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Census of Europeans in Europe

Where Europeans live, European civilization exists.

As part of an ongoing demographic project, I am conducting a census of all human beings of European descent throughout the Earth. I believe this is a topic of supreme importance not only for (neo-)reactionaries and New Right types, but also for all mainstream conservatives and any decent human beings willing to attempt to preserve what is left of Western (European) civilization across the globe. European civilization, which brought the entire world unprecedented advances in government, medicine, science, technology and philosophy, is something worth preserving. But how can we know how to preserve it unless we can locate and quantify it? To identify the areas where it flourishes and the areas where it is eroding? Where Europeans live, European civilization exists. When Europeans disappear, European civilization disappears with them. Anybody remember Rhodesia?

I begin my census with the homeland of the European peoples, Europe itself. It is almost sad that it is necessary to conduct a census of Europeans within their own homelands, but since the onsets of modernity and post-modernity (and the wonders of immigration, alienation and social dysfunction they brought), native European populations have dropped in many countries to points where it is no longer safe to assume native Europeans constitute overwhelming majorities of the population. To prevent any confusion, allow me to define who is a “European” before I continue to the data.

Who is European?

The range of definitions for who is “European” or “white” is very broad. The United States Census Bureau is happy to include North Africans, Middle Easterners and Jews in the “white” category, while a Nordicist may even exclude Irishmen, Greeks, Italians or Slavs. For this reason, I will avoid using the term “white,” and all its connotations, and focus instead on identifying people of European descent. People of European descent are defined as those people whose ancestral homeland is located on the continent of Europe, the jagged edge of the Eurasian landmass bordered by the Ural Mountains in the East, the Atlantic Ocean in the West and the Mediterranean Sea in the South.

Approximate border of Europe in red Approximate border of Europe in red

Those people whose ancestral homelands are North and West of the red border in the map above I will count as people of European descent i.e. Europeans. This may or may not be coterminous with others’ definitions of “whites” or “Europeans.” To be even abundantly clear, I will include all Latin, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Hellenic, Baltic peoples in my definition of European, as well as European linguistic/ethnic minorities such as Hungarians, Finns, Sami, Basque and Albanians. I will not include Jews, whose origin is in Palestine, nor will I include the Romani (Gypsies) who ostensibly came to Europe from the Indian subcontinent. Caucasian peoples such as Georgians, Chechens and Armenians are also excluded, since their homelands are just beyond the European border in West Asia. Non-European minorities such as sub-Saharan Africans, Arabs, Turks and East Asians who emigrated to Europe in the last century or so are obviously excluded.

I will include Muslims of European descent in my definition of “European.” Muslim Bosniaks, Albanians, Kosovars and any other converts will be counted as “European.” Although religiously not European, these peoples are native to Europe in the same way their neighbors are, and they have generally assimilated to wider European civilization and its undulations. Furthermore, seeing as they were once historically non-Muslim peoples, I do not find it extraordinary to believe they could someday once again be non-Muslim and more fully in tune with the rest of European civilization.

My definition of “Europeans” is purely geographical, and although there may be a certain degree of arbitrariness in terms of religion, culture or genetics, I think the geographical definition is the one most consistent with the group of people who create and sustain Western, European societies and civilization — Europeans.

With all that in mind, I present you Mark Yuray’s Census of Europeans in Europe. Data on the official percentage of Europeans in each state was collected, calculated, interpreted and estimated according to various sources (with various dates, mind you) and tabulated by yours truly. The percentages were then multiplied with the 2012 Google population counts for each country to get a ballpark estimate of the actual lump numbers of Europeans living in each country. Data can be accessed in excel format here. A PDF easier on the eyes is here. The important maps are presented below:

Percentage of population of European origin in European states. Percentage of population of European origin in European states.

Percentage of population of European origin in European states, with size-scaled percentages indicated. Percentage of population of European origin in European states, with size-scaled percentages indicated.

European states with the top ten most and least proportions of inhabitants of European origin. European states with the top ten most and least proportions of inhabitants of European origin.

Top Ten Most European States:

  1. Poland
  2. Czech Republic
  3. Lithuania
  4. Albania
  5. Croatia
  6. Estonia
  7. Slovenia
  8. Greece
  9. Iceland
  10. Finland

Top Ten Least European States:

  1. Cyprus
  2. Russia
  3. France
  4. The Netherlands
  5. Bulgaria
  6. United Kingdom
  7. Belgium
  8. Sweden
  9. Austria
  10. Spain

Final note:

Estimated population of Europe and Russia: 780,000,000 (i.e. including some 10 million Turks in East Thrace, all non-Europeans in Russia and the non-Europeans in the small bit of Kazakhstan technically East of the Urals.)

Total native European population of Europe and Russia in 2012 according to data: 675,251,937

Percentage of population of Europe and Russia of European descent: 86.6%

Europe and Russia Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans. I include the metric above simply because I think the historical domain of European civilization is the continent of Europe and the areas of Eurasia settled and ruled by Russia. That the domain is still 86.6% European is a good sign for Western civilization.

Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans. Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans.

Some commentary:

The range values for proportions of native Europeans in European states varies considerably. The island of Cyprus has a Turkish minority that runs a separate republic on the Northern end of the island, while Iceland and Poland are still >99% European. West European states such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium have the highest levels of non-European immigration, which is reflected in the larger proportions of non-Europeans in their borders. Sweden is the one Scandinavian state with an abnormally large number of non-Europeans, although it’s not exactly a surprise considering the recent riots that happened in Stockholm. East European states have large numbers of non-Europeans, although these are not new imports but historical non-European minorities such as Jews, Romani, Turks, Tatars, etc. Bulgaria and Russia are most significant in this regard.

The states with the lowest numbers of non-Europeans interestingly seem to run in a line from North to South down the center of Europe, as if they were not Western enough to jump on the immigration bandwagon but not Eastern enough to have left-over non-European minorities.

The Axis of Indigineousness The Axis of Indigineousness

The greatest demographic threats to Europe still remain the channels of third-world immigration maintained by left-wing politicians and bureaucrats in West European states and the institutions of the European Union. France, a nation that didn’t come into contact with non-Europeans for more than a millenium between the Battle of Tours in 732 and the beginning of colonial immigration after the Second World War, has been reduced to a demographic status similar to Bulgaria, a Southeastern country bordering Turkey that spent half a millenium as a province of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

Of the two traditional nomadic non-European minorities in Europe, the Jews and the Romani, only the Romani represent a notable demographic threat. Kudos to Steve Sailer, who has pointed out the Romani fertility rate in Hungary in 2003 was 3.0 children per woman compared to the national average of 1.3 children per woman. The Romani are small in population, but are spread throughout Europe and notoriously poor, fecund and criminal. The Jews have never recovered from the Holocaust all the way back in the 1940′s, which saw their European population reduced from some 9.5 million to around 1 million today. Except for the even smaller percentage of Orthodox Jews, Jewish fertility rates are about as low as those of other Europeans.

