parallel with the indigenous authority. Spread across the regions, but concentrated in metropolitan enclaves, these structures may be physical, such as mosques and madrassas, or they may be legal-theological, such as arbitration tribunals based on Shariah law. Their prosperity benefits from demographic contraction and loss of faith by Europeans, whose churches are gradually converted into mosques; but it is also driven by a will to conquer the land, which, from time to time, find open expression across a range of settings, from the streets to high political office held by Muslims. During the disturbances caused by the publication of a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed in Denmark in 2005, Muslim protesters variously called for Shariah law for the United Kingdom, worldwide domination by Islam, the death or slaughter of those who insult Islam, and the extermination of Europeans. Similarly, in 2008, Labour politician Shahid Malik, former Justice Minister and Minister for Race, Faith and Community Cohesion at the Department for Communities and Local Government, stated at that year’s “Global Peace and Unity” conference, held at the Excel London Centre:

I am proud of the achievements of Muslims in this country from ’97. In 19 97 we got our first Muslim MP. In 20 01 we had two Muslim MPs. In 20 05 we had four Muslim MPs. In ša Allah, in 20 09–10, we’ll have eight Muslim MPs. In 2014 we’ll have sixteen Muslim MPs. At this rate, the whole Parliament will be Muslim! But just to say, in case there are journalists here today, that is not my objective. But you know, we’ ve got four Muslim MPs; there should be twenty Muslim MPs in Parliament. And in ša Allah very shortly we’ll see that. I am confident, as Britain’s first Muslim Minister, that, in ša Allah, in the next thirty years or so, we’ll see a Prime Minister in this country, who happens to share my faith.
Such messages cannot be dismissed as simple expressions of anger or hopeful prognostication. Anger and hope can be expressed in many ways, and it is significant that, rather than calling for respect and toleration of a Muslim minority, the thrust of the messages, be it from protestors or from a Justice Minister, flowed uniformly in the direction of conquest, replacement, and Islamic supremacy.

In the United States, Mexican immigrants of recent decades have a well-documented history of forming their own parallel structures. In their case, it takes the form of businesses, pressure groups, student organizations, printed and electronic media, gangs, and social networks permeating occupations, neighborhoods, and local politics, within which all transactions and interactions are conducted in Spanish. Mexican immigrants, their descendants (including naturalized ones), as well as Mexicans in Mexico, also conceive themselves, even at official government level, as possessing a sovereign capacity as Mexicans—“I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border, that wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico.” A true Mexican immigrant leaves Mexico behind and appeals to the United States government so that he may eventually become an American; a Mexican settler takes Mexico with him, and, though he may take up American citizenship, the latter is done for purely instrumental (e.g., economic) reasons. Some more ideologically racialist Mexicans dream of replacing the United States government with a Chicano superstate to be called “Aztlan.” A more common assumption of Mexican settlers is that part or all of the U.S. will gradually transform into a more lucrative version of their home country.

The process of replacement is made partially invisible by its interaction with a vestigial European settler colonial consciousness: “immigrants” have slowly built their structures largely in the shadows, persistently undercounted and underestimated. This is an instance where settler colonialism and settler colonization interpenetrate.

Third World settlers in the West replicate the dual division of peoples in settler colonial projects, and the relationship between self and other is analogous. Upon arrival, they are faced with indigenous Others, who comprise the majority and are ostensibly the established authority, as well as with exogenous Others, who comprise minorities of fellow travelers and against whom they are now pitted in competition for resources and admission by the established authority. When faced with real or perceived resistance by the indigenous, settlers perceive themselves in a shared predicament with exogenous Others. This makes them more receptive to establishing friendships or alliances with exogenous Others against the indigenous established authority. Said exogenous Others, however, may be found within structures of the established authority itself. Thus, generic pro-“immigrant” pressure groups emerge with the backing of establishment politicians. (As discussed further below, these politicians, though exogenous, may also be or appear to be indigenous.)

The consciousness of settler colonization in the West is always virtuous: settlers seek employment, economic betterment, educational improvement, professional progress, and a peaceful life. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous: they are racists, bigots, Islamophobes, infidels, faithless, and degenerate. They can, however, be elevated by converting to the settler’s faith and/or cause. They can, by adopting their manners and sensibilities, also be selectively admitted into the settler collective, including through marriage, although this may require conversion. In the latter case, reluctant admission and desire for admission interpenetrate, for the settler, still perceiving himself as less powerful than the indigenous (even if more virtuous), sees acceptance as a gateway for deeper colonization and altering the indigenous society in ways more amenable to his collective (e.g. by campaigning for “anti-racist” legislation). When settlers run for political office, one part of them desires acceptance by the establishment (it is powerful and confers privilege), another desires to change that establishment (it is racist and excludes settlers). It is not gaining admission with a view to assimilating to the indigenous Other, but rather gaining admission with a view to neutralise and/or displace him.

