It’s January 19, 2021, and welcome back to The Spencer Report. We’ve successfully lobbied for a presidential pardon. This week I’m joined by Edward Dutton. Main topic: QAnon and the…
It’s January 19, 2021, and welcome back to The Spencer Report. We’ve successfully lobbied for a presidential pardon. This week I’m joined by Edward Dutton.
Main topic: QAnon and the End of the American Century
The storm came. That’s for sure. But it wasn’t the Storm QAnon had in mind. Trump ended his presidency—not by arresting pedophiles in the Deep State and releasing the children from underground dungeons—but in utter disgrace. His enthusiastically deluded voters ransacked the Capitol and attempted the most buffoonish coup d’état in recorded history.But what does this all mean? Should we chalk up “Q” to mere delusion? Or might it represent the beginnings of a new religion. Moreover, is Trump’s fall from grace merely a colorful moment in American history? Or might it spell the downfall of a once dominate empire?
Mark Brahmin and Richard Spencer discuss the intellectual background of REM theory, Apolloism, and their interpretive methodology. A new independent video series discussing Brahmin’s REM theories has appeared recently.
Mark Brahmin and Richard Spencer discuss the intellectual background of REM theory, Apolloism, and their interpretive methodology.
A new independent video series discussing Brahmin’s REM theories has appeared recently.
QAnon is a religious revival for the age of political polarization, and one which will likely outlast Donald Trump. Introduction A religious revival is sweeping the United States. It’s already…
QAnon is a religious revival for the age of political polarization, and one which will likely outlast Donald Trump.
A religious revival is sweeping the United States. It’s already expanded as far afield as Europe, and its devotees number in the millions.1 With an esoteric, and eccentric, though uniquely American creed; it is perhaps best understood as a new stage of Christianity. It revolves around nothing less than a metaphysical battle between Good and Evil, which plays out at the highest levels of government, media, and finance. The future of the country—and safety of the world’s children—is at stake. Wickedness abounds, but devotees have faith that a messiah is rising, one who will “make America great again.” This new religion is regarded as so inflammatory—and perhaps threatening to public order—that major social media companies have purged all content related to its doctrines.2
It’s called “QAnon.”
The rise of QAnon has startled and flummoxed most mainstream media commentators. They dismiss, ridicule, and denounce this online “conspiracy theory” as it continues to grow ever more popular, powerful, and influential. According to polling in October 2020, some 15 percent of President Donald Trump’s supporters are committed followers of “Q.” An additional 22 percent are “fellow travelers”: they believe some of Q’s claims but worry that the movement might “go too far.”3 A full half of Trump supporters believe that the Democrats are engaged in child-trafficking and that Trump is trying to put an end to it—an opinion clearly derived from the Q cult, as we will see. Even if we take surveys like this with a grain of salt, they reveal the intense popularity—and likely staying power—of the Q narrative within the American Right, and beyond.
This Trump-era Internet phenomenon makes a great deal of sense if we conceive of it as a religious revival, and not simply as a popular conspiracy theory (like those surrounding the JFK assassination or the moon landing). Many of the key components of a religion are obvious: Q has its “angels,” “demons,” “saviors,” and promises of “redemption.” And for its adherents, QAnon serves many other vital functions of religions of the past. Furthermore, this re-conception of Q raises some bigger questions. Why do religious revivals—periodic outbursts of intense devotion—occur in the first place? And if we accept that QAnon is a creed for our time, why has it taken this superficially bizarre guise, and shed the trappings of traditional religion?
To answer these questions, we will turn to modern history and specifically the impact it had on human evolution. The Industrial Revolution weakened Darwinian selection pressures on Western societies, leading to, among other things, a collapse in child mortality and a collapse in selection pressures for intelligence, traditional religiousness, and highly ethnocentric groups, all of which it is clear were being selected for until that point. Due to an inter-related sequence of consequences, this has resulted in an increasingly genetically diverse—and thus culturally and politically polarized—society. The bundle of inclinations that constitute “religion” have broken apart. As a result, where once a global plague might have led to a Christian revival, in 2020 it led to, or brought to prominence, two distinct quasi-religious movements: Black Lives Matter4 and QAnon. Furthermore, I will proffer that, despite QAnon’s ostensible wackiness, it is far more group-fitness promoting than BLM, not least due to its traditionally religious dimensions. And perhaps most shocking of all, there may be some kernels of truth within its most outlandish claims.
1. The Rise of Q
The exact origins of Q—as well as those behind the cult and profiting from it—are murky and disputed, and beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say, in the autumn of 2017, someone supposedly working for the National Security Administration—boasting “Q-level” clearance and calling himself “Q”—began posting on the anonymous message and image board “4chan.”5 His first missive, on October 28, 2017, announced the imminent arrest of Hillary Clinton:
HRC extradition already in motion effective yesterday with several countries in case of cross border run. Passport approved to be flagged effective 10/30 @ 12:01am. Expect massive riots organized in defiance and others fleeing the US to occur.6
Years have passed, and Clinton has not been locked up, but inaccurate predictions never affected the growth of Q’s prestige. In his second post, later that day, he began to outline his broader message:
HRC detained, not arrested (yet). […]
POTUS knew removing criminal rogue elements as a first step was essential to free and pass legislation.
Who has access to everything classified?
Do you believe HRC, Soros, Obama etc. have more power than Trump? Fantasy.
Whoever controls the office of the Presidency controls this great land.
They never believed for a moment they (Democrats and Republicans) would lose control.
This is not a R v D battle.
Why did Soros donate all his money recently?
Why would he place all his funds in a RC?
God bless fellow Patriots.7
Even at this early stage, Q’s style is established. Missives are released as a series of aphorisms and provocations, and Q asks more questions than Socrates. The cryptic, oracular suggestions nudge followers into perceiving politics in new ways. Indeed, Q’s message is highly counter-intuitive and revisionary, especially for conservatives. The NSA is not a shadow government engaged in surveillance and invasions of privacy—it’s the headquarters of the “good guys.” Donald Trump is not a buffoonish womanizer and jet-setter—he’s the enemy of the globalist class. And Robert Mueller was not investigating Trump for possible impeachment proceedings—he was working alongside him to “drain the swamp.” Nothing is as it seems. And in this topsy-turvy world, traditional political reporting must be distrusted and dismissed (“fake news”). The evocative call sign “Mockingbird,” in fact, seems to reference an alleged CIA program during the Cold War aimed at manipulating the media. Interestingly, Q’s unique brand of contrarianism can be translated for audiences outside the U.S. One German Q supporter exclaimed, regarding the American forces occupying his country, “these are troops that will free the German people from Merkel.”8
Each day, Q’s followers are tasked with exegesis and elaboration of his latest “Q drops” (anonymous posting on 4chan, certified by his handle “BQ7V3bcW”). Much like Jesus, the religion of Q was formed, not by the man himself—who always speaks elliptically and poetically—but by his devotees, who wrote the Gospels and formed the movement. Q’s crypsis re-enforces his central message: Trust the Plan. You can’t know, and maybe wouldn’t believe, what is happening behind the scenes. But you must hold fast and have faith that “good” will triumph in the end.
The Q drops birthed a Reddit community of 70,000 members at its height, and the movement gained serious attention when it was discussed by Sean Hannity, Roseanne Barr, and Alex Jones—the latter claiming to have direct contact with the man himself. Q memes were re-tweeted by Republican Party activists.9 And over the course of 2018-20, there arose what could be called “Q-adjacent” politicians, pundits, and celebrities, who might not address Q directly, and might not have any direct connection with the movement, but who speak in a language that resonated with the scene.
We’ll probably never know Q’s identity, or whether he—or she or they—desired to launch a crusade when it all first began. He might have merely been “shit posting” on 4chan, a website notorious for conspiracy theories, pornography, and outrageous right-wing opinions. But at least by 2018, Q was aware that he was part of something much bigger than himself and was consciously cultivating his movement, with heavy doses of moralizing. This impulse is apparent in his posting leading up to the 2020 election:
One party discusses God.
One party discusses Darkness.
One party promotes God.
One party eliminates God.
Symbolism will be their downfall.
The Great Deceiver(s). […]
Have Faith in Humanity.
Have Faith in Yourself.
UNITED WE STAND.
2. A Conspiracy So Immense . . .
Throughout the 20th century, sociologists studied the development, in America and most Western countries, of “public opinion.” This is a mostly unified understanding of important events (“the news”), as well as communally shared values, habits, and actions: “watch the news at 5,” “vote on Tuesday,” “church on Sunday,” and so on.11 “Public opinion” must be fostered and managed; it was a critical component of administering a technological, “democratic” society. Over the course of the past 25 years, such unity has been fragmenting: we don’t listen to the same music or watch the same movies and shows, nor do we consider ourselves part of a collective political community. The birth of the Web may have accelerated this trend; social networking and alternative media shifted it into overdrive.
Republicans, and especially Q followers, consider themselves “real Americans,” but in contradistinction to the “liberal elites,” who are, at best, hypocritical and selfish and, at worst, downright evil. The liberals, in turn, mirror this view: conservative Trump voters are deluded or racist reactionaries, out of touch with their country’s true national purpose. Political polarization derives from this “culture of suspicion.” Q supporters don’t merely distrust the mainstream media; they reject it because it’s the mainstream media. Authenticity and truth are to be found elsewhere. For some time, right-wing outlets such as Fox News and talk radio served this purpose, but these are quickly being replaced by websites like Breitbart, Facebook groups, “citizen journalists,” and, yes, QAnon. 4Chan itself acts as a kind of chaotic “Id” brain of the online Right. The anonymous poster possessing esoteric knowledge is the most anti-mainstream—and thus the most credible—source there is.
Q integrates a number of inter-related sets of conspiratorial beliefs. According to its gospel, throughout the 20th century, the world was gradually taken over by “wicked” people, who were prepared to do anything they could to enrich themselves and become ever-more powerful. Those who are not part of this criminal organization are, generally, “good” people, though many are turned “evil” by their evil masters. This vicious elite constitutes a shadowy “Deep State,” which runs the world behind the scenes. A criminal ruling class—which includes the Clintons, every president after Reagan, Bill Gates, and the leaders of every dimension of Western societies that have any influence—can be blamed for everything: financial collapses, pandemics, and even child-abuse rings. To turn us into cooperative drones to be exploited, they undermine the cornerstones of Western civilization, such as family and national solidarity, and direct external invasions and drug epidemics. Even childhood vaccinations are part of their dastardly scheme.
Some “good” people still hold positions of power, and they are able to use the digital footprint (emails and other communications) left by “The Cabal” to start to challenge it. These “good guys” are working for the NSA and some other branches of government. Not too long ago, they devised a plan to take the world back and eventually arrest The Cabal’s leaders and henchmen. These patriots asked Trump to run for president so that they could enact their, as it were, “counter-conspiracy.” The Cabal struck back and did all it could to overthrow Trump—but he just kept on winning.
Part of the success of QAnon is the way in which it, parsimoniously, brings together and provides an overarching rationale for so many “alternative histories” that have been popular in America for decades. For example, The Cabal killed JFK because he threatened to undermine it, and they shot Ronald Regan to dissuade him from challenging it. The 9/11 attacks were an “inside job,” at the hands of The Cabal, in order to grab power and further erode the freedoms enjoyed by good citizens. Similarly, Covid-19 is a hoax deployed by this Deep State to control the populace and render them despondent.
Relatively recent revelations about high-level sexual abusers and pedophiles, such as Harvey Weinstein and Jeffrey Epstein (1953-2019)—who supposed killed himself on suicide watch before he could face trial—are drawn into the web.12 Q followers have theorized that John F. Kennedy Jr. faked his death in 1999 in order to avoid being assassinated by The Cabal. He lives on as a Trump supporter in Pennsylvania; some think he might be Q himself.13 Some QAnon supporters accept the 2016 “Pizzagate” conspiracy, where a Washington, DC pizzeria was the headquarters of this diabolical child-abuse ring, with Bill Clinton’s chief of staff John Podesta, convicted sex offender and former Democrat congressman Anthony Weiner, and Hillary Clinton all being involved.
Yet another strand of QAnon thought focuses on the significance of Jewish financial interests in controlling The Cabal. According to this theory, the Satanic, child-stealing, baby-murdering Khazar Empire from Babylon was defeated by Russian Tzars and driven underground. They gradually infiltrated the world banking sector and even the British monarchy; the Rothschilds are actually Khazars, who control some of the world’s most powerful Satanists. As Q “dropped”: “Realize Soros, Clintons, Obama, Putin, etc. are all controlled by 3 families.”14 Q lists these three families in some posts: The House of Saud, George Soros himself, and the Rothschilds. In another post, Q asks: “What happened to Diana? What did she find out? Why was she running?” and invoked the idea of a secret British government, propped up by MI6.15 The rabbit hold runs deep . . .
3. That New Time Religion
What can we make of all this? America is notorious for its love of conspiracy theories, and these often seem to act much like “replacement religions.” Groups battle with each other and the victors pass on more of their genes. This is known as “group-selection.” Groups are more likely to win if they regard themselves as superior and the other group as evil. Religions tend to promote this adaptive way of thinking: We are the people of God; they worship the Devil. As a frontier and settler society at its inception, the American population has been subject to strong group-selection to be an intensely religious people, and a central aspect of religion is “over-detecting agency”—perceiving agents behind the world itself. It should thus be little surprise that in our “secular age,” America has become a land of believers in the supernatural, alien abductions, Satanic cabals, and bizarre creeds of all sorts.16 This has become particularly prominent from the 1960s onwards, as traditional religions have lost social power and prestige.17
Some Q followers have fully integrated his conspiracy theory into their religious practice; they, in fact, call themselves “Qvangelicals.”18 In this way, their daily news feed takes on religious significance. Q himself states: “We are living in Biblical times. Children of light vs children of darkness. United against the Invisible Enemy of all humanity.”19 Trump, in his way, is imagined as a fallen Messiah.
