Radix Journal

Radix Journal

A radical journal

Tag: Mass migration

Displacement from Within

What Turner documents is not just a ‘displacement’ of Britain’s indigenous population by foreigners, but, more important, its debasement of those, who have inherited the land and cultural institutions of their ancestors. Martin walks like a man on a tightrope between the void of today’s West and the transcendence of participating in true art.

It’s an oft-repeated cliché among the so-called alternative Right to say that while Britain once ruled a third of the globe, today it barely controls the streets of London. Those hit the hardest by Britain’s transformation (or, more accurately, deformation) is the working class—once the backbone of British industry and patriotism. Today, fed on the twin somas of sports and what little popular culture has to offer, the working class languishes in a post-industrial dystopia.

Derek Turner’s novella Displacement is a portrait of this Britain—a Britain of displaced workers, alienated elites, and a growing non-native population. It takes place alongside other social novels in the history of the British isles from Disraeli and Dickens to Orwell. But what separates Displacement from many works in this tradition is its non-didactic and honest portrayal of those whom it depicts.

Displacement’s protagonist, Martin Hacklitt, is the forgotten man of today’s Britain—an intelligent youth of poetic disposition, who finds his release from the drudgery and baseness of everyday life through practicing parkour in the streets of London. Parkour, or free running, is a sport that attempts to replicate natural obstacles. Using tall buildings, walls, and other bits of today’s urban jungle, its participants seek to bend their bodies to the world around them and find a sense of liberation from their banal lives below. At least this is how those ‘French books’ Martin reads on the subject describe it.

Martin, a quintessential Englishman, balks at the heady prose and philosophizing of the French parkour books he reads, and sees in it a way to keep fit. Outside parkour along with his poetry, Martin’s other main concern is his love for his on-and-off-again girlfriend Kate. They began dating in high school, where Martin stood up for himself to a gang of bullies. However, by the time of the events described in the novella, the two had grown apart.

Martin is eventually given celebrity status by a chance photograph depicting him performing parkour acts, with the tabloids referring to him as the ‘London leaper’. Who he is quickly takes on an ideological dimension, with left-wing presses seeing in him some exotic, rogue outsider, whereas the conservative media describe him as an enemy to public order.

Kate, recognizing Martin from pictures in the tabloids, contacts him and hopes to set up an interview with a posh, that is, upper class, journalist. Kate’s swift return to Martin—learning of his his celebrity status—will have most Radix readers instantly reminded of hypergamy and the work of F. Roger Devlin, as it should. One of the strengths of Displacement is its chilly realism. Indeed, nowhere is that more apparent than here. For instance, Martin’s inner monologue upon meeting Kate again after a long lull is reminiscent of many one would find in the sort of true-life ‘beta’ stories in the so-called ‘manosphere’:

“Martin tries to take her hand and she withdraws it, but not abruptly. He will try again soon. It feels weird not touching her when she is so close. They always touched, held. But if she feels the same she is disguising it well. She looks so poised, he marvels, yet the speed with which she has rattled out her news shows she’s nervous. As so often over the intervening three-and-a-quarter years, he wonders how many boyfriends she’s had, and hates them all. But he cannot ask her that yet.”

Many readers, especially young men, will recognize some of the same thoughts that have gone through their minds in the context of today’s feminized and deracinated society. But Kate is no villain—merely misguided and far too drawn by the pull of our age. Turner holds his vitriol for the real antagonist of the story—the liberal journalist Seb.

Seb seeks to write a story on the London leaper. For him, journeying to working-class Deptford is akin to traveling to an exotic Caribbean island. He is constantly taken aback by the boorish behavior of Martin’s football-hooligan brother and his staunch old-Labour, old-Britain father, who is constantly trying to hijack Seb’s interview. In addition, he is attracted to Kate and hopes to use this project to get closer to her.

However, when the story is published, it is more or less a hatchet job. Martin’s working-class background is viewed through the gaze of contempt by Britain’s ‘Guardianista’ cultural class. To Seb, the final version of the article was not meant to be this stereotyped, and, exasperated, he tries to excuse his less-than-positive story on Martin’s roots to Kate:

“I knew it! I knew it didn’t do you justice – I mean that it didn’t do Martin justice. But I only had very limited space. You know how it works!”

Indeed, this language should sound quite familiar. One only has to look at Jared Taylor’s recent run-in with the New Yorker to find another journalist, who hoped that he captured his ‘complex subject’.

Seb eventually attempts to buy off Martin’s loyalty by inviting him to edit a volume of Postmodernist poetry, the theme of which is outsider work edited by outsiders. In doing this, Martin is unwittingly making a deal with the devil, compromising who he is to be taken in by the cultural establishment that rules Britain and, indeed, the entire West. His football-hooligan brother says it best:

“Funny, ain’t it really – by having these published all you poetry plonkers become insiders, don’t you?”

Martin’s brother hits the nail on the head for many bright, poor whites, who go on to be educated at Oxford and Cambridge in the U.K., or the Ivy League schools in the U.S., or who achieve some status of cultural distinction by the current ‘Apes of God’, as Wyndham Lewis called the modern cultural classes.

What Turner documents is not just a ‘displacement’ of Britain’s indigenous population by foreigners, but, more important, its debasement of those, who have inherited the land and cultural institutions of their ancestors. Martin walks like a man on a tightrope between the void of today’s West and the transcendence of participating in true art.

In the end, we see him compromised, but through his portrait, we also note an all-too-familiar tale of what happens to bright young boys from traditional working class today. Displacement gives those of us, who self-describe as Identitarian and thus find ourselves in the political fringes, a moving literary look into the heart of our forgotten people.

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The Camp of the Saints: Where Literature and Life Collide

The Camp, although so redolent of Gitanes and High Mass at Nȏtre Dame, was in some strange way about me. It suggested that I was part of a cultural continuum that transcended national boundaries, which somehow encompassed Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Latin; Classicism, Christianity, and humanism; conservatism as well as liberalism.

There is something about the sea that makes it a useful metaphor for change—a combination of its constant movement, its exhilarating ozone, its swift mutability, its vastness and mystery. Depending on what shore one stands on, the sea is a road or rampart, highway to freedom or gateway for invaders, origin of life or cause of death—or all of these things at once.

Nineteenth-Dynasty Egyptians fearing another descent by the Sea Peoples, or Lindisfarne monks glimpsing at longships, understandably had less agreeable ideas of Ocean than Portugal’s Henry the Navigator, England’s Walter Raleigh, or all those other swaggering Europeans from the Age of Discovery. But always, to look out to sea is to invite introspection, consider possibilities.

One numinous day in 1972, a forty-something French novelist named Jean Raspail looked out over the Mediterranean from Vallauris, west of Antibes. He was privately-educated and widely-travelled, the winner of the Académie Française’s Jean Walter Prize for empathetic writings about the unlucky native peoples of South America, a traditionalist Catholic acutely aware of his country’s position in the world. He had seen pulsating poverty around the globe, knew the realities of overpopulation and ethnic conflict, and now he had a revelatory vision of his prosperous Provence suddenly so engulfed. “And what if they came?” he asked himself. “And what if they came?”

He records that The Camp of the Saints almost wrote itself, with him starting to write each morning without quite knowing where the story would have taken him by evening. There was certainly no shortage of source-material, now that Situationists and Soixante-huitards were the mainstream, and all of European civilization—under ideological attack. “The Wretched of the Earth” had been co-opted as auxiliaries by Marxists and as potential consumers by capitalists; the colonies were being abandoned; Catholicism was in freefall; and traditions had become trammels. Judging from permitted public discourse, everyone—from bishops, politicians and academics to actresses—was united in embracing an idea of “France” as outmoded and morally reprehensible. France needed to atone, according to this new narrative, for empire and exploitations, to reinvent herself for a post-national age, effectively commit suicide in order to save her soul.

To Raspail, such ideas were risible, as they probably seemed to the majority of the French—but he also knew that they needed to be taken seriously. He saw that darkly comic notions could have revolutionary consequences. So he stitched real-life quotations from contemporary public intellectuals and celebrities into an epic imagining of a million-strong convoy of India’s poorest and most misshapen, setting out inchoately from the mouth of the Hooghly in rust-bucket ships, and across the Indian Ocean towards the Cape of Good Hope, and so around to Europe—a Promised Land of plenty, trailing the stench of latrines. This reverse colonization by the Tier Monde’s least enterprising was the perfect antithesis of the elitist European navigators, the old continent recoiling back in on itself in tiredness and toxic doubt. Old Europe, expansive Europe, Christian Europe, the Camp of the Saints (Revelations, 20:9)—and for that matter easygoing Europe, too—was suddenly a shrinking island in a world of angry water.

In lambent language, Raspail visualizes the multitudinous currents that ebb and flow through his fictive France as “The Last Chance Armada” creeps through preternaturally calm waters en route to disembarkation and destiny. He tells all too believably of moral grandstanding—the mood-mélange of calculation, foolishness, hysteria, and myopia—the excited solidarity that surges through France’s marginal minorities—the ever-shriller rhodomontade about international obligations, human rights and anti-racism – the cowed silence or wry acceptance of the minority of realists. A river of hypocritical canards flows South from studios even as their utterers decamp in the opposite direction—leaving in their rubbish-strewn wake fellow French too poor or old to move, and a tiny number of patriots too attached to their homeland to consider forsaking it even in extremis.

These last-standers hold out on a hilltop, as all of France and Europe fall to what Raspail brilliantly termed “stampeding lambs”—immigrants, who are simultaneously individually inoffensive and cumulatively catastrophic. For a brief spell, the diehards assert their identity as their ancestors had always been prepared to do, patrolling their tiny borders, using hunting rifles to pick off interlopers, revelling in simply being French and in France (although one is an Indian volunteer). This is even though—or because—they guess it is only a matter of days before their own annihilation, which is inevitably ordered by Paris.

The Camp was highly original—Raspail’s realization that immigration was the defining issue of his (and our) age, his clear-eyed examination of intellectual trends then still far from their logical denouements, his uncompromising commitment to la France profonde, and to Christianity—all rendered in strong and sonorous prose. His narrative, howsoever exaggerated for effect, was a distillation and condensation of observable reality. He laid bare the weaponization of words—gentle words like “tolerance,” “compassion,” “non-discrimination”—and the harsh facts underlying ‘liberal’ contemporaneousness. “I see the UN has decided to abolish the concept of race”, one Camp resistant remarks sardonically. “That means us!”

Acclaimed authors were not expected to have such retrograde attitudes, and mainstream publishers (Laffont in France, Scribner’s in America) were not supposed to publish anything that emanated from the Right Bank. So there was a savage backlash from littérateurs (although Raspail also had intellectual allies), who saw the book as a betrayal by one of their own. Some must also have recognized themselves, or elements of themselves, in the book’s more contemptible characters. Reviewers dutifully assailed it in hyperbolical terms; one typical American article called it “a fascist fantasy…a disgusting book”. The reviewers thus morally purged, and the book (from their point of view) sluiced hygienically down the pissoir, it fell into abeyance, read chiefly by those on the furthest Right fringes of French life.

Yet it never went out of print in France, and every few years showed itself dangerously above the surface, usually in response to some news story paralleling his plot. It has now entered a new half-life, still sometimes ritualistically condemned, but increasingly accepted as a part (albeit a slightly embarrassing part) of the literary landscape. The novel undoubtedly helped create the intellectual space, which has made it possible for Alain Finkielkraut, Michel Onfray, Michel Houellebecq, Renaud Camus, and Éric Zemmour to examine some of the countless dilemmas of immigration, often on prime-time media slots—‘a cathode-ray apocalypse’, according to one terrified old-timer.

