One of the main advantages of the dissident Right is its intellectual heritage.
Tag: New Right
No one likes to be the object of criticism, Americans no more than any other people. And when someone is the target of criticism, he should not be expected always…
No one likes to be the object of criticism, Americans no more than any other people. And when someone is the target of criticism, he should not be expected always to agree with it. It is important, however, to comprehend that criticism, to take it seriously on its own terms, and not just dismiss it as inspired by malice, jealousy or ignorance.
The criticism that the French New Right (NR) has leveled at America has earned it an unjustifiable label of being inspired by some kind of hidden French chauvinism or “anti-American” phobia. And too often the New Right’s criticism has been poorly understood. Some Americans—who are themselves critical of what their country has now become and the way it has evolved—assume that the criticism is aimed primarily at the America of today. This is not true. The criticism the NR addresses against America is aimed, in fact, at the very foundation of what we call the “American ideology”—an ideology going back to the Founding Fathers. Or to put it differently, this is not a criticism of multiracial (or “multicultural”) America of modern and postmodern times, but primarily a criticism aimed at the America created by Whites and Anglo-Saxon Christians.
As a way of adding some final touches to Tomislav Sunic’s book, I’d like to outline the general thrust of this criticism.
Europe has never declared war on the United States. It is clear, however, that from its very beginning, the United States of America has had a score to settle with Europe. America was born out of desire to break up with Europe. What immigrant communities in the New World first and foremost desired was to dispense with the rules and political principles that prevailed in Europe. The American nation was born in a contractual form during the era of modernity, evoking largely the “primal scene” as imagined by Sigmund Freud: the children get together in order to kill their father and afterwards they draft a contract sanctioning the relationship between equals.
Evidently, the father in that scheme was Europe. It was necessary to make a clean break with the past in order to create a new humankind. Thus, in the Federalist Papers we read:
Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered,no government established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America and we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe.
Likewise, it was against Europe that in December 1823 James Monroe stated the central tenet of his famous “Doctrine,” that is, that no European intervention should be tolerated at any point whatsoever on the American continent. “We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe,” exclaimed for his part the poet and philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson in the 19th century. “In many respects,” as Dominique Moisi and Jacques Rupnik remark,
America is anti-Europe. It was born out of desire to create a “new Jerusalem” on earth in order to overcome the limitations and errors of the European history.
Given that U.S. citizenship is founded on a contract between immigrants of diverse origins, it follows that all cultural idiosyncrasies must be relegated into the private sphere, which means that they must be temporarily held outside the notion of citizenship. This requirement perfectly matches with the individualist philosophy of the Founding Fathers. It was in America, for the first time ever, that a society was construed composed exclusively of individuals and not of groups, just as capitalism itself presupposed a brand of individualism oriented first toward the property possession.
Sometimes the indifference of the Americans toward history is explained by a relative short duration of the existence of their country. This explanation does not sound convincing. After all, two centuries is a long stretch of time. In fact, the problem is not so much that Americans “have no history” but rather that they do not wish to have one. And they do not wish to have one because, for them, the past is reminiscent of their European roots, which they once attempted to discard. “This is the only people without any roots and genealogy,” wrote, quite fondly, the liberal author Guy Sorman. Thomas Jefferson expressed the same idea by saying that each generation forms a “separate nation.” “The dead,” he said, “have no rights.” Daniel Boorstin, the former director of the Library of Congress, wrote that “the notion of hyphenated Americans is un-American.
I believe that there are only Americans. Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, or African-Americans are an emphasis that is not fertile…. Americans prefer to be called by their first names and abandon the names of their heritage. The same applies to objects, the trend being toward the unsustainable and the disposable.
The same observation was made by Christopher Lasch, who wrote that in the U.S. “the removal of the roots has always been seen as the prerequisite for increased freedoms.” Hence, America can be described as a civilization of space and not a civilization of time. Its founding myth is not the origin, but the frontier, which in 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner interpreted as the most representative notion of the American ideal, that is, the aspiration toward “the conquest of space.” “What other people experience as history,” observes Jean-Paul Dollé, “the Americans perceive as a sign of underdevelopment.”
And the Americans did not wish to break up with only Europe. They also wanted to create a new society that would regenerate mankind. They wanted to create a new “promised land” that would become the model of the Universal Republic. This Bible-inspired theme, based on the idea of the “chosen” America, has, from its outset and by a purported divine choice, constituted the foundation of a “civil religion” and of American “exceptionalism.” It has kept resurfacing as a leitmotif throughout American history, ever since the days of the Pilgrims, as for instance when the Massachusetts Bay theologian John Cotton suggested the adoption of Hebrew as the official language for the former British colonies. John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which was founded in 1629, asserted:
We must always consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us. Today the eyes of all people are truly upon us—and our governments, in every branch, at every level, national, state and local, must be as a city upon a hill.
Similar statements were made by William Penn, the chief of the Quaker colony of future Pennsylvania, only to be echoed by the settlers of Virginia. As early as 1668, William Stoughton exclaimed: “God sifted a whole nation that he might send choice grain over into this wilderness.” For Daniel Webster, the United States is a “promised land,”
if indeed it be designed by Providence that the grandest exhibition of human character and human affairs shall be made on this theatre of the Western world. Thomas Jefferson defines a single set of individual and collective rights for all men. Influenced by the doctrine of natural rights, these rights were held to be universal and valid in all times and places. On November 13, 1813, John Adams exhorted the Americans to “our pure, virtuous, public spirited, federative republic that will last forever, govern the globe and introduce the perfection of man.” Even in 1996, the “conservative” U.S. Senator Jesse Helms exclaimed, “The United States must lead the world with the moral torch… and serve as an example to all peoples.”
The goal is not just welcoming the poor and the outcast, as proclaimed in the inscription on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty:
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she [Mother of Exiles]
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
The goal is also to enable the newcomers to take revenge against the country of their origin. And also to continue to proceed in a manner that would eventually lead the whole world to impregnate itself with the idea that the American society is the perfect society and that the descendants of the Puritans are God’s elect. Besides, it is the Puritan theology of the “covenant” that inspired the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, as put forward by John L. O’Sullivan in 1839:
Our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity…. Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity?
In other words, if God had chosen to favor the Americans, they should be entitled to convert other peoples whichever way they see best and most expedient.
Hence, on the one hand we are witnessing isolationism—America must separate itself from the outside world, which is seen as corrupt. On the other hand, there is a need for the “crusade”—the world must gradually be penetrated with the universal values of the American system. In economics, free-trade policies have never prohibited the use of protectionism, whenever this was deemed necessary; similarly, in foreign policy, isolationism, coupled with the spirit of “crusade,” can march hand in hand. These are the two sides of the same messianic vocation and a typical example of how political universalism is just a mask for ethnocentrism, that is to say, a peculiar model with planetary ambitions.
This underlying certitude explains the extraordinary stability of the U.S. system. In the course of its history, the United States has known only one important political model, a model which has virtually remained unchanged ever since the days of the Founding Fathers. The Constitution, largely inspired by Locke, and generally speaking by the philosophy of Enlightenment, and vetted through Puritanism, has become a sort of sacred monument that makes of Americanism a genuine religion. Be they on the right or on the left, all Americans are in agreement that they have a mission to spread “the word” to mankind. Even the most frenzied utopians do not call into question the authority of the Constitution or the superiority of individual initiative. The system can be tentatively improved or reformed, but it must be remain fundamentally unchanged, insofar as it meshes with the very existence of the country. Whereas in Europe it is still possible to refer to some of the countless political models that existed in the past, the political debate in America reduces itself to discussions about the relative merits of Hamilton, Jefferson, Washington, et al. Fascism and Communism have never had any real impact on the United States, nor has the idea of counterrevolution, nor critical Marxism, nor revolutionary syndicalism, nor anarcho-syndicalism, situationism, etc. At universities, Political Science courses often evolve around long discussions about the work of the Founding Fathers, who are portrayed as people of unsurpassable legacy. Even the eternal debate between Federalists and Anti-federalists, between the Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians, is, in fact, a family feud, which never calls into question the underlying political consensus.