According to this strand of Q theology, the world is controlled by a Satan-worshipping pedophile ring that sexually abuses and kills children—and even drinks their blood—in order to achieve immortality. In many ways, Q followers might be compared to the Gnostics in the Early Church. This was a highly diverse movement, theologically speaking, united by core ideas. In particular, Gnostics believed that the universe was dualistic, reflecting an eternal battle between a higher god and the evil god of this world. This evil god was responsible for all of the world’s woes, and one could be “saved” by attaining direct knowledge of the higher god, knowledge which the evil god attempted to hide from you, via mystical practices.20
QAnon possesses not just a fledgling theology but an eschatology as well, a vision of the imminent End Times, both apocalyptic and triumphant. We are living through “The Awakening,” the point when the good people in government have begun communicating with and enlightening the broader public. Trump’s assumed re-election in November was said to herald “The Storm,” in which The Cabal was to be overthrown and America, restored. This November’s election has been tempestuous, indeed: both sides claimed victory; the Republicans cried “voter fraud”; and the Democrats suspected a potential coup. Q himself has gone mostly silent. On November 13—more than a week after Biden was deemed President Elect—Q announced: “Nothing can stop what is coming. Nothing!”21 But overall, Q has not given his millions of followers much guidance for how they should process what is unfolding.
Nevertheless, liberals will be disappointed if they expect that Biden’s inauguration will put a swift end to the QAnon phenomenon. The movement has deeper causes than Trump’s mercurial political career, and either outcome (a new Biden administration or Trump’s unlikely return to power) can be rationalized as The Cabal’s counter-strike or else as all part of The Plan. Put simply, QAnon and movements like it are here to stay. Remove Trump from office and watch the cult become more powerful than you could possibly imagine.
4. The Times They Are A Changin’
Historically, religious revivals tend to take place during periods of dramatic change, especially during those that involve an elevated awareness of death: war, famine, plague, political instability, and the seeming end of the world.22 This makes sense because experimental research has found that individuals become more religious—more prone to strongly believing in God—in precisely these dire contexts.23 In the wake of World War I and the Spanish Flu Pandemic, there were notable religious revivals in eastern England and in northeast Scotland.24 After World War II and the end of post-War restrictions, there was a huge religious revival in the U.S. and in the UK led by pastor Billy Graham (1918-2018), based around emotional rallies each attended by many thousands.25
By 2020, Covid-19 burst on the scene and led to hundreds of thousands of deaths around the world, creating a period of deep anxiety, in which it seemed very possible that the death toll could be enormous. In turn, the “lockdowns,” which governments instituted as a means of containing the plague, marked unprecedented disruptions to normal life. We have also had the sudden and heightened trauma of the Black Lives Matter Movement, resurrected in a newer, more intense form after the death of George Floyd. As I have argued, BLM can be considered a religious revival of its own.26 Regardless, the protests of this past summer eventuated in a collapse of public order in parts of the U.S. and UK: an orgy of inter-racial strife, violence, and self-righteous displays, which the political and legal Establishment was unable or unwilling to suppress. This was accompanied by the sapping of White morale through the removal of historical statues and other links with the “certainties” of the past.
With this background, we would expect there to be a religious revival in Western countries—and specifically one that might counter BLM. For various reasons, however, it could not be as overtly religious, as was Billy Graham’s movement, which developed in a context in which traditional Christianity was still dominant. Since then, we have witnessed the collapse of traditional society,27 a significant fall in the influence of Christianity, and deviations from traditional religious norms in many directions, with many people creating their own ersatz religion from various sources.28 Put simply, we’re lived through the fallout of the “death of God.”
For at least the past 100 years, a secularization thesis has informed, sometimes unconsciously, the minds of scholars, public intellectuals, and policy-makers. Briefly, people and institutions are becoming less religious; those religions that do persist are largely relegated to the private sphere: they are “tolerant” and more like lifestyles than ways of life. In reality, the situation is far more complicated. Society is increasingly divided between “Individualists” and those who are high in “Binding Values” (putting the group ahead of the individual). “Individualist” ideas have gradually become dominant across time. And extreme Individualists have ascended to the heights of the social ladder and pushed the broader society in their direction. While this has been happening, however, those who are highest in Binding Values—and especially those prone to intense religiosity—have been having the most children. The result is that America—and, in fact, nations around the world29—are undergoing radical polarization. Social trust has collapsed, as each side is increasingly alienated from the other, culturally and morally. Moreover, in “meritocratic” societies, education, IQ, and being “politically correct” are all inter-related, as we will see in more detail below. This has led to even greater social and economic distance between the two polarized groups.
It is against this background that QAnon’s rise must be understood, as the religion provides a means of making sense of a world that its adherents increasingly don’t understand. If Americans’ moral foundations veer more towards those of a traditional kind, they will be profoundly concerned with a structured and ordered society, with rescuing and promoting their group, and with destroying that which fills them with disgust—sexual disgust, in particular. QAnon is attractive to such people because it provides order out of chaos; it offers a rescue plan for the group as a whole; and it is partly focused on destroying sexual deviants and those disloyal to the group—those that want to create chaos.
There are certainly ways that the Q cult can encourage unhealthy obsessions and anti-social behavior among its believers. It’s worth remember that on December 4, 2016, a North Carolina man, brandishing a rifle, entered the Comet Ping Pong pizzeria in Northern Virginia and threatened employees before being arrested. He claimed to be “investigating” the Pizzagate affair, discussed above.30 It might be only a matter of time before something similar, or worse, takes place involving a deranged Q advocate.
That said, we would be remiss if we ignored the ways that the Q cult can be “adaptive,” in an evolutionary sense, and bring along many of the benefits of older religions. First, Q offers the promise that, once the evil-doers are dispatched, America will experience a revival of traditional values, which used to be central to American life (including ethnocentrism and pro-natalism). Additionally, in that Q presents itself as a moral crusade, it can also inspire self-sacrificing, group-selected, and ultimately pro-social behavior. And, as we will see as we turn to the scientific theories of religion, it is the more tightly bonded groups that tend to triumph in the end.
5. The Evolution of Religion in the 21st Century
“Religion,” in the widely accepted sense of the word, involves all of the key components of an evolutionary adaptation. It is around 0.4 genetic; traditional religiousness (specifically the collective worship of a moral god) is associated with physical and mental health, partly at the genetic level;31 it correlates with fertility; and specific parts of the brain are associated with it.32 Accordingly, religiousness was selected for under the conditions of harsh Darwinian selection that were prevalent until the breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution.
There are likely a number of non-exclusive reasons why religiousness evolved. One is that it promoted pro-social behavior. Those who believed in a god who told them to behave in a pro-social way were less likely to be cast out or killed by the pre-historic band and were, therefore, more likely to pass on their genes. A related possibility is that it reduced stress when we, as advanced rational beings, recognized our own mortality. Those who felt that their lives had eternal meaning and that a god was constantly looking after them would be less likely to become depressed and anxious and more likely to pass on their genes.33 Consistent with this, not only do people tend to become more religious at times of stress, they are more likely to have dramatic religious experiences in which they do not merely vaguely feel that God is present but, as far as they are concerned, see Him and hear His reassuring voice.34 In general, it seems reasonable to argue that religiousness would have been selected for because it promoted mental health, with the result that mental health and religiosity have become genetically related, due to both being simultaneously selected over a lengthy period of time.35
Religion also would have been kin-selected for, too. You can pass on your genes indirectly by aiding your kin: your children share 50 percent of your genes and more distant kin, such as nephews, share 25 percent. If a person were highly religious, it would make their kin more attractive, because of the associations between religiousness, pro-social behavior, and mental stability. This would help to explain why some Islamic fundamentalists kill daughters who have dishonored the family. It is a way of signaling the family’s commitment to Islam, and thus elevating kin selection.36 An ethnic group is an extended genetic kinship group and is thus a means by which you indirectly pass on your genes.37 It has been found, using computer-modeling, that groups that are highest in positive ethnocentrism (internal cooperation) and negative ethnocentrism (external hostility) tend to dominate others in the battle of group selection.38 There is evidence implying that religiousness is genetically associated with both kinds of ethnocentrism, because a part of the brain associated with ethnocentrism is also associated with religiousness.39 And the correlation between positive ethnocentrism and religiousness would make sense because a group would be more internally cooperative if it were high in pro-social traits and low in mental instability.
This is why religion is such a prominent part of the human experience. In essence, the group that promoted the most adaptive behaviors as “God’s will” was more likely to pass on its genes, while those who did not were more likely to die off. To be religious became associated with other adaptive traits, but it also elevated group-fitness by elevating being group-selected as “divinely ordained.”
There has, however, long been variation within societies in the nature of religiousness. One reason for this is that religion is itself composed of a series of adaptive traits, which, because they were adaptive, became bundled together and selected for as a single trait—religiosity. These are, among others:
Agency Over-Detection. We have a cognitive bias towards detecting the presence of an agent behind events. This is because, following the “Smoke Detector Principle,” it is adaptive to assume the worst and get it wrong—such as to assume that that rustling noise behind the bush was a wolf rather than the wind. This helps to explain why we might see evidence of god’s agency in the world.
Pattern Over-Detection. Much as with agency, we are evolved to over-detect causation. This is adaptive because those who under-detected it would have been wiped out. Partly for this reason, we are evolved to want a world that is highly structured and that makes sense to us.
Follow the Leader. We are evolved to form strongly-bonded groups and to obey authority; as such, groups are more likely to survive in the battle of group selection.40
Religions will vary in the extent of the prominence of each of these factors. This means that, though religiousness is generally adaptive, it is quite possible for maladaptive forms of religiousness—which do not “get the balance right”—to manifest, as has been the case throughout history. Those that espoused these forms of religiousness have tended not to survive.
One of the key balances that has to be maintained in any group is that between “individualism” and “binding values,” which we briefly looked at above. Jonathan Haidt has proposed that there are “Five Moral Foundations” on which humans vary. These divide into two higher order clusters: Individualizers (who are broadly left-wing) and those who are high on Binding (we’ll call them Binders, and they tend to be right-wing). Individualizers are strongly focused on “Care” (harm avoidance) and “Fairness” (a desire for equality). Although these values may superficially appear “selfless,” they are individualist, because they are concerned with the good of the individual (harm avoidance) or how he feels (equality) about the good of the group. Individualizers have relatively little interest in “Authority,” “Loyalty,” and “Sanctity” (that some things are “pure” and others “revolting” and “reprehensible”).
Binders are roughly equally concerned about “Loyalty,” “Authority,” “Sanctity,” “Care,” and “Fairness,” though there are some “extreme Binders” who do not much care about the latter two foundations; these people tend to be “far right.” Different forms of religion are thus differentially attractive to those who are stronger or weaker in the different moral foundations. For example, early Protestantism can be regarded as, in many ways, a revolutionary left-wing movement that was very high in “Fairness” and very low in traditional “Authority.”41 Of course, there will be all kinds of individual variance in the degree of strength within these moral foundations, but, overall, this was the clustering that was found.42 The groups that were successful in the battle of group selection were the groups that attained the optimum adaptive balance between these sets of foundations.
By 1800, we would expect White Americans to be particularly religious, because the cultural core of the country was founded by Puritans, who would have passed on their intense religiosity as a genetic legacy. The heritability of extreme religiosity is around 0.7,43 and White Americans were subject to intense group selection, especially in fighting Native Americans and the demands of establishing themselves in a hostile environment to which they were not adapted. Then again, evolution never stops. So we need to look closer at what happened to that original American stock.
6. The Industrial Revolution’s Revolution
Some 200 years ago, a basic level of religiosity had been established across the White race. Indeed, it has been shown that Western Europeans became more religious, seemingly for genetic reasons, throughout the Middle Ages, often due to executing and ostracizing “heretics” (that is, those prone to religious deviation and atheism).44 At that time, in Europe, the child mortality rate was 50 percent. A further 40 percent of people either witnessed all of their offspring die young or did not marry. Thus, only 10 percent of people born actually passed on their genes, and it has been shown in other species that this is necessary for a population to remain healthy. The Industrial Revolution heralded huge improvements in medicine, inoculations, and general living standards. And currently, around 80 percent of people pass on their genes and child mortality is 1 percent.45 In other words, the Industrial Revolution sparked a genetic revolution, as well—a dramatic change in who survived and reproduced.
In 1800, White America was a small gene pool in which people were all relatively genetically similar and strongly genetically fit, because those who deviated from the optimum—due to mutant genes—were purged from the population every generation. Being strongly genetically similar, the population would tend to trust each other, cooperate, and think in the same direction. We bond with people who are more genetically similar to ourselves because this is a means of indirectly passing on more of our genes. This trend is found even when looking at relationships between siblings, whose genetic similarity level can be subtly differ. This is why husbands and wives—and even best friends—are more genetically similar than could ever come about by chance.46 With the Industrial Revolution, this happy homogeneity began to break down, because selection pressure was heavily weakened. The result is a many-fold, inter-related sequence of factors, which change the nature, cohesiveness, and worldview of the population.
The Eleven Consequence of the Industrial Revolution
1. Genetic Physical Sickness
Populations are increasingly genetically sick, as mutations are no longer purged from the population. This has been demonstrated by growing evidence of highly genetic physical disorders.
2. Genetic Mental Sickness
Populations are increasingly mentally unfit, as witnessed by a rise in mental conditions associated with low fertility, such as depression and schizophrenia.
3. Genetic Diversity and Low Trust
Even controlling for immigration, societies are increasingly genetically diverse, leading, purely for genetic reasons, to lots of differences in how people view the world and a gradual collapse in social trust.