Thus, inclusion by and of the settler and exclusion of the indigenous operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operating concurrently and without consistency.

The search for admission, even if without a view to assimilation, does involve a process of indigenization. The indigenous in Europe, because they tend towards individualism and low ethnocentricity, confuse indigenization of the settler with assimilation, not realizing that settlers are ethnocentric collectivists and seek eventually to recast European society in their image. The process of indigenization involves settlers becoming the indigenous, not settlers becoming like the indigenous (even though the former does superficially involve and necessitate the latter to varying degrees.)

A process of exogenization of the settler in relation to the latter’s original society is the other facet of his indigenization in Europe, for as he indigenizes in an alien environment, he also diverges from the members of his race, whom he has left behind. The evolution of past settler colonial projects, particularly those involving multiple races and ethnicities, such as what became the United States, point to the eventual emergence of a sense of peoplehood, albeit qualified by racial or ethnic membership. This means that while the United Kingdom may variously converge with India, Pakistan, Africa, and the Caribbean, settlers from these countries or regions, and more so their descendants, and particularly where they are racially mixed, will not see themselves as subjects or indigenous to those countries and regions, but as British citizens indigenous to Britain, whose heritage goes back to one or more of those countries or regions. It follows from this that while there will be convergence, the line will never be crossed because the distinction will always remain.

While the end result is the transference (removal) of the indigenous, settler colonization in the West coexists with exploitative relationships proper of straight colonialism. It is well known that Third World settlers in the West, even at the appellant stage, take advantage of the indigenous’ welfare state and concessionary provisions, and that these benefits are often a reason for immigrating in the first place; indeed, on the whole, these settlers consume more than they produce. However, exploitation is not limited to scrounging from the indigenous government: it also takes the form of various forms of ethnically organized fraud, such as car crash insurance claim scams, which are run by Muslim gangs, or ethnically organized exploitation, such as pedophilia, also associated with Muslim gangs. So long as the indigenous remain in charge, they remain both an obstacle and a resource.

This is linked both to the subjective underestimation of the indigenous and the conception of Europe as vacant. Although the latter may seem an exaggeration, it is not if we understand ethnocentricity as involving a certain “vacating” (or evacuation) of the Other’s humanity. Third World settlers in the West are by nature highly ethnocentric, at least in relation to the indigenous White majority. The West is thus conceived by settlers primarily as a space, a land, where there are resources and opportunity, not as comprising people just like them who can provide generosity and friendship. The indigenous Westerner, therefore, is vacant, present but absent, a somewhat abstract entity that has to be dealt with, if only because “it” holds the “keys to the kingdom,” but which is otherwise denied and subjectively disappears until the next time “it” gets in the way or the settler realizes he needs something from “it.” The indigenous White majority is essentially part of the landscape, but, as with irredentist Mexican settlers in the United States, it can be seen as sojourners, interlopers, or usurpers.

Both the emergent sense of peoplehood, even if multifarious and complicated by racial and ethnic divides and miscegenation, and the conception of a vacant land of opportunity, are concurrent with autonomy from the originating metropole, and even resistance to its interference. It must be borne in mind that many settlers immigrate as economic or political refugees, and seek to make a new life in the Western El Dorado. Making a new life is another way of saying regeneration; the West, and immigration to the West, are imbued with a regenerative nature. In turn, this regeneration occurs as a dual process, whereby the settler regenerates (that is, generates again) his own society and simultaneously has his life regenerated in (and/or by) the land of opportunity. Given the often dysfunctional nature of Third World societies, this duality would seem to be mutually negating, since the society being regenerated is the society from which the settler fled, and a successful regeneration of that society would impede the successful regeneration of the settler’s life. Indeed, a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one. But settlers do not require consistency.

Third World settlers immigrating into the West are motivated primarily by the prospect of economic betterment; they have no specific understanding of their sovereignty and neither do they, with the exception of politicized Mexican settlers in the United States, possess a conscious collective will, for settlers move individually, even if they arrive in groups. All the same, as we have seen from the proliferation of parallel substitutive formations by settlers in the West, they do possess the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.