Some early denunciators have sportingly admitted that they had been wrong to condemn The Camp—but it has dogged Raspail’s career nonetheless, and undoubtedly prevented him from being elected to the Académie Française in 2000. Yet even if he was forbidden to join the ranks of “les immortels” (as Academicians are nicknamed), ironically his book is likely to live for longer than most of those produced by present Academy members (except, maybe, Finkielkraut). As the author observed in a September 2015 interview,

“What’s happening today isn’t important, it’s anecdotal, because we are only at the beginning…Politicians have no solution to this problem. It’s like the national debt—we pass it on to our grandchildren.”

When Sea Changes was published in 2012, several commentators pointed out similarities to The Camp—a comparison more flattering to me than Raspail—and similarities could indeed be found, although also major differences. The Camp, which I read when I was nineteen, had unquestionably been an influence on me, helping crystallize pre-existing intuitions. It had proved to my youthful satisfaction something I had always felt (despite always being told I must not)—that immigration really mattered, more than almost any other political question. The book suggested not just that it was reasonable to take an interest, but that it was irresponsible not to do so. Raspail linked ancientness to modernity and aesthetics to demographics, and there was a fey romance in his worldview, so at odds with the boring mainstream (within which every choice seemed to come down to either Leftish vapidity or Rightish philistinism).

The Camp, although so redolent of Gitanes and High Mass at Nȏtre Dame, was in some strange way about me. It suggested that I was part of a cultural continuum that transcended national boundaries, which somehow encompassed Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Latin; Classicism, Christianity, and humanism; conservatism as well as liberalism. I was in Raspail’s redoubt, even though I was not French, nor Catholic, indeed whether or not I believed in Christianity. When Raspail’s character Professor Calgues peers out from his seventeenth-century house towards the ominous beachhead, he was someone, whose motivations I could comprehend, and on whose side I instinctively aligned.

Ever afterwards, when I heard of some new landmark in loss—more restrictions on free speech in Belgium, liberalization of German citizenship laws, immigrant rapists in Malmo, riots in Bradford, a mosque opening in Granada (the first one since the Reconquista)—they seemed to be of more than local significance. I watched passive-aggressive phalanxes overwhelm one old bastion after another, and wondered when somebody with power would take notice, do something. But like the fifth-century Romans, who were cheering so enthusiastically at the Colosseum that they did not hear Alaric’s attack, twentieth-century Europeans seemed dangerously distracted from their dispossession. I was clearly a bit of a prig, yet I still think I had a point.

Then 9/11 sparked mass interest in immigration for the first time since Enoch Powell. Overnight there were newspaper columns, radio and TV programmes, think-tank reports…and then those dead were fading into memory, and immigration was continuing just as before. Even new bombs in London, Madrid and elsewhere did not slow the flow (cliché notwithstanding, it was never a “tide”, because tides go out again). Politicians, who projected Western power often violently abroad, were fostering weakness at home—even as public concern against mass migration, always considerable, continued to grow. The protesting-too-much, Stakhanovite rhetoric about diversity somehow equalling strength was heard much less often, but the underlying disease (literally dis-ease) remained untreated. If anything, the temperature kept rising, the boils—suppurating.

By now, I had exchanged Deptford for Lincolnshire, and a 1990s flat for an 1840s house across a field from a 1380 church, near a beach on which Viking rings have been found. It was only natural that I should imagine this ghosted frontier as besieged, not now by Danish pirates, but by soft-power cannon-fodder, human shields for an internationalist army. Hesitantly, with frequent halts, and feeling rather inadequate to the task, I started to makes notes for Sea Changes.

It mattered that the unwanted incomers should be comprehensible, sympathetic people doing exactly as I would have done. (I am, after all, an immigrant too.) Ibraham Nassouf had every reason to flee Basra, and every reason to think he would find a home in Britain. Who could not feel sorry for a man doubly betrayed, first, by his own culture, and then, by the West? But it mattered even more that the unwilling recipients should also be comprehensible and sympathetic, because this was the perspective usually absent from media discussions about immigration. The name of Dan Gowt given to my decent, out-of-his-depth farmer had several connotations—Daniel in the lions’ den, the old-fashioned disability of gout, and the old landscape, in which he had long-ago lodged so securely (gowt being an Anglo-Saxon term for a “drain” or “dyke”).

I wanted also to dissect the contemporary leftist mentality, which loves to see itself as ‘radical’, yet which is so reminiscent of previous religious outbreaks. So I named my chiliastic, self-regarding journalist John Leyden, in a nod to the especially obnoxious Anabaptist preacher John of Leyden. It just remained to give the too-British-to-be-quite-British name of Albert Norman to my never-quite-serious conservative journalist to have all the principal protagonists, after which, like Raspail, I let the action partly write itself.

Less happens in Sea Changes than in The Camp. The scale is smaller, the tone—more intimate. It is undoubtedly a more ‘English’ book in its slightly untidy, unsystematic approach to even this hugest of events—at times, more like reportage than a novel. Sea Changes is also more plangent—few of The Camp’s calumniators remarked on its essential calmness, Raspail’s belief that the time of the Europeans was over, and this was irresistible, part of a great cosmic cycle, in which sometimes one and sometimes another group rotates to the top. The ending of Sea Changes is much less dramatic, in fact, inconclusive—there could theoretically be a Sea Changes II.

Maybe there will need to be, because despite Raspail’s efforts, the Europe of 2015 is in an even sorrier psychological state than it was in 1972. To take one small but piquant example, Raspail suggests that French radio broadcasts Eine Kleine Nachtmusik as an instinctive response to the Last Chance Armada’s landfall, instead of the previously prevailing pop and trivia. This now sounds wildly romantic—today, the pop and trivia would continue unabated. (That cheering from the Colosseum…)

In retrospect, 1970s can seem like a decade of realism. They were certainly freer years intellectually. Would The Camp find a mainstream publisher now, in any Western country? Maybe, but most publishers, howsoever nominally committed to freedom of expression, when given an obviously controversial and not obviously commercial text, would probably prefer some other publisher to exercise that right. At the least, the text would probably be redacted to reflect today’s neuroses. France, like every European country, has a manically active and, at times, aggressive Left always looking for things to hate, to give them a raison d’être in a universe emptied of meaning—and they are usually acceded to by publishers, universities, institutions, and governments, because it is easier that way. Certainly, I found it impossible to place Sea Changes with any major firm, or even an agent, despite its more-in-sorrow-than-anger decidedly un-apocalyptic tone. Although it sounds immodest, I do not think Sea Changes is any worse than many of the books published by big firms (and I had no problem finding an agent for other books)—so I am compelled to conclude that the problem was the subject-matter.

That subject-matter is every day being added to, as real events catch up with Raspail’s plot-line (once called so unlikely). Europeans of all classes stare in compassion, but also dismay, at the oncoming pulses from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and all points East and South, encouraged by a worldly-unwise Roman Cathartic Pontiff and an angst-ridden German Chancellor so desperate to erase her people’s past that she is willing to convulse their present and sell their future. (And these are the conservatives.) The ultra-Left, of course, welcomes the turmoil, full certain that Jerusalem will be built here as soon as Europe falls. Mainstream opinion squats guiltily in the middle, morally obese, dining chiefly on sweets, wallowing in a diabetic kind of delusion. “Britain opens its arms to refugees”, gushed a Times headline—below a photo of a child staring through a rain-streaked Hungarian train window—the editors never seemingly considering that the effect is more like an opening of veins.

Few of our many self-appointed gatekeepers (who are also our gaolers) ever seem to ask themselves, “What happens next?” Of course, genuine refugees ought always to be assisted—as they would (presumably) help us if our situations were reversed. Few Europeans would object to costed and conditional schemes to assist those really in need, with refugees returned as soon as it is safe for them. Many Europeans would also accept that some of their governments bear much responsibility for the catastrophes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we also know that many of the new arrivals are economic opportunists, who know their human rights (and maybe even Islamist infiltrators), that those, who come, will stay, and their families will join them—and that behind this vanguard, whole new hosts shuffle on from all horizons.

How many will there be? Where will they live? How will we pay for them? What mental baggage do they bring? How will they adjust to us—or will we be told yet again to adjust to them? How will their being here affect the idea we have of ourselves, and our communal identities? Will there even be an “us” several decades hence? A Jesuit priest, who had spent most of his life in Africa and Asia, noted he had been “called home” to Italy to oversee arrivals—but if this continues, how much longer will he have a “home”? Will our children and grandchildren be better or worse off living in a continent even more divided than now, and more likely to be majority Muslim? Fifty years hence, what will be the state of the fought-for freedoms of the Left, or Christianity, stable states, and free economies of the Right—innovations and inheritances alike engulfed in a sea of perpetual Otherness?

It is possible to find inadvertently comic touches even in the midst of compulsory métissage, as we watch the tergiversations of politicians straddling contradictory demands, unwilling either to “embrace” or to be “left behind”: the Finnish Prime Minister, who so crassly offered to put up refugees in one of his houses; Sinn Féin’s wolfishly-grinning Gerry Adams toting a sign saying “Refugees welcome”; the English bishop, who demanded 30,000 more refugees, yet declined to offer any house-room in his mansion; that the Royal Naval flagship picking up Mediterranean migrants was H.M.S. Bulwark (rather than, say, Sponge); the German open-borders activist, who understandably felt “very sad” after being stabbed by clients.

To the sardonically-inclined, the present spectacle is, at times, reminiscent of religious ecstasies—mass swoonings, passionate and ostentatious self-flagellations (too passionate, too ostentatious to be true), votive offerings, and even icons, in the shape of little, drowned, doll-like Aylan Kurdi, lying so rigidly to attention at the margin of the Aegean. There is vast emotion out there in the hinterland—but how deep does it go? How many truly feel for people they do not know? Already, there are panicky pull-backs by mainstream—politicians suddenly seeing what they have allowed, upswings for non-mainstream parties representing old Europe, surging demonstrations, hostels burned…and these are just the immediate effects.

Then there are the absorbing psychological puzzles, like Chancellor Merkel—rectory-reared like so many of the worst (and best), privately haunted by the idea of Europe dying, yet pursuing policies guaranteed to expedite this, somehow believing that economic prudence, strong institutions, and family life can be achieved without social solidarity. The outwardly stolid operator would seem to be a little girl inside, aghast at the nature of the world, seeking inner absolution by changing everyone and everything else. Her ignoble example filters all the way down to the likes of the Hessian provincial politician, who told a restive audience of his own people that if they did not like the idea of 400 immigrants being deposited in their little town, they should be the ones to leave.

Unsatisfied with this, Merkel is offering Turkish EU membership as a bribe for helping halt the Syrian tsunami—all too ably assisted by foreign equivalents like David Cameron and the European Commission’s suitably-named Jean-Claude Juncker. To offer European membership to a developing nation with a burgeoning population, dominated by an historically antithetical faith, unstable and corrupt, riven by terrorism and bordering Syria, Iraq, and Iran is a stroke of geopolitical genius that might be disbelieved if suggested by a satirical novelist, just as Raspail’s forecasts were ridiculed by so many of his contemporaries.

Human beings notoriously tend towards short-term thinking, but we can sometimes make serious attempts to avert looming catastrophes, as seen in relation to climate change. Why can we not similarly exert ourselves to protect unique national cultures, irreplaceable efflorescences of the human spirit? Must our continent of cathedrals and charters be overcome, drowned as surely and sadly as the Kurdish boy? Must all that is excellent and European be agglomerated down in the name of a spurious equality?

Or maybe there is still a way to break free from merciless logic through some blend of activisms that can remind us of who and what we were, and could be again. Maybe we can turn our alleged end into a brave beginning. History is fluid, we have resources, and there is scope for practical idealism. We, who have inherited this most enviable of civilizations, need to believe that and look for a future—because the alternative is unspeakable.