4. Diverse and Maladaptive Worldviews
We see worldviews that were extraordinarily rare in 1800 becoming more and more commonplace. This makes sense if we understand the relatively close relationship between physical and mental traits. The brain is 84 percent of the genome. This means it is a massive target for mutation, such that the higher your general mutational load, the more likely you are to have mutations of the mind, which would have been strongly maladaptive under Darwinian conditions and which correlate with other physical and mental mutations. Under harsh conditions, we were evolved to collectively worship a moral god in order to be highly ethnocentric. We should see increasing deviation from group religiosity, and worldviews that are highly maladaptive; these should be associated with evidence of mutation.47 In line with this prediction, views associated with the Left can be regarded as clearly maladaptive or deviations from the Darwinian optimum. These include atheism (which undermines group selection), believing that life is pointless and has no eternal significance, anti-natalism, redistribution (putting other families above your own), multiculturalism (putting other ethnic groups above your own), individualism (having no concern for your group), and animal rights (putting other species above your own). These viewpoints are themselves associated with other maladaptive traits, in particular low fertility and high levels of mental illness, one strong example being depression.48 These deviations from the collective worship of a moral god are, unsurprisingly, also associated with physical evidence of mutation. In other words, you can learn a lot about someone’s psychology by assessing what they look like.
Having a symmetrical face is attractive because it implies that you have low levels of mutations. It indicates that you have been able to maintain a symmetrical phenotype in the face of disease, meaning that you have an optimal immune system, good genetic health, and thus a low mutational load. A person with high mutational load, and thus poor genetic health, need to employ proportionately more of their bio-energetic resources fighting off disease, resulting in less symmetry.49 On this basis, we would predict that people who were traditionally religious or right-wing—the two measures robustly correlate50—to be judged as better looking than left-wing people and to have faces that were more symmetrical. There is evidence indicating that this is, indeed, the case.51 Left-handedness is also a sign of high mutational load, as a symmetrical brain is associated with right-handedness. Accordingly, we would predict that non-right-handedness would be correlated with atheism, and this is so.52
5. The Spread of these Maladaptive Views to the Relatively Healthy
As humans are a highly pro-social species, we evolved to be in networks of mentally healthy people, and are impacted by the nature of the people with whom we interact. For example, though depression is highly genetic, there is a significant environmental component, with people who regularly associate with depressed people being more likely to become depressed themselves.53 In the same way, those who hold maladaptive views would become an increasing presence in the population and would influence those around them to adopt these views. These influencers, who hold these views to a pronounced degree, can be termed “spiteful mutants,” as they induce those who are lower in mutational load to adopt maladaptive views.54 Traditional society has established structures—such as religiosity and child-rearing practices—which optimally elevate its group fitness. The spiteful mutant will attack and undermine these, subverting them such that they undermine the fitness of society. Only those who are, for genetic reasons, extremely fitness-oriented, such as the traditionally religious, will instinctively reject the spiteful mutants, just as, centuries ago, ideas that undermined group fitness were dismissed as “witchcraft” and “devil worship.”
Once around 20 percent of the population holds maladaptive views, studies have shown that it can be expected to turn, very quickly, towards the new “system,” as the old system will appear moribund in comparison and adaptive people seek to join the winning team.55 This change seems to have happened around the 1960s. The means by which you would gain status in the new system would be to signal how pro-equality you were, meaning that society, taken over by the new way of thinking, would overtly become ever more left-wing and, thus, ever more different from the remnant group-selected component of the population, which maintained traditional values and was relatively resistant to changes. It would also mean that regulations on issues such as sexual mortality would collapse.
6. Declining Religiousness and Rising Individualism
Due to very low mortality salience, and all else controlled for, people would be very low in religiousness and thus low in the group-fitness promoting ideas associated with religiousness, such as ethnocentrism. It has been found that religiousness promotes social trust among non-relatives, as it is an insurance policy that a stranger—believing that god will punish him for his misdeeds—can be trusted. As religion collapses, therefore, social trust collapses, as well.56 The collapse of religiously-induced ethnocentrism, combined with a drift towards individualist values, also leads to mass immigration. It has been found that multiculturalism—specifically a local neighborhood becoming ethnically diverse—reduces social trust. The natives are not only disinclined to trust foreign immigrants but other natives, as well. This happens because the natives blame their co-ethnics for allowing the multicultural situation to occur, and also because they now fear that disloyal co-ethnics might collaborate against them with the immigrants.57
7. High Fertility on the “Far Right”
The portion of the society that is utterly resistant to the new fitness-damaging system of individualist values will be predicted to have been growing due to the association between traditional religiosity and fertility. In this line, it has been found that, using Western samples, being “far right” predicts having the highest fertility while being “far left” predicts having the lowest.58
8. A Genetic Caste System
Our relatively meritocratic and mobile society has created increasing cognitive stratification, whereby intelligent people, who happen to be born into working-class families, for example, are very easily able to leave this environment, become educated, and move to other areas dominated by educated and intelligent people.59 This was not possible when society was less meritocratic, in part because it was less interested in values such as “Fairness.” The result is that people of different intelligence levels, and even of different social classes (socioeconomic status being robustly predicted by intelligence60), increasingly inhabit different worlds. And, due to the high genetic component of intelligence of around 0.8, as well as the high genetic component of the personality traits associated with high IQ,61 they will be increasingly different from each other genetically, as well. So, we would expect those at the bottom of society to decreasingly trust and admire the elite. Furthermore, intelligence is associated with realizing what the dominant set of values is, and with forcing yourself to adopt them so that you can get on better in life. This is why professional people, currently, tend to espouse leftist values.62 Those of lower socioeconomic status will be less able to do this so, in a society of cognitive stratification, and will be increasingly alienated from the elite.
9. Declining IQ and so Declining Trust
One of the correlates of intelligence is trust. People with high IQ are more trusting, possibly because if you have low IQ you are more likely to be taken advantage of, meaning that it is adaptive to trust nobody. Another result of the Industrial Revolution has been declining intelligence. Various factors have contributed to this, but the most salient is contraception—the promotion of wide scale, reliable contraception being a major innovation of the Industrial Revolution. Intelligence predicts the impulse control to use contraception and the cognitive ability to use it correctly. As a result, large families now happen by accident and are associated with low intelligence, there being a correlation of about -0.2 between IQ and how many children you have. We know this is happening for genetic reasons because the population prevalence of alleles associated with high intelligence in a Western sample has decreased across three generations, and numerous other correlates of intelligence all show the same pattern.63 This results in a society that is less trusting overall, and particularly less trusting of its elite. A lower intelligence, all else being equal, would also predict a population becoming more conservative, more religious, and more dogmatic.
10. The Mutation of Religion
The genetic diversity, and increased mutation, wrought by the Industrial Revolution means that we would expect the traditional “religious bundle” to break up in a growing number of people. Thus, you would have, in many supporters of Black Lives Matter, for example, high levels of dogmatism, intense hatred of the out-group, fervent belief in certain ideas, belief in the morality of the in-group, even collective worship of sorts, but no belief that life has eternal significance or belief in gods. This ideology is underpinned by individualistic foundations which, in some respects, it renders sacred: unquestionable dogmas, like “equality” and “social justice.”
We might also expect a similar deviation among those who have Binding values: they will semi-sanctify Binding values, meaning they will have some aspects of religiousness, but they might lack the belief in a moral god, or their belief in god will be so extreme as to be obsessive and damaging to their ability to get along with people. We can see QAnon supporters who worship Donald Trump as Messianic figure.
Such people would be high in evidence of mutation. Consistent with this prediction, it has been found that people who are high in the personality trait Neuroticism (which is associated with depression and anxiety) are generally low in religious belief. However, they go through phases of extremely intense religious belief. Suffering from manic depression or bipolar disorder, and Schizophrenia, as well, is also strongly associated with hyper-religiosity. In sum, mental illness is a marker of genetic mutation, and it seems to make one prone to an unhealthy righteousness.64
This makes sense because an aspect of schizophrenia is hyper-mentalizing, whereby schizophrenics are intensely interested in the feelings of others and external cues from them. Accordingly, they perceive evidence of “mind” everywhere, including in the world itself, making them paranoid.65 A study from Switzerland found that one third of schizophrenics are very strongly involved with their local mainstream church and that a further 10 percent are involved in New Religious Movements: small sects that tend to be fervently religious.66 All people sit on a schizotypy scale, with full schizophrenia at one extreme; the higher they are on this scale, the more attracted they are to conspiracy theories67 and unconventional and paranoid beliefs.68 So, this implies that some people on the “Right” are also manifestations of high mutational load. The “Right,” however, would be less influenced by mutational load than the Left, because the Right would be closer to the ideas that were prominent under harsh Darwinian conditions and, in line with this, being right wing lineally correlates with fertility and mental health, as noted earlier. It might also be noted that extreme Left activists have been shown to score very high in Narcissism (entitlement and desire for adulation) and Machiavellianism (desire for power), which makes sense as, in the current climate, being left wing is a means of achieving these aims. Those who are “White Identitarian” score high in psychopathology (low empathy), which makes sense because, currently, they are profound non-conformists.69 If combined with a period of high mental instability, then this could predict attraction to the “far Right,” at least when that is highly counter-cultural. These traits are expressions of developmental instability and thus, in some cases, mutational load.70
11. The Internet Echo Chamber
Finally, a clearly important factor, which indirectly emanates from the Industrial Revolution, is the technological revolution and the rise of the Internet. This has aided polarization by permitting like-minded people to easily find each other and establish online communities, which can spill over into real life. We have progressively moved from being a “mass society,” in which public opinion is managed by an elite, to a “network society” of ever fragmenting, often hermetic groups, each with its own inner-directed propaganda.71 This has permitted the proliferation of “non-mainstream” opinions, and the managing elite has, to a large extent, lost control of people’s minds. This happened previously in history, with the birth of printing, but not to this pronounced degree. Elites have attempted to deal with this reality by increasingly censoring social-media platforms, as noted above, but, in many ways, the train has left the station. The rise of the Internet—and social-media echo chambers like Q—are simply amplifying a polarizing tendency that was already under way.
The year 2020, which many saw as the end of the world, catalyzed two distinct religious revivals for our divided age: BLM and QAnon. They are godless faiths; however, they contain many of the core elements of the Christian revivals of yesteryear. Both are birthed from the evolutionary dynamics of post-Industrial society. And both, in their ways, are hysterical, schizophrenic expressions of how religiosity manifests itself in our “secular age.”
Coda: Is Q Getting At Something?
The mainstream media dismisses QAnon’s beliefs as fraudulent—ridiculous at best, dangerous at worst. We should remember that a cult like Q is unlikely to be persuasive if did not tap into some aspects of reality or contain a few kernels of truth.
Take, for instance, the belief that causes the most controversy—that Satanic pedophiles are in positions of power around the world. If we break this down, it could be argued that, in the minds of evangelicals, what “Satan” essentially preaches is individualism: wealth, power, and pleasure in the here and now, rather than sacrificing power in this world for glory in the next.72 There is a substantial body of evidence that people who tend to reach the very top of their professions, especially in business and politics, seem to combine outlier high intelligence with moderately psychopathic traits, such as moderately low altruism and moderately low impulse control. This means, for example, that not being bound by rules and conventions, they have the intelligence and traits to conceive of original ideas, and they don’t care that their original ideas may offend against vested interests.73 In the world of business, such people will come up with brilliant ideas, as they will in the arts. In the world of politics, such men will be superb at presenting themselves and persuading and manipulating their peers.
In an increasingly individualistic society, in which religious condemnation of individualistic behavior such as adultery has collapsed, such people would be more easily able to attain positions of political leadership. Sexual promiscuity is one of a number of accepted markers of psychopathic personality, alongside grandiosity and superficial charm.74 A few generations ago, revelations that a politician had had an affair, let alone fathered an illegitimate child, would be the end of his career. No longer. A key correlate of originality is testosterone, because it makes one driven, ambitious, competitive, low in impulse control, and low in altruism. It also gives you a high sex drive.75 Indeed, an analysis of a sample of extremely eminent people found them to have been high both in sexual deviance and sexual promiscuity, as well as being high in sub-clinical psychopathology. This analysis, by psychologist Felix Post (1913-2001), found that six percent of the male population in Western countries can be regarded as archetypal psychopaths, something true of none of a sample of “eminent men” whom he biographically analyzed. However, Post estimated that 10 percent of the male population were “subclinical psychopaths,” meaning psychopathic tendencies sufficiently strong to adversely impact relationships or careers. This he estimated to be true of 14 percent of eminent men, meaning subclinical psychopaths were overrepresented. Among eminent writers, subclinical psychopathology was 20 percent, while among eminent artists it was 25 percent. Among politicians it was just 11 percent, only slightly above the general male population. However, using the less severe measure of having “potentially handicapping traits” of antisocial personality disorder, Post found that this was true of 52 percent of politicians, 50 percent of artists, and 70 percent of writers. Post cautiously estimates that this level of psychopathology applies to 16 percent of the male population. Accordingly, it can be averred that moderate antisocial behavior disorder is elevated among the highly eminent.76 So, we should not be surprised that, to a greater extent than was once the case, people who are high in individualism, intelligence, and psychopathic traits should rise to the top.
Such people’s rise would be aided if they adopted the group-fitness damaging, spiteful mutant-inspired leftist ideas that are currently in vogue, so we would expect them to do that. And, with their high sex drives, and low empathy, we might even expect them to engage in sexual abuse to an elevated degree, including abuse of children because, as they are such easy prey. Approximately half of those who sexually abuse children are not exclusively attracted to children. Pedophiles, so defined, have strongly elevated levels of poor mental health (something Post also found was high among the very eminent), including mood disorders (66 percent), obsessive compulsive disorder (25 percent), and personality disorders of various kinds (61 percent), such as Psychopathic Personality.77 For this reason, evidence of the abuse, especially of young girls, by such males starts to make more sense. Pedophilia and psychopathic personality may be comorbid, because they are both manifestations of developmental instability, resulting from elevated mutational load.78 In addition, only pedophiles who are high in psychopathic personality would be likely to act on their proclivities. Those who are high in psychopathic personality are, in evolutionary terms, adapted to a chaotic, unstable environment in which cooperating with people is futile, because such acts might never be reciprocated; you must, therefore, “live fast, die young” and opt to pass on your genes as quickly as possible. This militates in favor of having as much sex as you can with as many fertile (and thus young) females as possible. This is known as a fast Life History Strategy.79 Having sex with underage, though fertile, girls—“ephebophilia”—would simply be an extreme manifestation of this sexual strategy. There is also evidence that, in such contexts of instability, males who engaged in rape were more likely to pass on their genes, and that gang rape was especially common in pre-history. As a consequence, males, even now, produce more semen during rape, as rape traditionally involved sperm competition. Men also become more aroused by, and produce more semen, when watching violent porn than “vanilla” porn. In other words, men have been selected to be aroused by violence, especially sexual violence.80 Thus, for some men who abuse underage children, it may not be that they find them attractive; they are turned on by power and dominance. This would be more likely if they were fast Life History Strategists.