The great expanse of the Russian East, suffering from low fertility rates (like all of European civilization), is facing a new demographic threat from a rising China, with some 1.5 million Chinese reportedly illegally crossing the Russian border with China in the last few years. I am personally, however, not overly concerned considering the true vastness of Russia, China’s own obsession with population control and falling fertility rates and the staunchly anti-progressive and anti-liberal sentiments that rule Russia from Moscow. Russia will not be starting a government-mandated restructuring of society into a ‘vibrant, multicultural, diverse paradise‘ like Britain anytime soon.

I leave you with that thought, dear readers. Study and share the maps and data above; perhaps you can alert some other Westerners to the slow erosion of their civilization in its own homeland.

This article was originally published at Mark Yuray’s blog, Ara Maxima.

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The “Risk of Becoming a Multicultural Hellhole” Index

“The UK will go down before the other countries because it has much less space.” So sayeth Michael Anissimov. Geopolitically speaking, the UK’s historical fortunes will not be determined by its land area, so I knew he meant it would ‘go down’ culturally and demographically i.e. it would be swamped in a grunting tidal wave of non-Europeans facilitated by traitorous European bureaucrats and their ilk.


“The UK will go down before the other countries because it has much less space.” So sayeth Michael Anissimov. Geopolitically speaking, the UK’s historical fortunes will not be determined by its land area, so I knew he meant it would ‘go down’ culturally and demographically i.e. it would be swamped in a grunting tidal wave of non-Europeans facilitated by traitorous European bureaucrats and their ilk.

However, I couldn’t agree with the statement. Land area is useful in playing with demographic statistics, but the United Kingdom is not the population-densest European country suffering from a steady stream of third-world immigration. The Netherlands and Belgium have even less space and possibly more immigration, so why wouldn’t they be the first to go down?

My instant response was to suggest a better metric using urbanization rates and immigration rates, since those are the most reliable indicators for whether a country is ‘going down’ culturally and demographically or not. High urbanization typically means less children, more irreligion, social isolation, technological dependence, nihilism, leftism and the normalization of a myriad of social and sexual deviancies. High immigration means egalitarian-universalist politicians, an apathetic population or pathological altruism and itself results in societal degradation: crime, rioting, ‘Zones Urbaines Sensibles,’ usw.

I figured by combining the urbanization rate for a European country with the level of non-European immigration, we could get a pretty good idea of the country’s risk of ‘going down,’ and becoming a no-holds-barred multicultural hellhole. With that in mind, I have devised a simple metric for determining the chances that a country will be ‘going down’ sometime soon. I present, ladies and gentlemen, Mark Yuray’s “Risk of Becoming a Multicultural Hellhole” Index:

Index = ((% of population of non-European ancestry / 2) + (Urbanization rate / 2)) * 0.01

A very simple formula. But what can it tell us? Here’s the data.

(Percentage of population of non-European ancestry was collected, estimated or calculated by yours truly primarily using government statistics websites. Urbanization rates are from the UN World Urbanization Prospects 2011 revision.)

Risk of a European Country Becoming a Multicultural Hellhole:

Darker red indicate a higher risk of becoming a multicultural hellhole. Pink indicates lower risk.  

Darker red indicate a higher risk of becoming a multicultural hellhole. Pink indicates lower risk.  

Some highlights (excluding Greenland, Russia and Kosovo*):

Country most at risk: Belgium

Country least at risk: Liechtenstein

Average risk: 0.37 (Approx. Italy or Austria)

Top 10 most at risk:

  1. Belgium
  2. France
  3. Cyprus
  4. Sweden
  5. The Netherlands
  6. Iceland
  7. San Marino
  8. Andorra
  9. United Kingdom
  10. Denmark

Top 10 least at risk:

  1. Liechtenstein
  2. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  3. Slovenia
  4. Moldova
  5. Albania
  6. Romania
  7. Slovakia
  8. Croatia
  9. Serbia
  10. Poland

You’ll notice that the United Kingdom is only the 9th most likely to become a multicultural hellhole. Eight other European states are more at risk.

Some may ask how Bosnia, Moldova or Albania could be ranked so lowly for becoming multicultural hellholes — aren’t they already multicultural hellholes? Yes, but they are intra-European hellholes. The ethnic conflicts that erupt there are between native European peoples. I guarantee you that neither Bosnia nor Moldova will be have gay parades, ‘human rights’ crusaders, ‘social justice,’ or a long list of Congolese asylum-seekers waiting to loot the country sooner than the countries ranked above them.

Finally, you may notice some countries have nearly non-existent non-European minorities (Iceland, San Marino, Andorra) but are still ranked quite highly. This is because of their abnormally high rates of urbanization. Iceland, San Marino and Andorra are all essentially city-states, which makes them extremely vulnerable to large migrations of poor third-worlders. One-tenth of the immigration France or Britain receives each year would devastate any of these countries, and all the countries tend to share the same cosmopolitan urban elite predicted by the urbanization rate: hence, the risk of becoming a multi-culti hellhole.

The last interesting bit is Cyprus. For those who are unaware, approximately one-third of Cyprus is Turkish, and they currently run the northern half of the island under the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In some regards, Cyprus already is an international, multicultural hellhole; one where a non-European minority has seceded from European rule. There is a lesson here for other highly-ranked countries.

N.B. :

  1. I did not include Russia due to its historically large non-European minorities. Greenland was excluded since it’s a historically non-European nation. Kosovo was excluded to due a lack of data at the current moment.
  2. Here is the data in excel format, if anyone cares to play with it themselves.

This article was originally published at Mark Yuray’s blog, Aramaxima.

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Emanations of Wotan

Surely as Wotan/Odin personifies the warrior god amongst many of his emanations, Wotan also epitomizes the mystic priest, as well, as the All-father is unbound to simplistic distillations. The emanations of Wotan, as suggested by Jung in his essay, change, evolve, and adapt to the time at hand.

The Spirit of White Consciousness WWII to the Present

Much has been written about Carl Jung’s 1936 essay entitled “Wotan,” where Jung provides an esoteric traditionalist criticism of contemporary events during this precarious era of European history, focusing specifically on the rising atavistic Teutonic ethos embodied by the Nazis and the German people. However, the following paragraphs will not focus on the coming renaissance of Odinism, nor will it focus on erroneous rationalizations for RAHOWA, or any other spurious exegeses the essay has inspired.

Surely as Wotan/Odin personifies the warrior god amongst many of his emanations, Wotan also epitomizes the mystic priest, as well, as the All-father is unbound to simplistic distillations. The emanations of Wotan, as suggested by Jung in his essay, change, evolve, and adapt to the time at hand. In this manner, the ethos and Zeitgeist of modern White consciousness in all the major European theaters of the world (North America, Europe, Australia, etc…) no longer exhibits the ethos and characteristics of Wotan, the war god; instead, the contemporary White, Occidental world reflects Wotan, the master of words, language, and mysticism, as our world moves away from mass violence and mass warfare as the most effective and efficient means of communication both literal and symbolic.