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Evolving Before Our Eyes

In Chapter Four of _The 10,000 Year Explosion_, Greg Cochran and Henry Harpending discuss the astonishing speed of genetic diffusion for skin lightening in Caucasians. The single most important gene is Solute Carrier 24A5, and the authors state that the skin lightening variant arose only about 5,800 years ago, yet now has a frequency of 99 percent in Europe and is found at significant levels as far away as Ceylon. Subsequent research has shown that it’s probably a little older, but as Cochrane and Harpending suggest, either way, the variant must have had a huge selective advantage and might have spread so rapidly that, at the most accelerated stage, a particularly old farmer could have noticed the change in appearance in his own village within his lifetime.

Watching the recent film Gangster Squad, my thoughts went something like this:

What is it about the Ryan Gosling’s character that doesn’t quite work? The Josh Brolin and Sean Penn characters—they work. And it’s not that Gosling’s a bad actor and that his looks are unappealing. But somehow, he just doesn’t quite fit 1949. What is it?

Even his suit doesn’t seem right. But it can’t be that—Hollywood must have experts in costuming working on style and tailoring. And I can suspend disbelief on Gosling’s perfect dentition; almost no one had perfect teeth in 1949, but now the entire middle class does. No, it’s no one feature, but the gestalt. I just don’t feel cops looked like Gosling in 1949.’

I’ve had a similar thought watching many period movies: times are changing in fundamental ways.

In Chapter Four of The 10,000 Year Explosion, Greg Cochran and Henry Harpending discuss the astonishing speed of genetic diffusion for skin lightening in Caucasians. The single most important gene is Solute Carrier 24A5, and the authors state that the skin lightening variant arose only about 5,800 years ago, yet now has a frequency of 99 percent in Europe and is found at significant levels as far away as Ceylon. Subsequent research has shown that it’s probably a little older, but as Cochrane and Harpending suggest, either way, the variant must have had a huge selective advantage and might have spread so rapidly that, at the most accelerated stage, a particularly old farmer could have noticed the change in appearance in his own village within his lifetime.

The Gangster Squad is set in 1949—not so long ago, but over a decade before I was born, so I’m not quite the equivalent of that long-lived farmer. Also, there’s the time-travel aspect of film: I suspect a long-lived Bronze Age farmer could have noticed the skin change, but in reality I doubt he would have, because he was brought to the boil too gradually in a pot of lightening skin. But in a film set in 1949 and released in 2013, I can erase those 64 intervening years all at once. It’s as if that farmer, dreaming of his youth and the dusky charms of his maiden field companions, woke to find the fair-haired son of the local warlord showing a particular interest in his great-granddaughter.

It all got me to thinking, once again, about the evolution taking place within our lifetimes. There are a few items people wonder about.

First are the trends that “everyone knows”—those that, like Darwinism itself, we all think we understand. Increased race-mixing may be the most obvious. Whenever I get “race-realist” with my scientist wife, her reaction: ‘It’s all going toward one mixed brown race and there’s nothing anyone can do.’ And if I take that to my scientist father, his reaction boils down to ‘Whites deserve it in the end.’

That’s how it is with scientists; they are self-selected for incredible patience; the key segment of any experiment, no matter how creative, is one of passive observation of external nature; and scientists tend to orient to the geological scale of time. All this leaves them with little faith in the long-term power of will.

I doubt modern race-mixing is quantitatively so different from past upheavals, say, with the great migrations in the wake of Rome’s decline. For that matter, the Roman expansion must have spurred a lot of miscegenation, and the rise of sailing before that. To genes, planes are no faster than boats. Sure, migrants can now get to a new country within hours instead of months. But any descendants they have there will still require several generations, at least, to become truly comfortable. Geographic determinism got a bad rap under race-denying Jared Diamond, but that’s because he left a step out. Diamond believes geography determines culture, but it clearly should be geography determines genes determine culture. Race-realists should note the primacy of geography either way. Mountains and plains are not going away any time soon, are still important, and will re-assert themselves still more if the jet and the air conditioner run their course.

Something else race-realists all think we know is the dysgenic aspect of demographic transition theory. Leading edge dogma now is that a group of gene-based qualities, basically those that select for a prosperous farmer, have been favored reproductively since the dawn of agriculture; but with the maturation of the Industrial Age, they no longer are. Among these were relatively high intelligence, more patience through delayed gratification and impulse control, the capacity for hard, sustained work, and relatively low aggression. Essentially, high paternal investment. For 10,000 years in the earth’s temperate zones, these qualities led to having more children on average; but they no longer do. That change is the basis of demographic transition theory, with much speculation about widening IQ gaps, smaller elites and benighted mobs.

But I want the personal touch. Here’s one: I confess to being occasionally so masochistic that I listen to NPR. And the morning of this writing, I was tuned in to an interview with a blogger well-known in “popular genetics.” I’d never heard his voice before. My immediate impression was how feminine it sounded, not to the degree of the overt gay accents commonly heard on NPR, but very different from the deep, reassuring voices that were the rule among male radio personalities until very recently. The topic of the conversation was the genetics of the fetus his wife and he were expecting. Not absolute proof of heterosexuality, but good enough for me.

I see the “metrosexual” voice as something of a milder version of the gay accent. A portmanteau for the ability to pick out distinctions like the latter is “gaydar.” It’s interesting that the validity of gaydar (and its nearly instantaneous, gestalt aspects) have been scientifically validated, though mostly visually. (It’s even more interesting that the original research into gaydar failed to validate it and subsequently, more careful research did—one wonders whether the first group had an ideological motivation.) Yet auditory recognition is typically more implicit and indescribable, more gestalt, than visual. If you find it hard to describe a friend’s face in detail, trying to describe his voice is really dancing about architecture. Yet you can instantly recognize both. And some kinds of 10,000-hour people, like old-school sonar operators, find that even when they have simultaneous video and audio versions of the signals they are trying to distinguish from background noise, it is the audio that tells them the most, but in ways that are almost impossible to describe, ways in which there is no substitute for experience.

Seeing Ryan Gosling in a period movie and wondering whether faces really looked like that only seven decades ago is fraught with all kinds of bias. So is concluding that the metrosexual voice is evidence of a feminization that is partly genetic. Nevertheless, I think it is. Mike Judge nailed it in Idiocracy: the 100-point IQ of Joe Bauers, the definitively ordinary hero, becomes ingenious in the idiocy of the future, and his middle-of-the-road voice becomes correspondingly “faggy.”

If I’m right, then evolution toward more pliant husband material, originally reflecting higher paternal investment, is not over in the developed world. Women are continuing to choose softer men, or at least men who are far from being natural masters, to breed with. Many will argue that the metrosexual voice must be all cultural, that it burst far too quickly on the scene to reflect anything genetic. Maybe they’re right, but I like my version. I bet that old farmer’s wife tried to convince him the young folk of the day were just spoiled by a soft new culture, and didn’t spend enough time out working in the sun.


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The Hope of Europeanization

Imagine being a part of a political movement where Europe was a dirty word.

Imagine being a part of a political movement where Europe was a dirty word.

Where Europeanization was synonymous with socialist tyranny and thrown as an epithet at ideological foes.

Think this sounds idiotic? Welcome to American conservatism.

This is a movement that was battered around Europeanization as a slur during the Obamacare debate and used it to denote the “terror” that will arrive with government-subsidized healthcare.

Here’s Neoconservative gentile Victor Davis Hanson on the perils of Europeanization back in 2009:

I don’t know quite what the allure of Europe is for the American Left. But it seems to be that more of us will soon all be working for the government, habitually striking, hunting out that rare capitalist in hiding for a shake-down, and bitching over our weary 35 hr. work week.

Yet without hardship, challenge, and hope, the individual dies daily. Once the government ensures that all your needs will be taken care of, from your teeth and joints to job and retirement, ennui sets in, and with it the cargo we see in Europe—pacifism, cynicism, the loss of transcendence marked by atheism and childlessness, and worry about what others have rather than what you aspire to…

We can see what Europeanization leads to: you worship at the altar of the goddess Pax, but hate the United States for still having a military that saves postmodern you from premodern others…

Europeanization is so at odds with human nature that it bifurcates it—a false public face, a cynical private one…

In Hanson’s mind, modern Europe stands for “Last Man syndrome” and an unwillingness to fight wars on Tel Aviv’s behalf. America is also the modern Sparta in his mind, and Europeanization would sap our will in the same way Athenization sapped the ancient city-state’s.

Ridiculous . . . but his definition does strikes (in a contrived fashion) at the Last Man that’s created by the triumph of liberalism. It also imagines life that should be lived in struggle and overcoming. The problem is that America hasn’t stood for that for nearly a hundred years, and fighting pointless wars in the Middle East on behalf of liberal democracy doesn’t make us Nova Sparta. Nor is Last Capitalist Man more superior than Last Socialist Man just because he had to buy his own health insurance.

He also echoes Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 when the former Secretary of Defense bashed the European nations that were critical of the Iraq invasion as “Old Europe“—a set of dying nations that have lost their virtu to take down benign dictatorships that keep an unstable region relatively stable.

Since the conservative movement is not known for inventing new ideas and loves reanimating notions from their past (Reagan Forever!), the specter of Europeanization is once again arising in conservative media.

Is it because we aren’t willing to invade Iran? Is it because we want universal healthcare? Or, is it because too many Americans have become overnight soccer fans?

Well, there’s some hand-wringing about the last item, but the new concern for Europeanization is due to a worrying amount of White Americans rising up against mass non-White immigration.

In other words, it’s the leaders of conservatism bashing their own followers.

In a column for the neocon newssite Washington Free Beacon, Editor-in-Chief Matthew Continetti trotted out the old tropes of the feared menace of Europe (socialized healthcare, lack of desire to invade Syria, etc.) before unveiling a new parallel with the Old World that is “not a good one,” in the writer’s opinion:

There was a time when Americans could feel superior to our European allies on matters of immigration and assimilation. That time is passing. With the arrival of the Dreamers the issues of migration, border security, amnesty, and incompetence are refashioning American politics, fracturing allegiances and commitments and social bonds, exposing the contradiction between liberal humanitarianism and national identity, and forging new coalitions, with the elites of both parties on the one hand, and the fading American middle on the other.

One cannot look at the images of protests in Murrietta, California, where demonstrators waving Gadsden Flags stopped school buses carrying the sons and daughters of Guatemala and Honduras to shelters, without recalling the vitriolic debates over busing in the 1970s, without thinking of the anti-immigration marches in Western and Southern Europe today. One cannot look at the images of the children themselves, sleeping in detention, looking vacantly in the distance, lured to this country under false pretenses, desperate for food and shelter and attachment and hope, without remembering the Spanish detention camps in the Canary Islands, or the Italian “Identification and Expulsion Center” in Rome. This isn’t An American Tail. This is Children of Men.

Continetti writes of the rise of populism in Europe with a foreboding and mentions detention camps is an intentional allusion to certain other camps that were created by Europeans … He puts the anti-immigration protesters in Murietta, California, in the same category as Front National and UKIP—which for Continetti is not a comparison made in praise.

But since the Free Beacon has to appeal to the conservative base that has embraced the Murietta protesters, he has to beat around the bush and not openly condemn their actions as an unfortunate outburst of xenophobia. Instead, he appeals to the supposed all-American value of welcoming the stranger and never seeing another group of people as the Other.

Taking a different angle from the goofy Christianity of Glenn Beck (who also called Americans to open up our compassionate arms to these Mayans), this author says that compassion is one of the defining cornerstones of America. We have no defined Others because anyone can become an American. Thus, in the minds of necons like Continetti, opposing these immigrants is a definably un-American act. It is an act only Europeans would do—Whites who have organic national identities and have no problem with identifying another group as the Other.