American domestic politics is often reduced to a competition between the two major parties, which in the eyes of the Europeans say more or less the same thing. Electoral competitions, with their conventions organized as circus shows, are entirely dependent on money. “Democracy” in America equals financial oligarchy. The elections are financial effusions of the billionaire class. For the Americans, it is considered natural that politicians must be rich—in my view, society should be extremely skeptical of anyone who is rich and powerful at the same time—just as it is natural for the politicians to exhibit their wives and children in public meetings, while multiplying religious slogans in their speeches. In continental Europe, a head-of-state addressing his constituents with “God bless you!” and inviting the parliamentarians to a day of prayer and fasting would be viewed by many as a person ripe for the mental asylum. . .
The flip side of this institutional paralysis is formidable conformism and extraordinary monotony of a society that, decade after decade, asserts, with the same docile conviction, that America is a “free country,” while adhering to the same modes, abiding by the same conventions, repeating the same slogans, and, of course, wearing the same uniforms (jeans and T -shirts with a logo of a university that one never attended or a baseball team of which one is not a member). This monotony was already described by Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted that the sequence of commotion and fleeting fashions never augur anything new in America. About the same time the Countess of Merlin also remarked that life of the Americans is “an eternal course in geometry.”
The same messianic certitude inspires American foreign policy, whose main principle is that what is good for America must also be good for the rest of the world—which, in turn, must allow America to expect from its allies financial contributions and applause. As a secularized guise of the Puritan ideal, foreign policy is based on the idea that only the lack of information or the intrinsic evil of foreign leaders explains the reluctance of people around the world to embrace the American way of life. As Jean Baudrillard wrote, the United States is a society
whose naiveté can be described as unbearable and whose fixed idea is that America is the perfect completion of everything that others dream about.
“International relations” is nothing but a global diffusion of the American ideal on the planetary level. Since they assume that they represent the model of perfection, American do not feel obliged to get to know others. It remains for others to adopt the American way. “The tradeoff is uneven,” observes Thomas Molnar, “because America has nothing to learn but everything to teach.” And indeed, everything that happens in America must eventually happen elsewhere in the world. In other words, foreign policy has for a goal the creation of unified humanity no longer in need of any foreign policy. Under such circumstances one must not be surprised that setbacks encountered by the United States in the international arena are often the results of America’s inability to comprehend that other peoples think differently than they do. In fact, for the Americans, the external world (“the rest of the world”) simply does not exist, or rather it exists in so far as it becomes Americanized—a necessary precondition to become comprehensible.
Many observers have noticed the importance of religion in the American society. “In God we trust” is written on all banknotes, and since 1956, it has become a national motto. In the United States, almost all official ceremonies are preceded or followed by a prayer. As of 1923, the Reverend J.B. Soames declared in Washington, during a solemn blessing of the military equipment: “If Jesus Christ came back to Earth he would be white, American and proud of it!” Tocqueville already observed,
It is the religion that gave birth to the Anglo-American societies. One must never forget this; in the United States, religion is therefore intermingled with all the national habits and all the sentiments to which a native country gives birth.
Religion is often redefined in an optimistic sense, consistent with the requirements of practical materialism and aspirations of the people who has never ceased to believe in the virtues of technology and who spontaneously assume–given that the sense of the tragic is alien to it—that somehow things will always sort themselves out in the end. The well known American professor Thomas L. Pangle, in his study on Montesquieu and his influence on the Founding Fathers, suggests the adoption of liberal, commercial republicanism and the spirit of commerce as the best regime
fundamentally opposed, not only to insecurity, but also to both the austere civic virtue of republican antiquity and to religious self-transcendence or otherworldliness.
The bottom line is the reconciliation of religion with optimism inherited from the Enlightenment and embedded in the direction pointing toward the future and the mystique of progress. From John Winthrop to George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the Americans have never given up on the belief in progress, which often leads them to the conclusion that material and technological developments will also bring about the betterment of mankind. In this world of ours, only through the hoarding of material goods can a person be saved. Hence the idea of “redemption” through the conversion to the American way of life. Calvinism had already tried to solve this problem of “predestination” by interpreting material success as a sign of divine election. The glorification of individual performance, the spirit of capitalism, the pacifying virtues of “smooth trade,” all of this nurtures hopes that the accumulation of wealth will someday erase all evil. Evil becomes a “mistake,” a state of imperfection that must be eventually surpassed by increased trade and economic “development.” From now on, it is no longer ethics that justify interests but interest that attempt to justify ethics. In his letter of 1814, addressed to Thomas Law, Jefferson wrote: “The answer is that nature has constituted utility to man the standard and best of virtue.” One hundred years later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes added,
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
It seems that in America truth has become a commercial issue.
Televangelists preach the “prosperity gospel”—getting rich is a sign of getting saved—before making their constant fundraising appeals.
The Puritans had retained from Locke the idea that all other human rights derive from “natural right of property.” For Madison, “the first goal of the government” is to ensure the acquisition of property. In 1792, he said: In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.” Rights are interpreted as inherent attributes of human nature, something that individuals possess because of their membership to the human species, and it is those rights that governments are bound to “ensure.”
The New Right totally rejects this notion of subjective rights, which are absolutely opposed to the traditional notion of objective law. In this view, law is an equity relationship, enabling everyone to get what he deserves. Similarly, the New Right rejects the idea that private property must be an absolute.
Such an idea of man was inherent to the foundations of a society, aptly described by Ezra Pound as a “purely commercial civilization.” His words echo Tocqueville’s:
The passions that agitate the Americans most profoundly are commercial passions and not political passions, or rather, they carry the habits of trade into politics.
America is certainly not the first commercial republic in history, but it is the first one to have posited that nothing whatsoever should limit economic activities, as it is the cherished means of achieving the betterment of all mankind. Being on his own, the individual counts in so much as his external activity keeps growing. Naturally, only his economic performance will properly measure his worth. “In America,” wrote Hermann Keyserling, “people really believe that the rich are superior simply because they have money; in America, having money creates, in fact, moral rights.”
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno observed from their perspective:
Here in America, there is no difference between a man and his economic fate. A man is made by his assets, income, position, and prospects. The economic mask coincides completely with a man’s inner character. Everyone is worth what he earns and earns what he is worth..
Capitalist competition represents the most ethical tribunal: the rich are the “winners,” and the “winners” are the righteous. This is the primacy of civilization of having over the civilization of being.
Such traits do not lend themselves to meditative thinking and inner reflection. When the link to others is solely nurtured by the respect for material goods and the Dollar Almighty, the result is alienation with no bounds. For the Americans, notes Anaïs Nin in his diary, “it is a sin to have an inner life.” These words may sound excessive, yet they reflect the same conclusions made by the American Christopher Lasch. In the United States there is a consistent trend to believe that intelligence must be reduced to technical knowledge and that the fixation on economic matters should help dispense with the world of pure ideas. Whoever attempts to express an original and profound idea runs the risk of encountering the answer: “Don’t be so negative. Keep it practical! Stay positive!”
For the Founding Fathers, the purpose of the government was to ensure the “inalienable rights” of individuals who were “created equal.” Thusly, political life was reduced to morality and law. The American dissident HL Mencken quipped that the very opposite was true:
The worst government is the most moral. One composed of cynics is often very tolerant and humane. But when fanatics are on top, there is no limit to oppression.
In the United States, political action must always begin with a sudden surge of moral awareness (“Something must be done about it!”), which invariably leads to a “technical” examination of the subject matter under consideration. The law itself is a mode of expression that sets legal forms of moral characteristics inherent to the ideology of human rights. Hence, the extraordinary importance of lawyers in American politics, which Michel Crozier calls the “delirium of the proceedings” and “legal madness.” Meanwhile, the intrinsic superiority of private over public life must be loudly declared everywhere; “civil society” over the world of politics, business and economic competition over the common good. “An American, be he a government official or man on the street,” writes Thomas Molnar, “is convinced that politics as such is a bad thing and that people need to find something else in order to communicate and establish peaceful relations.” As I stated above, the Americans are inclined to think that evil could disappear and that it is possible to remove the tragic trait of human existence. That is why they want to abolish politics, while at the same time bring history to an end. “America was constructed in order that it can exit history,” wrote Octavio Paz. The American “neoconservative” Francis Fukuyama believed to be able to announce its end.
Waging war has always meant for the Americans a morality “crusade.” This is why it is not enough for them to obtain military victory only. They must also annihilate the enemy, who is invariably depicted not as a leader or state that happens to be an adversary but as the incarnation of evil. Under the guise of “humanitarian intervention” or battles against “terrorists,” American wars are always “just wars,” that is to say, justa causa wars—and not wars against a justus hostis (“just enemy”). Hence, the enemy must be invariably described not just as the enemy of the moment (who could eventually also become an ally in the future), but as a criminal who deserves punishment and re-education.