The most important, and often quoted, metaphor extracted from Jung’s essay concerns Jung’s metaphor of the river bed. Through this image, Jung asserts that the gods of our ancestors, as archetypal mechanisms of the psyche, have existed as long as we have existed as a race. The subconscious archetypal gods of the Teutonic peoples are the innate creations of our earliest ancestors. The trough of their riverbed, or the subconscious erosion made by these archetypes over such a great period of time, extends the deepest and remains most readily to be filled when the flood of mystic waters flows over this subconscious topography once more. This explains how these ancient gods continue with us. Even if the river bed is dry for a time and the gods seemingly dead, the riverbed remains waiting to be filled by the spirit of these same gods. More often than not, the gods never die; rather, their aspects and nomenclature change and shift.

Jung’s riverbed metaphor explains the power that this Teutonic ethos wielded during the Nazi era. Even though the pagan period had all but lied dormant for a thousand years, this atavistic Zeitgeist remerged in the mid-20th century, irrevocably altering the landscape of the time and the people who survived the period. Viewing the Nazi period objectively, without moralism, their return to ancient ideologies, symbols, perspectives, and philosophies at least lends empirical credence to the idea of racial memory, how there is a narrative unfurling in every racial culture and spirituality, and how these aspects endure and adapt overtime.

Considering the occultic phase “As above, so below,” in other words “the macrocosm will reflect the microcosm and vice-versa,” archetypal gods such as Wotan and the Aesir macrocosmically reflect the microcosm of the Teutonic soul. In Germanic metaphysics of the soul, there existed the idea of the soul complex made up of different, yet complimentary parts, much unlike the unified soul idea of Christianity. One particular aspect of the soul complex is the fetch. On this concept, Esoteric Germanic Scholar Stephen Flowers asserts,

The fetch can be understood in the traditional sense as an entity separate from the individual, but which is attached to him for the duration of his life. It is the conduit through which the gods communicate to him, and the embodiment of all that he has ever been. It is a storehouse of images and powers from beyond this life and from beyond Midgard. (…) In this is housed all of the echoes of all of the deeds ever done by the bodies to which the fetch has ever been bound (58-59).

In other words, the fetch represents the racial collective unconscious that Jung himself introduce as a concept. On the macrocosmic level, Wotan reflects the mechanism of the fetch to the whole race instead of the mere individual. If one ponders about this archetypal role of the gods in connection with Oswald Spengler’s view of civilization as reflecting the microcosmic cycle of birth, life, and death of the human individual on the macrocosmic level, then the notion that the spiritual, that which is immaterial yet ever-present, must function on the macrocosmic level, as well. Therefore, the body of the civilization must die; however, the ancestral spirit and ethos is eternal in some sense.

The spirit of the civilization lives long after the corporeal civilization. Both the spiritual and residual physical legacy continues. The spirit of Wotan, operating as the fetch on the macrocosmic level, detaches from the dead civilization and reattaches to a nascent civilization of the same racial stock. The physical legacy is more obvious. The best example of physical legacy would be in the consideration of how important classicism (the legacy of Greek and Rome) is still to the present day. Wotan and the Aesir still linger in our subconscious though Germanic and Scandinavian practice ended a thousand years earlier. Plato’s Republic or Artistole’s Treatise on Rhetoric still reach from beyond the ancient grave to influence modern thought. In turn, the runes and the gods lied mostly dormant, much like the One Ring of Tolkien’s epic, until both the runes and the gods revealed themselves once more during the German Romantic period of the late 19th century.

It is my assertion that Wotan, the War god, reared his ugly head during this period of turmoil as the most effective means of communication and action. Unexhausted by the First World War, nations and principalities on both sides of the Ally and the Axis powers malevolently postured in the perilous geopolitical situation. The goals of these various parties and their globalist banker “philanthropists” could only be achieved through mass warfare. The most effective means of communication to fight the growth of Marxism in the Soviet Union, the Fascism of Mussolini’s Italy, or the National Socialism of Germany was to forego intellectual debates of merit and dive head strong in a measure of brute force. Though “mass” media of the period could reach and influence great numbers over great distances of geographic locations, its distribution was far too slow to keep apace with the escalating situation of World War II. The metaphysical semiotics of War, whether Ally or Axis, were far more powerful statements than the written word. Only the mass blood shed of Dresden, Nazi and Soviet Death Camps, post-war German civilian concentration camps, and last, but hardly least, the atomic bombs dropped upon Nagasaki and Hiroshima both provided the shock-and-awe military leaders, politicians, and globalist bankers wanted while also sobering the frenzied bloodlust of the world’s population for a time.

Today, Occidental denizens, White or otherwise, have reached our threshold for wanton and mass violence. There is no longer a fervor, no longer a romanticism of war. Vietnam and the War on Terror shattered the last vestiges of the idea of noble warfare. Hardly 10 years since the beginning of the War on Terror, ordinary Americans and our ordinary global counterparts no longer call for blood against nebulous, barely-identifiable groups. I feel even a true, authentic sense of shame in America for our initial reaction to 9/11 and the exponential mess originating therefrom. Not even the rednecks of my home state have the gall nor the want to wish ill-fates upon “towel heads” any longer. Too many pictures of dead women and children. Too many destroyed lives. Too many raw, uncensored videos. Even the toughest, most cynical vanguardist would be hard pressed not to be affected by an Arab father losing his daughter, wife, son, etc. Though the signs of degradation surround us, we still understand on some level that we are blessed.

The rise of global communications, the Internet, alternative journalism, and the like have begun to decimate the globalists’ logos and rationale for the continuation of purposeless wars that benefit none but the globalists themselves. Blind faith in politics, political leaders, and their agendas is seemingly less and less tolerated or fashionable on either the left or the right. We are now so much unlike the Great Generation willing to die for God and Country, a generation whose members sometimes committed suicide if unable to fight for freedom and liberty. Even the poorest of the cracker proletariats are hardly that naïve in 2014. Military service is a means-to-an-end, not a service of valor, honor, and courage. There is no authentic ethos that guides the passions of youthful combatants, only the promise of a paycheck, skills specialization, and a means of going to college. I surely do not mean this as a slight to service men and women, but they must be willing to accept the vast difference in what it means to be a part of the military now as opposed to then.

The priestly avatar of Wotan, that archetypal spinal column of the Teutons, emerges once more. No longer does the god of the Wild Hunt scorch the land. The Valkyrie no longer trails behind in such great force to lift up the 60 million slain Einherjar as the result of fratricidal World War II. Now Wotan, the god of poetry, mysticism, and language wanders the information superhighway. Wotan is present at every church, every community, every group within instinctually/inherently white cultures and subcultures. Is there any doubt there is a correlation between Odin the wanderer and the migratory nature of White “racism”? At White cultures most pacifist, our ethnic migratory trends and patterns reflect the desires of White Americans at large whether they are conscious of the fact or are completely unawares. If White culture has been rendered mute by the established hierarchy and artificial structures that reinforce cultural Marxist norms, then Whites silently congregate. Whether this is the White churches, from the “mega” to the bible study at home, or at concerts/festivals of inherently White music, or certain particular geographically insular wWhite communities, we still seek those like us. Hysterically, few Whites who engage in the latter activities would be galled to admit this is true. Yet when Christians “fight for Christmas,” they fight for Wotan. When yuppies and hipsters converge for music where they lift up their voices in one accord comfortable in the safety of familiar demographics, they sing for Wotan in their transcendent groupthink. And one day, when the place between that which is hard and the rock closes in, the spirit of Wotan will guide our voices once more.