The process of doing so is non-violent, following a legal sequence comprising: appeal to the indigenous authority (for recognition and admission as permanent minorities, and eventually citizens); development of exogenous structures (serving as substitutes to indigenous ones); co-option of indigenous structures (lobbying for concessions, multiculturalism); subversion from without (lobbying for anti-racist legislation); and indigenization (becoming legislators, subversion from within). At the same time, the process coexists with violence, whereby the indigenous are physically attacked or subject to predations (typically muggings, robberies, racially motivated beatings, and rape), or else morally attacked (typically accusations of prejudice and “racism,” and/or “racism” hoaxes).

Conversely, settlers live in paranoid fear. In the West, colored settlers imagine themselves in the midst of indigenous “racists,” in an institutionally “racist” society, even though said society has invited them, granted them recognition, made concessions, opened its labour market to them, accepted them as citizens, elected them into public offices, denounced “racism” in all its forms, swiftly purged “racists” upon detection, and even changed its laws to criminalise “racism” and punish “racists” with added rigor. This may be because settlers both have a well-developed sense of racial identity, because they would never welcome colonization in their traditional homeland, and because they are routinely agitated by ideologically egalitarian fanatics. No matter what gains they make, the fear of “racism” is ever present, and the perceived risk of expulsion (decolonization) ever lingering. In both Europe and the United States, it has happened before: in 1492 (the Spanish Reconquista) and 1954 (Operation Wetback).

Expulsion or a mass exodus would, indeed, be the only way to end Third World settler colonization in the West. Millions of settlers are citizens, many going back several generations, not a few descended from mixed race marriages. Short of expulsion or a mass exodus, the long-term effect of settler colonization, aided by high numbers of incomers and differential fertility favoring the settlers, is the replacement of the indigenous population. The latter will not need to disappear entirely, at least as a biological entity, before being completely dispossessed: even without violence, the indigenous institutions of democracy and equality provide the logic and mechanisms for dispossession. If the majority of people in Britain are Muslim, for example, democracy necessitates that they be proportionally represented in the seats of political, economic, cultural, academic, and institutional power. The historical rarity and fugaciousness of democracy in the Third World, however, suggests that democratic governance would end as soon as it ceases to be useful for the settlers, though this is not to say that the indigenous could not well dispense with it in the face of an immediate existential threat—democracy has proven historically rare and fugacious in the West, too.

Without the complete erasure of the indigenous Westerners, the end of Third World settler colonization in the West would at best imply a dubious procedure of “national reconciliation,” involving negotiation by the indigenous with triumphant settlers from within, and in the context of settlers’ established forms. Most likely, given the multiracial character of settler colonization in the West, is that one ethnicity would gain the ascendancy over all the others, and it would be they who become the new indigenous. The Bantus in South Africa provide a historical example.

Uniqueness of Settler Colonization in the West

Settler colonization in the West is not unique because of its scale or the fact that settlers are poor. Settler colonialist projects have involved large numbers in the past and many of the settlers have been poor—in most cases, they immigrated looking for a better life. The uniqueness of our experience with settler colonization results from the unique features of modern Western societies.

First, it is the colonization of the more powerful by the less powerful, of the former colonialists by the formerly colonized; it is, in other words, a reversion of past colonialism and settler colonialism.

Secondly, this process enjoys the ongoing complicity of the indigenous’ ruling elites, who, wittingly or unwittingly, instigated it in the first place out of a perceived economic need, and have since institutionalized it out of political opportunism, greed, a sense of historical guilt, or befuddlement with an ideology of human universalism. The opening of land to colonists by leaders is not unique: African kings in southern Africa either sold or gave away land to European settlers in exchange for military service during the 19th century. What is unique is the institutionalization of a policy of welcoming settler colonization, supported by a universalist ideology that makes the voluntary transfer of land and sovereignty morally virtuous.