The differences seem to be profound between the political thought in the continental Europe and the American mentality, marked by an economic, commercial and procedural view of the world, by the omnipresence of biblical values, as well as by technological optimism, contractualism, the language of “rights,” and the belief in progress.
I think I know the United States well, as I have sojourned there on many occasions. I have travelled in all directions, from Washington, DC, to Los Angeles, from New Orleans to Key Largo, from San Francisco to Atlanta, from New York to Chicago. I have, of course, come across a number of things that I enjoyed very much. Americans are friendly and welcoming (even if human relationship is often superficial). They have a tangible sense of community. Their biggest universities offer working conditions that the Europeans could only dream about. I can’t forget the influence that American movies had on me at a time when they were not limited to special effects or superhero nonsense. Especially impressive for me were American literature figures such as Mark Twain, Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Melville, John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, William Faulkner, et al. But I also detect the reverse side of the “American way of life”: culture viewed as perishable commodities, or as “entertainment,” a technomorphic conception of human life designed to transform people into extended remote controlled terminals or computers, fake gender relations, automobile civilization and commercial architecture (there is more genuine sociability at an African local market than at an American supermarket—a prime symbol of Western nihilism), obese children groomed by television, glorification of “winners” and the obsession with consumption, fast food, a mixture of Puritans decrees and hysteric transgressions, hypocrisy, corruption, etc. Yes, I am aware of the risk of being accused of bias. But I must admit that for the America of “golden boys,” of “rednecks,” of “body-builders” and “bimbos,” of the “American dream” and cheerleaders, of “money makers” and “brokers” on Wall Street, I have no sympathy at all.
Is globalism today synonymous with Americanism? One is tempted to answer in the affirmative. The fact is that the United States has never stopped exporting its problems to the rest of the world, starting with Europe. In the opinion polls, hostility towards globalization is often accompanied by the rejection of American hegemony. Politically and culturally, globalization largely means a process of Americanization, as the dominant superpower continues to exports its merchandise, its capital, its services, its technology, but also its “industry of the imaginary,” its culture, its language, its standards of living and its own worldview.
But instead of Americanization, should it not be more appropriate to speak of “Westernization?” Many Americans consider themselves “Westerners”—with some of them even using the term “The West” as a synonym of the “white world” (politically a meaningless expression).
Etymologically, “The West” is a place where the sun sets, a place where things perish, and where history comes to an end. In the past, this term designated one of the two empires (pars occidentalis) born out of the dismemberment of the Roman Empire. Subsequently, the term became synonymous of the “Western civilization.” Today, like many other terms, it is in the process of taking on an economic aura as Western countries are primarily designed as “developed” countries. This is not a term, however, that I myself use in a positive sense. In my view, “The West” has now become the vehicle—in contrast to Europe—of a social model that has become a mirror image of nihilism. During my travels around the world, I have witnessed what happens to rooted cultures when they are affected by “The West”: traditions quickly turn into folklore for tourists, the social bond is undone, the folkways become utility oriented, the American language and the music permeate the mind, and the passion for money becomes overwhelming.
It is often understood by the expression “The West” the aggregate composed of the United States of America and Europe. But this aggregate, provided that it has ever existed, is already crumbling, as was noted some years ago by Immanuel Wallerstein.[19 The transatlantic gap widens every day more and more. Globalization, while exacerbating competition, reveals profound divergences between European interests and American interests. On the geopolitical level, the divergences are even more glaring—the United States is a maritime power, whereas Europe is a continental power. As was shown by Carl Schmitt, the logic of Land vs. Sea represents the two conflicting logics. The Land is opposed to the Sea just as politics is opposed to commerce, the boundary to the wave, the telluric element to the oceanic element. Therefore, I do not identify as a “Westerner.” I am a European.
Seen from the angle of economics, capitalism was not born across the Atlantic, although it was there that it became incorporated into the national ideology: the primacy of contract, the downsizing of the state, the criticism of the “big government,” the advocacy of competition and free trade, etc. It is also in the United States that the concept of “governance” was born—firstly applied to business and then to political and social life. It must not come as a surprise that since 1945, the U.S. economy has become the central stage of the international financial system. It was the United States that established in 1947 the Internatioanl Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), succeeded in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO.) Those were the institutions that liberated capital movements in 1974 in order to finance America’s deficits. In the realm of financial capital, America still retains a much higher share compared to its industrial sector. It sets the rules for international trade, whereas its monetary policies remain the chief mechanism of regulating the financial accumulation across the globe.
Just like many Europeans, I am amazed that America’s self-titled “conservatives” defend, almost without exception, a capitalist system whose expanded methodically destroys everything that they supposedly wish to conserve. Despite the structural crisis that the capitalist system has experienced over the last couple of years, American conservatives continue to celebrate capitalism as a system that allegedly respects and guarantees individual freedom, private property, and free trade. They believe in the intrinsic virtues of the market, whose mechanism they cherish as a paradigm of all social relations. They believe that capitalism has something to do with democracy and freedom. They believe in the the necessity of perpetual economic growth. They think that consumption equals happiness and that “more” is synonymous with “better.”
Capitalism, however, is not “conservative.” It is the very opposite of it. Karl Marx already observed that the dismantlement of feudalism and the eradication of traditional cultures and values are the result of capitalism, which, in turn, drowns everything in the “icy water of egotistical calculation.” Today, the capitalist system, more than ever before, is poised toward the over-accumulation of capital. It needs more trade outlets, more and more markets, and more and more profit. Well, such a goal cannot be achieved unless everything that stands in its way is dismantled, starting with collective identities. A full-fledged market economy cannot operate in a sustained manner unless people first internalize a fashionable culture, consumption, and unlimited growth. Capitalism cannot transform the world into a vast market—which, to be sure, is its main objective—unless the planet is flattened and all people renounce their symbolic imaginations and continues to indulge in a fever for the endless accumulation of something new.
This is the reason why capitalism, in its attempt to erase borders, is also a system that has turned out to be far more effective and far more destructive than Communism. The reason for this is that the economic logic places profit above everything else. Adam Smith wrote that the merchant has no homeland other than the territory where he makes the biggest profit. It is this logic of the commodity, inspired often by the United States of America, which the New Right firmly opposes.
Translated from the French by Tomislav Sunic
- Federalist Papers , No. 14, November 30, 1787. ↩︎
- John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630), Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1838), 3rd series 7:31-48, accessed June 15, 2016, http://winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php. Winthrop delivered this sermon on board the Arbella en route to the Massachusetts Bay Colony. “A city upon a hill” is a reference to Matthew 5:14; Jesus tells his listeners, “You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden.” ↩︎
- Election Sermon at Boston, April 29, 1669. ↩︎
- The Character of George Washington, Speech at a Public Dinner, Washington, February 22, 1832. ↩︎
- John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 15, 1813, ↩︎
- The Statue of Liberty was given to the United States by the government of France and established in its current site off Manhattan Island in 1886. Emma Lazarus’s poem, “The New Colossus,” was written in 1883; in 1903, it was engraved on a bronze plaque and mounted inside the lower level of the
pedestal of the Statue. ↩︎
- John L. O’Sullivan, “The Great Nation of Futurity,” The United States Democratic Review, Volume 6, 1839. ↩︎
- Jean Baudrillard, America. ↩︎
- Thomas Molnar, L’Américanologie. ↩︎
- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 405-6. ↩︎
- Thomas L. Pangle, The Theological Basis of Liberal Modernity in Montesquieu’s “Spirit of the Laws” (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 100. ↩︎
- Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814. ↩︎
- Abrams v. United States, 1919, dissenting opinion. ↩︎
- James Madison, “Property,” National Gazette, March 29, 1792. ↩︎
- Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume I, 273. ↩︎
- Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940–1950 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fishcher Verlag GmbH, 1987). ↩︎
- H.L. Mencken, Minority Report: H.L. Mencken’s Notebooks , §327 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 221. ↩︎
- Molnar, L’Américanologie. ↩︎
- Immanuel Wallerstein, “Does the Western World Still Exist?,” Commentary, No. 112, May 1, 2003. ↩︎
- See Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschtliche Betrachtung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1942); Land and Sea: A World Historical Meditation (Candor, New York: Telos Press, 2015). ↩︎
- Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto. ↩︎
Personally, I had once considered these critiques as being essentially valid, but upon a more thorough investigation of Dugin’s writings and thought, I concluded that these critiques were based on flawed premises and assumptions. My intention here is to point out what the most common reasons for denouncing Dugin have been and why they are based on misconceptions and propaganda rather than reality.