Communication now vastly outweighs war as the most effective means of transfiguring cultural and societal landscapes. Now is the age of the “Info War,” a term Alex Jones poignantly coined. He is correct in this affair. In the First World still, battles of words and intellect have mostly replaced military or crusader tactics of submit-or-die type conversion techniques. We can take the skirmish to Twitter or Facebook instead of bloodletting on the battlefield. As such, a new spirit of Wotan now emerges. Some readers may be offended that I have reduce Wotan to the role of some beta male who is somehow emasculated; however, I would argue that Wotan is not an unlearned, uninitiated, lowly warrior. The modern world is now far too complex to apply brute strength as a means of change. The modern world is far more like a vast and complicated game of chess than a game of Battleship. The oversoul of the Teutonic, Scandinavian, Slav, and Celtic peoples must adapt to this new paradigm of warfare. A long-game strategy must be deployed. We may be forced to into defensive stance at present, but being on the defensive in the chess analogy does not mean we will lose. It means we must, we have to, play a serious, committed, and smart game for the win.

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NPI—which includes The National Policy Institute, Washington Summit Publishers, and Radix—also needs your help to cover basic expenses for projects that will launch in the coming months. (I’ll discuss these below.)  


But since it’s the turn of the year—a time for reflection—I don’t simply want to ask for money.  I want to show the path we’re treading as an organization so that we can understand how all of our project are part of a larger vision.    

The Christmas and New Year’s season is our favorite time of year. (That might sound trite, but it’s true.) We experience the return of family, rituals, and festivities. We also get the opportunity—which is quite rare today—to step back from the daily distractions and toil and honestly reflect on where we came from and where we’re going.

As I’m sure you know, Christmas and New Year’s also mark the season of fundraising campaigns. . . and by the time you read this, you have, no doubt, already been subjected to many.

NPI—which includes The National Policy Institute, Washington Summit Publishers, and Radix—also needs your help to cover basic expenses for projects that will launch in the coming months. (I’ll discuss these below.)

But since it’s the turn of the year—a time for reflection—I don’t simply want to ask for money. I want to show the path we’re treading as an organization so that we can understand how all of our project are part of a larger vision.


Before talking about what we did this past year, it’s useful to remind ourselves who we are, and of our fundamental mission. The National Policy Institute is dedicated to setting forth alternative political ideas, neither Left nor Right, which promote the flourishing of European-Americans, and Europeans around the world. Washington Summit Publishers produces literature on scientific understanding and, in particular, Human Biodiversity; and Radix seeks to establish a higher culture and revive distinctly Occidental ways of looking at the world. (Put most simply, politics, science, and culture; that is what NPI, WSP, and Radix are about.)

At NPI, we don’t believe in quick, easy fixes; that is, we don’t focus on a single issues or the next election or imagine that defeating this one bad bill or instituting this one good amendment would fundamentally alter our people’s and civilization’s destiny. Our task is as much about consciousness, understanding, culture, and awakening as it is about “politics” in the technical sense of the term.

At NPI, we don’t get caught up in the little stuff. We want to set big, meaningful goals for our movement—goals that might now seem “impossible,” even outlandish, but which will define our projects moving forward.

At the end of this essay (or by visiting this page), you can learn about becoming part of NPI, and about our basic membership program—The Sam Francis Circle (named after our co-founder).

What follows is a New Year’s reflection: an examination of what we’ve accomplished and where we’re headed.


What did we do in 2013? Perhaps we should first look at what was done to us (!). It was impossible not to notice that in the past year mainstream media have been keen on “promoting” NPI, our projects, and yours truly. We were the subject of quite a few hit pieces; most prominently, Rachel Maddow of MSNBC warned her viewer against NPI and tried to use “the NPI menace” as a means of passing immigration reform, unsuccessfully. (I must admit, there was something surreal about seeing myself appear on the nightly news.) We also received press coverage by no less than the Washington Post, along with web outlets like Vice.com and The Daily Caller.

And then there was the curiously fawning profile of me in Salon. . .

We need to put these articles into perspective. Mainstream liberal media outlets have their own motivations for attacking us, and we shouldn’t fall into the trap of being defined by them and thinking that if they hate us, we must be doing something right! That’s not always true. For instance, I could definitely get another write-up by making a complete ass of myself, and we would recognize that this would harm NPI, our movement, and me.

But look closely at these various hit pieces. Amongst the vitriol, our attackers were unanimous in claiming that we are serious, even attractive; that we comprise the “next generation” of nationalism; and that we have influence among conservatives.

So let’s prove Rachel Maddow right!

This past year, we also took advantage of opportunities to present ourselves to the world on our own terms. This happened first in April, when I addressed Jared Taylor’s American Renaissance gathering, which was both an honor and thrill. There, I presented probably the most important piece I’ve written in some time, “Facing the Future as a Minority,” which argues that we must go beyond mainstream conservatism—beyond immigration and the hot-button issues we’re used to—and begin the struggle for a post-American Ethno-State on the American continent. This project is still in the stage of impossible, “utopian” ideals, but that’s where it has to start. Later in the fall, I also had the opportunity to travel to London and address the Traditional Britain Group, where I spoke on a similar topic.

And then in October, there was NPI’s 2013 National Conference, “After the Fall.” Put simply, this event put our organization on the map. First, there was the line-up of speakers, which included Alain de Benoist, a “founding father” of the postwar traditionalist Right. He spoke along with mainstays such as Tomislav Sunic, Alex Kurtagic, and Sam Dickson. We also featured new voices such as Jack Donovan, Roman Bernard, and a host of activists, publishers, and writers. And we did it all in Washington, DC—we turned the enemy territory against the enemy and made it our platform.

We need events like the National Leadership Conference for a number of reasons. They are rallying points and networking opportunity—perhaps their most important function is to facilitate introductions, friendship, and networking. They act as a means of communicating our messages to the world, and they demonstrate our resolve.

Looking ahead, I would like to announce three important things.

First, beginning in January, we will release all videos from the 2013 Conference—for free and on-demand.

Secondly, in the fall of 2014, NPI will be again host a gathering of a similar scale and importance as our 2013 event.

Thirdly, this spring, we’re going to try something new, edgy, and potentially rewarding for an event. I’ll be announcing details soon.


Now, let’s now turn to books. In September, we published The Newton Awards: A History of Genius in Science and Technology, by Michael Hart and Claire Parkinson (who’s a researcher at NASA). The Newton Awards is a quite readable history and, in its short life, it has already been sold to university libraries, bringing prestige to everything we do.