His article is an expression of what Richard Spencer labeled the “Metapolitics of America.” America began as a project rejecting the traditions and identities of Old Europe. It based itself on the abstract values of the Enlightenment and created documents that declared all men are created equal, with the implication that all men have the ability to become Americans (even though the creators likely didn’t believe in them to their full conclusion).

If you believe in the idea of the compassionate proposition nation, how could you protest these immigrants coming here for a better life?

Of course, there’s a tremendous amount of cognitive dissonance in the minds of conservative Americans who still cling to the idea of America, yet are terrified by the changing demographics of the country they love.

This is the mindset of the Murietta protesters and the militias forming to patrol the Texas border. They chant “U! S! A!” and wave the Stars and Stripes and claim authority over the real American legacy. They have no idea that the flag they wave and the country they love hates them and no longer shares the same values they cherish.

As Vice President Joe Biden pointed out, the latest push for global human rights trumps all cultures and tradition–making it clear that the America of today has fully embraced the abstract values of the Enlightenment and wants to disregard the values bequeathed to it by its European heritage. It’s more of a de-Europeanization rather than a Europeanization that’s happening to America. That is why the previous frettings of conservatives were so ridiculous—the great America of yore had a European character and defined itself as so. One example is the vast majority of America supported the Immigration Act of 1924 because it preserved the traditional, Northern European character of this nation. That’s a sign of a Europeanized America (because there’s more to Europe than socialized medicine and great unemployment benefits).

But America has lost any sense of being a White nation and has embraced the promise of becoming the continental, Lockean shopping mall. Both the right, the left, and the leaders and followers of the conservative movement subscribe to this notion and firmly reject Identitarianism. And who can blame them when the founding documents tell them to?

And that is the tragic element of these protests—they’re fighting against the ideas of their own nation. Their nationalism is implicitly White, but it will never progress to White nationalism, which they view that as un-American (they still believe in the civic promise of the US of A). The problem for them is that their patriotism is now antiquated. Every major leader now subscribes to the vision of America being the great spreader of liberal virtues to the world and wants their own country to act out these values. Gay marriage has triumphed, multiculturalism is unchallenged, and immigration continues to rise. And that is what our nation is now all about.

They still cling to the jingoism that was encouraged and harvested by the neocons to drum up support for the Iraq War and is now thoroughly mocked by SWPL nationalism. Whenever the young and educated see someone wave a flag and sing “God Bless America,” they laugh and feel zero connection to it. They celebrate this country not through a genuine attachment to it, but through irony. The World Cup highlighted this as thousands poured out into SWPL hubs like DC and Seattle to cheer on their team in bald eagle shirts and tacky Old Glory shorts.

To them, patriotism is a joke. To the vast majority of young people, the patriotism of Murrieta is thoroughly passé and they have no connection to it whatsoever. Middle America doesn’t grasp that the jokes on them.

Which brings us to why we have to abandon these outdated symbols if we hope to forge an authentically right-wing, Identitarian movement in this country. Leftist writer Sinclair Lewis is attributed (wrongly though) with shrieking, “When fascism comes to America, it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying a cross.” Disregarding the use of “fascism” and understanding the left uses the term to denote any right-wing movement they don’t like, it’s the opposite of the truth. If Identitarianism ever rises in America, it will not be wrapped in the flag and carrying the cross.

Some of you reading this might question that statement. You’re probably already saying that these symbols still carry power among the people we are trying to reach and we should re-appropriate them for our cause. We can’t alienate potential followers that would flock to our cause if we weren’t so down on the United States. There is one major flaw with that reasoning though: these symbols represent values that we are utterly opposed to. We cannot say we are opposed to egalitarianism while brandishing flags that were created by men that wrote “all men were created equal.” We cannot say we are committed to create communities based on organic identities with symbols that give off the hope that man can live in deracinated, proposition states.

If you want to know why there’s never been a strong and coherent nationalist movement in the United States, it’s because of the unwillingness to abandon the idea of America. Yes, we will alienate people in the process and limit our audience for the short-term–but we have to firmly reject the concept of this proposition nation. It is killing us and not allowing us to represent our own interests. It hates our identity and wants us to sacrifice it for the “good of humanity.” This is not our country and we have to finally accept that. We have to Europeanize ourselves—meaning we have to start seeing ourselves as children of Europe rather than Americans. We have to see ourselves as a distinct group that other groups and other individuals can never be apart of.

We have to represent the spirit that Continetti is so worried about—the willingness to stand against the Other and fight for our own interests.

Part of this process of Europeanization is the rejection of the symbols of the American state. They are not some type of ancient icons associated with our Indo-European ancestors. The Saxons were not emblazing the Stars and Stripes on their shields as they went into battle. They were created a little over 200 years ago. They are not sacred objects.

We can create symbols that will resonate with the men and women we want to attract. Namely, young people. They are the future and no successful movement has ever gone without their energy and vitality. No revolutionary movement was ever stocked full of pensioners. If we want to change the world, we have to attract the people who want to change it—not people whose primary concern is the preservation of their 401ks.

We will not reach them with Tea Party-style patriotism and trying to associate ourselves with Sarah Palin. That will only serve to alienate them from our cause, while making us look like a bunch of deluded rubes in the process. Besides, does anyone who reads Radix actually feel any real emotion during the singing of the “Star Spangled Banner”? I think not, and so we should not make disingenuous attempts trying to act like real ‘Murican patriots.

SWPL nationalism has gone a long way in cutting the ties young people have for this country—which presents an opportunity for us to finally reach people who no longer have patriotic hang-ups.

There’s also the promising trend which Murrieta is only the latest example. There are more and more cases of White Americans rising up against the state and perceiving it as a body that doesn’t represent their interests (the Bundy Ranch episode being another example). While they still embrace the America they grew up in, it is another question whether their children and grandchildren will—especially how that very same country treated them. We can only expect more incidents like to this to occur as our federal government continues to go after every single White person who goes off the reservation.

But to become that alternative, we have to first separate ourselves from the idea of American. We have to disregard the worries of yesterday’s people. It’s time to look towards tomorrow and step over Old Glory and the Constitution and prepare for the day that the spirit of Europe will arise in our people once more.

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Derek Turner’s Sea Changes

As far as anti-establishment contemporary fiction goes, Derek Turner’s Sea Changes is among the best one is likely to read in English today. In tone, it is clearly a satire;…

As far as anti-establishment contemporary fiction goes, Derek Turner’s Sea Changes is among the best one is likely to read in English today. In tone, it is clearly a satire; in sensibility, it is clearly traditionalist; but in sentiment, it has the added virtues of temperance and compassion, qualities that steer this novel clear of the vices that have afflicted others dealing with immigration and the tone and character of modern race relations—Jean Raspail’s The Camp of the Saints comes to mind—which have usually been vehicles for sublimated spleen. Perhaps the reason is that this novel was aimed at a mainstream audience, and not at fellow outsiders looking for a wink and a nod.

Sea Changes tells the story of Ibraham Nassouf, a young Iraqi. Desiring to escape the poverty and limited prospects of existence in his native Basra, he sets sights on emigrating to England, dreaming of the sort of life he had seen in Western media and magazines; his very grim and unpleasant journey, however, ends badly, for, having paid, along with dozens of others, a gang of human traffickers to take him to Britain, the latter decide to throw their human cargo into the sea and spray it with bullets after being challenged by a British coastal patrol. Ibraham is the only survivor, but he is washed on the beach along with forty or so of his fellow migrants, mostly African. The discovery, the suggestion that the migrants may have been murdered by local racists, and the throwaway remarks of a stolid farmer who finds himself in front of a television camera, being asked for comment by a reporter hyper-attuned to the racial angle, triggers a noisy media event, which dominates and is the raison d’être of the story.

Unusually, sympathy is with Ibraham, despite the fact that he funded his migration journey with money he earned working for a gangster in Basra. In a serio-comical fashion, at once caricaturesque and sophisticated, Turner skilfully conveys the squalor, uncertainties, precariety, mentality, and transient relationships involved in a journey of this nature. At each stage, Ibraham is reliant on a shady link in a long chain of sleazy, crooked, callous types who, while outwardly amiable, well-wishing, and occasionally hospitable, nevertheless make a living, or supplement their income, by fleecing the immigrants passing through. Ibraham is portrayed exactly as migrants are portrayed in Western media: a well-meaning, somewhat childlike, hard-working poor devil escaping war or poverty, and willing to go through hell for a better life in a rich Western country. Similar treatment is accorded to the Mediterranean countries of Europe forced to deal with the ever-rising tide of Third World migrants: the latter are seen by the authorities as pests, to be moved around and put out of sight in processing centres, where they languish in boredom and inactivity, but where they learn about rights they never imagined they had. It is a shadowy, confusing, and unforgiving world, constantly in flux, where every human is both predator and prey. What is worse, once Ibraham arrives at his destination, England, that paradise of the North Atlantic, it turns out his troubles have only just begun, for he becomes the ball in what is for him a confusing game of political football, in which he, the migrant of colour, is manipulated as a tool by the white English who, while appearing incredibly kind and helpful to him, are in fact completely self-absorbed and do not give a hoot about him. Eventually, he attains his dream—after some difficulty, he is allowed to remain in the United Kingdom—and he is even given permission to import his family. But life in London proves a tremendous disappointment, and we leave him living in bleak accommodation, jobless, with embarrassing flatmates, and in the throes of alienation, living in—but not part of—a culture he neither understands nor any longer wishes to understand. Looking back, life in Iraq, difficult as it was, at least offered community, friendships, and meaning. The process of migration proves destructive.

The closest to villain in the novel is John Leyden, a handsome Left-leaning journalist replete with fine phrases and crusading zeal, yet also egotistical, vain, shallow, arrogant, hypocritical, infantile, and spoilt rotten to the core. The reader does not end up hating him, however; rather, he comes across as a buffoon—a cog of the system he helps maintain. In the end, we are left to wonder about his motivations, for he is clearly not psychologically healthy or normal, despite his polished façade and professional success. His main antagonist is another journalist, Albert Norman, an old, grizzled, jaded, fat, wealthy, peppery, recalcitrant reactionary, whose politically incorrect column is both popular—indeed, it is the only thing levitating the circulation numbers in an otherwise modernising (=flagging) newspaper—and the last bastion of sense in a world gone mad. Along with Ibraham, Norman is Turner’s vehicle for some of his commentary on modern Britain, but, though almost heroic, he is ultimately an object of pity, for he is eventually defeated by the forces of ‘progress’ and even comes to realise his own futility. These two characters constitute the poles between which we find an array of depressingly familiar types: the thriving ethnic activist, the anti-racist thug, the Gerry Gables of this world, the ‘modernised’ offspring of rural parents, the cynical politicians, the semi-illiterate socialists, and, of course, the equally opportunistic, but far less skilled, anti-establishment politician. The latter, incidentally, a Nick Griffin analogue, has a seat in Parliament, until his party is banned in a swell of righteous fervour. Though stereotypes, all appear as three-dimensional characters, neither wholly good nor wholly evil, and indeed very human. All are, nevertheless, cogs in a machine.