Alexander Dugin is by now well-known in “Right-wing” circles of all sorts across the world—whether we are speaking of nationalists, Fascists, traditionalists, cultural or national conservatives, or New Rightists (also known as Identitarians). Upon the translation of his book The Fourth Political Theory in 2012, Dugin has received a significant amount of international attention from anyone interested in Right-wing or Conservative theory. Since then, a number of other essays by Dugin on the topics of Eurasianism (also spelled “Eurasism”) and also the Theory of the Multipolar World (both of which are interconnected with each other and with what he calls the Fourth Political Theory) have been translated into English, among other languages, allowing us a better view into his thought.
There is no need to discuss Dugin’s theories in any depth here, since his own essays achieve that sufficiently. However, a problem has arisen among Right-wingers in the West in regards to Dugin: while many have appreciated his works, a large number have completely dismissed or attacked him and his theories largely on the basis of misunderstandings or propaganda from Dugin’s political enemies. The situation is certainly not helped by the fact that well-known Identitarian writers such as Greg Johnson, Michael O’Meara, Domitius Corbulo, and some others in Europe have denounced Dugin with reasoning based upon such misunderstandings. Personally, I had once considered these critiques as being essentially valid, but upon a more thorough investigation of Dugin’s writings and thought, I concluded that these critiques were based on flawed premises and assumptions. My intention here is to point out what the most common reasons for denouncing Dugin have been and why they are based on misconceptions and propaganda rather than reality.
Position on Race
First, one of the most difficult issues is the claim that Alexander Dugin believes that race has no substantial reality, that it is a “social construct” and must be completely abandoned as a harmful product of modern Western society. Certainly, he critiques racialist theory, but this is not the same as rejecting race entirely (since one can assert the importance of race without resorting to “racism.” See my essay “Ethnic and Racial Relations”). It must be admitted that Dugin has not taken a clear stance on the matter of race, and occasionally makes statements which imply a dismissal of race (although it is significant that, for the most part, he leaves it an open question). On the other hand, he has also made statements implying an appreciation for racial identity to some extent, such as when he wrote the following:
Being White and Indo-European myself, I recognize the differences of other ethnic groups as being a natural thing, and do not believe in any hierarchy among peoples, because there is not and cannot be any common, universal measure by which to measure and compare the various forms of ethnic societies or their value systems. I am proud to be Russian exactly as Americans, Africans, Arabs or Chinese are proud to be what they are. It is our right and our dignity to affirm our identity, not in opposition to each other but such as it is: without resentment against others or feelings of self-pity. (quoted from “Alexander Dugin on ‘White Nationalism’ & Other Potential Allies in the Global Revolution”)
However, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Dugin truly does believe that race is a “social construct”, as some have assumed. Would this be enough reason to declare Dugin a subversive intellectual in the Right? If this was the case, it would follow by the same reasoning that any past Right-wing intellectual who did not believe in the importance of race (or at least the biological form of race) must also be denounced. This would include such notable thinkers as Oswald Spengler, Francis Parker Yockey, Othmar Spann, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Oswald Mosley, and numerous other Fascist or nationalist intellectuals and leaders who did not place much importance upon physical race. Yet, paradoxically, many of those we see denouncing Dugin today would not do the same for such thinkers. This is not to imply that previous Fascist or nationalist intellectuals are entirely agreeable for us today (in fact, most New Rightists reject Fascism and old-fashioned nationalism), it is only to point out the self-contradiction which has gone unnoticed.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that Dugin clearly believes in the importance of ethnicity and culture and advocates ethnic separatism. Similarly to German Revolutionary Conservative and Völkisch thinkers, Dugin has unmistakably placed the Volk or ethnos as one of the highest values of his philosophy: “The subject of this theory [the Fourth Political Theory], in its simple version, is the concept ‘narod,’ roughly, ‘Volk’ or ‘people,’ in the sense of ‘peoplehood’ and ‘peoples,’ not ‘masses’” (quoted from “The Fourth Estate: The History and Meaning of the Middle Class”). Thus, it is clear that even if he does not value race, Dugin certainly does value ethno-cultural identity. Of course, this is not to say that rejecting the reality of race is not at all problematic, only that it is not enough to denounce a philosopher. However, those who like to claim that Dugin dismisses race as a “social construct” are reminiscent of those who say the same thing about Alain de Benoist, whereas it is clear that Benoist asserts the reality of race and advocates racial separatism–specifically from a non-racist standpoint–in many of his writings, one of the most notable in English being “What is Racism?”.
Empire vs. Imperialism
The second problematic notion about Dugin is that he is an advocate of a type of Russian imperialism, usually suggested being of a Stalinist and Soviet type. However, this claim has no basis in fact, since he has renounced Soviet imperialism and has also distinguished between true empire and imperialism (which also made by Julius Evola and many other Traditionalist and New Right authors). In his essay “Main Principles of Eurasist Policy,” Dugin has asserted that there are three basic types of policy in modern Russia: Soviet, pro-Western (liberal), and Eurasist. He criticizes the Soviet and Liberal types while advocating the Eurasist policy: “Eurasism, in this way, is an original ‘patriotic pragmatism’, free from any dogmatics – be it Soviet or liberal… The Soviet pattern operates with obsolete political, economic and social realities, it exploits nostalgia and inertness, it lacks a sober analysis of the new international situation and the real development of world economic trends.” It should be clear from Dugin’s analysis of different forms of political approaches that his own viewpoint is not based on the USSR model, which he explicitly rejects and critiques.
Moreover, it is often overlooked that when Dugin advocates a Eurasian empire or union, there is a distinction between a true empire—in the traditionalist sense—and imperialism, and thus an empire is not necessarily an imperialistic state (for a good overview of this concept, see Alain de Benoist’s “The Idea of Empire”). Unlike domineering and imperialistic states, the Eurasian Union envisioned by Dugin grants a partial level of self-government to regions within a federalist system:
The undoubted strategic unity in Eurasist federalism is accompanied by ethnic plurality, by the emphasis on the juridical element of the “rights of the peoples”. The strategic control of the space of the Eurasian Union is ensured by the unity of management and federal strategic districts, in whose composition various formations can enter – from ethno-cultural to territorial. The immediate differentiation of territories into several levels will add flexibility, adaptability and plurality to the system of administrative management in combination with rigid centralism in the strategic sphere. (quoted from “Main Principles of Eurasist Policy”)
Of course, it must also be remembered that Dugin’s vision needs to be differentiated from the policies of the present Russian state, which, at this time, cannot be said to adequately represent the Eurasists’ goals (despite the influence of Eurasism on certain politicians). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that while Dugin currently supports president Putin, it is clear that he does not uncritically accept all of the policies of Putin’s government. Therefore, a sound analysis of Dugin’s proposed policies will not equate them with those of the Russian government, as some of his critics have erroneously done.
The “West” as the Enemy
Another common misconception is that Dugin is hostile to Western European civilization and even advocates its complete destruction. It is important to recognize that Dugin’s conception of the “West” is similar to that advocated by the European New Right (in the works of Pierre Krebs, Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Tomislav Sunic, etc.). The “West” is not a reference to all of Western-European civilization, but rather to the specific formulation of Western-European civilization founded upon liberalism, egalitarianism, and individualism: “The crisis of identity […] has scrapped all previous identities–civilizational, historical, national, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, in favor of a universal planetary Western-style identity–with its concept of individualism, secularism, representative democracy, economic and political liberalism, cosmopolitanism and the ideology of human rights.” (quoted from the interview with Dugin, “Civilization as Political Concept”).