In the UK, elite pedophile fascination was sparked in the wake of the death of the extremely popular and influential entertainer Sir Jimmy Savile (1926-2011). Evidencing his “Establishment” status, Savile had been given a knighthood in 1990. After Savile died, large numbers of allegations came to light that he had raped and otherwise sexually abused under-age girls throughout his long career and had even been subject to a police investigation about this shortly before his death.81 A subsequent police inquiry into historic sexual abuse, “Operation Yew Tree,” as well as concomitant investigations and publicity, led to the downfall or reassessment of many other celebrities and politicians who had received assorted honors such as CBE (Companion of the British Empire), OBE (Order of the British Empire), and knighthoods. The investigation led to the jailing of a household name, entertainer Rolf Harris, CBE (b. 1930), for sexually abusing under-age girls; the imprisonment of TV personality Stuart Hall, OBE (b. 1929), on 13 counts of indecent assault against girls aged 9 to 17 between 1967 and 1986; and two posthumous allegations of underage rape, and one of rape of a 17-year-old woman, against deceased TV personality Sir Clement Freud (1924-2009), grandson of the psychiatrist.82
So, looked at in this way, the idea that the world is run—or at least heavily influenced—by selfish, child-abusers Satanists becomes less than entirely ludicrous. And, as was noted when Jimmy Savile’s proclivities came to light, there must have been so many high-status people who, at best, turned a blind eye to what they knew he was doing and, at worst, enabled him.83 We can see how people might suspect the same to be true of Jeffrey Epstein, Harvey Weinstein, Michael Jackson, and many others. In general, we exaggerate the extent to which members of an out-group are morally deficient, and we can see how this would become particularly pronounced at a time of extreme polarization and existential stress.84
Katrin Bennhold, “QAnon Is Thriving in Germany. The Extreme Right Is Delighted,” New York Times, October 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/world/europe/qanon-is-thriving-in-germany-the-extreme-right-is-delighted.html (accessed November 15, 2020). ↩︎
Barabara Ortutay, “YouTube Follows Twitter and Facebook with QAnon Crackdown,” AP News, October 15, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/youtube-qanon-conspiracy-theories-ef03a889e68239de6692ce42666d97d8 (accessed November 15, 2020). ↩︎
Graeme Bruce, “Half of Trump’s Supporters Think Top Democrats are Involved in Child Sex-trafficking,” YouGov, https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/10/20/half-trump-supporters-believe-qanon-theory-child-s (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Edward Dutton, “The Next Great Awakening,” Radix Journal, https://radixjournal.com/2020/06/the-next-great-awakening/ (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
For an early look at “Q”, see Paris Martineau, “The Storm Is the New Pizzagate — Only Worse,” New York, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/qanon-4chan-the-storm-conspiracy-explained.html (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/146981635/#147012719 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/146981635/#147012719 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Bennhold, “QAnon Is Thriving in Germany,” New York Times, op cit.↩︎
William March, “Conspiracy Theorist QAnon Promoted, Then Deleted, by Hillsborough County GOP, Tampa Bay Times, July 16, 2018, https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/16/conspiracy-theorist-qanon-promoted-then-deleted-by-hillsborough-county-gop/ (accessed November 15, 2020). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/146981635/#147012719 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1922); Jacques Ellul, Propaganda (Alfred A. Knopf, 1967). ↩︎
See Jasun Horsley, The Vice of Kings: How Socialism, Occultism, and the Sexual Revolution Engineered a Culture of Abuse (London, Aeon Books, 2019). ↩︎
E.J. Dickson, “QAnon Followers Think JFK Jr. Is Coming Back on the 4th of July,” Rolling Stone, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/qanon-jfk-jr-conspiracy-theory-854938/ (accessed December 10, 2020). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/147433975/#147434025 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Ling, “QAnon’s Creator Made the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory,” op cit.↩︎
Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2003). ↩︎
Peter Knight, Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to The X Files (London, Routledge, 2013). ↩︎
Justin Ling, “QAnon’s Creator Made the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory,” Foreign Affairs October 6, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/06/qanon-creator-ultimate-conspiracy-theory-q/ (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://qalerts.app/?q=Biblical+times (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Gerard van Grongingen. First Century Gnosticism: Its Origin and Motifs (Leiden: BRILL, 1967). ↩︎
Anonymous, BQ7V3bcW, 4chan.org/pol, https://qalerts.app/?n=4950 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
See Steve Bruce, God Is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002). ↩︎
Ara Norenzayan and Azim Shariff, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-sociality,” Science, 322 (2008): 58-62. ↩︎
Stanley C. Griffin, A Forgotten Revival: East Anglia and Northeast Scotland, 1921 (Bromley: Day One Publications, 1992). ↩︎
Callum Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000 (London: Routledge, 2009). ↩︎
See Brown. The Death of Christian Britain, op cit.↩︎
See Edward Bailey. Implicit Religion: An Introduction (Hendon, Middlesex University Press, 1998). ↩︎
Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Book, 2010). ↩︎
Faiz Siddiqui and Susan Svrluga, “N.C. Man Told Police He Went to D.C. Pizzeria With Gun to Investigate Conspiracy Theory,” Washington Post, December 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/12/04/d-c-police-respond-to-report-of-a-man-with-a-gun-at-comet-ping-pong-restaurant/ (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Edward Dutton, Guy Madison, and Curtis Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God’: The Rejection of Collective Religiosity Centered Around the Worship of Moral Gods is Associated with High Mutational Load,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 4 (2018): 233-244. ↩︎
Rüdiger Vaas, “God, Gains and Genes,” in The Biological Evolution of Religious Mind and Behavior, eds. Eckart Voland and Wulf Schiefenhövel (New York: Springer, 2009). ↩︎
Norenzayan and Shariff, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-sociality,” op cit.↩︎
Lewis Rambo. Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). ↩︎
See Dutton, Madison and Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God,’” op cit.↩︎
Yael Sela, Todd K. Shackelford, and James R. Liddle, “When Religion Makes It Worse: Religiously Motivated Violence As a Sexual Selection Weapon,” in The Attraction of Religion: A New Evolutionary Psychology of Religion, eds. D. Jason Sloane and James A. Slyke (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). ↩︎
Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 2006). ↩︎
Robert Axelrod and Ross A. Hammond, “The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50 (2006): 1-11. ↩︎
Colin Holbrook, Keise Izuma, Choi Deblieck, Daniel M. Fessler, and Marco Iacoboni, “Neuromodulation of Group Prejudice and Religious Belief,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11 (2016): 387-394. ↩︎
Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors (London: Heinemann, 2001). ↩︎
G.J.R. Parry, A Protestant Vision: William Harrison and the Reformation of Elizabethan England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). ↩︎
Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek, “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations,” Personality Processes and Individual Differences, 96 (2009): 1029-1046. ↩︎
Matt Bradshaw and Christopher G. Ellison, “Do Genetic Factors Influence Religious Life? Findings from a Behavior Genetic Analysis of Twin Siblings,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47 (2008): 529-544. ↩︎
Edward Dutton and Guy Madison, “Execution, Violent Punishment and Selection for Religiousness in Medieval England,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 4 (2018): 83-89. ↩︎
Anthony Volk, and Jeremy Atkinson, “Is Child Death the Crucible of Human Evolution?” Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 2 (2008): 103-116. ↩︎
J. Philippe Rushton, “Ethic Nationalism: Evolutionary Psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory,” Nations and Nationalism, 11 (2005): 489-507. ↩︎
Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, Radomir N. Pestow, and Heitor B. F. Fernandes, “Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191. ↩︎
Emil Kirkegaard, “Mental Illness and the Left,” Mankind Quarterly, 60 (2020): 487-510. ↩︎
Michael Woodley of Menie, Heitor Fernandes, Satoshi Kanazawa, and Edward Dutton, “Sinistrality is Associated With (Slightly) Lower General Intelligence: A Data Synthesis and Consideration of Secular Trend Data in Handedness,” HOMO: Journal of Comparative Human Biology, 69 (2018): 118-126. ↩︎
Corwin Smidt and James Penning, “Religious Commitment, Political Conservatism, and Political and Social Tolerance in the United States: A Longitudinal Analysis,” Sociological Analysis, 43 (1982): 231-245. ↩︎
Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl, Panu Poutvaara, “The Right Look: Conservative Politicians Look Better and Voters Reward It,” Journal of Public Economics, 146 (2017): 79-86. ↩︎
Dutton, Madison and Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God’”, op cit.↩︎
T.E. Joiner, “Contagious Depression: Existence, Specificity to Depressed Symptoms, and the Role of Reassurance Seeking,” Journal of Personal and Social Psychology, 67 (1994): 287-296. ↩︎
Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, Rodomir N. Pestow, and Heitor B. F. Fernandes, “Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191. ↩︎
Damon Centola, Joshua Becker, Devon Brackbill, and Andrea Baronchelli, “Experimental Evidence for Tipping Points in Social Convention,” Science, 360 (2018): 1116-1119. ↩︎
See Ara Norenzayan, Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). ↩︎
Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize lecture,” Scandinavian Political Studies, 30 (2007): 137–174. ↩︎
Martin Fieder and S.usanne Huber, “Political Attitude and Fertility: Is There a Selection for the Political Extreme?” Frontiers in Psychology (2018), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02343. ↩︎
See Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994). ↩︎
See Arthur Jensen. The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). ↩︎
Richard Lynn. Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations (London: Ulster Institute for Social Research, 1996). ↩︎
Michael Woodley of Menie and Curtis Dunkel, “Beyond the Cultural Mediation Hypothesis: A Reply to Dutton (2013),” Intelligence, 49 (2015): 186-191. ↩︎
See Edward Dutton and Michael Woodley of Menie. At Our Wits’ End: Why We’re Becoming Less Intelligent and What It Means for the Future (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2018). ↩︎
Harold G. Koenig, “Religion, Spirituality, and Health: The Research and Clinical Implications,” ISRN Psychiatry (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.5402/2012/278730 (accessed December 5, 2020). ↩︎
Christopher Badcock, “Mentalism and Mechanism: Twin Modes of Human Cognition,” in Evolutionary Psychology, Public Policy and Personal Decisions, eds. Charles Crawford and Catherine Salman (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003). ↩︎
Philippe Huguelet, Sylvia Mohr, Laurence Borras, et al., “Spirituality and Religious Practices Among Outpatients With Schizophrenia and Their Clinicians,” Psychiatric Services, 57 (2006): 366–372. ↩︎
D. Barron, A. Furnham, L. Weiss, K. Morgan, T. Towell and V. Swami. “The Association Between Schizotypal Components and Conspiricist Beliefs Through Cognitive Mediators,” Schizophrenia Bulletin, 44 (2018): s368-369. ↩︎
Jo Hodgekins, “Schizotypy and Psychopathology,” in Schizoptypy: New Dimensions, eds. Oliver Mason and Gordan Claridge (London: Routledge, 2015). ↩︎
Jordan Moss and Peter O’Connor. “The Dark Triad traits Predict Authoritarian Political Correctness and Alt-Right Attitudes,” Heliyon, 6 (2020): e04453. ↩︎
Martin Lalumiere, Grant T. Harris, and Marnie Rice, “Psychopathy and Developmental Instability,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 22 (2001): 75-92. ↩︎
See Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts, Network Propaganda: Manipulations, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). ↩︎
See J.A. Peterson, “Carnal, Chthonic, and Complicated: The Matter of Modern Satanism,” in Controversial New Religions. eds. James Lewis and Jesper Peterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). ↩︎
See, Edward Dutton and Bruce G. Charlton, The Genius Famine (Buckingham, University of Buckingham Press, 2015). ↩︎
See Edward Dutton and Richard Lynn, “Cheating in Sport and Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality,” Mankind Quarterly, 55 (2015): 325-334. ↩︎
Dimitri Van der Linden, Edward Dutton, and Guy Madison, “National-Level Indicators of Androgens are Related to the global distribution of number of scientific publications and science Nobel prizes.” Journal of Creative Behavior, 54 (2020): 134-149. ↩︎
Felix Post, “Creativity and Psychopathology,” British Journal of Psychiatry, 165 (1994): 22-34. ↩︎
Gilian Tenbergen, Matthias Wittfoth, Helge Frieling, et al., “The Neurobiology and Psychology of Pedophilia: Recent Advances and Challenges,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, (2015): 344. ↩︎
J. Philippe Rushton, Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective (New Brusnwick, NJ, Transaction Publishing). ↩︎
Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Lee Ellis, Theories of Rape: Inquiries Into the Causes of Sexual Aggression (New York: Hemisphere Publishing, 1989). ↩︎
Dan Davies, In Plain Sight: The Life and Lies of Jimmy Savile (London: Quercus Books, 2014). ↩︎
Martin Evans, “Clement Freud Accused of Raping Another Teenage Girl as Evidence Mounts That He Was a Predatory Paedophile,” Daily Telegraph (15th June 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/15/clement-freud-accused-of-raping-another-teenage-girl-as-evidence/ (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek, “The Moral Stereotypes of Liberals and Conservatives: Exaggeration of Differences across the Political Spectrum,” PLOS One (2012), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0050092 (accessed December 1, 2020). ↩︎
It seemed like only yesterday that all those online atheists were dominating YouTube—owning the fundies with facts and logic. *The dinosaurs are real—take that, Christians!* Chief Atheist Richard Dawkins just…
It seemed like only yesterday that all those online atheists were dominating YouTube—owning the fundies with facts and logic. *The dinosaurs are real—take that, Christians!*
Chief Atheist Richard Dawkins just released a new book, *Outgrowing God*. If anything, it expresses the intellectual exhaustion and growing irrelevancy of the movement he launched some 15 years ago.