Turner’s assessment of the situation is, therefore, that the problem is not the malfeasance of particular individuals, though some are more contemptible than others: everyone is implicated in some fashion, knowingly or unknowingly, actively or passively, whatever their individual reasons, however sensible their course of action may seem in the circumstances. The problem is systemic. And what sustains the system, in this case, is not the media, nor the politicians, nor any particular ethnic group, since they are all part of it: it is the idea that equality as the highest good—the highest expression of moral enlightenment. This is not explicitly stated in the novel; the latter is very focused on how British society today thinks about race and immigration. Yet, it is obvious, or it should be, that, in a type of society in which ethics possess singular importance, as is the case in Western societies, despite the corruption of modern times, what drives the tone and character of race relations today, and the debate on immigration, is the ethics of egalitarianism. That is what drives all the chatter, all the policies, all the decisions, all the actions and reactions despised by the type of reader who will read these lines. Without it, there would be no Sea Changes, nor a need for it. This is what, in my opinion, is most admirable about this novel, and why it is, to date, the most serious treatment of today’s cultural malaise, despite its satirical tone and occasional incursion into outright caricature. This is the only illustration I have seen in fiction of the way egalitarianism produces unfair, unjust, invidious, and unhappy outcomes. Something worth pondering.

There are, of course, some minor niggles, stemming from this being Turner’s first effort at fiction. I was distracted by the presence of superfluous adverbs, for example, a common mistake not made by more experienced writers of fiction, and not tolerated by professional editors at large mainstream publishers. And I am not a big fan of the front cover and general layout, which I think undersells the content. The book is, indeed, far better than it looks. Yet, this aside, Turner’s prose is elegant, effective, and rich with beautiful metaphor and well-crafted phrases. It is consistently good all the way through, and there is no sagging in the narrative, despite the predictable unfolding of events; it is, in fact, a page-turner, which sails along at a leisurely pace. Above all, Turner is to be commended for having successfully negotiated, with humour, sensitivity, and insight, a topic given to hysterics (on both sides), making the case against egalitarianism for readers of any political persuasion, radical and conformist alike.

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Another “Defective Western Altruism” Data Point…

Now there is further proof that the West’s pathological altruism is not being universally interpreted as a desire for global equalism…or whatever. But as was always suspected… As weakness.

All white nations are subject to the same threats: Nominally, inexorable demographic shifts as a function of invading battalions of high TFR Third World Uruk-Hai, reinforced with medieval era religious extremists from the Middle East for good measure, for one.

Geographical location, however does provide variation with how these threats are encountered.

Australia is protected by large expanses of ocean, against what are euphemistically called “irregular maritime arrivals” – which only provides a marginal deterrent at any rate, as tens of thousands are mobilized, despite the fact that circa 1400 have drowned since 2001 in the attempt, lured no doubt by the siren song of the welfare on-tap largesse of the Australian Taxpayer, in the land of, er, rape and honey.

Under the mandate of what the leftist press calls xenophobia, but what the superior minds at Radix would no doubt, consider to be merely popular opinion and rational reasoning, the newly tenured government has introduced measures to reduce the number of these arrivals.

The policy now being that the Australian Navy intercepts these boats and returns the passengers back from whence they came – such as Muslim Indonesia to the north, which is used as a staging ground by the ‘fugees. Of course, there was always going to be altercations between the Navy personnel and the invaders, and inevitably, with modern electronic devices being so ubiquitous, even amongst supposedly starving refugees(?), it was only a matter of time before a smart phone recording was made of alleged mistreatment of these international itinerants at the hands of the Navy, during the reversing procedure.

Only in this instance, it is difficult for the diversity apologists in the MSM to reconcile the actions of the refugees, with the image of hard working, benevolent victims they try oh-so hard to perpetuate. Not only are threats to kill navy personnel made, as well as a cheerful round of bird flipping “F$%k Australia”. But alarmingly,references to the 9/11 terror attacksare mentioned. Now, I’ll concede that it is conceivable that these comments were made in the heat of the moment. Due to a resultant epinephrine release, preparing the body for great physical exertion, at the expense of higher order reasoning.

Nevertheless, what makes this event of particular of note for those with Nationalist leanings, is that this footage was submitted to a news agency by the refugees themselves, some weeks after the footage was filmed, presumably in order to gain public support. As columnist Andrew Bolt pointed out, surely, this is an example of the “cultural disconnect” and social mis-calibration of these individuals that they thought this was a sound strategy to curry favour with the public. However, no-one likes being threatened (at least that is somewhat universal) thus the only way to balance this equation,in that there was some semblance of rationality to their actions, is to assume that public support wasn’t the anticipated goal of the video, and the intent was actually to frighten the Australian public into accepting them and their ilk. The salient point being, because now there is further proof that the West’s pathological altruism is not being universally interpreted as a desire for global equalism…or whatever. But as was always suspected… As weakness.

Ultimately, this is a faux victory for Nationalists, as whilst the back door has been squeezed shut, the front door has been left wide open, as a “virtue” of being a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, with the aggregate intake remaining the same.The only dubious improvement being that the illusion of choice has been given, over whom the government can select for the humanitarian program.

References / Acknowledgements:

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Census of Europeans in Europe

Where Europeans live, European civilization exists.

As part of an ongoing demographic project, I am conducting a census of all human beings of European descent throughout the Earth. I believe this is a topic of supreme importance not only for (neo-)reactionaries and New Right types, but also for all mainstream conservatives and any decent human beings willing to attempt to preserve what is left of Western (European) civilization across the globe. European civilization, which brought the entire world unprecedented advances in government, medicine, science, technology and philosophy, is something worth preserving. But how can we know how to preserve it unless we can locate and quantify it? To identify the areas where it flourishes and the areas where it is eroding? Where Europeans live, European civilization exists. When Europeans disappear, European civilization disappears with them. Anybody remember Rhodesia?

I begin my census with the homeland of the European peoples, Europe itself. It is almost sad that it is necessary to conduct a census of Europeans within their own homelands, but since the onsets of modernity and post-modernity (and the wonders of immigration, alienation and social dysfunction they brought), native European populations have dropped in many countries to points where it is no longer safe to assume native Europeans constitute overwhelming majorities of the population. To prevent any confusion, allow me to define who is a “European” before I continue to the data.

Who is European?

The range of definitions for who is “European” or “white” is very broad. The United States Census Bureau is happy to include North Africans, Middle Easterners and Jews in the “white” category, while a Nordicist may even exclude Irishmen, Greeks, Italians or Slavs. For this reason, I will avoid using the term “white,” and all its connotations, and focus instead on identifying people of European descent. People of European descent are defined as those people whose ancestral homeland is located on the continent of Europe, the jagged edge of the Eurasian landmass bordered by the Ural Mountains in the East, the Atlantic Ocean in the West and the Mediterranean Sea in the South.

Approximate border of Europe in red Approximate border of Europe in red

Those people whose ancestral homelands are North and West of the red border in the map above I will count as people of European descent i.e. Europeans. This may or may not be coterminous with others’ definitions of “whites” or “Europeans.” To be even abundantly clear, I will include all Latin, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Hellenic, Baltic peoples in my definition of European, as well as European linguistic/ethnic minorities such as Hungarians, Finns, Sami, Basque and Albanians. I will not include Jews, whose origin is in Palestine, nor will I include the Romani (Gypsies) who ostensibly came to Europe from the Indian subcontinent. Caucasian peoples such as Georgians, Chechens and Armenians are also excluded, since their homelands are just beyond the European border in West Asia. Non-European minorities such as sub-Saharan Africans, Arabs, Turks and East Asians who emigrated to Europe in the last century or so are obviously excluded.

I will include Muslims of European descent in my definition of “European.” Muslim Bosniaks, Albanians, Kosovars and any other converts will be counted as “European.” Although religiously not European, these peoples are native to Europe in the same way their neighbors are, and they have generally assimilated to wider European civilization and its undulations. Furthermore, seeing as they were once historically non-Muslim peoples, I do not find it extraordinary to believe they could someday once again be non-Muslim and more fully in tune with the rest of European civilization.

My definition of “Europeans” is purely geographical, and although there may be a certain degree of arbitrariness in terms of religion, culture or genetics, I think the geographical definition is the one most consistent with the group of people who create and sustain Western, European societies and civilization — Europeans.

With all that in mind, I present you Mark Yuray’s Census of Europeans in Europe. Data on the official percentage of Europeans in each state was collected, calculated, interpreted and estimated according to various sources (with various dates, mind you) and tabulated by yours truly. The percentages were then multiplied with the 2012 Google population counts for each country to get a ballpark estimate of the actual lump numbers of Europeans living in each country. Data can be accessed in excel format here. A PDF easier on the eyes is here. The important maps are presented below:

Percentage of population of European origin in European states. Percentage of population of European origin in European states.

Percentage of population of European origin in European states, with size-scaled percentages indicated. Percentage of population of European origin in European states, with size-scaled percentages indicated.

European states with the top ten most and least proportions of inhabitants of European origin. European states with the top ten most and least proportions of inhabitants of European origin.

Top Ten Most European States:

  1. Poland
  2. Czech Republic
  3. Lithuania
  4. Albania
  5. Croatia
  6. Estonia
  7. Slovenia
  8. Greece
  9. Iceland
  10. Finland

Top Ten Least European States:

  1. Cyprus
  2. Russia
  3. France
  4. The Netherlands
  5. Bulgaria
  6. United Kingdom
  7. Belgium
  8. Sweden
  9. Austria
  10. Spain

Final note:

Estimated population of Europe and Russia: 780,000,000 (i.e. including some 10 million Turks in East Thrace, all non-Europeans in Russia and the non-Europeans in the small bit of Kazakhstan technically East of the Urals.)

Total native European population of Europe and Russia in 2012 according to data: 675,251,937

Percentage of population of Europe and Russia of European descent: 86.6%

Europe and Russia Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans. I include the metric above simply because I think the historical domain of European civilization is the continent of Europe and the areas of Eurasia settled and ruled by Russia. That the domain is still 86.6% European is a good sign for Western civilization.

Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans. Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans.

Some commentary:

The range values for proportions of native Europeans in European states varies considerably. The island of Cyprus has a Turkish minority that runs a separate republic on the Northern end of the island, while Iceland and Poland are still >99% European. West European states such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium have the highest levels of non-European immigration, which is reflected in the larger proportions of non-Europeans in their borders. Sweden is the one Scandinavian state with an abnormally large number of non-Europeans, although it’s not exactly a surprise considering the recent riots that happened in Stockholm. East European states have large numbers of non-Europeans, although these are not new imports but historical non-European minorities such as Jews, Romani, Turks, Tatars, etc. Bulgaria and Russia are most significant in this regard.

The states with the lowest numbers of non-Europeans interestingly seem to run in a line from North to South down the center of Europe, as if they were not Western enough to jump on the immigration bandwagon but not Eastern enough to have left-over non-European minorities.

The Axis of Indigineousness The Axis of Indigineousness

The greatest demographic threats to Europe still remain the channels of third-world immigration maintained by left-wing politicians and bureaucrats in West European states and the institutions of the European Union. France, a nation that didn’t come into contact with non-Europeans for more than a millenium between the Battle of Tours in 732 and the beginning of colonial immigration after the Second World War, has been reduced to a demographic status similar to Bulgaria, a Southeastern country bordering Turkey that spent half a millenium as a province of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

Of the two traditional nomadic non-European minorities in Europe, the Jews and the Romani, only the Romani represent a notable demographic threat. Kudos to Steve Sailer, who has pointed out the Romani fertility rate in Hungary in 2003 was 3.0 children per woman compared to the national average of 1.3 children per woman. The Romani are small in population, but are spread throughout Europe and notoriously poor, fecund and criminal. The Jews have never recovered from the Holocaust all the way back in the 1940′s, which saw their European population reduced from some 9.5 million to around 1 million today. Except for the even smaller percentage of Orthodox Jews, Jewish fertility rates are about as low as those of other Europeans.

The great expanse of the Russian East, suffering from low fertility rates (like all of European civilization), is facing a new demographic threat from a rising China, with some 1.5 million Chinese reportedly illegally crossing the Russian border with China in the last few years. I am personally, however, not overly concerned considering the true vastness of Russia, China’s own obsession with population control and falling fertility rates and the staunchly anti-progressive and anti-liberal sentiments that rule Russia from Moscow. Russia will not be starting a government-mandated restructuring of society into a ‘vibrant, multicultural, diverse paradise‘ like Britain anytime soon.