Thus, Dugin, like the New Right, asserts that the “West” is actually foreign to true European culture—that it is in fact the enemy of Europe: “Atlanticism, liberalism, and individualism are all forms of absolute evil for the Indo-European identity, since they are incompatible with it” (quoted from “Alexander Dugin on ‘White Nationalism’ & Other Potential Allies in the Global Revolution”). Likewise, in his approving citation of Alain de Benoist’s cultural philosophy, he wrote the following:
A. de Benoist was building his political philosophy on radical rejection of liberal and bourgeois values, denying capitalism, individualism, modernism, geopolitical atlanticism and western eurocentrism. Furthermore, he opposed “Europe” and “West” as two antagonistic concepts: “Europe” for him is a field of deployment of a special cultural Logos, coming from the Greeks and actively interacting with the richness of Celtic, Germanic, Latin, Slavic, and other European traditions, and the “West” is the equivalent of the mechanistic, materialistic, rationalist civilization based on the predominance of the technology above everything. After O. Spengler Alain de Benoist understood “the West” as the “decline of the West” and together with Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger was convinced of the necessity of overcoming modernity as nihilism and “the abandonment of the world by Being (Sein)” (Seinsverlassenheit). West in this understanding was identical to liberalism, capitalism, and bourgeois society – all that “New Right” claimed to overcome. (quoted from “Counter-hegemony in Theory of Multi-polar World”)
While Dugin attacks the “West” as modern liberal civilization, he simultaneously advocates the resurrection of Europe in his vision of the multipolar world: “We imagine this Greater Europe as a sovereign geopolitical power, with its own strong cultural identity, with its own social and political options…” (quoted from “The Greater Europe Project”). Similarly to the previous statements which we have quoted, he asserts here that European culture has multiple ideological elements and possible pathways in its history which are different from the liberal model: “Liberal democracy and the free market theory account for only part of the European historical heritage and that there have been other options proposed and issues dealt with by great European thinkers, scientists, politicians, ideologists and artists.”
Domitius Corbulo has argued, based on statements Dugin made in The Fourth Political Theory that liberalism and universalism are elements which run throughout Western civilization, that Dugin condemns Western-European culture in its entirety. However, it is important to recognize that these arguments are largely borrowed from Western-European authors such as Spengler, Heidegger, and Evola. These authors also recognized that anti-universalist, anti-liberal, and anti-materialist elements also exist in Western-European culture, and thus that there have always been other paths for the destiny of this culture. It is evident that Dugin would assert the same fact from his essays which we have cited here (as well as books not yet available in English, such as ¿Qué es el eurasismo?, Pour une théorie du monde multipolaire, or in Russian in Четвертый Путь, among others). It is important to remember here that The Fourth Political Theory is not a complete and perfect statement of Dugin’s thought, and that what he says there must be balanced with what he says in his other works.
It is often assumed that, considering his hostility to the liberal “West,” Dugin also advocates a complete destruction of the United States of America, which is seen as the epitome of the “West.” However, the very essence of his theory of the multipolar world is the idea that each civilization and nation must be granted the right to live and to determine its own destiny, political form, and way of life. For this reason, Dugin advocates the global combating of American cultural and economic imperialism, which denatures non-Western cultures. However, in the multipolar scheme, the United States also has the right to exist and to choose its own path, which means allowing the American people the right to continue the liberal model in the future, should they desire to do so. Of course, the liberal model would naturally be discouraged from abroad and be limited in its influence. This position can be drawn from Dugin’s key essays explicating the Theory of the Multipolar World: “The Multipolar World and the Postmodern” and “Multipolarism as an Open Project”.
The Fourth Political Theory vs. Reactionary Traditionalism
Some writers, such as Kenneth Anderson (“Speculating on future political and religious alliances”), have interpreted Alexander Dugin’s thought as a form of Radical Traditionalism (following Julius Evola and Rene Guenon) which is completely reactionary in nature, rejecting everything in the modern world–including all technological and scientific development–as something negative which needs to be eventually undone. This interpretation can be easily revealed to be incorrect when one examines Dugin’s statements on Traditionalism and modernity more closely. It is true that Dugin acknowledges Traditionalist thinkers such as Evola and Guenon among his influences, but it is also clear that he is not in full agreement with their views and advocates his own form of conservatism, which is much more similar to German Revolutionary Conservatism (see The Fourth Political Theory, pp. 86 ff.).
Unlike some Traditionalists, Dugin does not reject scientific and social progress, and thus it can also be said that he does not reject the Enlightenment in toto. When Dugin criticizes Enlightenment philosophy (the ideology of progress, individualism, etc.), it is not so much in the manner of the Radical Traditionalists as it is in the manner of the Conservative Revolution and the New Right, as was also done by Alain de Benoist, Armin Mohler, etc. In this regard, it can be mentioned that critiquing the ideology of progress is, of course, very different from rejecting progress itself. For the most part, he does not advocate the overcoming of the “modern world” in the Traditionalist sense, but in the New Rightist sense, which means eliminating what is bad in the present modern world to create a new cultural order (“postmodernity”) which reconciles what is good in modern society with traditional society. Thus Dugin asserts that one of the most essential ideas of the Eurasist philosophy is the creation of societies which restore traditional and spiritual values without surrendering scientific progress:
The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”. The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development. (quote from Eurasian Mission, cited in Dugin, “Multipolarism as an Open Project”)
It should be evident from these statements that Dugin is not a reactionary, despite his sympathy to Radical Traditionalism. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Dugin also supports a “Third Positionist” form of socialism as well as a non-liberal form of democracy. In regards to socialism, he has written that the “confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society…” (from “Multipolarism as an Open Project”). Whereas some have accused Dugin of being anti-democratic, he has plainly advocated the idea of a “democratic empire”: “The political system of the Eurasian Union in the most logical way is founded on the ‘democracy of participation’ (the ‘demotia’ of the classical Eurasists), the accent being not on the quantitative, but on the qualitative aspect of representation” (quoted from “Main Principles of Eurasist Policy”; see also the comments on democracy in his “Milestones of Eurasism”).
References to Leftists and Cultural Marxists
Finally, one of the most recent attacks on Alexander Dugin is based on his reference to Cultural Marxist and “Leftist” philosophers, which is seen by some as an indicator that Dugin himself is sympathetic to Cultural Marxism (see Domitius Corbulo’s “Alexander Dugin’s 4th Political Theory is for the Russian Empire, not for European Ethno-Nationalists”). However, Dugin has clearly pointed out that while he uses ideas from Marxist and “Leftist” theorists, he rejects their ideologies as a whole: “The second and third political theories [Fascism and Marxism] must be reconsidered, selecting in them that which must be discarded and that which has value in itself. As complete ideologies… they are entirely useless, either theoretically or practically.” (quoted from The Fourth Political Theory, p. 24).
If one notes that Dugin occasionally makes use of Marxist thinkers, then it should not be overlooked that he places even more importance on Right-wing thinkers, who clearly form the greater influence on him; the intellectuals of the Conservative Revolution (Heidegger, Schmitt, Moeller van den Bruck, etc.), the Traditionalist School (Evola, Guenon, Schuon, etc.), the New Right (Benoist, Freund, Steuckers, etc.), and the conservative religious scholars (Eliade, Durand, etc.). Furthermore, Corbulo objects to Dugin’s use of Claude Levi-Strauss’s work, yet respected New Right thinkers like Alain de Benoist and Dominique Venner (see Robert Steuckers, “En souvenir de Dominique Venner”, citing Venner’s Le siècle de 1914) have also referenced the ideas of Levi-Strauss on matters of culture and ethnicity, among other authors that Dugin uses, such as Jean Baudrillard.
In a recent interview, Dugin has clearly agreed with the European Right’s position on immigration (which advocates the restriction of non-European immigration), mentioning the threat that liberal cosmopolitanism brings to European culture: “The immigration changes the structure of European society. The Islamic people have very strong cultural identity. The European people weaken their own identity more and more in conscious manner. It is human right and civil society individualistic ideological dogma. So Europe is socially endangered and is on the eve to lose it identity” (quoted from “The West should be rejected”). Thus, when we take a less biased view of Dugin’s writings and statements, it is clear that his overall position is very far from that of the Cultural Marxists and the New Left.
From our examination thus far, it should be obvious that there are too many misconceptions about Alexander Dugin’s thought being circulated among Right-wingers. These misconceptions are being used to dismiss the value of his work and deceive members of Right-wing groups into believing that Dugin is a subversive intellectual who must be rejected as an enemy. Many other important Right-wing intellectuals have been similarly dismissed among certain circles, due to practices of a kind of in-group gleichschaltung, closing off any thinker who is not seen as readily agreeable. It is important to overcome such tendencies and support an intellectual expansion of the Right, which is the only way to overcome the present liberal-egalitarian hegemony. People need to take a more careful and unbiased look at Dugin’s works and ideas, as with other controversial thinkers. Of course, Dugin is not without flaws and imperfections (
nor is any other thinker), but these flaws can be overcome when his thought is balanced with that of other intellectuals, especially the Revolutionary Conservatives and the New Rightists.
Can we restart history after all?
Can we restart history after all?