Ed, Keith, and I look back at so-called “New Atheism,” revealing how those liberal edge-lords never asked any serious questions and how the battle between science and religion is not what it’s cracked up to be.
With the rise of the BLM movement, we are not just witnessing protests and riots but the birth of an old/new religion. Summary The Black Lives Matter protests are best…
With the rise of the BLM movement, we are not just witnessing protests and riots but the birth of an old/new religion.
The Black Lives Matter protests are best understood as a religious revival, emerging from the United States but global in scale. This new religion is “Multiculturalism” and based on institutions and ideals outside traditional churches; however, its structure and sacraments strikingly resemble those of Christianity. It could even be considered a kind of heresy.
Religious revivals take place in the wake of wars and disasters, periods of elevated stress and widespread angst. They are spearheaded by and attractive to people who are relatively high in neurotic traits such as anxiety. Their disturbed mental states are, temporarily, alleviated by the religious experiences that take place through these revivals—with religion, more generally, being an adaptation that allows us to cope with an unpredictable and traumatic world.
Leftists and atheists, of course, proudly reject traditional religion and sexual morality, and we should appreciate the irony of a “religious revival” capturing their hearts and minds. However, as a group, leftists and atheists are high in mental instability—especially those who are young and female—and thus they are highly susceptible to the religious experience, if not religion as it has been historically understood.
Following the Industrial Revolution and the exploitation of fossil fuels, the world became immensely wealthier, healthier, and more comfortable, and the harsh Darwinian selection pressures that characterized previous ages subsided. One of the most impactful consequences of this is the dramatic decrease in childhood mortality. Thus, millions of people with high levels of mutations, who would not have survived childhood in previous times, walk among us in the postmodern age. These “spiteful mutants” have managed to bring about the collapse of traditional religion—which is associated with mental and physical health and evolutionary success. They have spread Multiculturalism as a religion in its place. The result is a Multiculturalist revival, where 70 years ago there would have been a Christian one.
Imagine there’s no countries It isn’t hard to do Nothing to kill or die for And no religion, too Imagine all the people Living life in peace You, you may say I’m a dreamer But I’m not the only one I hope someday you will join us And the world will be as one —“Imagine,” John Lennon
The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement swept through the Western World beginning in May 2020 after the accidental death of African-American criminal George Floyd at the hands of a Minneapolis police officer. The initial result was widespread riots and looting by African-Americans in Minneapolis, followed by similar scenes in other places. But this quickly morphed into an ideological movement—under the already extant slogan “Black Lives Matter”1—in which a kind of anarchy swept through American cities, encouraged by Social Justice Warriors2 and, to a large extent, the leftist media and political establishment. A kind of hysteria appeared to take hold among White Americans, including politicians and even police officers.
Flagrantly breaking the “lock down,” which had been in action for two months due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Whites gathered in the streets and knelt in the name of George Floyd. Many police officers publicly engaged in this deferential behavior, often holding out their open hands to signify their willingness to make themselves defenseless. White Americans were filmed not just kneeling before Blacks but symbolically washing their feet.3 The riots were stated, by the media, to be “largely peaceful” even as buildings were aflame behind them or as White news reporters were physically attacked by rampaging mobs. There were calls to abolish the police and even for complete anarchy, under the slogan “No Justice, No Peace.”
The hysteria quickly spread to other Western countries. There were Black riots— assisted by White SJWs—on the streets of central London. White news reporters were attacked live on air. British police, in front of the gates of Downing Street, knelt before Black protestors rather than arrest them for breaking the lockdown and for rioting, as English Law demanded. Companies began to signal their support for “Black Lives Matter,” with those who were slow to do so being criticized as “racist” because, according to one slogan, “Silence is Violence.” In a BLM protest in Helsinki, the overwhelmingly White and female “protestors” didn’t merely kneel but lay prostrate on the ground in order to signal total submission and deference. Young females posted videos of themselves online renouncing their Whiteness, showing their “solidarity” with BLM. In one extreme case, a woman smeared herself in excrement as a sign of abasement.
Then came the attacks on statues and other public monuments. A statue of Winston Churchill in central London was graffitied with the word “Racist.” Britain’s Cenotaph war memorial was desecrated, and a young Black woman attempted to burn the Union Jack that hung from it. The statue of an 18th-century philanthropist and slave trader, which had stood in Bristol since 1895, was dragged down by a mob and thrown in the dock. Other statues that “offended” the sensitivities of the mob were preemptively removed, likely never to be re-erected, to prevent their destruction, including one of Belgium’s King Leopold, which stood in Brussels.
The streaming service HBO Max removed the American civil war epic Gone With The Wind (1939)—a film preserved by the Library of Congress as “culturally, historically, and aesthetically significant”4—after its romanticization of the South and depiction of African slaves was deemed unwatchable in the current climate. The chairman of Warner Media called the ban a “no brainer,” a curious choice of words.5 The BBC even removed from its streaming sites relatively recent comedies, made by liberal comedians only a decade ago, such as the light-hearted “Little Britain,” because “times have changed.”6
A New Religion
This wasn’t just mob rule and anarchy. On display was a religious intensity. And people were sucked into it. If the mob declared that you were not a “true believer,” you could lose your job, or perhaps even be subject to a police investigation. So, as more people exhibited their adherence to the Cult of George Floyd, an arms-race developed to indicate ever-greater fervor.
We need to stop calling things like this “liberalism” or a “civic religion.” It’s a religion. Period. A new stage of Christianity, which has gone through major mutations before.pic.twitter.com/uKxlmxhoy6
This was all so predictable. In April 2020, experts in the study of religion cautiously suggested that there might be some kind of religious revival in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, though they focused on what might happen in churches.7 There are always religious revivals after or during wars, famines, and pandemics. Why would the Covid-19 be any different?
In other words, we are witnessing another “Great Awakening.” But the religion of a significant portion of Western populations, and especially the young, is not Christianity. This new global religion of the 21st century is Multiculturalism. That said, Multiculturalism contains many elements of evangelicalism, both aesthetically and structurally, and perhaps could be viewed as Christianity’s latest mutation.
In order to understand what has taken place, we need to make sense of what religion is; why “mortality salience” is relevant to it; and how, precisely, religious revivals occur. Once this is clear, we will see that Multiculturalism is not just an ideology, partisan politics, or passing fad; it must properly be understood as a religion itself.
One of the key predictors of becoming religious is being confronted with your own mortality or that of your loved ones. No matter what an inveterate skeptic might say or write throughout his life, when told that his mother is in intensive care or his daughter has been in a car accident, there is a very strong possibility that, in private, he will beg God for help. “There are no atheists in foxholes,” as the saying goes. So-called “mortality salience” is an extreme example of the kind of psychological stress that appears to elevate religiousness. “Feelings of exclusion” seems to cause people to become more religious, too, as do periods of dramatic change, such as significant changes in government.8
“Religion,” in the widely accepted sense of the word, involves all of the key components of an evolutionary adaptation. Religiousness is around 0.4 genetic; it is associated with physical and mental health partly at the genetic level;9 it correlates with fertility; and specific parts of the brain are associated with it.10
There are likely a number of non-exclusive reasons why religiousness evolved. One is that it promoted pro-social behavior. Those who believed in a god who told them to behave in a pro-social way were less likely to be cast out or killed by the pre-historic band and were, therefore, more likely to pass on their genes. A related possibility is that it reduced stress in the face of danger or as we become aware of our own mortality. Those who felt that their life had eternal meaning and that a god was constantly looking after them would be less likely to become depressed and anxious and would be more likely to pass on their genes.11
Consistent with this, not only do people tend to become more religious at times of stress, they are more likely to have dramatic religious experiences, in which they do not merely vaguely feel that God is present but, as far as they are concerned, see Him and hear His reassuring voice.12 People who are high in neurotic personality traits are prone to depression and anxiety, these being manifestations of “mental instability.” Neuroticism seems to decrease considerably after one has undergone conversion and other religious experiences.13
Intrinsic religiousness—genuinely believing in god—is negatively correlated with Neuroticism.14 We can see this in the average churchgoer of the past century, a man who conforms to the belief system of his community, intellectually believes in a higher power, but likely doesn’t take his religion overly seriously nor does he worship with particular emotional affect. On the other hand, extrinsic religiousness—outward conformity to religion—is positively associated with Neuroticism. We can think of the fanatic or obnoxious scold, someone who wears his faith on his sleeve, perhaps even so devoted that religion negatively affects his welfare.
Being a “religious seeker” is also associated with Neuroticism. This involves going through phases of mental instability that are alleviated by an unusual and often very extreme forms of religiosity, which are duly abandoned during periods of sound mental health.15 Overall, it’s reasonable to argue that religiousness would have been selected for, because it promoted mental health, with the result that mental health and religiosity have become genetically related, due to both being simultaneously selected over a lengthy period of time.16
Religion also would have been “kin-selected.” You can pass on your genes indirectly by aiding your kin: your children share 50 percent of your genes, and more distant kin, such as nephews, share 25 percent. If a person were highly religious, it makes their kin more attractive, because of the associations between religiousness, pro-social behavior, and mental stability. This would help explain why some Islamic fundamentalists kill daughters who have dishonored the family. It is a way of signaling the family’s commitment to Islam and, thus, elevating kin selection.17 An ethnic group is, in the sense, an extended genetic kinship group and thus a means by which you can indirectly pass on your genes.18 It is has been found, using computer modeling, that groups that are highest in positive ethnocentrism (internal cooperation) and negative ethnocentrism (external hostility) tend to dominate others in the battle of group selection.19 There is evidence implying that religiousness is genetically associated with both kinds of ethnocentrism, because a part of the brain associated with ethnocentrism is also associated with religiousness.20 And the correlation between positive ethnocentrism and religiousness would make sense because a group would be more internally cooperate if it were high in pro-social traits and low in mental instability. But our key point is that religiousness has evolved, in part, as a means of coping with stress and mortality salience.
Why Are Women So Religious?
The high female presence both in BLM protests and in churches is obvious to anyone who has ever attended either. And this shouldn’t be surprising. Women are more religious than men, across cultures, in terms of how likely they are to believe in God and engage in collective worship.21 In the United States, Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, and Mormons are each 55 percent female. Some 70 percent of American women report an “absolute certainty” in their belief in a god, compared to 57 percent of men. American women are also much more likely to report that religion is important in their lives, and atheism is found twice as often among men than women (12 percent vs. 6 percent).22
This occurs because religion has been sexually selected for, too, as it is associated with being pro-social, rule-following (and thus not cuckolding your husband or abandoning your family and child), and with being part of a supportive group of co-religionists. These clear sex differences in the strength of religiousness will become significant later when we analyze the Black Lives Matter protests.
There are a number of probable reasons for higher female religiousness, one of which is empathy. Females are higher than in empathetic behavior, which involves being interested in people’s feelings and being able to detect their feelings from external markers, such as facial expressions.23 There is evidence that people who are high in empathy transfer this ability over to the world itself, meaning that they perceive the presence of a “mind” or “higher power” simply from looking around the world. Accordingly, low empathy—that is, stereotypical autism—is associated with atheism.24
Another reason may be adaptation to patriarchy. Females sexually select for male status because a high-status male is better able to invest in them and their offspring, meaning that both are more likely to survive.25 Until the Industrial Revolution, wealth and status strongly predicted completed fertility, and this is the case among pre-industrial peoples today. 26 If males must invest resources in the female in order to obtain sexual intercourse, then they want to be certain that the offspring in which they are investing their resources are actually their own. The result is a system of patriarchy in which females are controlled by males such that male paternity anxiety can be reduced. This system of patriarchy will tend to be promoted by the society’s religion as divinely ordained, possibly because patriarchal societies reduce paternity anxiety, meaning that they, in turn, reduce inter-male conflict, thus causing males to be more internally cooperative. And, again, as computer models have shown, societies of internally cooperative people are more likely to triumph in warfare with competing societies.27
This system of patriarchy, however, would mean that females would be strongly selected to be accepting of patriarchy and thus to be religious, as this is what the religion would promote.28 Consequently, there would be a religious “arms race” among females in order to obtain the highest-status males, especially in the kind of polygamous societies in which humans have lived for most of history, in which the highest status males monopolize the most desirable females. As such, we would expect females to be strongly prone to wishing to signal their virtue and, if religiosity were regarded as virtuous, to signal this. And they would be more convincingly able to signal it if they genuinely believed it.
Why is Religiousness Associated With Mental Health?
It is also clear to anyone that has ever attended a BLM protest that many of those involved—with their stereotypical unnatural colored hair and screams of righteous fury—are not mentally well. By contrast, females in churches appear sober and under control.
Why should traditional religiousness be associated with mental health? The answer lies in its evolutionary history. In understanding the evolution of religion, it is worth noting that it is a combination of a variety of traits, which would have been adaptive in pre-history.
1. Agency Over-Detection. We have a cognitive bias towards detecting the presence of an agent behind events. Following the “Smoke Detector Principle,” it is adaptive to assume the worst and get it wrong—such as to assume that that noise over there was a wolf rather than just the wind. This helps to explain why we might see evidence of god in the world.
2. Pattern Over-Detection. We are evolved to over-detect causation. This is adaptive because those who under-detected it would have put themselves in danger of being wiped out or not been able to analyze and understand the world around them.
3. Follow the Leader. We are evolved to form strongly-bonded groups and obey authority. By working as a team with a leader, groups are more likely to survive in the battle of group selection.29
Religions will vary in the extent of the prominence of each of these factors. This means that although religiousness is generally adaptive in an evolutionary sense of promoting individual and especially group fitness, it is quite possible for maladaptive forms of religiousness—which do not promote genetic fitness—to manifest. Some devotees might be, for example, too extreme in their obedience to the leader or in their pattern over-detection, such that adhering to such a religion is harmful for its followers. An obvious example of this would be suicide cults—such as the notorious Jonestown—in which devotees are so inclined to follow their leader and so inclined to over-detect patterns that they accept a mentally ill man’s paranoid worldview and kill themselves, completely destroying their genetic interests.30 Membership of such groups is associated with other maladaptive traits—such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—whereas traditional religiousness is genetically associated with mental health.