I leave you with that thought, dear readers. Study and share the maps and data above; perhaps you can alert some other Westerners to the slow erosion of their civilization in its own homeland.

This article was originally published at Mark Yuray’s blog, Ara Maxima.

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Mass Immigration and Public Education

Americans presume that illegal immigration is always grounded in an attempt to meet enormous material challenges. But what if it turns out that parents pay coyotes to be rid of troublesome children in a guilt free fashion?

While it’s long been the case that the majority of immigrant kids in our city do not live with both parents, it is increasingly prevalent to find such kids living without any parents around at all; teenagers are foisted off on distant relatives, friends, or acquaintances: it seems some Mexican and Central American parents have taken to immigration to solve their parenting deficiencies. They pay enormous amounts to have their child smuggled north, while staying home themselves, smug in the knowledge that they’ve done the very best thing they could do for the kid. After all who can argue against the good will of a parent who makes this kind of financial and emotional sacrifice? Aren’t North American salaries much higher, and unemployment much lower? Is it not the case that even illegal aliens are entitled to free public schooling in El Norte, even college?

Americans presume that illegal immigration is always grounded in an attempt to meet enormous material challenges. But what if it turns out that parents pay coyotes to be rid of troublesome children in a guilt free fashion? And there are many such troubled children, of course; poverty, the lack of a social net, and the explosion of violence in Central America and Northern Mexico have seen to that. These immigrant flows are the blowback from exportation not just of our own drug and gang cultures, but of globalization; free enterprise has undercut traditional family values in unprecedented ways. Outsourcing has added vitality to a maquilera economy that sunders families; aping the license of American media culture, local television, film, and music producers promote transgressive excitements which entail the abandonment of Christian morals; divorce is rampant, while even in intact households, permissiveness undermines traditional methods of child nurture—the inability to discipline children effectively, a marker of western social progress almost everywhere, is epidemic. Kids are sucked up into gang life, drug abuse and violence, and parents having lost control over them, turn in desperation to the traditional outlet of relief, immigration. Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador are in the throes of a societal breakdown. How much of the blame should we take upon ourselves for the destruction of these societies? Shall we, by absorbing these “feral” children through belated guilt, allow our own systems to collapse? Do the rights of undocumented children include a right to parents? Shouldn’t neglect be part of the equation here? Offering these children de facto sanctuary in our schools may not be in their interests. By accepting the ambitions of their parents on face value, we may be dooming the very kids we hope to save to a cycle of crime, imprisonment, illiteracy, and brutal poverty. Students are being essentially abandoned: by parents, who are glad to be rid of them, by a system of jurisprudence which is not equipped to make distinctions, by cops so overwhelmed en masse by gang culture that they gladly lash out at those so clueless as to become easy targets, and by teachers, who are asked to take responsibility for a child that has lived without adult supervision or care for most of his life, and asked to do so at the peril of destroying any semblance of class management. If their parents abroad don’t care, if they scoff at their parental obligations as they scoff at immigration laws, why does it become the State’s responsibility to raise their offspring? Which moral duty has precedence…the duty to provide children with decent, orderly schools, or the duty to take in an unwanted brood whose feral impulses have reaped havoc on school discipline?

So, given these facts, I suppose it had to happen one day. As a high school teacher of English as a Second Language, I’ve grown quite accustomed to finding students in my “advanced” classes who’ve been in American classrooms since second and third grade, but this is a first: this week Miguel enrolled in my ESL1a class, the very beginning level. This seventeen year old was born in the United States and has attended school every year here, apart from some time off in jail. A pleasant fellow whose smile lights up the class, Miguel rings the changes of English vulgarity with great proficiency, but cannot write a sentence, in either Spanish or English. Many such children find themselves trapped in a feral abyss between two underfed idioms. But how? Bilingual illiteracy takes some doing. Should we blame Miguel, who in seventeen years hasn’t found English important enough to master, it appearing a paltry thing to be able to read, for instance, the terms of his probation? No. He, like so many of his immigrant peers, has never known real schooling. Periods of no schooling were interrupted by graceless passages through dysfunctional schools, where, over the klangefarbe of Spanish chit-chat, it was impossible to hear English modelled. For Miguel school has been a restless moil, the futility of which was broken only by the brisk business of selling drugs at lunch.

It cannot be supposed that his Salvadoran parents could ever have offered a reliable memory of what it means to get educated, a functional educational routine. They more than likely dropped out in grade school, or never attended at all. For generation after generation, the process of intellectual accumulation has not merely been stifled, but forcibly excised from the culture; now on both sides of La Frontera, what it means to be a student has been largely forgotten.

The kind of people we are does not, then, really depend on us, but on the communities that sustain us. Lacking this constraint, students become a kind of void that attracts blind contingency. The kind of people we see in our classroom—are bedeviled or enchanted by—likewise is contingent, the result of circumstantial luck or chaos, and our intuition about this, that they are to be held morally accountable neither for the failings of history, nor for intentions good or ill, nor for the missteps of time, seems naturally convincing and generous, but it too is a luxury we can no longer afford. Quantitative change becomes, alas, qualitative. Nothing can be more demoralizing than to see how this plays out, in my classroom as Miguel stumbles into class thirty minutes late, in a cloud of marijuana, his eyes pinpoints of inexpressible delight.

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Choosing Limbo

In his “statement of principles” issued this past Thursday, Senate Majority Leader John Boehner claims to have—at last!—put forth a “common-sense” and “bipartisan” approach that will fix our “broken immigration system.” Such clichés have become all-too familiar, and the memo is yet one more variation on a theme, played every couple of years for the past 15.  

In his “statement of principles” issued this past Thursday [PDF], Speaker of the House John Boehner claims to have—at last!—put forth a “common-sense” and “bipartisan” approach that will fix our “broken immigration system.”

Such clichés have become all-too familiar, and the memo is yet one more variation on a theme, played every couple of years for the past 15.

As other commentators have pointed out, Boehner’s “principles” are quite similar to those of the “Gang of Eight,” whose bill died in the House in 2013. The difference that jumps out is that Boehner would allow migrants who are in the U.S. illegally to acquire legal status, though not citizenship. (In other words, they would be allowed to stay but not allowed to vote for Democrats.)

Coming after the Gang of Eight’s failure, Boehner’s memo and resultant bill (if there ever is one) amount to a calculated attempt to negotiate between two centers of power in the Republican Party. The first is a constellation of interests that, for ideological and economic reasons, wants ever more immigration and access to global labor pools. The second is the GOP’s overwhelmingly White electoral base, which accounts for some 90 percent of Republican vote totals.

Mass immigration is patently unpopular among White Republicans; more important, immigration (along with “illegals,” “amnesty,” and related buzzwords) has taken on a profoundly symbolic meaning. Immigration is a kind a proxy war—and maybe a last stand—for White Americans, who are undergoing a painful recognition that, unless dramatic action is taken, their grandchildren will live in a country that is alien and hostile.

There are many within nationalism and traditionalism, as well as the “hard Right” of Beltway conservatives, who are convinced that the GOP is acting like “the Stupid Party” in supporting the mass immigration of millions of likely Democrats. Such activists, it seems, want to save the GOP from itself, and prevent an unnecessary political suicide at the behest of clueless “RINOs”. (My fear is that Republicans aren’t as stupid as they look.)

But the GOP’s “grassroots” are, on some level, at fault for continuing to articulate their opposition to immigration using the bugaboo of “amnesty,” which effectively makes immigration a matter of legality, national security, and abstract notions of citizenship. (I, for one, would happily grant “amnesty” to a million Russian, German, or Italian “boat people” who might happen to wash up on American shores.)

Immigration and “amnesty” are, as mentioned, non-racist proxies for race and culture. In focusing on these, the base has effectively painted itself into a corner, in which it will have a difficult time opposing a bill that, say, promises border enforcement and increases legal immigration or, qua Boehner’s memo, offers penalties and legal status to migrants without citizenship and voting rights.

Putting that aside, a bill based on Boehner’s memo (if it ever sees the light of day) would create a “new normal” socially and demographically—and one with many unintended political consequences.

First and foremost, the migrants would remain here, regardless of whether they’d be allowed to vote. Hispanics would thus continue to establish enclaves and quasi-homelands.

Secondly, their children would be citizens. In other words, the political effects would not be immediate but they would be inevitable, some 25 years later when the current crop of Republicans are in retirement and no longer need to build careers by manipulating White voters.

Thirdly, and most provocatively, America would have generated a new “Jim Crow” myth. If Boehner proves successful, imagine the stories we’d read, only a couple of years on, of hard-working “José,” who’s here legally and whose lifelong dream is to vote or run for office. The American Left (and, likely, much of the Right) would be revitalized by the prospect of advocating for American Hispanics “living under Apartheid,” working and paying taxes but not receiving representation.

In the near term, I’ll refrain from predicting what will come of Boehner’s memo. A year ago, my gut feeling was that the Gang of Eight’s bill, introduced shortly after Obama’s second inauguration, would prove successful. (I was incorrect.) And since Boehner’s memo was released, there has been passionate opposition, even among mainstream conservatives.

Of course, all of this has remained entirely on the level of reaction: conservatives express their distaste and unease, without really articulating a competing vision—even on the most rudimentary level of Who We Are. For better and for worse, a likely scenario is that we will remain in the same limbo we’ve been in for decades: mass Third World immigration will continue, legally and illegally, and White America will keep putting off a definitive answer on its identity. At a time when it is needed most.

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The Great Erasure

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

This article first appeared in the print edition of RADIX Journal (Vol. 1 / 2012)

Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?

Some critics of “immigration” feel the term is euphemistic and prefer to label the phenomenon “invasion.” Guillaume Faye calls it “colonization.” Yet, although the use of alternative terminology is motivated by legitimate concerns with the scale, the permanence, and the non-assimilation associated with modern immigration in the West, neither alternative seems satisfactory.

First, the scale of immigration does not alter the nature of the phenomenon, as the definition of “immigration” still holds so long as it describes individuals moving from one polity to another for purposes of establishing residence. Secondly, length of residence does not transform immigration into something else, as immigration does not exclude, and, indeed, often involves, permanent relocation. Thirdly, assimilation is separate from, and not a condition for, successful immigration, even if it is so for integration. Furthermore, both invaders and colonizers can be immigrants, but immigrants are not necessarily invaders or colonizers (and they are neither if they appeal to the established sovereignty for admission, inclusion, and integration.)

Indeed, “invasion” is wide of the mark. In a geopolitical sense, an invasion is an aggressive military operation aimed at “conquering, liberating, or re-establishing control or authority over a territory, forcing the partition of a country, altering the established government or gaining concessions from said government, or a combination thereof.”[1] In a biological sense, the term still involves aggression. Modern “immigration” in the West, though it may have similar effects, and though some “immigrants” may be aggressive, is neither military in character nor centrally organized—save exceptionally and loosely—by either active or passive encouragement to emigrate and resettle in a specific polity or territory.

“Colonization” is much closer to the mark, but still not on it. The term refers to the establishment of colonies in one territory by people from another territory, but colonies can comprise colonists or colonials, the latter of which is linked to colonialism. In colonialism, a metropole claims sovereignty over the colony, deliberately changing—when the territory is already inhabited—the social structure, government, and economics of the colonized territory. “Immigration” is not “colonization” in this sense. Arguably, “immigrants” into the West have increasingly sought to gain or exert control over the social structure, government, and economics of their host countries, but they are not—save with one exception, mentioned below—subjects of a metropole with a deliberate policy of colonization. The “immigrants” issue from multiple metropoles, which are uncoordinated, geographically dispersed, may be rivals or enemies, and in all but one case operate no policy of colonization, officially or unofficially. Moreover, the so-called “immigrants” are not even coordinated among themselves, beyond temporary subjection by some or exploitation by criminal gangs of human traffickers.The “immigrants” are impelled, not by a single-minded desire to establish or join a colony, but by a variety of individual motives, mostly involving escape from danger or poverty in their native territory and a desire for safety and (above all) economic betterment in a prosperous metropole.