Daniel McCarthy has written a remarkable essay in The American Conservative questioning Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of The End of History. McCarthy challenges the assumption that the Hegelian process of History has come to an end with the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy. McCarthy contends that the so called “end of history” is simply a product of Anglo-American world hegemony–and points to the rise of anti-liberal systems such as fascism when this hegemony was challenged. He concludes:
Liberal democracy is unnatural. It is a product of power and security, not innate human sociability. It is peculiar rather than universal, accidental rather than teleologically preordained. And Americans have been shaped by its framework throughout their history; they have internalized liberalism’s habits and rationales. Not surprisingly, they have also acquired the habits and rationales of empire—and now they must understand why.
In short, “liberalism means empire.”
While Fukuyama’s work is mostly driven by ideas, McCarthy’s thesis is driven by geopolitics. McCarthy bases a large amount of his thesis on the common geopolitical assumption that land based, imperialist, militaristic powers practice a more anti-liberal form of social organization. In contrast, the offshore-balancing Atlanticist powers of Great Britain and the United States did not face the constant existential threat of invasion and therefore, were more willing and able to permit free speech and develop liberal institutions–at least most of the time.
McCarthy’s thesis, true to what one would expect from The American Conservative, is that one of the great threats to liberalism comes from its most militant defenders–the neoconservatives. Their insistence on spreading liberal revolution by force is challenging the entire security system that guarantees liberalism by introducing catastrophic instability. McCarthy writes:
The conservative realist knows that America will not be anything other than broadly liberal and democratic for a long time to come, and liberal democracy requires a delicately balanced system of international security upheld by an empire or hegemon. This balance is apt to be upset not only by some rampaging foreign power—by a Napoleonic France or a Nazi Germany or Soviet Union—but also by our own revolution-loving, democracy-promoting liberals.
Of course, what if you don’t want to safeguard liberal democracy–and aren’t particularly happy about America being liberal and democratic either? McCarthy identifies George Kennan and Pat Buchanan as examples of anti-liberal anti imperialists. While they “are among our greatest critics, they are also among our most neglected. They preach what a liberal nation will not hear.”
Most readers will read this and come away with a greater appreciation of the fragility of the international order and the need for prudence in foreign affairs. A thinker of the New Right may accept McCarthy’s premise but come to a different conclusion. After all, we are not so much fighting Islamization, egalitarianism, or dysgenics as we are fighting that most terrible of all conjurations–the Last Man.
Therefore, if McCarthy is correct, we should know hope–this too shall pass, and Western Man will once again have the chance to walk the upward path unrestrained by liberalism, classical or otherwise. Will liberalism fade with the end of the American Empire? We can only hope.
The Persistence of the Last Man
But is McCarthy right? Before judging, it’s necessary to clarify that Fukuyama’s thesis has been widely misinterpreted by many commentators—who think it was “disproved” by September 11, the persistence of authoritarianism, or Islamic fundamentalism. There has also been some whining from leftists who will point to poverty or inequality as disproving what they see as American triumphalism.
American hegemony or some kind of democratic utopia wasn’t what Fukuyama was defending. He simply stated that liberal democracy represented a universal ideal that most governments feel the need to pay lip service to and that provides a rhetorical framework for people to express their yearning for dignity as a human being. Whatever authoritarian holdouts remain, this thesis remains essentially true in 2014, as even countries like Belarus, Iran, and China use democratic trappings to justify their system.
Though Islamic fundamentalism and the yearning for a caliphate is a theoretical rival, in practice such an opinion is relegated to the fringe of the Islamic world, as even most “fundamentalists” mobilize via political parties that participate in elections, a la the Muslim Brotherhood. The new “Caliphate” of ISIS has its fiercest rival in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fact that stating “I am a man” or “We are human beings” is considered some kind of compelling political statement shows the power of Fukuyama’s argument.
However, though Fukuyama generally supports democracy, he had the integrity to say that there was the possibility of a challenge. Interestingly, Fukuyama held that the most compelling challenge to the worldwide system of liberal democracy could only come from the Nietzschean Right. The Last Man–the men without chests who prize safety, comfort, and consumption–are contemptible creatures, and the “dignity” they secure through democracy may not seem enough to some individuals. Fukuyama writes that the striving for megalothymia is the great danger to liberal democracies, and it requires safe outlets. Interestingly, he notes that “for most of post-historical Europe, the World Cup has replaced military competition as the chief outlet for nationalist strivings to be number one.”
More importantly, Fukuyama recognizes that “liberal democracies… are not self-sufficient; the community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source different than liberalism itself.” Citizens need an irrational pride in their own institutions in order for the largely rationalistic ends those institutions serve to be fulfilled. Absent that pride, the institutions cannot be maintained and Fukuyama has since written about the tendency of democracies, including the United States, to fall into “political decay.”
Nevertheless, Fukuyama wrote this year that:
No one living in an established democracy should be complacent about its survival. But despite the short-term ebb and flow of world politics, the power of the democratic ideal remains immense. We see it in the mass protests that continue to erupt unexpectedly from Tunis to Kiev to Istanbul, where ordinary people demand governments that recognize their equal dignity as human beings. We also see it in the millions of poor people desperate to move each year from places like Guatemala City or Karachi to Los Angeles or London.
Even as we raise questions about how soon everyone will get there, we should have no doubt as to what kind of society lies at the end of History.
It hurts to say it, but from the standpoint of 2014, Fukuyama is right. The eternal temptation any commentator is to confuse what we hope to be the case with what is the case. I hope Fukuyama is
wrong. I fear that he is right.
McCarthy suggests that all of this is less the working out of some grand historical pattern than an accident of history. If societies are under threat, the premises that underlie liberal democracy will be abandoned and societies will (presumably) return to more traditional arrangements where social choice is limited in order to safeguard the existence of the state.
However, since 1989, the “men without chests” have only grown in number. While Fukuyama lightly says that nature itself will impose limits on egalitarianism, we now live in a society where “fat shaming” and pregnant men are part of the daily conversation. Although the tendency to megalothymia is still a driving force in our culture (for God’s sake, witness Kanye West), liberal democracy has been remarkably adept at assimilating every attempt at social rebellion or self-expression into simply another form of consumerism. This is less a function of collective security than individuals taking the ideological premises of liberal democracy to their logical conclusions.
More importantly, if McCarthy is right, threats to security would prompt illiberal tendencies in American life. Yet the response of the West to 9/11, terrorist bombings in England and Spain, and demographic transformation of host populations has been an even greater emphasis on tolerance and multiculturalism. Though government surveillance has grown, none of it is being directed towards the maintenance of traditional Western identity or the restoration of Authority. Instead, it’s being targeted at those reactionary elements of the population who insist on maintaining their national identities. As Mark Steyn put it, “Just as the AIDS pandemic greatly facilitated societal surrender to the gay agenda, so 9/11 is greatly facilitating our surrender to the most extreme aspects of the multicultural agenda.” For most people in the West, the literal replacement of entire national populations with the debris of the Third World is either not worthy of notice, or is actually a cause for celebration.
This does not mean we are living in a classical liberal paradise. On the contrary, the state controls more of our lives than ever before, and even a casual glance through the morning paper makes one pine for the return of George III or even Nero. Yet in the kinds of freedoms ordinary Westerners favor–consumption, obscenity, entertainment, and sex–Western Man is “free.” The prominence of homosexual and other movements of sexual “liberation” indicates that sexual freedom is now the only freedom that seems to matter. Liberal democracy has triumphed because it provides limited government for the things modern people care about–the freedom to intoxicate, rut, and consume their way into a meaningless oblivion.
Though McCarthy references the “Red Scare” as an example of how even liberal America can abandon liberalism when under foreign threat, he does not bring up the never ending “Brown Scare” raging throughout the West, where physical attacks, workplace discrimination, and even blunt government repression are all justified in the name of fighting racism.
In this never ending climate of hysteria, we see the one thing Fukuyama got wrong–it is not “community” that is the illiberal value on which democracy relies. It is a constant war footing against fascism, Traditionalism, and racism as expressed in law codes throughout the West and organized anti-White hysteria in the Third World. Liberalism relies upon whipping up continuous hatred against prospective anti-liberals. The rights of church or family are swiftly abandoned if government repression is performed in the sacred name of “anti-fascism.” And although some of it may just be acquiescence due to fear, the fact remains that more people believe in anti-racism in the West than sincerely believe in God–and those that believe in God probably believe He and anti-racism are the same thing. Indeed, we may have something worse than the Last Man—the Proud Cuckold who is willing to fight, but only in defense of his own degradation.