The relationship between religiousness and sound mental health makes sense if we delve a little deeper into how religiousness has been selected for over time. This will also be highly relevant, later, to understanding the nature of the Black Lives Matter movement. As I have discussed in my study “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There is No God,’”31 we were under conditions of harsh Darwinian selection until the breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution, which began in around 1800. The resulting improved public health and living conditions meant that child mortality has fallen from around 50 percent in 1800 to 1 percent today.32 High child mortality ensured that the surviving population was very strongly adapted to its ecology. Babies with mutations that made them unfit—such as those leading to a poor immune system—were purged from the population every generation, meaning that it overall had a very low “mutational load.” Under these brutal conditions, traditional religion—based around the collective worship of a moral god—was adaptive, meaning that it came to be selected for in tandem with other adaptive traits, which thus became genetically connected.
With the break-down of harsh Darwinian selection, we would expect the population to display increasing evidence of mutational load. This would be observed in secular increases in the prevalence of partly genetic medical conditions.33 We would also expect the development of all kinds of deviations from this delicately balanced Darwinian religious norm—deviations that would be maladaptive in terms of group and individual selection and that would be attractive to people with maladaptive traits, such as mental illness. Religious suicide cults, such as Jonestown and Waco, would exemplify this process. These religious deviants would have high mutational loads and likely be people who would not have survived childhood under harsh Darwinian conditions.
How do we know that such people would not have survived? In that the brain is 84 percent of the genome, it is an enormous target for mutation, meaning that those who have physical mutations can be expected to have mental mutations as well, which would direct them towards deviations from the most adaptive form of religiousness. Consistent with this, it has been found that, in modern samples, collective worship of a moral god is genetically associated with physical and mental health and is negatively associated with other markers of high mutational load, including autism, physical asymmetry, and left-handedness. These are associated with atheism or religious deviations, such as paranormal belief. The inability to develop a symmetrical phenotype implies a poor immune system, because a person with a poor immune system would have to use disproportionately more of his bio-energetic resources to fight off pathogens, meaning insufficient resources left over to ensure symmetry. Left-handedness is an accepted marker of “developmental instability.” If the brain develops symmetrically, people will tend to be right-handed. Failure to do so implies mutational load and, thus, left-handedness is associated with many examples of poor physical and mental health.34
So, with the nature of “religion” and its connection to mortality salience understood, let us now turn to making sense of “religious revivals.”
What Causes Religious Revivals?
Religious revivals appear to occur when the kind of situation that would lead to a period of religiousness in an individual—such as stress and mortality salience—are experienced relatively suddenly by a substantial portion of a society. There will be variation in the nature of the revival, depending on the kind of people who are impacted. But, in general, dramatic change and a period of difficulty can be expected to lead to a religious revival of some kind. These can be charted throughout history and, interestingly, there is often a time lag separating the period of stress from the revival itself.
Christian evangelists are constantly attempting to create revivals, traveling to different communities and preaching their message of conversion and redemption. However, they only seem to be able to create mass revivals during, or just after, periods of significant distress.
An examination of British revivals during the 20th century is consistent with this pattern. The first major revival of the twentieth century took place in Wales between 1904 and 1905. At the time, South Wales was ravaged by industrial unrest and unemployment in a society in which there was no welfare state. Accordingly, Welsh workers, many of whom were already heavily influenced by Methodism and were facing serious hardship and the realistic possibility of destitution.35 Interesting, there was no religious revival during World War I in the UK, nor during the Spanish Flu pandemic that immediately followed it36. There were, however, various revivals during the 1920s. The lack of communications at the time meant that it was more difficult than in the 1950s for these to become national phenomena. A major revival in East Anglia in 1921 focused around socioeconomically deprived fishing communities, which were under considerable distress even compared to ordinary people recovering from the Great War. The following year, there were revivals in other parts of the country, most notably in fishing communities in northeast Scotland.37 There was no major revival in Britain in the 1930s, other than in the deeply conservative Hebridean islands off the north west of Scotland in 1939. This year was a time of elevated distress due to very real possibility that Britain might go to war again.38
There was no major revival in the UK during World War II itself. The next Christian revival, and a concomitant reassertion of conservative attitudes, came after the War, and especially in the 1950s. There was a revival in the Hebrides in 1949, in which large numbers of people, who had not previously been especially devout, underwent religious experiences and became more involved in their church and in which those who were already religious became more fervent. According to revival leader the Rev. Duncan Campbell (1898-1972), in late 1949, in the village of Barvas on the Island of Lewis, he conducted a night-time meeting at which:
Three o’ clock in the morning came and God swept in. About a dozen men and women lay prostrate on the floor, speechless . . . We left our cottage at 3am to discover men and women seeking God. I walked along a country road and found three men on their faces, crying to God for mercy. There was a light in every home; no-one seemed to think of sleep.
At 5 AM that morning, 14 buses full of people arrived from all parts of the island and even from the island of Harris. People at these meetings fell into trances, fainted, swayed and collapsed to the floor.39 Campbell felt that he had been inspired by the Holy Spirit to go and revive the Outer Hebrides and, given the stressful conditions of the time, people were extremely receptive to religious-fervor in a ways that they otherwise wouldn’t have been.40
Wartime rationing did not cease until 1954, so it could be argued that it was only at this point that “normal life” finally reasserted itself.41 In an era of mass-communication, a spark was needed to set off a nationwide revival, and this came in the form of American pastor Billy Graham (1918-2018), as witnessed in his British rallies, which took place between 1954 and 1955. The postwar religious fervor was such that it has been estimated that roughly 21 percent of the London population attended a Billy Graham rally, while up 73 percent of the Glasgow population did so.42 In 1955, 100,000 people packed a Glasgow stadium to attend a single service conducted by Billy Graham.43 I am not aware that the relationship has been quantitatively tested, but, as a rule of British Modern History, religious revivals seem to manifest in areas of elevated mortality salience as a consequence of impoverishment or, directly, famine and other highly stressful phenomena.
What Kind of People Have Religious Experiences?
What was happening, in terms of individual and mass-psychology, during these revivals? As we have discussed, quotidian, stable religiousness—in which you are religious all the time—is correlated with sound mental health. Even religious people who are mentally healthy, however, go through periods of stress and mortality salience in which they may become more religious. They may even undergo forms of what is known as a “religious experience.”
Religious experiences are profound psychological experiences in which a person may be overwhelmed by a feeling of God’s love and even hear God’s voice or believe to have seen Him. In making sense of these kinds of experiences, American neuroscientist Andrew Newberg and colleagues argue that the mind has two effective systems, calming and arousal. When either of these systems is pushed to their extremes, through meditation or hyper-arousal—both of which can be achieved via religious services—they argue that it is dangerous for the body. Accordingly, the other system hits in, leading to alternative states of consciousness and intense psychological experiences.44 British biologist Richard Dawkins has suggested that they may be provoked by the way in which stress makes us highly instinctive, and thus prone to religious belief anyway. Dawkins also argues that we are also evolved to over-detect agency: as mentioned above, if we mistake a distant rock for a wolf, we have lost nothing, but if we make the opposite mistake, we may be killed. Accordingly, at times of very intense stress, we are much more likely to mistake some unidentified sound as the voice of God and, at the same time, find that our calming system would hit in. This would lead to an intense religious experience combined with feelings of relief and joy.45 Undergoing mild religious experiences—known as “spiritual” experiences—is about 0.3 heritable. Undergoing intense religious experiences is approximately 0.66 heritable.46 This high heritability might imply that the ability to undergo a religious experience is extremely beneficial, in evolutionary terms, because it combats stress and, due to its profound nature, keeps you low in negative feelings for a substantial period of time afterwards.
However, we must distinguish between the “religious experience” and the “conversion experience”—and also between being “religious,” being “hyper-religious,” and going through a phase of being intensely religious. American psychologist William James (1842-1910) distinguished between the religion of the “sick soul” and that of “healthy mindedness.” The religion of healthy mindedness is characterized by relatively mild religious experiences. The religion of the “sick soul,” however, is marked by a dramatic conversion experiences, which occur at times of intense stress.47 Those who lead religious revivals—people such as Billy Graham—can be regarded as constantly “hyper-religious.” As already noted, this is associated with either schizophrenia or with being a severely depressive personality. Psychological studies of those who lead religious revivals have found that most of them display evidence of these pathological traits. They require, for example, the absolute structure and order which fanatical religiousness provides in order to allay their anxiety and frequently undergo intense religious experiences.48 Such is the nature of revival “leaders.” It may be beneficial for a healthy society to be able to maintain a very small percentage of such lunatics, precisely because they are able to inspire fervent religiosity in other people and religiosity is traditionally a means of promoting ethnocentrism. In this regard, it has been noted that tribal shamans tend to the same kinds of psychological characteristics as modern-day charismatic leaders.49
But what about the followers, and those who become followers during a revival? What is their psychology? Religious revivals are characterized by the “conversion” type of religious experience, in which a person undergoes a kind of psychological breakdown and, to some extent, adopts a new identity, for example as a “Christian” or as “real Christian” in a way that they somehow were not prior to the revival.50 They, consequently, go through a transient phrase of hyper-religiosity. Transient hyper-religiosity is associated with high Neuroticism,51 while bipolar disorder and bouts of depression also predict periods of extreme religious fervor, as does schizophrenia.52 Schizophrenia, and its milder forms, is also elevated at times of stress, just as is anxiety.53 There is a range of severity to schizophrenia-type conditions. Mild symptoms are summarized as “schizoid personality.” This is characterized by anhedonia (the inability to experience joy) and apathy. More severe is “schizotypal personality,” where the schizoid symptoms are accompanied by social anxiety, paranoid ideation, unconventional or paranoid beliefs, and, sometimes, psychosis. Diagnosable schizophrenia is a particularly severe manifestation of these characteristics.54 Having undergone a conversion experience has been found to be associated with having been, prior to that experience, high in anxiety and other Neuroticism traits.55 When people suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress, which is associated with high Neuroticism, they can develop a very specific kind of religiosity known as “spiritual struggle” or “negative religious coping.” Those who undergo this believe that God is punishing them for their sins, plead for God to intervene in the world, and project hostility towards out-group members. “Positive religious coping” can cross over with this, insomuch as it involves conversion, but this also involves the belief that God has forgiven you and that you are purified of your sins.56
So, people who are high in Neuroticism—and even under the harsh Darwinian conditions prevalent until 1800, there would have been population variance in this trait—are more likely to become part of religious revivals. They will feel stress more acutely and will, accordingly, be more likely to become extremely religious in the aftermath of periods of intense societal distress. Females score higher than males in Neuroticism. For this reason alone, we would predict that females would play a noticeable part in religious revivals.57 Consistent with this, studies of religious revivals in the U.S. have found that “white and black women were among the most visible participants at religious revivals, where converts wept, wailed, writhed, and fainted as they received God’s grace.”58 Neuroticism tends to decrease with age in males. But in females, Neuroticism decreases with age until adolescence and at that point, it increases, possibly due to the adaptive need to worry about one’s children. This can be seen most obviously among university students, where females in particular tend to suffer mental health problems of various kinds that they will often have recovered from by the time they are in their mid-20s.59 Neuroticism, in women, begins to decline in early adulthood.60 For this reason, as well as due to their higher general religiousness, we would expect females in their mid-teens to mid-20s to be attracted to religious revivals. In line with this prediction, there is detailed data on those who “came forward” to receive God’s forgiveness during Billy Graham’s British rallies. In London, 65 percent were female and 50 percent were under the age of 19. In Glasgow, 71 percent were women and 73 percent were under the age of 30.61
Even those who are not sufficiently Neurotic to undergo religious experiences can be expected to be influenced by a religious revival if it appears to be sufficiently popular. Neuroticism predicts extrinsic religiousness, that is, religious outward conformity.62 People who are high in Neuroticism will fear being judged negatively or even being ostracized for failure to conform, meaning that they may fake religious fervor even if they don’t actually feel it. This means that religious revivals that become particularly prominent can envelop people who are far lower in Neuroticism than those who are, as they see it, “slain by the Holy Spirit.” Accordingly, popular revivals can generate a kind of group hysteria and thus appear far more popular than they really are. This is obvious when we consider how so many celebrities felt compelled to jump on the bandwagon of Black Lives Matter.
The Religion of Multiculturalism and Mental Health
So, with the nature of “religion” and “religious revivals” clear in our minds, we can now explore the “religious” nature of the Black Lives Matter protests. There are obvious parallels between 20th-century religious revivals—such as that that spear-headed by Billy Graham—and the Black Lives Matter revival. The leaders of the movement are extreme “liberals”—with this being clearly associated with mental instability, where conservatism and traditional religiosity are correlated with mental stability.63 The “revival” has taken place in the wake of a period of elevated mortality salience; in other words, it is a response to stress. Those who are drawn into it are politically liberal themselves, with this being associated with mental instability.64
In many respects, Multiculturalism can be argued to be a secular “replacement religion” for Christianity—and perhaps even a kind of Christian sect. The same argument has been made with regard to Marxism and even some kinds of Romantic Nationalism.
Traditional Christianity is based around a series of dogmas that you must accept in order to be regarded as a Christian and achieve salvation. These dogmas are sometimes logically incoherent—such as the Trinity—or require the acceptance of truth-claims that cannot be proved or are, on any reasonable basis, extraordinarily improbable. However, you signal your intellectual submission to the religious community by accepting these. This can be regarded as their purpose; they are tests of loyalty. In much the same way, Multiculturalism requires that you accept dogmas that are empirically inaccurate or patently nonsensical, such as that there are no race differences in intelligence or that everyone is “equal.”
2. “The Last Shall Be First.”