Also this winter, we published, under the Radix imprint, Survive—The Economic Collapse by Piero San Giorgio. Survive was a hit in Europe, where it first appeared, and was quite popular among “identitarian” groups. It is an analysis of the unsustainability of the credit-bubble, cheap-oil, endless-growth economy; it also offers a “practical guide” for building what Giorgio calls a “Sustainable Autonomous Base”—a self-reliant and resilient community. (In other words, you can learn how to live well in “interesting times.”) One quite positive thing about this book is that even though it’s about the end of the world as we know it, it’s never cranky; it’s written in an approachable and often humorous tone. This volume will appeal to a large community beyond our movement (including confused conservatives and leftists).

Our next volume is a real treasure—Reuben a novel by Tito Perdue. Reuben is both light-hearted and deeply serious, written in both a realistic and outrageous style. Tito tells the story of a man whose goal is nothing less than taking over the world, or at least “turning it around.” Without reading it yourself, it’s probably impossible for me to communicate just how funny and compelling it is.

Also, in the coming first quarter of 2014, we will release a second, revised edition of Richard Lynn’s classic Race Differences in Intelligence—which was, by the way, the first WSP volume I ever read—along with the second issue of Radix Journal.

Over the coming year, Radix will publish a study of Martin Heidegger by Alexandr Dugin as well as Raymond Wolters’s quite excellent book on education. And in late 2014, we have a surprise in store, a new book which is something of an archeological find . . . (I’ll say no more at this point.)

RadixJournal.com + NPIAmerica.org

NPI has also re-dedicated itself to having a strong web presence and being a place where we go, everyday, for analysis, culture, and commentary. NPI’s home website, NPIAmerica.org, was completely redesigned and now features regular blogging. Also, we launched RadixJournal.com, a complementary website to the print journal, which will involve some of the best writers in our movement. Roman Bernard has come on board to help me with all of these projects, especially the website. (I discussed our overall goals for Radix here.)

Put simply we’re doing a hell of a lot! And we need your help to keep getting better.

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The Great Erasure

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

This article first appeared in the print edition of RADIX Journal (Vol. 1 / 2012)

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

Some critics of “immigration” feel the term is euphemistic and prefer to label the phenomenon “invasion.” Guillaume Faye calls it “colonization.” Yet, although the use of alternative terminology is motivated by legitimate concerns with the scale, the permanence, and the non-assimilation associated with modern immigration in the West, neither alternative seems satisfactory.

First, the scale of immigration does not alter the nature of the phenomenon, as the definition of “immigration” still holds so long as it describes individuals moving from one polity to another for purposes of establishing residence. Secondly, length of residence does not transform immigration into something else, as immigration does not exclude, and, indeed, often involves, permanent relocation. Thirdly, assimilation is separate from, and not a condition for, successful immigration, even if it is so for integration. Furthermore, both invaders and colonizers can be immigrants, but immigrants are not necessarily invaders or colonizers (and they are neither if they appeal to the established sovereignty for admission, inclusion, and integration.)

Indeed, “invasion” is wide of the mark. In a geopolitical sense, an invasion is an aggressive military operation aimed at “conquering, liberating, or re-establishing control or authority over a territory, forcing the partition of a country, altering the established government or gaining concessions from said government, or a combination thereof.”[1] In a biological sense, the term still involves aggression. Modern “immigration” in the West, though it may have similar effects, and though some “immigrants” may be aggressive, is neither military in character nor centrally organized—save exceptionally and loosely—by either active or passive encouragement to emigrate and resettle in a specific polity or territory.

“Colonization” is much closer to the mark, but still not on it. The term refers to the establishment of colonies in one territory by people from another territory, but colonies can comprise colonists or colonials, the latter of which is linked to colonialism. In colonialism, a metropole claims sovereignty over the colony, deliberately changing—when the territory is already inhabited—the social structure, government, and economics of the colonized territory. “Immigration” is not “colonization” in this sense. Arguably, “immigrants” into the West have increasingly sought to gain or exert control over the social structure, government, and economics of their host countries, but they are not—save with one exception, mentioned below—subjects of a metropole with a deliberate policy of colonization. The “immigrants” issue from multiple metropoles, which are uncoordinated, geographically dispersed, may be rivals or enemies, and in all but one case operate no policy of colonization, officially or unofficially. Moreover, the so-called “immigrants” are not even coordinated among themselves, beyond temporary subjection by some or exploitation by criminal gangs of human traffickers.The “immigrants” are impelled, not by a single-minded desire to establish or join a colony, but by a variety of individual motives, mostly involving escape from danger or poverty in their native territory and a desire for safety and (above all) economic betterment in a prosperous metropole.

The term “colonization,” however, is not entirely inadequate, for modern “immigration” in the West still involves exogenous strangers colonizing Western polities. This is because, while different from colonialism, structurally the phenomenon remains related to it. A more apt term for the phenomenon of “immigration” would be “settler colonialism,” which can involve settlers from multiple metropoles whose behavior and consciousness is very similar to that of our modern Third World “immigrants”; but the term remains problematic, since it describes projects like Israel today, South Africa up until the early 20th century, and what eventually became the United States, from the 17th century through most of the 19th. Nevertheless, “settler colonialism” is structurally most similar to what is discussed in this essay, however, and provides a sound theoretical basis for what I propose to call, for the purposes of distinction, “settler colonization.”
In this essay, I will first provide a description of settler colonialism as it is currently theorized. I will then show how settler colonialism closely describes modern “immigration” in the West. Next, I will indicate how the Western experience with modern settlers from the Third World differs from that of past settler-colonial projects. Finally, I will suggest possible strategies for combating settler colonization in our hemisphere.

Settler Colonialism

Edward Cavanagh, editor of the Settler Colonial Studies journal, and Lorenzo Veracini, author of Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview[2], define settler colonialism as follows:

Settler colonialism is a global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present. There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends. Not all migrants are settlers; as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settlers come to stay. They are founders of political orders who carry with them a distinct sovereign capacity. And settler colonialism is not colonialism: settlers want Indigenous people to vanish (but can make use of their labour before they are made to disappear). Sometimes settler colonial forms operate within colonial ones, sometimes they subvert them, sometimes they replace them. But even if colonialism and settler colonialism interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other.