Thirdly, alongside indigenous collaborationism, Third World settler colonization in the West has been catalyzed by both historical events and the existence of a hostile or at least self-serving exogenous minority of very able intellectuals, businessmen, and legislators. The excesses of the National Socialist government in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, Allied victory in World War II, and the moral capital amassed and exploited by Jews—and especially radical Marxist Jews—as a result of well publicized National Socialist persecution, permitted the development of Jewish intellectual movements that subjected traditional European identity and institutions to radical critiques. Their effect was the gradual deprecation of European tradition and racial identity and the development of universalism to its logical extreme. Interacting with guilt as the primary method of social control in the West, this made it possible even for genetically distant immigrants eventually to become legislators because it had become impossible for the indigenous to argue against exclusion based on race.[5]

Fourthly, the sovereignty transfers take a more abstract form than the land leases, cessions, seizure, or annexations that have characterized settler colonialist projects elsewhere. In the West transfers occur at the legal, policy, and moral- philosophical levels; they involve, for example, changes in legislation that privilege settlers over the indigenous, abdication of indigenous racial consciousness as a morally legitimate cognitive structure, or discrimination policies against the indigenous designed disproportionately to enhance settlers’ access to higher education and the job market. Similarly, the emptiness and evacuation of the “land of opportunity” among settlers occurs at a much more abstract level than allowed by indigenous demographic contraction: the Western “land of opportunity” is densely populated and highly developed, so the evacuation is purely subjective. Its closest analogue is modern Israel, where the “promised land” is subjectively emptied by denying Palestinians the same moral and symbolic status as Jews.

Finally, the settler colonization in the West does not involve the ignoring or direct overrunning of the indigenous, but rather an incremental engagement, which runs concomitantly with a process of gradual transformation of the settler from appellant to citizen to legislator, which is, in turn, wrapped up with the process of indigenization already mentioned.

Third World settler colonization of the West is possible only as a result of a uniquely Western ideology (egalitarianism) and an autochthonous political system (democracy), both of which morally and ideologically disarm the indigenous against settler ascendancy and predation.

Ending Settler Colonization

As has been noted, settler colonialism rarely ends, and it is superseded only by itself. After the United States’ independence, the former settlers ceased to be colonials from a distant mother country because their mother country had become the United States. Moreover, the indigenous were in time either displaced or made to disappear entirely, so there was no question of the indigenous regaining their independence and the colonials returning home—as just stated, the latter were at home. Third World settler colonization in the West being analogous, it follows that the crisis faced by Westerners is much more fundamental than simple out-of-control immigration. A polity can exclude immigrants and strip resident immigrants of their citizenship, but settlers are founders of polities, so they cannot be stripped of their own citizenship by the displaced indigenes, since the indigenous sovereignty is not recognized.

It should be apparent that we in the West live still in a time of transition, where immigration coexists with and interpenetrates settler colonization, and where one has not entirely given way to the other. Yet it is already possible for a citizen of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean descent in the United Kingdom to treat, for example, a White South African over the age of 16 immigrating into the island as a foreigner, and to be in a position to grant or deny admittance, even where the South African has blood ties to the island going back thousands of years and was born to United Kingdom citizens. Conversely, it is no longer possible, without an abrogation of modern Westernism’s basic philosophical tenets, suddenly to withdraw citizenship from a United Kingdom resident descended from one or more generations of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean citizens. Even the overnight expulsion of illegal immigrants and the passing of the most restrictive immigration law imaginable in our present ideological context could not deal with this problem. As time passes, the immigration reform debate will become increasingly irrelevant.

Where settler colonialism was terminated or reversed, such as in South Africa after Nelson Mandela, Rhodesia after Robert Mugabe, and Haïti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the measures required were violent and broke (or would have broken had it existed) current international law. Because this law is premised on equality as an absolute moral good, reversing settler colonization in the West would, without first abrogating this law, or else discrediting the moral basis for such body of law, also imply violent and illegal acts. Settler colonization is, after all, a game of erasure: settlers erase or are erased; no ongoing or equitable relationship is possible between settlers and indigenes. And the single biggest impediment to Whites’ avoiding erasure is the hegemonic belief in the West in equality as an absolute moral good, because the latter dictates that settlers be accorded equal rights and privileges to the indigenous (despite settlers being hostile), and because this belief effectively short-circuits the possibility of an opposing belief in the morality of White racial consciousness and preservation.

Whites in Europe and North America, as well as in former colonies in Africa, the South Pacific, and South America, currently lack a moral theory, let alone the legal means (since the latter would stem from the former), with which to justify and secure their continuity. Unless a new moral theory of difference can be formulated to support an ideology and legal framework that both justifies and enables its self-preservation as a unique biological entity in their own homelands, the White race faces complete erasure from the Earth.


  1. “Invasion,” Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion (accessed September 1, 2012).  ↩
  2. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010.  ↩
  3. Ibid., p. 54.  ↩
  4. Ibid., p. 81.  ↩
  5. See Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Paul Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press 2002).  ↩
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