Is there an Asian exception? Asia will be the powerhouse of the global economy in the next century, and Asians have not fallen for the poison of mass immigration or national self-loathing–yet. However, Japanese and South Korean culture can hardly be called more edifying than the pop culture of the West. Nor is there a real ideological alternative to liberal democracy taking shape in the Asian Tigers or even in China. While there may not be the same kind of racial replacement taking place, the Asian nations are slowly transforming into economic administrative units just like the nations of the West.
The Return of History
Can the Last Man be killed off?
Radical Traditionalists believe in the cyclical nature of history and that an age of decadence and collapse is necessary before a purging fire and rebirth. Civilizations become decadent and are overwhelmed by stronger and culturally healthier outsiders, like the Germanic barbarians that sacked degenerate Rome. McCarthy’s thesis ultimately depends on the existence of external blocs that will eventually displace the American Empire.
Unfortunately, this theory presupposes civilizations, states, or nations are still in competition. To those that rule Europe, it really does not make a difference if national populations are replaced or traditional cultures annihilated. To paraphrase Sam Francis, most elites in history have had a stake in the survival of the society and were therefore conservative, but the new managerial elite actually depends upon social deconstruction as the basis of its power. Absent sweeping revolution, the end of the military hegemony of the United States or even the end of Western Civilization doesn’t really challenge the position of the financial interests that are increasingly functioning as part of one global unit.
Many of the great security problems of the past seem unlikely to return, even if America disappeared altogether. With the creation of the common market, who can imagine France once again warring with Germany? At the same time, the very same leaders that seem most enthusiastic about the American Empire and its ability to make war, like Senators McCain and Graham, are the also the most indifferent about violations of sovereignty that would have had a Bismarck or even a Metternich mobilizing the troops. The interest of “empire”–as defined as the security arrangement that underlies the global economy–is not the same as the interest of America, even to American government officials.
Empire, as McCarthy noted, is valuable because it facilitates systems of global trade. Is American hegemony really necessary to maintain that system? While the relative decline of the West compared to Asia will change the makeup of the international financial elite, there’s nothing to suggest than an international financial system ca
n’t facilitate that transformation peacefully. More importantly, there’s nothing to suggest that Western populations would even resist large scale displacement, provided they were still given an outlet for consumption and sex. America may go away–but the Empire that sustains liberalism is now international in scope, and it is based out of banks and media outlets, not airstrips or barracks.
I see nothing inevitable about the end of the End of History. In fact, I think it can stumble on all but indefinitely. As Fukuyama posits, even in the face of incredible disaster or the fabled “collapse,” people would hasten to reconstruct it. We have an elite that is fueled by the monetization of humankind’s basest instincts–and those are not going away anytime soon.
“The Ride Never Ends” – Unless We End It
Is there hope? As Fukuyama suggests, it is the Right–those who actually wish for the destruction of global liberalism–that can offer the only challenge. This cannot be primarily an economic challenge, but a challenge of spirit, a contention that the life liberal democracy offers us is simply not good enough.
What the collapse of American Empire would offer is only an opportunity. It might open up a vacuum that would give competing creeds, power centers, and systems opposed to classical liberalism an opportunity to offer their alternatives. But even if America somehow collapsed tomorrow with its media, educational system, and law enforcement, there’s no reason to suggest that the leaderless masses would do anything other than try to build it back up again. And there’s no guarantee that the Empire would even be interrupted in its repression against the authentic Right–it would simply change how anarcho-tyranny is administered.
Still, I hope Dan McCarthy is right. His pessimism is actually optimism to a Man Against Time. But the lesson to be learned is not to wait for the collapse. It’s to live our lives in accordance with the principles that we wish to see in the world. It’s to build the alternative in the real world with every action we take. And it’s to wage a war by any means necessary from within the core of the democratic world itself against the Last Man and all he represents, holding before us the distant hope of that victory which can start the world again.
For those who are wanting these questions tackled with philosophical soundness, clear reasoning, and accessible prose, Greg Johnson’s latest book New Right Versus Old Right offers that and more with sober analysis of the predicaments our movement faces.
For a movement so small and on the fringe, we certainly have our fair share of debates and opposing viewpoints. Some call it “infighting,” others call it healthy debate. Whichever way your eye beholds our internal quarrels, the one thing we can all agree on is that there are many unresolved questions for those who are interested in preserving White identity.
For those who are wanting these questions tackled with philosophical soundness, clear reasoning, and accessible prose, Greg Johnson’s latest book New Right Versus Old Right offers that and more with sober analysis of the predicaments our movement faces.
Many stateside books with a racialist focus are primarily intended for the uninitiated and are designed to convince the reader that the problems plaguing are world are not going to be resolved by budget cuts or mandated healthcare. [New Right Versus Old Right is not one of those books, and is intended for those who have already accepted the righteousness of White identity and have already immersed themselves in dissident thought.
Don’t expect to find any breakdowns of minority crime levels, evidence of alien group subversion, or essays detailing the IQ levels of every racial group–the book assumes the reader has already accepted these points and is wanting to educate themselves on theory and strategy instead.
Composed of previously published essays, New Right offers readers a chance to digest the thought of Johnson in a more traditional setting of reading–which, in my opinion, it’s more suited for. Reading any article on the internet requires a certain kind of breeziness and lack of attention due to the nature of the web. I also think man likes reading the traditional way and a physical book in his hands can never be replaced by words on a screen.
So don’t be bristled at the thought that you might have read these essays before. I certainly had read many of them before, but the print edition allowed me to better comprehend the finer points of Dr. Johnson’s theses and find new details that I had previously overlooked.
The essential article of this collection (and what gives it its namesake) is “New Right Versus Old Right” and it constitutes a theme that is repeated throughout the work.
The Old Right is defined by the totalitarian and national-populist ideologies that flourished during the middle of the 20th century and have since become the devils of today. With the New Right, Johnson argues that we should adopt Jonathan Bowden’s adage to “step over” the hurdles left by the Old Right and forge ahead in the fight to preserve Whites as a distinct people.
The former philosophy lecturer even conjures up his own maxim for defining the relationship between the perceived evils of the Old Right and the progress of the New Right: “The North American New Right, like the European New Right, is founded on the rejection of Fascist and National Socialist party politics, totalitarianism, terrorism, imperialism, and genocide.”
But both the New and the Old are defined by a similar ideology. In Johnson’s words:
The New Right and the Old Right share the same goal: a society that is not just hierarchical but also organic, a body politic, a racially and culturally homogeneous people, a people that is one in blood and spirit, a people that is politically organized and sovereign and thus in control of its own destiny.
The difference comes from rejecting the tactics and aspirations that led to the downfall of the Old Right and led to the casting of its associated ideologies as the work of pure evil.
It is not pure evil to want to defend your own people, further their own interests, and establish a society where healthy values can take root. The main objective of the New Right, according to Johnson, is to step over the wreckage of the Old Right and establish a new, metapolitical view that puts the future of White Identity first.
And what Johnson primarily argues for those wishing to fight for White interests is to focus on metapolitics. Johnson defines metapolitics in the essay “Metapolitics and Occult Warfare”:
Metapolitics deals with the underlying causes and conditions of political change. Metapolitics operates on two levels: intellectual and organizational. Metapolitical ideas include moral systems, religions, collective identities (tribal, national, racial), and assumptions about what is politically possible. Metapolitical organizations propagate metapolitical ideas, bridging the gap between theory and practice. Examples of metapolitical movements include the European New Right and North American New Right.
It is Johnson’s opinion that Whites cannot hope to win without first articulating an effective metapolitical outlook and creating outlets for promoting that worldview. Activism and electoral politics are fruitless without it and we cannot hope to achieve anything without sound theory to guide our cause.
The Weltanschauung that dominates the West today will never allow us to survive. It only cares about profit and material comfort. Hoping that if we just stay within the confines of classical liberalism that we will be able to win back our lands is no longer a viable option. We must advance metapolitics that counter liberal metapolitics. Plain and simple.
The rest of the essays that comprise New Right Versus Old Right are equally lucid and enlightening.
“The Moral Factor” argues for the New Right to adopt a moral seriousness that is desperately lacking in the movement and to begin to argue for the moral case for White Nationalism. Too often our side attracts psychopaths and those wanting to shock society, which we shouldn’t accept. Our side is naturally good and we should not be tainted by accusations of evil and immorality. Standing up for one’s people is noble and is far worthier than standing up for the desire of more gratification.