The term “colonization,” however, is not entirely inadequate, for modern “immigration” in the West still involves exogenous strangers colonizing Western polities. This is because, while different from colonialism, structurally the phenomenon remains related to it. A more apt term for the phenomenon of “immigration” would be “settler colonialism,” which can involve settlers from multiple metropoles whose behavior and consciousness is very similar to that of our modern Third World “immigrants”; but the term remains problematic, since it describes projects like Israel today, South Africa up until the early 20th century, and what eventually became the United States, from the 17th century through most of the 19th. Nevertheless, “settler colonialism” is structurally most similar to what is discussed in this essay, however, and provides a sound theoretical basis for what I propose to call, for the purposes of distinction, “settler colonization.”
In this essay, I will first provide a description of settler colonialism as it is currently theorized. I will then show how settler colonialism closely describes modern “immigration” in the West. Next, I will indicate how the Western experience with modern settlers from the Third World differs from that of past settler-colonial projects. Finally, I will suggest possible strategies for combating settler colonization in our hemisphere.

Settler Colonialism

Edward Cavanagh, editor of the Settler Colonial Studies journal, and Lorenzo Veracini, author of Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview[2], define settler colonialism as follows:

Settler colonialism is a global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present. There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends. Not all migrants are settlers; as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settlers come to stay. They are founders of political orders who carry with them a distinct sovereign capacity. And settler colonialism is not colonialism: settlers want Indigenous people to vanish (but can make use of their labour before they are made to disappear). Sometimes settler colonial forms operate within colonial ones, sometimes they subvert them, sometimes they replace them. But even if colonialism and settler colonialism interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other.

In his book, Veracini also ascribes to settler colonialism distinctive characteristics:

  • Settler colonialism creates a dual division between itself, exogenous Others, and indigenous Others; these can be either virtuous or degraded.
  • Settler colonialism is always virtuous, always forward-moving, conceiving itself and its activity in terms of improvement and progress. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous, but can be either elevated or degraded, while exogenous Others can be selectively included or segregated. However, settler colonialism more easily includes exogenous Others than indigenous Others and routinely fantasizes about exchanging indigenous Others with exogenous Others.
  • Inclusion and exclusion operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operate concurrently, without a need for consistency. Yet, while borders are internally porous, they are externally impermeable: settlers can go out, but indigenes cannot get in.
  • Settler colonialism involves the settler self undergoing coeval processes of indigenization and exogenization.
  • Settler colonialism thus converges with the original society, but the line is never crossed because the distinction needs to remain.
  • Settler colonialism dominates in order to transfer (remove); colonialism dominates in order to exploit.
  • Settler colonialism tends to underestimate the indigenous in various objective and subjective ways, making the indigenous invisible.
  • Settler colonialism, accordingly, subjectively conceives areas to be annexed or opened for settlement as vacant.
  • Settler colonialism sees itself as ultimately, if not immediately, autonomous, and therefore resists interference from the metropole; colonialism is subordinate to the metropole.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by an exclusive interpretation of peoplehood, a specific understanding of sovereign capacities and their location, even though settlement itself is messy and most people move individually, “without a conscious determination to establish a new, ideal, society, and with no specific understanding of their own sovereignty.”[3]
  • Settler colonialism sees the settler colonial setting as charged with a special regenerative nature.
  • Settler colonialism is characterized by the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.
  • Settlers come to work and live in peace and see themselves as escaping from violence; a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one.
  • Settler colonialism disavows its violent foundation, but peacefulness coexists with violence.
  • Settler colonialism suffers from “ongoing concerns with existential threats and a paranoid fear of ultimate decolonization.”[4]
  • Settler colonialism has a linear structure, whereas colonialism has a circular structure: for one, the literary metaphor is the Aeneid, for the other, the Odyssey; one involves non-discovery, since settlers simply reproduce their society; the other, discovery, since the discoverer reports back to the metropole; one involves non- encounter with the indigenous (they are invisible, shadows, undercounted, deterritorialized, sojourners, part of the landscape), the other encounter (through exploitation).
  • Settler colonialism, because it deterritorializes the indigenous and denies their state-forming capacity, can be superseded only by itself, ending with the complete elimination of the indigenous. In this case, the end is negotiated from within, including complicated and dubious processes of “national reconciliation.” The alternative ending is settler exodus or expulsion. In this case, there is never equality or any subsequent relationship between the indigenous and the settlers; settler colonialism is a winner-takes-all scenario: either the indigenous or the settlers disappear. Colonialism, on the other hand, ends with state formation (by the indigenous), and its end is a negotiation between states (the colonizers’ and the indigenous’).
  • Settler independence accelerates the process of nation-building and hence the process of erasure of the indigenous. Even well-meaning acts of reconciliation and incorporation entail the erasure of indigenous forms as it occurs in the context of settlers’ forms.

Settler Colonization in the West

As has been noted, critics of “immigration” in the West have noted its unprecedented scale, its permanent character, and the non-assimilation/non-assimilability of Third World “immigrants.” Among the characteristics of settler colonialism is that settlers come to stay and do not appeal to the established indigenous sovereignty, but rather deny it and seek to remove it in order to replace it with a reproduction or regeneration of their own society. Implied in settler colonialism is scale: settlers may arrive as individual immigrants, but the process of reproduction, removal, and replacement necessitates sufficient scale successfully to neutralise, overcome, and eliminate indigenous resistance.

In Western Europe this is most apparent in the continuing growth of Islamic formations by immigrant Muslims, who, now numbering in the millions, found and daily operate their own structures in parallel with the indigenous authority. Spread across the regions, but concentrated in metropolitan enclaves, these structures may be physical, such as mosques and madrassas, or they may be legal-theological, such as arbitration tribunals based on Shariah law. Their prosperity benefits from demographic contraction and loss of faith by Europeans, whose churches are gradually converted into mosques; but it is also driven by a will to conquer the land, which, from time to time, find open expression across a range of settings, from the streets to high political office held by Muslims. During the disturbances caused by the publication of a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed in Denmark in 2005, Muslim protesters variously called for Shariah law for the United Kingdom, worldwide domination by Islam, the death or slaughter of those who insult Islam, and the extermination of Europeans. Similarly, in 2008, Labour politician Shahid Malik, former Justice Minister and Minister for Race, Faith and Community Cohesion at the Department for Communities and Local Government, stated at that year’s “Global Peace and Unity” conference, held at the Excel London Centre:

I am proud of the achievements of Muslims in this country from ’97. In 19 97 we got our first Muslim MP. In 20 01 we had two Muslim MPs. In 20 05 we had four Muslim MPs. In ša Allah, in 20 09–10, we’ll have eight Muslim MPs. In 2014 we’ll have sixteen Muslim MPs. At this rate, the whole Parliament will be Muslim! But just to say, in case there are journalists here today, that is not my objective. But you know, we’ ve got four Muslim MPs; there should be twenty Muslim MPs in Parliament. And in ša Allah very shortly we’ll see that. I am confident, as Britain’s first Muslim Minister, that, in ša Allah, in the next thirty years or so, we’ll see a Prime Minister in this country, who happens to share my faith.
Such messages cannot be dismissed as simple expressions of anger or hopeful prognostication. Anger and hope can be expressed in many ways, and it is significant that, rather than calling for respect and toleration of a Muslim minority, the thrust of the messages, be it from protestors or from a Justice Minister, flowed uniformly in the direction of conquest, replacement, and Islamic supremacy.

In the United States, Mexican immigrants of recent decades have a well-documented history of forming their own parallel structures. In their case, it takes the form of businesses, pressure groups, student organizations, printed and electronic media, gangs, and social networks permeating occupations, neighborhoods, and local politics, within which all transactions and interactions are conducted in Spanish. Mexican immigrants, their descendants (including naturalized ones), as well as Mexicans in Mexico, also conceive themselves, even at official government level, as possessing a sovereign capacity as Mexicans—“I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border, that wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico.” A true Mexican immigrant leaves Mexico behind and appeals to the United States government so that he may eventually become an American; a Mexican settler takes Mexico with him, and, though he may take up American citizenship, the latter is done for purely instrumental (e.g., economic) reasons. Some more ideologically racialist Mexicans dream of replacing the United States government with a Chicano superstate to be called “Aztlan.” A more common assumption of Mexican settlers is that part or all of the U.S. will gradually transform into a more lucrative version of their home country.

The process of replacement is made partially invisible by its interaction with a vestigial European settler colonial consciousness: “immigrants” have slowly built their structures largely in the shadows, persistently undercounted and underestimated. This is an instance where settler colonialism and settler colonization interpenetrate.

Third World settlers in the West replicate the dual division of peoples in settler colonial projects, and the relationship between self and other is analogous. Upon arrival, they are faced with indigenous Others, who comprise the majority and are ostensibly the established authority, as well as with exogenous Others, who comprise minorities of fellow travelers and against whom they are now pitted in competition for resources and admission by the established authority. When faced with real or perceived resistance by the indigenous, settlers perceive themselves in a shared predicament with exogenous Others. This makes them more receptive to establishing friendships or alliances with exogenous Others against the indigenous established authority. Said exogenous Others, however, may be found within structures of the established authority itself. Thus, generic pro-“immigrant” pressure groups emerge with the backing of establishment politicians. (As discussed further below, these politicians, though exogenous, may also be or appear to be indigenous.)

The consciousness of settler colonization in the West is always virtuous: settlers seek employment, economic betterment, educational improvement, professional progress, and a peaceful life. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous: they are racists, bigots, Islamophobes, infidels, faithless, and degenerate. They can, however, be elevated by converting to the settler’s faith and/or cause. They can, by adopting their manners and sensibilities, also be selectively admitted into the settler collective, including through marriage, although this may require conversion. In the latter case, reluctant admission and desire for admission interpenetrate, for the settler, still perceiving himself as less powerful than the indigenous (even if more virtuous), sees acceptance as a gateway for deeper colonization and altering the indigenous society in ways more amenable to his collective (e.g. by campaigning for “anti-racist” legislation). When settlers run for political office, one part of them desires acceptance by the establishment (it is powerful and confers privilege), another desires to change that establishment (it is racist and excludes settlers). It is not gaining admission with a view to assimilating to the indigenous Other, but rather gaining admission with a view to neutralise and/or displace him.

Thus, inclusion by and of the settler and exclusion of the indigenous operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operating concurrently and without consistency.

The search for admission, even if without a view to assimilation, does involve a process of indigenization. The indigenous in Europe, because they tend towards individualism and low ethnocentricity, confuse indigenization of the settler with assimilation, not realizing that settlers are ethnocentric collectivists and seek eventually to recast European society in their image. The process of indigenization involves settlers becoming the indigenous, not settlers becoming like the indigenous (even though the former does superficially involve and necessitate the latter to varying degrees.)

A process of exogenization of the settler in relation to the latter’s original society is the other facet of his indigenization in Europe, for as he indigenizes in an alien environment, he also diverges from the members of his race, whom he has left behind. The evolution of past settler colonial projects, particularly those involving multiple races and ethnicities, such as what became the United States, point to the eventual emergence of a sense of peoplehood, albeit qualified by racial or ethnic membership. This means that while the United Kingdom may variously converge with India, Pakistan, Africa, and the Caribbean, settlers from these countries or regions, and more so their descendants, and particularly where they are racially mixed, will not see themselves as subjects or indigenous to those countries and regions, but as British citizens indigenous to Britain, whose heritage goes back to one or more of those countries or regions. It follows from this that while there will be convergence, the line will never be crossed because the distinction will always remain.