In his book, Veracini also ascribes to settler colonialism distinctive characteristics:

  • Settler colonialism creates a dual division between itself, exogenous Others, and indigenous Others; these can be either virtuous or degraded.
  • Settler colonialism is always virtuous, always forward-moving, conceiving itself and its activity in terms of improvement and progress. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous, but can be either elevated or degraded, while exogenous Others can be selectively included or segregated. However, settler colonialism more easily includes exogenous Others than indigenous Others and routinely fantasizes about exchanging indigenous Others with exogenous Others.
  • Inclusion and exclusion operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operate concurrently, without a need for consistency. Yet, while borders are internally porous, they are externally impermeable: settlers can go out, but indigenes cannot get in.
  • Settler colonialism involves the settler self undergoing coeval processes of indigenization and exogenization.
  • Settler colonialism thus converges with the original society, but the line is never crossed because the distinction needs to remain.
  • Settler colonialism dominates in order to transfer (remove); colonialism dominates in order to exploit.
  • Settler colonialism tends to underestimate the indigenous in various objective and subjective ways, making the indigenous invisible.
  • Settler colonialism, accordingly, subjectively conceives areas to be annexed or opened for settlement as vacant.
  • Settler colonialism sees itself as ultimately, if not immediately, autonomous, and therefore resists interference from the metropole; colonialism is subordinate to the metropole.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by an exclusive interpretation of peoplehood, a specific understanding of sovereign capacities and their location, even though settlement itself is messy and most people move individually, “without a conscious determination to establish a new, ideal, society, and with no specific understanding of their own sovereignty.”[3]
  • Settler colonialism sees the settler colonial setting as charged with a special regenerative nature.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.
  • Settlers come to work and live in peace and see themselves as escaping from violence; a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one.
  • Settler colonialism disavows its violent foundation, but peacefulness coexists with violence.
  • Settler colonialism suffers from “ongoing concerns with existential threats and a paranoid fear of ultimate decolonization.”[4]
  • Settler colonialism has a linear structure, whereas colonialism has a circular structure: for one, the literary metaphor is the Aeneid, for the other, the Odyssey; one involves non-discovery, since settlers simply reproduce their society; the other, discovery, since the discoverer reports back to the metropole; one involves non- encounter with the indigenous (they are invisible, shadows, undercounted, deterritorialized, sojourners, part of the landscape), the other encounter (through exploitation).
  • Settler colonialism, because it deterritorializes the indigenous and denies their state-forming capacity, can be superseded only by itself, ending with the complete elimination of the indigenous. In this case, the end is negotiated from within, including complicated and dubious processes of “national reconciliation.” The alternative ending is settler exodus or expulsion. In this case, there is never equality or any subsequent relationship between the indigenous and the settlers; settler colonialism is a winner-takes-all scenario: either the indigenous or the settlers disappear. Colonialism, on the other hand, ends with state formation (by the indigenous), and its end is a negotiation between states (the colonizers’ and the indigenous’).
  • Settler independence accelerates the process of nation-building and hence the process of erasure of the indigenous. Even well-meaning acts of reconciliation and incorporation entail the erasure of indigenous forms as it occurs in the context of settlers’ forms.

Settler Colonization in the West

As has been noted, critics of “immigration” in the West have noted its unprecedented scale, its permanent character, and the non-assimilation/non-assimilability of Third World “immigrants.” Among the characteristics of settler colonialism is that settlers come to stay and do not appeal to the established indigenous sovereignty, but rather deny it and seek to remove it in order to replace it with a reproduction or regeneration of their own society. Implied in settler colonialism is scale: settlers may arrive as individual immigrants, but the process of reproduction, removal, and replacement necessitates sufficient scale successfully to neutralise, overcome, and eliminate indigenous resistance.

In Western Europe this is most apparent in the continuing growth of Islamic formations by immigrant Muslims, who, now numbering in the millions, found and daily operate their own structures in parallel with the indigenous authority. Spread across the regions, but concentrated in metropolitan enclaves, these structures may be physical, such as mosques and madrassas, or they may be legal-theological, such as arbitration tribunals based on Shariah law. Their prosperity benefits from demographic contraction and loss of faith by Europeans, whose churches are gradually converted into mosques; but it is also driven by a will to conquer the land, which, from time to time, find open expression across a range of settings, from the streets to high political office held by Muslims. During the disturbances caused by the publication of a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed in Denmark in 2005, Muslim protesters variously called for Shariah law for the United Kingdom, worldwide domination by Islam, the death or slaughter of those who insult Islam, and the extermination of Europeans. Similarly, in 2008, Labour politician Shahid Malik, former Justice Minister and Minister for Race, Faith and Community Cohesion at the Department for Communities and Local Government, stated at that year’s “Global Peace and Unity” conference, held at the Excel London Centre:

I am proud of the achievements of Muslims in this country from ’97. In 19 97 we got our first Muslim MP. In 20 01 we had two Muslim MPs. In 20 05 we had four Muslim MPs. In ša Allah, in 20 09–10, we’ll have eight Muslim MPs. In 2014 we’ll have sixteen Muslim MPs. At this rate, the whole Parliament will be Muslim! But just to say, in case there are journalists here today, that is not my objective. But you know, we’ ve got four Muslim MPs; there should be twenty Muslim MPs in Parliament. And in ša Allah very shortly we’ll see that. I am confident, as Britain’s first Muslim Minister, that, in ša Allah, in the next thirty years or so, we’ll see a Prime Minister in this country, who happens to share my faith.
Such messages cannot be dismissed as simple expressions of anger or hopeful prognostication. Anger and hope can be expressed in many ways, and it is significant that, rather than calling for respect and toleration of a Muslim minority, the thrust of the messages, be it from protestors or from a Justice Minister, flowed uniformly in the direction of conquest, replacement, and Islamic supremacy.

In the United States, Mexican immigrants of recent decades have a well-documented history of forming their own parallel structures. In their case, it takes the form of businesses, pressure groups, student organizations, printed and electronic media, gangs, and social networks permeating occupations, neighborhoods, and local politics, within which all transactions and interactions are conducted in Spanish. Mexican immigrants, their descendants (including naturalized ones), as well as Mexicans in Mexico, also conceive themselves, even at official government level, as possessing a sovereign capacity as Mexicans—“I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border, that wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico.” A true Mexican immigrant leaves Mexico behind and appeals to the United States government so that he may eventually become an American; a Mexican settler takes Mexico with him, and, though he may take up American citizenship, the latter is done for purely instrumental (e.g., economic) reasons. Some more ideologically racialist Mexicans dream of replacing the United States government with a Chicano superstate to be called “Aztlan.” A more common assumption of Mexican settlers is that part or all of the U.S. will gradually transform into a more lucrative version of their home country.

The process of replacement is made partially invisible by its interaction with a vestigial European settler colonial consciousness: “immigrants” have slowly built their structures largely in the shadows, persistently undercounted and underestimated. This is an instance where settler colonialism and settler colonization interpenetrate.

Third World settlers in the West replicate the dual division of peoples in settler colonial projects, and the relationship between self and other is analogous. Upon arrival, they are faced with indigenous Others, who comprise the majority and are ostensibly the established authority, as well as with exogenous Others, who comprise minorities of fellow travelers and against whom they are now pitted in competition for resources and admission by the established authority. When faced with real or perceived resistance by the indigenous, settlers perceive themselves in a shared predicament with exogenous Others. This makes them more receptive to establishing friendships or alliances with exogenous Others against the indigenous established authority. Said exogenous Others, however, may be found within structures of the established authority itself. Thus, generic pro-“immigrant” pressure groups emerge with the backing of establishment politicians. (As discussed further below, these politicians, though exogenous, may also be or appear to be indigenous.)