Christianity also tends towards idolizing the “marginalized.” It preaches that “the last shall be first” and encourages its followers to empower those who are supposedly marginalized, and humble themselves, embracing a kind of sacred poverty. Similarly, Marxism idolizes the dispossessed in the form of the “worker”; Romantic nationalism worships the “peasant”; and Multiculturalism, as espoused by Whites, idolizes non-Whites, and the more different they are—culturally and genetically—from Whites, the more they are worthy of reverence. There is evidence that humans—being evolved to tightly structured groups—have two fundamental instincts: one towards climbing the social hierarchy and the other towards equality, as groups that are relatively equal tend to avoid collapsing into discord.65 Thus, religions that preach “equality” can be highly psychologically attractive, especially to those who are not close to the top of the hierarchy or who fear they will not be able to get there. This is consistent with evidence that males who are physically strong—and thus who would have been more likely to ascend the prehistoric hierarchy via winning fights and being sexually selected for—are more likely to hold conservative views that specifically favor hierarchy and inequality.66
3. Self-Abasement and Guilt
The third key point that Multiculturalism has in common with Christianity, though not with pagan religions such as Hinduism, is the salience of “guilt.” In general, “guilt” and “shame” both function to make people “know their place,” and thus conform and behave in pro-social, cooperative ways. Accordingly, a group that adopts a religion imbued with these feelings to an optimum degree would be likely to out-compete other groups.
Christianity is a religion to which “guilt” is extremely important—“central to the biblical message” as one theologian has put it.67 According to Christian dogmas, humanity is “Fallen” as a consequence of its “Original Sin.” In other words, God is perfect and all-benevolent, whereas humanity is inherently sinful and bad, living in a sinful, Fallen world. Indeed, it was cast down into this world from Paradise as a punishment for its wickedness. The only way humanity can gain salvation and forgiveness is to admit how sinful it is and humbly worship God and follow the commands of His Church. Worldly success is, in a sense, something for which you should feel guilty—unless you are certain that God has blessed you with this success—because it implies that you are insufficiently humble; you are failing to sufficiently repent for your wickedness.
In much the same fashion, the Church of Multiculturalism tells its adherents that they are burdened by the Original Sin of Whiteness. White people are presumed to have treated people of other races in abominable ways, with images of slavery, the Holocaust, Jim Crow, and the like acting as symbols of their primal deeds. Whites must repent for their Original Sin by empowering those who are not White, such that racial “Equality” is attained. In the same way that wealthy people in Christian societies are “privileged” and must engage in charitable works to assuage their “guilt,” White people have the “privilege” of being “White”—not only being wealthy but enjoying that wealth at the expense of non-Whites, whom their ancestors brutalized, enslaved, or murdered. “Privilege” is the source of “guilt,” which must be assuaged through acts of humility and penance, potentially including not producing White children and adopting non-Whites instead.
Shame, though less obvious, is also germane to Christianity and its replacement religions. Those who refused to conform to Christianity could be “shamed” as devil-worshippers who might bring God’s anger on the community, and shunned accordingly. Those who do not “take the knee” for George Floyd or who remain silent, instead of publicly stating their support for Black Lives Matter, can be shamed as possible “racists;” with this term of abuse implying that you are not an adherent to the religious community. You are “Other.” This is because membership of the community is based around adherence to dogmas, not around blood-bonds, as is the case with pagan religions and with many forms of nationalism.68
A New Kind of Awakening
The key difference between the Church of Multiculturalism and Christianity is that there is no god—no non-physical existence. Moreover, Black Lives Matter represents an extremely “spiteful” form of religiosity, in the sense that there doesn’t appear to be any “forgiveness.” In Billy Graham rallies, you could “step forward” and be forgiven for your sins. In Black Lives Matter rallies, it doesn’t matter how many times you “take the knee,” there can be no forgiveness for your sin of being White. You must simply learn to live with the guilt, slightly assuaging it ever so often by campaigning to empower non-Whites.
As previously discussed, we can conceive of two distinct kinds of religion: those which are selected for under centuries of Darwinian conditions—that tend to involve the collective worship of a moral god—and those which deviate from this norm. Due to the way in which mental health and religiousness were co-selected under Darwinian conditions as we have explored, this “traditional religiosity” is now positively associated with mental health, while deviations from it—such as New Age affectations or belief in the paranormal—are associated with anxiety and depression, either on-going or periodic. People who are high in mental instability can be expected to become highly religious in the wake of a crisis and being low in traditional religiosity as well as fervently left-wing correlates with being high in mental instability
Accordingly, we would expect such people—self-identified “liberals”—to become extremely religious (in terms of their religious deviation) in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, and this is what we appear to be seeing. In previous situations of gravity, the overwhelming majority of the British population was Christian and believed, to varying degrees, in its doctrines. This would have meant that the relationship between being a traditional Christian and mental stability would have been much weaker than is now the case. It also meant that the revivals were Christian in nature, because this was the religious belief even of the kind of mentally unstable people who tend to undergo intense religious experiences. As already noted, a specific form of religiosity has been found to manifest among mentally unstable people suffering from high levels of stress—“Spiritual Struggle.” Those who felt the Holy Spirit during this revival would be, in general, relatively high in Neuroticism, something that would be soothed, temporarily, by their religious experience. Usually, their Christian zeal would be temporary. It would no longer be psychologically required once the period of stress was over and recovered from, by which time the factor that was elevating their anxiety to intolerable levels would have dissipated.
In 2020, especially for younger people, their religion is Multiculturalism and not Christianity. Christianity is now the religion of a shrinking minority. Consequently, we would expect some variant on the kind of revival outlined above to occur in the wake of Covid-19, especially among such people. Its leaders, as with Christian revivals, would be mentally unstable people. However, many of the “followers,” caught up in the revival, would be prone to mental instability and would be going through a particularly acute phase of anxiety. As with a Christian revival, these feelings would be alleviated by the collective experience—in this instance of “Black Lives Matter”—in which they would feel a sense of certainty that they were morally superior; that they were better than most (“racist”) people; and that they were part of creating a paradise on Earth. Once the anxiety-reducing feelings this induced wore off, such people would no longer be subject to acute mortality salience and then they would return to being much less fervent believers in the Church of Multiculturalism.
We would expect any such revival to be more pronounced among Multiculturalists than among Christians. Social Justice Warriors are irreligious and liberal, both of which correlate with mental instability. “Christians” are conservative and religious, both associated with mental stability. Accordingly, in a world in which remnant Christianity is associated with sound mindedness, a Multiculturalist revival in the wake of a pandemic becomes far more probable than a Christian one—though there still may be a Christian one of some kind in the near future. We would expect this Multiculturalist revival to be elevated among young people—because people go through a period of relatively high mental instability when they are young adults—and, in particular, among young females, because females are more religious than males and they are more prone to depression and anxiety. Multiculturalism is the “new religion”—the “new morality”—and thus females would be evolved to want to signal the extent of their adherence to it, being ultimately psychologically adapted to polygamous societies in which they must compete for the highest status males by strongly signaling their religiosity and sexual faithfulness.69 Females are also evolved to a patriarchal society in which decisions tend to be made for them by their fathers and husbands. With the breakdown of patriarchy, it has been argued that we would expect females—especially young females—to make particularly maladaptive decisions.70 These would include strongly aligning with a religion that seeks to destroy their ethnic group and effectively encouragers them to be childless.
It should be noted that, in relatively religious societies, females tend to be more politically conservative than males, seemingly because females are more religious and the religion promotes “traditional” values as the will of God. However, when the influence of traditional religiousness breaks down, the female propensity towards higher empathy—and thus leftism and anti-traditionalism—begins to manifest. In 1992, in Britain, women born in the 1920s were more conservative than men of the same age. However, women born in the 1960s were less conservative than males of the same age.71 These younger women, no longer as influenced by traditional religious ideas, tend to promote leftist ones—including altruism towards competing ethnic groups—with a kind of religious zeal. One commentator astutely termed them “The New Church Ladies,” evoking the subterranean religious quality to so much of contemporary female discourse.72
Traditional religiousness took the female propensity to strongly believe in God and engage in religious worship and focused this into an adaptive form of religiosity in which God promoted group-selected values. With the breakdown of this religion, we are left with females tending to be religiously fervent and high in generalized empathy and thus attracted to Multiculturalism and leftism. Females are also higher than males in Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism, and, thus in social conformity.73 So, for this reason as well, we would expect them to be more heavily involved in the New Church into which younger females have been inculcated.
It has been observed that highly educated young people—those with post-graduate degrees—are significantly over-represented among Black Lives Matter activists.74 One possible explanation for this—beyond the fact that university Humanities and Social Science departments are increasingly indoctrination factories for leftist ideas75—is that there is a positive relationship between Neuroticism and academic success at university, especially when this is combined with high Conscientiousness (impulse control and rule-following).76 This is possibly because anxiety acts as a motivator towards diligence or because Neuroticism means you desire greater certainty about the nature of the world and believe you can attain this through higher education. In that Neuroticism predicts extrinsic religiousness77—that is, outward religious conformity—we would expect non-SJWs who were relatively high in these traits to be drawn into this dominant, public revival due to their fear of not conforming, leading them to compete to strongly outwardly conform.
Anarchic Religious Awakenings
The other difference between the British religious awakenings in the 20th century and Black Lives Matter is the anarchy involved: BLM activists flagrantly breaking the law, engaging in dangerous behavior, rioting, inciting perpetual disorder (“No Justice, No Peace”), and engaging in iconoclasm by toppling statues and desecrating memorials. In this sense, a clearer comparison can be found in the Peasants War that took place in German-speaking states in the 1520s, in the early days of the Reformation. There are multiple reasons why the Reformation began when it did, but one of them was a period of elevated mortality salience. There had been severe famine in Germany between 1515 and 1520.78
Reports indicate that violent Protestant mobs would strip Catholic Churches of their valuables and destroy their idols. As with Black Lives Matter, educated people were heavily over-represented among early Protestant iconoclasts—they were mainly the so-called “middling sort.”79 The Protestant leaders would oppose iconoclasm, publicly stating that idols should only be removed with permission from the proper authorities. But, as has occurred in Britain in 2020, the Swiss authorities preemptively removed icons as a way of halting public disorder and also as way of appeasing Protestant leaders. In June 1524, all Zurich churches were closed in order to prevent a maelstrom.80
In other words, Black Lives Matter is a particularly pronounced religious revival. In the 1520s, this occurred, in part, due to particularly difficult conditions. In 2020, it may be that the cause was moderately difficult conditions plus a growing percentage of young people who, partly for genetic reasons underpinned by increasing mutational load, increasingly suffer from depression and anxiety and, therefore, cannot psychologically cope with what would have been historically regarded as quite normal levels of mortality salience. Contemporary young people are increasingly in a situation of “evolutionary mismatch” where—under the influence of modern, anti-traditional ideologies, over-parenting, and education— they are decreasingly socialized as children in the manner that was the norm under harsh Darwinian conditions. This has been shown to lead to severe behavioral problems in non-human animals,81 and we will explore this issue in more detail below.
Furthermore, far superior communications—social media and instantaneous reactions to events around the world—mean that what may otherwise have been isolated patches of revivalism have been globalized, impacting much larger numbers of people. And there may also be an extent to which these riots are in the interests of some powerful individuals, who are themselves fervent adherents to Multiculturalism or who desire a subservient population that will not challenge them. If the population is depressed and demoralized, this subservience is clearly better accomplished. Accordingly, the riots—which could be crushed if so desired—are permitted to run their course. It is as if ordinary people are being told: “Look what we can allow to happen to you if you elect the wrong people or vote the wrong way in a referendum.” Afraid of offending the righteous mob—and their high-level sympathizers—even leaders who oppose leftist disorder dare not act decisively. Again, comparisons to the iconoclasm of the early English Reformation leap to mind. Iconoclasts were permitted to “get away with it” during the periods when the Protestant faction, most notably led by Thomas Cromwell (c.1485-1540), wielded the most influence at Court.82
All of this leads us to a final question. How have we reached a situation where so many people—including many in positions of power—wish to destroy their own extended kinship group?
BLM and the Spiteful Mutants
Christianity, even the zealous kind of the Reformation, was an adaptive form of religiosity. Thus, a key part of it is “forgiveness”—after publicly confessing your sins and wavering of faith. With the breakdown of Darwinian selection, we see an increasing deviation from this religious evolutionary norm, including religions that are maladaptive, because they are ultimately nihilistic and lack doctrines that allow a person’s highly negative feelings during times of stress to be fully expunged. This is what we see with Black Lives Matter—the ultimate logic of which is that Whites should simply feel perpetual shame throughout their lives with no hope of it being alleviated, other than in a very mild and brief way via “taking the knee.”
Young people have been inculcated with this maladaptive religion due, in part, to the breakdown of traditional Christianity, which, like all religions that survived under harsh Darwinian conditions, tended to take behavior that was adaptive in terms of group selection and turn this into the will of God. As discussed above, as child mortality collapsed, we had more and more people who would not have survived under harsher conditions—due to their high mutational load—who had mutations of the mind that caused to hold beliefs that would be highly maladaptive if held by even a small percentage of the group—anti-natalism being only the most obvious. Due to our being a highly eusocial species—that is, interacting in a “hive mind”—we are heavily influenced by those around us. In this way, it has been found that depression can spread like a contagion. If you are around a person who is depressed then you are more likely to become depressed yourself, a condition which is negatively associated with fertility.83 As a result, these mutants— spiteful mutants84—helped to spread their maladaptive ways of thinking even to non-mutants, gradually undermining adaptive institutions, such as traditional churches, and replacing them with their Church of Multiculturalism, a church which is now clearly adhered to even by the leadership of the Church of England.85 Having taken over the state’s organs of power, such as the education system and the media, they could then inculcate young people into the New Church, alter the evolutionarily adaptive methods of socialization traditionally imposed on them, and push them—and with them, the entire super-organism—to think and behave increasingly contra to their genetic interests.