While the end result is the transference (removal) of the indigenous, settler colonization in the West coexists with exploitative relationships proper of straight colonialism. It is well known that Third World settlers in the West, even at the appellant stage, take advantage of the indigenous’ welfare state and concessionary provisions, and that these benefits are often a reason for immigrating in the first place; indeed, on the whole, these settlers consume more than they produce. However, exploitation is not limited to scrounging from the indigenous government: it also takes the form of various forms of ethnically organized fraud, such as car crash insurance claim scams, which are run by Muslim gangs, or ethnically organized exploitation, such as pedophilia, also associated with Muslim gangs. So long as the indigenous remain in charge, they remain both an obstacle and a resource.

This is linked both to the subjective underestimation of the indigenous and the conception of Europe as vacant. Although the latter may seem an exaggeration, it is not if we understand ethnocentricity as involving a certain “vacating” (or evacuation) of the Other’s humanity. Third World settlers in the West are by nature highly ethnocentric, at least in relation to the indigenous White majority. The West is thus conceived by settlers primarily as a space, a land, where there are resources and opportunity, not as comprising people just like them who can provide generosity and friendship. The indigenous Westerner, therefore, is vacant, present but absent, a somewhat abstract entity that has to be dealt with, if only because “it” holds the “keys to the kingdom,” but which is otherwise denied and subjectively disappears until the next time “it” gets in the way or the settler realizes he needs something from “it.” The indigenous White majority is essentially part of the landscape, but, as with irredentist Mexican settlers in the United States, it can be seen as sojourners, interlopers, or usurpers.

Both the emergent sense of peoplehood, even if multifarious and complicated by racial and ethnic divides and miscegenation, and the conception of a vacant land of opportunity, are concurrent with autonomy from the originating metropole, and even resistance to its interference. It must be borne in mind that many settlers immigrate as economic or political refugees, and seek to make a new life in the Western El Dorado. Making a new life is another way of saying regeneration; the West, and immigration to the West, are imbued with a regenerative nature. In turn, this regeneration occurs as a dual process, whereby the settler regenerates (that is, generates again) his own society and simultaneously has his life regenerated in (and/or by) the land of opportunity. Given the often dysfunctional nature of Third World societies, this duality would seem to be mutually negating, since the society being regenerated is the society from which the settler fled, and a successful regeneration of that society would impede the successful regeneration of the settler’s life. Indeed, a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one. But settlers do not require consistency.

Third World settlers immigrating into the West are motivated primarily by the prospect of economic betterment; they have no specific understanding of their sovereignty and neither do they, with the exception of politicized Mexican settlers in the United States, possess a conscious collective will, for settlers move individually, even if they arrive in groups. All the same, as we have seen from the proliferation of parallel substitutive formations by settlers in the West, they do possess the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.

The process of doing so is non-violent, following a legal sequence comprising: appeal to the indigenous authority (for recognition and admission as permanent minorities, and eventually citizens); development of exogenous structures (serving as substitutes to indigenous ones); co-option of indigenous structures (lobbying for concessions, multiculturalism); subversion from without (lobbying for anti-racist legislation); and indigenization (becoming legislators, subversion from within). At the same time, the process coexists with violence, whereby the indigenous are physically attacked or subject to predations (typically muggings, robberies, racially motivated beatings, and rape), or else morally attacked (typically accusations of prejudice and “racism,” and/or “racism” hoaxes).

Conversely, settlers live in paranoid fear. In the West, colored settlers imagine themselves in the midst of indigenous “racists,” in an institutionally “racist” society, even though said society has invited them, granted them recognition, made concessions, opened its labour market to them, accepted them as citizens, elected them into public offices, denounced “racism” in all its forms, swiftly purged “racists” upon detection, and even changed its laws to criminalise “racism” and punish “racists” with added rigor. This may be because settlers both have a well-developed sense of racial identity, because they would never welcome colonization in their traditional homeland, and because they are routinely agitated by ideologically egalitarian fanatics. No matter what gains they make, the fear of “racism” is ever present, and the perceived risk of expulsion (decolonization) ever lingering. In both Europe and the United States, it has happened before: in 1492 (the Spanish Reconquista) and 1954 (Operation Wetback).

Expulsion or a mass exodus would, indeed, be the only way to end Third World settler colonization in the West. Millions of settlers are citizens, many going back several generations, not a few descended from mixed race marriages. Short of expulsion or a mass exodus, the long-term effect of settler colonization, aided by high numbers of incomers and differential fertility favoring the settlers, is the replacement of the indigenous population. The latter will not need to disappear entirely, at least as a biological entity, before being completely dispossessed: even without violence, the indigenous institutions of democracy and equality provide the logic and mechanisms for dispossession. If the majority of people in Britain are Muslim, for example, democracy necessitates that they be proportionally represented in the seats of political, economic, cultural, academic, and institutional power. The historical rarity and fugaciousness of democracy in the Third World, however, suggests that democratic governance would end as soon as it ceases to be useful for the settlers, though this is not to say that the indigenous could not well dispense with it in the face of an immediate existential threat—democracy has proven historically rare and fugacious in the West, too.

Without the complete erasure of the indigenous Westerners, the end of Third World settler colonization in the West would at best imply a dubious procedure of “national reconciliation,” involving negotiation by the indigenous with triumphant settlers from within, and in the context of settlers’ established forms. Most likely, given the multiracial character of settler colonization in the West, is that one ethnicity would gain the ascendancy over all the others, and it would be they who become the new indigenous. The Bantus in South Africa provide a historical example.

Uniqueness of Settler Colonization in the West

Settler colonization in the West is not unique because of its scale or the fact that settlers are poor. Settler colonialist projects have involved large numbers in the past and many of the settlers have been poor—in most cases, they immigrated looking for a better life. The uniqueness of our experience with settler colonization results from the unique features of modern Western societies.

First, it is the colonization of the more powerful by the less powerful, of the former colonialists by the formerly colonized; it is, in other words, a reversion of past colonialism and settler colonialism.

Secondly, this process enjoys the ongoing complicity of the indigenous’ ruling elites, who, wittingly or unwittingly, instigated it in the first place out of a perceived economic need, and have since institutionalized it out of political opportunism, greed, a sense of historical guilt, or befuddlement with an ideology of human universalism. The opening of land to colonists by leaders is not unique: African kings in southern Africa either sold or gave away land to European settlers in exchange for military service during the 19th century. What is unique is the institutionalization of a policy of welcoming settler colonization, supported by a universalist ideology that makes the voluntary transfer of land and sovereignty morally virtuous.

Thirdly, alongside indigenous collaborationism, Third World settler colonization in the West has been catalyzed by both historical events and the existence of a hostile or at least self-serving exogenous minority of very able intellectuals, businessmen, and legislators. The excesses of the National Socialist government in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, Allied victory in World War II, and the moral capital amassed and exploited by Jews—and especially radical Marxist Jews—as a result of well publicized National Socialist persecution, permitted the development of Jewish intellectual movements that subjected traditional European identity and institutions to radical critiques. Their effect was the gradual deprecation of European tradition and racial identity and the development of universalism to its logical extreme. Interacting with guilt as the primary method of social control in the West, this made it possible even for genetically distant immigrants eventually to become legislators because it had become impossible for the indigenous to argue against exclusion based on race.[5]

Fourthly, the sovereignty transfers take a more abstract form than the land leases, cessions, seizure, or annexations that have characterized settler colonialist projects elsewhere. In the West transfers occur at the legal, policy, and moral- philosophical levels; they involve, for example, changes in legislation that privilege settlers over the indigenous, abdication of indigenous racial consciousness as a morally legitimate cognitive structure, or discrimination policies against the indigenous designed disproportionately to enhance settlers’ access to higher education and the job market. Similarly, the emptiness and evacuation of the “land of opportunity” among settlers occurs at a much more abstract level than allowed by indigenous demographic contraction: the Western “land of opportunity” is densely populated and highly developed, so the evacuation is purely subjective. Its closest analogue is modern Israel, where the “promised land” is subjectively emptied by denying Palestinians the same moral and symbolic status as Jews.

Finally, the settler colonization in the West does not involve the ignoring or direct overrunning of the indigenous, but rather an incremental engagement, which runs concomitantly with a process of gradual transformation of the settler from appellant to citizen to legislator, which is, in turn, wrapped up with the process of indigenization already mentioned.

Third World settler colonization of the West is possible only as a result of a uniquely Western ideology (egalitarianism) and an autochthonous political system (democracy), both of which morally and ideologically disarm the indigenous against settler ascendancy and predation.

Ending Settler Colonization

As has been noted, settler colonialism rarely ends, and it is superseded only by itself. After the United States’ independence, the former settlers ceased to be colonials from a distant mother country because their mother country had become the United States. Moreover, the indigenous were in time either displaced or made to disappear entirely, so there was no question of the indigenous regaining their independence and the colonials returning home—as just stated, the latter were at home. Third World settler colonization in the West being analogous, it follows that the crisis faced by Westerners is much more fundamental than simple out-of-control immigration. A polity can exclude immigrants and strip resident immigrants of their citizenship, but settlers are founders of polities, so they cannot be stripped of their own citizenship by the displaced indigenes, since the indigenous sovereignty is not recognized.

It should be apparent that we in the West live still in a time of transition, where immigration coexists with and interpenetrates settler colonization, and where one has not entirely given way to the other. Yet it is already possible for a citizen of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean descent in the United Kingdom to treat, for example, a White South African over the age of 16 immigrating into the island as a foreigner, and to be in a position to grant or deny admittance, even where the South African has blood ties to the island going back thousands of years and was born to United Kingdom citizens. Conversely, it is no longer possible, without an abrogation of modern Westernism’s basic philosophical tenets, suddenly to withdraw citizenship from a United Kingdom resident descended from one or more generations of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean citizens. Even the overnight expulsion of illegal immigrants and the passing of the most restrictive immigration law imaginable in our present ideological context could not deal with this problem. As time passes, the immigration reform debate will become increasingly irrelevant.

Where settler colonialism was terminated or reversed, such as in South Africa after Nelson Mandela, Rhodesia after Robert Mugabe, and Haïti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the measures required were violent and broke (or would have broken had it existed) current international law. Because this law is premised on equality as an absolute moral good, reversing settler colonization in the West would, without first abrogating this law, or else discrediting the moral basis for such body of law, also imply violent and illegal acts. Settler colonization is, after all, a game of erasure: settlers erase or are erased; no ongoing or equitable relationship is possible between settlers and indigenes. And the single biggest impediment to Whites’ avoiding erasure is the hegemonic belief in the West in equality as an absolute moral good, because the latter dictates that settlers be accorded equal rights and privileges to the indigenous (despite settlers being hostile), and because this belief effectively short-circuits the possibility of an opposing belief in the morality of White racial consciousness and preservation.

Whites in Europe and North America, as well as in former colonies in Africa, the South Pacific, and South America, currently lack a moral theory, let alone the legal means (since the latter would stem from the former), with which to justify and secure their continuity. Unless a new moral theory of difference can be formulated to support an ideology and legal framework that both justifies and enables its self-preservation as a unique biological entity in their own homelands, the White race faces complete erasure from the Earth.


  1. “Invasion,” Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion (accessed September 1, 2012).  ↩
  2. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010.  ↩
  3. Ibid., p. 54.  ↩
  4. Ibid., p. 81.  ↩
  5. See Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Paul Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press 2002).  ↩
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