The consciousness of settler colonization in the West is always virtuous: settlers seek employment, economic betterment, educational improvement, professional progress, and a peaceful life. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous: they are racists, bigots, Islamophobes, infidels, faithless, and degenerate. They can, however, be elevated by converting to the settler’s faith and/or cause. They can, by adopting their manners and sensibilities, also be selectively admitted into the settler collective, including through marriage, although this may require conversion. In the latter case, reluctant admission and desire for admission interpenetrate, for the settler, still perceiving himself as less powerful than the indigenous (even if more virtuous), sees acceptance as a gateway for deeper colonization and altering the indigenous society in ways more amenable to his collective (e.g. by campaigning for “anti-racist” legislation). When settlers run for political office, one part of them desires acceptance by the establishment (it is powerful and confers privilege), another desires to change that establishment (it is racist and excludes settlers). It is not gaining admission with a view to assimilating to the indigenous Other, but rather gaining admission with a view to neutralise and/or displace him.

Thus, inclusion by and of the settler and exclusion of the indigenous operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operating concurrently and without consistency.

The search for admission, even if without a view to assimilation, does involve a process of indigenization. The indigenous in Europe, because they tend towards individualism and low ethnocentricity, confuse indigenization of the settler with assimilation, not realizing that settlers are ethnocentric collectivists and seek eventually to recast European society in their image. The process of indigenization involves settlers becoming the indigenous, not settlers becoming like the indigenous (even though the former does superficially involve and necessitate the latter to varying degrees.)

A process of exogenization of the settler in relation to the latter’s original society is the other facet of his indigenization in Europe, for as he indigenizes in an alien environment, he also diverges from the members of his race, whom he has left behind. The evolution of past settler colonial projects, particularly those involving multiple races and ethnicities, such as what became the United States, point to the eventual emergence of a sense of peoplehood, albeit qualified by racial or ethnic membership. This means that while the United Kingdom may variously converge with India, Pakistan, Africa, and the Caribbean, settlers from these countries or regions, and more so their descendants, and particularly where they are racially mixed, will not see themselves as subjects or indigenous to those countries and regions, but as British citizens indigenous to Britain, whose heritage goes back to one or more of those countries or regions. It follows from this that while there will be convergence, the line will never be crossed because the distinction will always remain.

While the end result is the transference (removal) of the indigenous, settler colonization in the West coexists with exploitative relationships proper of straight colonialism. It is well known that Third World settlers in the West, even at the appellant stage, take advantage of the indigenous’ welfare state and concessionary provisions, and that these benefits are often a reason for immigrating in the first place; indeed, on the whole, these settlers consume more than they produce. However, exploitation is not limited to scrounging from the indigenous government: it also takes the form of various forms of ethnically organized fraud, such as car crash insurance claim scams, which are run by Muslim gangs, or ethnically organized exploitation, such as pedophilia, also associated with Muslim gangs. So long as the indigenous remain in charge, they remain both an obstacle and a resource.

This is linked both to the subjective underestimation of the indigenous and the conception of Europe as vacant. Although the latter may seem an exaggeration, it is not if we understand ethnocentricity as involving a certain “vacating” (or evacuation) of the Other’s humanity. Third World settlers in the West are by nature highly ethnocentric, at least in relation to the indigenous White majority. The West is thus conceived by settlers primarily as a space, a land, where there are resources and opportunity, not as comprising people just like them who can provide generosity and friendship. The indigenous Westerner, therefore, is vacant, present but absent, a somewhat abstract entity that has to be dealt with, if only because “it” holds the “keys to the kingdom,” but which is otherwise denied and subjectively disappears until the next time “it” gets in the way or the settler realizes he needs something from “it.” The indigenous White majority is essentially part of the landscape, but, as with irredentist Mexican settlers in the United States, it can be seen as sojourners, interlopers, or usurpers.

Both the emergent sense of peoplehood, even if multifarious and complicated by racial and ethnic divides and miscegenation, and the conception of a vacant land of opportunity, are concurrent with autonomy from the originating metropole, and even resistance to its interference. It must be borne in mind that many settlers immigrate as economic or political refugees, and seek to make a new life in the Western El Dorado. Making a new life is another way of saying regeneration; the West, and immigration to the West, are imbued with a regenerative nature. In turn, this regeneration occurs as a dual process, whereby the settler regenerates (that is, generates again) his own society and simultaneously has his life regenerated in (and/or by) the land of opportunity. Given the often dysfunctional nature of Third World societies, this duality would seem to be mutually negating, since the society being regenerated is the society from which the settler fled, and a successful regeneration of that society would impede the successful regeneration of the settler’s life. Indeed, a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one. But settlers do not require consistency.

Third World settlers immigrating into the West are motivated primarily by the prospect of economic betterment; they have no specific understanding of their sovereignty and neither do they, with the exception of politicized Mexican settlers in the United States, possess a conscious collective will, for settlers move individually, even if they arrive in groups. All the same, as we have seen from the proliferation of parallel substitutive formations by settlers in the West, they do possess the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.

The process of doing so is non-violent, following a legal sequence comprising: appeal to the indigenous authority (for recognition and admission as permanent minorities, and eventually citizens); development of exogenous structures (serving as substitutes to indigenous ones); co-option of indigenous structures (lobbying for concessions, multiculturalism); subversion from without (lobbying for anti-racist legislation); and indigenization (becoming legislators, subversion from within). At the same time, the process coexists with violence, whereby the indigenous are physically attacked or subject to predations (typically muggings, robberies, racially motivated beatings, and rape), or else morally attacked (typically accusations of prejudice and “racism,” and/or “racism” hoaxes).

Conversely, settlers live in paranoid fear. In the West, colored settlers imagine themselves in the midst of indigenous “racists,” in an institutionally “racist” society, even though said society has invited them, granted them recognition, made concessions, opened its labour market to them, accepted them as citizens, elected them into public offices, denounced “racism” in all its forms, swiftly purged “racists” upon detection, and even changed its laws to criminalise “racism” and punish “racists” with added rigor. This may be because settlers both have a well-developed sense of racial identity, because they would never welcome colonization in their traditional homeland, and because they are routinely agitated by ideologically egalitarian fanatics. No matter what gains they make, the fear of “racism” is ever present, and the perceived risk of expulsion (decolonization) ever lingering. In both Europe and the United States, it has happened before: in 1492 (the Spanish Reconquista) and 1954 (Operation Wetback).