This became possible when a “tipping point” is reached, whereby about 25 percent of the population advocated anti-traditional ideas. Experiments have shown that when this happens, people perceive the new worldview as the way forward and begin to abandon the old one en masse.86 With our evolution to obedience and following the leader and the mob, this can sometimes result in a misfiring of our adaptations such that we start to engage in behavior which is not in our evolutionary interests. This is particularly likely to be the case if we are subject to “evolutionary mismatch;” if we are placed in an ecology to which we are not evolved. We are evolved to a pre-industrial ecology, so we can expect to find ourselves increasingly maladapted as the ecology increasingly deviates from this. We will engage in behavior which would have been adaptive under previous conditions – such as following the crowd – but this will be decreasingly adaptive as the crowd is increasingly evolutionarily mismatched, mutated and influenced by spiteful mutants.
In 1954, this tipping point had not yet been reached in Britain. People forced themselves, for fear of ostracism, through so-called “effortful control,”87 to believe in traditional Christianity, meaning that the revival was Christian and adaptive in nature. Around 1970, the tipping point was reached. This is demonstrated by the fact that evidence of mutational load – in the form of autism, which is associated with paternal age – did not predict atheism in the 1950s, but by the 1970s it did predict atheism. By the 1970s, in the U.S., having an older father predicted atheism in a way that had not previously been the case. This is because Christianity was so strong during the earlier period that autistics, who tend not to be religious as we have already noted, forced themselves to conform to the dominant religiosity. By the latter period, the tipping point had been reached, so they no longer needed to conform.88
The Toppling of Evolutionary Success
The Church of Multiculturalism, and its Black Lives Matter conversion rallies, is a Church with “spiteful mutants” as its priestly class. Under harsh Darwinian conditions, only those with adaptive cognitive biases survived childhood, because maladaptive cognitive biases were under-pinned by mutation, and those with high mutational load would likely perish before reaching adulthood. With the extreme relaxation of these conditions, these “spiteful mutants” walk among us in significant numbers. These are people who are programmed to behave in a way that is highly maladaptive in evolutionary terms—which results in the destruction of group and even individual fitness—and to persuade others to do likewise. All of the doctrines they advocate involve, if accepted, essentially being a “failure as an organism”:
life has no meaning so you may as well not have children;
put the interests of other ethnic groups above your own and so reduce the extent to which your own genes are passed on;
have few or no children to assist non-human animals and their genetic interests over your own.
The toppling of “racist” statues by the Black Lives Matter mob can be perceived as tearing down the “old gods,” those whom European people have venerated as heroes. These statues have traditionally been erected to honor highly group-selected people who have promoted the genetic interests of Europeans by expanding their territory and leading their ethnic group to victory over rivals. In a sense, the statues are sacred, they are idols; objects of worship. To tear them down is a way of asserting that the religion that they represented no longer has any power, is no longer sacred, simply because the idols that embody it can successfully humiliated.
In 1520, Spanish explorer Hernan Cortes (1485-1547) destroyed every Aztec idol that he could and desecrated the temples. He noticed that it left the Aztecs demoralized and less able to put up a fight.89 So, this leaves the worshipers in a state of confusion in which the previously certain, uniquely real system by which they made sense of the world—and in which they played an integral and positive part—is an under assault. They feel confused because they have got used to this system, and the comforting presence of these statues, and they feel demoralized and anxious. Any significant change can cause this by virtue of elevating anxiety about the unknown.90
This, alongside the symbolism of the system that gives their life meaning being attacked, leads them to feel depressed and looking for new certainties. But what if the certainties offered are nihilistic and tell you that you are inherently evil and should debase and even destroy yourself, never able to be forgiven for your and your ancestors’ sins? This is the ultimate message of the Death Cult that is the Church of Multiculturalism. It is, therefore, no coincidence that it attracts the same psychological types who are attracted to literal suicide cults. Indeed, a Black Lives Matter Suicide Cult, in which young White women kill themselves to repent for their racist sins, would not be beyond the realms of possibility.
Black Lives Matter, “Herstory,” accessed June 20, 2020. ↩︎
See Edward Dutton, “The Return of Heresy,” The National Policy Institute, March 26, 2020, accessed June 20, 2020. ↩︎
Ara Norenzayan and Azim F. Sharif, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-Sociality,” Science, 322 (2008): 58-62. ↩︎
Edward Dutton, Guy Madison, and Curtis Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God’: The Rejection of Collective Religiosity Centred Around the Worship of Moral Gods is Associated with High Mutational Load,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 4 (2018): 233-244. ↩︎
Rüdiger Vaas, “God, Gains and Genes,” in The Biological Evolution of Religious Mind and Behavior, eds. Eckart Voland and Wulf Schiefenhövel (New York: Springer, 2009). ↩︎
Ara Norenzayan and Azim Sharif, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-Sociality,” Science, 322 (2008): 58-62. ↩︎
Lewis Ray Rambo. Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). ↩︎
Peter Halama and Mária Lačná, “Personality Change Following Religious Conversion: Perceptions of Converts and their Close Acquaintances, Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 8 (2011): 757-768. ↩︎
Peter Hills, Leslie J. Francis, Michael Argylea, Chris J. Jackson, “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation, Personality and Individual Differences, 36 (2004): 61-73. ↩︎
See Dutton, Madison and Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God,’” op cit.↩︎
Yael Sela, Todd K. Shackelford, and James R. Liddle, “When Religion Makes It Worse: Religiously Motivated Violence as a Sexual Selection Weapon,” in The Attraction of Religion: A New Evolutionary Psychology of Religion, eds. D. Jason Sloane and James A. Van Slyke (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). ↩︎
Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 2006). ↩︎
Ross Hammond and Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006): 1-11. ↩︎
Colin Holbrook, Keise Izuma, Choi Deblieck, Daniel M. Fessler, and Marco Iacoboni, “Neuromodulation of Group Prejudice and Religious Belief,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11 (2016): 387-394. ↩︎
Darren Sherkat, “Sexuality and Religious Commitment in the United States: An Empirical Examination,” Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion, 41 (2002): 313-323. ↩︎
Edward Dutton and Guy Madison, “Why Do Finnish Men Marry Thai Women but Finnish Women Marry British Men? Cross-National Marriages in a Modern Industrialized Society Exhibit Sex-Dimorphic Sexual Selection According to Primordial Selection Pressures,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 1-9. ↩︎
Edward Dutton and M.A. Woodley of Menie. At Our Wits’ End: Why We’re Becoming Less Intelligent and What It Means for the Future (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2018), Ch. 3. ↩︎
Hammond and Axelrod, “The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior,” op cit. ↩︎
Rachel A. Grant and V. Tamara Montrose, “It’s A Man’s World: Mate Guarding and the Evolution of Patriarchy,” Mankind Quarterly 58 (2018): 384-418. ↩︎
Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Book, 2001). ↩︎
Marc Galanter. Cults: Faith, Healing and Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). ↩︎
Dutton, Madison, and Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God,’” op cit.↩︎
Tony Volk and Jeremy Atkinson, “Is Child Death the Crucible of Human Evolution?” Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 2 (2008): 103-116. ↩︎
Matthew Sarraf, Michael A. Woodley of Menie, and Colin Feltham, Modernity and Cultural Decline: A Biobehavioral Perspective (Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) ↩︎
Dutton, Madison, and Dunkel, “The Mutant Says in His Heart, ‘There Is No God,’” op cit.↩︎
Pippa Catterall. Labour and the Free Churches, 1918-1939: Radicalism, Righteousness and Religion (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 94. ↩︎
Callum G. Brown Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain (London: Routledge, 2006), 92.It’s worth mentioning that 1917 saw publication of first revision of the Scofield Reference Bible, which was deeply influential on the development of evangelical Christianity, apocalyptic Christianity, and Christian-Zionism. ↩
Stanley C. Griffin. A Forgotten Revival: East Anglia and Northeast Scotland, 1921 (Bromley: Day One Publications, 1992). ↩︎
Matthew Backholer. Revival Fires and Awakenings, Thirty-Six Visitations of the Holy Spirit (ByFaith Media, 2009). ↩︎
Andrew Newberg, Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002). ↩︎
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Books, 2006), 116. ↩︎
Matt Bradshaw and Christopher G. Ellison, “Do Genetic Factors Influence Religious Life? Findings From a Behavior Genetic Analysis of Twin Siblings, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47 (2008): 529-544. ↩︎
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902). ↩︎
William Sargent. Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brainwashing (Cambridge, MA: International Society for Human Knowledge, 1997). ↩︎
See John M. Ingham and Denis Feeney. Psychological Anthropology Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). ↩︎
Thomas Hywel Hughes, Revival: The New Psychology of Religious Experience (London: Routledge, 1933). ↩︎
Hills, Francis, Argylea, Jackson, “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation,” op cit.↩︎
Cheryl Corcoran, Lilianne Mujica-Parodi, Scott Yale, et al., “Could Stress Cause Psychosis in Individuals Vulnerable to Schizophrenia?” CNS Spectrum, 7 (2002): 33-42. ↩︎
Jo Hodgekins, “Schizotypy and Psychopathology,” in Schizoptypy: New Dimensions, eds. Oliver J. Mason and Gordon Claridge (London: Routledge, 2015), 184. ↩︎
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi and Michael Argyle, The Social Psychology of Religion (London: Routledge, 1975). ↩︎
Crystal L. Park, Philip H Smith, Sharon Y. Lee, et al., “Positive and Negative Religious/Spiritual Coping and Combat Exposure as Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress and Perceived Growth in Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans, Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 9 (2017): 13-20. ↩︎
Christopher Soto, Oliver John, Samuel Gosling, and Jeff Potter, “Age Differences in Personality Traits From 10 to 65: Big Five Domains and Facets in a Large Cross-Sectional Sample,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100 (2011): 330-348. ↩︎
Kathleen Brown, “The History of Women in the United States to 1865,” in Women’s History in Global Perspective, ed. Bonnie G. Smith, (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 264. ↩︎
Paul E. Jenkins, Imogen Ducker, Rebecca Gooding, et al., “Anxiety and Depression in a Sample of UK College Students: A Study of Prevalence, Comorbidity, and Quality of Life,” Journal of American College Health (2020) DOI:10.1080/07448481.2019.1709474. ↩︎
Soto, John, Gosling, and Potter, “Age Differences in Personality Traits from 10 to 65,” op cit.↩︎
Hills, Francis, Argylea, Jackson, “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation,” op cit.↩︎
Emil Kirkegaard, “Mental Illness and the Left,” Preprint (2020) doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25598.33605. ↩︎
Sarraf, Woodley of Menie, and Feltham, Modernity and Cultural Decline, op cit.↩︎
Jerome H. Barkow, “Beneath New Culture is Old Psychology: Gossip and Social Stratification, in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, eds. Jerome H. Barkow, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). ↩︎
Michael Bang Petersen and Lasse Laustsen, “Upper-Body Strength and Political Egalitarianism: Twelve Conceptual Replications,” Political Psychology, (2018). DOI: 10.1111/pops.12505. ↩︎
Timothy Tennant, Theology in the Context of World Christianity (Zondervan, 2004), 93. ↩︎
See Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan (Atlanta, GA: Ultra, 2004). ↩︎
See David Buss. The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating (New York: Basic Books, 1989). ↩︎
Menelaos Apostolou, Sexual Selection Under Parental Choice: The Evolution of Human Mating Behavior (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2014). ↩︎
Pippa Norris, “Mobilising the ‘Women’s Vote’: The Gender Generation Gap in Voting Behaviour,” Parliamentary Affairs, 49 (1996): 333-342. ↩︎
Jim Goad. The New Church Ladies: The Extremely Uptight World of Social Justice (Stone Mountain, GA: Obnoxious Books, 2017). ↩︎
Ronald W. Johnson and Joan MacDonnell, “The Relationship Between Conformity and Male and Female Attitudes toward Women,” Journal of Social Psychology, 1 (1974): 155-156. ↩︎
See: Noah Carl, Can Intelligence Explain the Overrepresentation of Liberals and Leftists in American Academia?” Intelligence, 58 (2015): 181-193. ↩︎
James McKenzie, Mahdad Taghavi-Khonsary, Gary Tindell, “Neuroticism and Academic Achievement: The Furneaux Factor as a Measure of Academic Rigor,” Personality and Individual Differences, 29 (2000): 3-11. ↩︎
Hills, Francis, Argyle, and Jackson, “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation,” op cit.↩︎
Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 15. ↩︎
Lee Palmer Wandel. Voracious Idols and Violent Hands: Iconoclasm in Reformation Zurich, Strasbourg, and Basel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14. ↩︎
Bridget Heal, “Visual and Material Culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Protestant Reformations, ed. Ulinka Rublack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 603. ↩︎
See Michael A. Woodley of Menie, Matthew A. Sarraf, Radomir N. Pestow, and Heitor B. F. Fernandes, “Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations,” Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191; and John Calhoun, “Death Squared: The Explosive Growth and Demise of a Mouse Population,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 66 (1973): 80-88. ↩︎
Julie Spraggon, Puritan Iconoclasm During the English Civil War (Woodbridge, Suffolk, The Boydell Press, 2003), 4. ↩︎
T.E. Joiner, “Contagious Depression: Existence, Specificity to Depressed Symptoms, and the Role of Reassurance Seeking,” Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 67 (1994): 287-296. ↩︎
M. A. Woodley of Menie, M. Sarraf, R. Pestow and H. Fernandes, H. Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations. Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3 (2017): 181-191. ↩︎
Damon Centola, Joshua Becker, Devon Brackbill, Andrea Baronchelli, “Experimental Evidence for Tipping Points in Social Convention, Science, 360 (2018): 1116-1119. ↩︎
K. MacDonald. Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions. Psychological Review, 11 (2008): 1012-1031. ↩︎
M.A. Woodley of Menie, S. Kanazawa, J. Pallesen, and M. Sarraf. Paternal Age Is Negatively Associated With Religious Behavior in a Post-60s But Not a Pre-60s US Birth Cohort: Testing a Prediction From the Social Epistasis Amplification Model. Journal of Religion and Health, (2020). doi: 10.1007/s10943-020-00987-9 ↩︎
Victor Davis Hanson. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2007), 175. ↩︎
Ara Norenzayan and Azim F. Shariff, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Pro-Sociality, Science, 322 (2008): 58-62. ↩︎