Expulsion or a mass exodus would, indeed, be the only way to end Third World settler colonization in the West. Millions of settlers are citizens, many going back several generations, not a few descended from mixed race marriages. Short of expulsion or a mass exodus, the long-term effect of settler colonization, aided by high numbers of incomers and differential fertility favoring the settlers, is the replacement of the indigenous population. The latter will not need to disappear entirely, at least as a biological entity, before being completely dispossessed: even without violence, the indigenous institutions of democracy and equality provide the logic and mechanisms for dispossession. If the majority of people in Britain are Muslim, for example, democracy necessitates that they be proportionally represented in the seats of political, economic, cultural, academic, and institutional power. The historical rarity and fugaciousness of democracy in the Third World, however, suggests that democratic governance would end as soon as it ceases to be useful for the settlers, though this is not to say that the indigenous could not well dispense with it in the face of an immediate existential threat—democracy has proven historically rare and fugacious in the West, too.

Without the complete erasure of the indigenous Westerners, the end of Third World settler colonization in the West would at best imply a dubious procedure of “national reconciliation,” involving negotiation by the indigenous with triumphant settlers from within, and in the context of settlers’ established forms. Most likely, given the multiracial character of settler colonization in the West, is that one ethnicity would gain the ascendancy over all the others, and it would be they who become the new indigenous. The Bantus in South Africa provide a historical example.

Uniqueness of Settler Colonization in the West

Settler colonization in the West is not unique because of its scale or the fact that settlers are poor. Settler colonialist projects have involved large numbers in the past and many of the settlers have been poor—in most cases, they immigrated looking for a better life. The uniqueness of our experience with settler colonization results from the unique features of modern Western societies.

First, it is the colonization of the more powerful by the less powerful, of the former colonialists by the formerly colonized; it is, in other words, a reversion of past colonialism and settler colonialism.

Secondly, this process enjoys the ongoing complicity of the indigenous’ ruling elites, who, wittingly or unwittingly, instigated it in the first place out of a perceived economic need, and have since institutionalized it out of political opportunism, greed, a sense of historical guilt, or befuddlement with an ideology of human universalism. The opening of land to colonists by leaders is not unique: African kings in southern Africa either sold or gave away land to European settlers in exchange for military service during the 19th century. What is unique is the institutionalization of a policy of welcoming settler colonization, supported by a universalist ideology that makes the voluntary transfer of land and sovereignty morally virtuous.

Thirdly, alongside indigenous collaborationism, Third World settler colonization in the West has been catalyzed by both historical events and the existence of a hostile or at least self-serving exogenous minority of very able intellectuals, businessmen, and legislators. The excesses of the National Socialist government in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, Allied victory in World War II, and the moral capital amassed and exploited by Jews—and especially radical Marxist Jews—as a result of well publicized National Socialist persecution, permitted the development of Jewish intellectual movements that subjected traditional European identity and institutions to radical critiques. Their effect was the gradual deprecation of European tradition and racial identity and the development of universalism to its logical extreme. Interacting with guilt as the primary method of social control in the West, this made it possible even for genetically distant immigrants eventually to become legislators because it had become impossible for the indigenous to argue against exclusion based on race.[5]

Fourthly, the sovereignty transfers take a more abstract form than the land leases, cessions, seizure, or annexations that have characterized settler colonialist projects elsewhere. In the West transfers occur at the legal, policy, and moral- philosophical levels; they involve, for example, changes in legislation that privilege settlers over the indigenous, abdication of indigenous racial consciousness as a morally legitimate cognitive structure, or discrimination policies against the indigenous designed disproportionately to enhance settlers’ access to higher education and the job market. Similarly, the emptiness and evacuation of the “land of opportunity” among settlers occurs at a much more abstract level than allowed by indigenous demographic contraction: the Western “land of opportunity” is densely populated and highly developed, so the evacuation is purely subjective. Its closest analogue is modern Israel, where the “promised land” is subjectively emptied by denying Palestinians the same moral and symbolic status as Jews.

Finally, the settler colonization in the West does not involve the ignoring or direct overrunning of the indigenous, but rather an incremental engagement, which runs concomitantly with a process of gradual transformation of the settler from appellant to citizen to legislator, which is, in turn, wrapped up with the process of indigenization already mentioned.

Third World settler colonization of the West is possible only as a result of a uniquely Western ideology (egalitarianism) and an autochthonous political system (democracy), both of which morally and ideologically disarm the indigenous against settler ascendancy and predation.

Ending Settler Colonization

As has been noted, settler colonialism rarely ends, and it is superseded only by itself. After the United States’ independence, the former settlers ceased to be colonials from a distant mother country because their mother country had become the United States. Moreover, the indigenous were in time either displaced or made to disappear entirely, so there was no question of the indigenous regaining their independence and the colonials returning home—as just stated, the latter were at home. Third World settler colonization in the West being analogous, it follows that the crisis faced by Westerners is much more fundamental than simple out-of-control immigration. A polity can exclude immigrants and strip resident immigrants of their citizenship, but settlers are founders of polities, so they cannot be stripped of their own citizenship by the displaced indigenes, since the indigenous sovereignty is not recognized.

It should be apparent that we in the West live still in a time of transition, where immigration coexists with and interpenetrates settler colonization, and where one has not entirely given way to the other. Yet it is already possible for a citizen of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean descent in the United Kingdom to treat, for example, a White South African over the age of 16 immigrating into the island as a foreigner, and to be in a position to grant or deny admittance, even where the South African has blood ties to the island going back thousands of years and was born to United Kingdom citizens. Conversely, it is no longer possible, without an abrogation of modern Westernism’s basic philosophical tenets, suddenly to withdraw citizenship from a United Kingdom resident descended from one or more generations of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean citizens. Even the overnight expulsion of illegal immigrants and the passing of the most restrictive immigration law imaginable in our present ideological context could not deal with this problem. As time passes, the immigration reform debate will become increasingly irrelevant.

Where settler colonialism was terminated or reversed, such as in South Africa after Nelson Mandela, Rhodesia after Robert Mugabe, and Haïti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the measures required were violent and broke (or would have broken had it existed) current international law. Because this law is premised on equality as an absolute moral good, reversing settler colonization in the West would, without first abrogating this law, or else discrediting the moral basis for such body of law, also imply violent and illegal acts. Settler colonization is, after all, a game of erasure: settlers erase or are erased; no ongoing or equitable relationship is possible between settlers and indigenes. And the single biggest impediment to Whites’ avoiding erasure is the hegemonic belief in the West in equality as an absolute moral good, because the latter dictates that settlers be accorded equal rights and privileges to the indigenous (despite settlers being hostile), and because this belief effectively short-circuits the possibility of an opposing belief in the morality of White racial consciousness and preservation.

Whites in Europe and North America, as well as in former colonies in Africa, the South Pacific, and South America, currently lack a moral theory, let alone the legal means (since the latter would stem from the former), with which to justify and secure their continuity. Unless a new moral theory of difference can be formulated to support an ideology and legal framework that both justifies and enables its self-preservation as a unique biological entity in their own homelands, the White race faces complete erasure from the Earth.

  1. “Invasion,” Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion (accessed September 1, 2012).  ↩
  2. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010.  ↩
  3. Ibid., p. 54.  ↩
  4. Ibid., p. 81.  ↩
  5. See Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Paul Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press 2002).  ↩
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