“Dealing with the Holocaust” is a sober and reasoned analysis of the role the Nazi persecution of the Jews plays in modern society and how it is used to cowl those promoting White Identity politics. Rather than engaging in pointless debates about the facts of the Holocaust, Johnson argues for us to overcome the harmful guilt that results from fixating on it and once again step over it.
“First, Do No Harm” should be mandatory reading for anyone who wishes to become an activist. While not condemning any specific forms of activism, Johnson merely acknowledges the obvious fact that nationalists are prone (especially in the US) to engage in acts that serve no purpose outside of undermining our cause and depicting those involved as a bunch of loony troglodytes. While activism should want to promote good work rather than just doing no harm, we are not at a point where that would no longer be an issue. Thus, everyone should always live to the principle of doing no harm.
New Right contains several more fascinating essays on a variety topic ranging from the process of conversion, women in the movement, the relationship with violence, dealing with mainstream politics, and many more.
I have to admit that I agree with the vast majority of points that Dr. Johnson makes in his work–especially with the critical point of adopting a metapolitical focus to our cause. But I personally believe Johnson is a little too focused on the Jewish question and he does not adequately stress the role of ideas and values that were created by Whites in causing our decline. I would also argue that we would need to put more distance between ourselves and the Old Right and not pen odes to figures who are no longer relevant to the situation we face today (except for our enemies to browbeat us with of course).
Still, those are only quibbles and I appreciate Greg’s willingness to engage and discuss these topics in an intelligent and reasonable manner.
I cannot recommend this book enough and I would rank it as one of the most important collections of writing available to Identitarians today. We must engage ourselves in the world of ideas and culture before we can set ourselves on the path to power. Here’s to the future of making that a reality.
Where Europeans live, European civilization exists.
As part of an ongoing demographic project, I am conducting a census of all human beings of European descent throughout the Earth. I believe this is a topic of supreme importance not only for (neo-)reactionaries and New Right types, but also for all mainstream conservatives and any decent human beings willing to attempt to preserve what is left of Western (European) civilization across the globe. European civilization, which brought the entire world unprecedented advances in government, medicine, science, technology and philosophy, is something worth preserving. But how can we know how to preserve it unless we can locate and quantify it? To identify the areas where it flourishes and the areas where it is eroding? Where Europeans live, European civilization exists. When Europeans disappear, European civilization disappears with them. Anybody remember Rhodesia?
I begin my census with the homeland of the European peoples, Europe itself. It is almost sad that it is necessary to conduct a census of Europeans within their own homelands, but since the onsets of modernity and post-modernity (and the wonders of immigration, alienation and social dysfunction they brought), native European populations have dropped in many countries to points where it is no longer safe to assume native Europeans constitute overwhelming majorities of the population. To prevent any confusion, allow me to define who is a “European” before I continue to the data.
Who is European?
The range of definitions for who is “European” or “white” is very broad. The United States Census Bureau is happy to include North Africans, Middle Easterners and Jews in the “white” category, while a Nordicist may even exclude Irishmen, Greeks, Italians or Slavs. For this reason, I will avoid using the term “white,” and all its connotations, and focus instead on identifying people of European descent. People of European descent are defined as those people whose ancestral homeland is located on the continent of Europe, the jagged edge of the Eurasian landmass bordered by the Ural Mountains in the East, the Atlantic Ocean in the West and the Mediterranean Sea in the South.
Approximate border of Europe in red
Those people whose ancestral homelands are North and West of the red border in the map above I will count as people of European descent i.e. Europeans. This may or may not be coterminous with others’ definitions of “whites” or “Europeans.” To be even abundantly clear, I will include all Latin, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Hellenic, Baltic peoples in my definition of European, as well as European linguistic/ethnic minorities such as Hungarians, Finns, Sami, Basque and Albanians. I will not include Jews, whose origin is in Palestine, nor will I include the Romani (Gypsies) who ostensibly came to Europe from the Indian subcontinent. Caucasian peoples such as Georgians, Chechens and Armenians are also excluded, since their homelands are just beyond the European border in West Asia. Non-European minorities such as sub-Saharan Africans, Arabs, Turks and East Asians who emigrated to Europe in the last century or so are obviously excluded.
I will include Muslims of European descent in my definition of “European.” Muslim Bosniaks, Albanians, Kosovars and any other converts will be counted as “European.” Although religiously not European, these peoples are native to Europe in the same way their neighbors are, and they have generally assimilated to wider European civilization and its undulations. Furthermore, seeing as they were once historically non-Muslim peoples, I do not find it extraordinary to believe they could someday once again be non-Muslim and more fully in tune with the rest of European civilization.
My definition of “Europeans” is purely geographical, and although there may be a certain degree of arbitrariness in terms of religion, culture or genetics, I think the geographical definition is the one most consistent with the group of people who create and sustain Western, European societies and civilization — Europeans.
With all that in mind, I present you Mark Yuray’s Census of Europeans in Europe. Data on the official percentage of Europeans in each state was collected, calculated, interpreted and estimated according to various sources (with various dates, mind you) and tabulated by yours truly. The percentages were then multiplied with the 2012 Google population counts for each country to get a ballpark estimate of the actual lump numbers of Europeans living in each country. Data can be accessed in excel format here. A PDF easier on the eyes is here. The important maps are presented below:
Percentage of population of European origin in European states.
Percentage of population of European origin in European states, with size-scaled percentages indicated.
European states with the top ten most and least proportions of inhabitants of European origin.
Top Ten Most European States:
- Czech Republic
Top Ten Least European States:
- The Netherlands
- United Kingdom
Estimated population of Europe and Russia: 780,000,000 (i.e. including some 10 million Turks in East Thrace, all non-Europeans in Russia and the non-Europeans in the small bit of Kazakhstan technically East of the Urals.)
Total native European population of Europe and Russia in 2012 according to data: 675,251,937
Percentage of population of Europe and Russia of European descent: 86.6%
Europe and Russia Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans. I include the metric above simply because I think the historical domain of European civilization is the continent of Europe and the areas of Eurasia settled and ruled by Russia. That the domain is still 86.6% European is a good sign for Western civilization.
Eurasian areas historically and currently dominated by Europeans.
The range values for proportions of native Europeans in European states varies considerably. The island of Cyprus has a Turkish minority that runs a separate republic on the Northern end of the island, while Iceland and Poland are still >99% European. West European states such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium have the highest levels of non-European immigration, which is reflected in the larger proportions of non-Europeans in their borders. Sweden is the one Scandinavian state with an abnormally large number of non-Europeans, although it’s not exactly a surprise considering the recent riots that happened in Stockholm. East European states have large numbers of non-Europeans, although these are not new imports but historical non-European minorities such as Jews, Romani, Turks, Tatars, etc. Bulgaria and Russia are most significant in this regard.
The states with the lowest numbers of non-Europeans interestingly seem to run in a line from North to South down the center of Europe, as if they were not Western enough to jump on the immigration bandwagon but not Eastern enough to have left-over non-European minorities.
The Axis of Indigineousness
The greatest demographic threats to Europe still remain the channels of third-world immigration maintained by left-wing politicians and bureaucrats in West European states and the institutions of the European Union. France, a nation that didn’t come into contact with non-Europeans for more than a millenium between the Battle of Tours in 732 and the beginning of colonial immigration after the Second World War, has been reduced to a demographic status similar to Bulgaria, a Southeastern country bordering Turkey that spent half a millenium as a province of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.
Of the two traditional nomadic non-European minorities in Europe, the Jews and the Romani, only the Romani represent a notable demographic threat. Kudos to Steve Sailer, who has pointed out the Romani fertility rate in Hungary in 2003 was 3.0 children per woman compared to the national average of 1.3 children per woman. The Romani are small in population, but are spread throughout Europe and notoriously poor, fecund and criminal. The Jews have never recovered from the Holocaust all the way back in the 1940′s, which saw their European population reduced from some 9.5 million to around 1 million today. Except for the even smaller percentage of Orthodox Jews, Jewish fertility rates are about as low as those of other Europeans.
The great expanse of the Russian East, suffering from low fertility rates (like all of European civilization), is facing a new demographic threat from a rising China, with some 1.5 million Chinese reportedly illegally crossing the Russian border with China in the last few years. I am personally, however, not overly concerned considering the true vastness of Russia, China’s own obsession with population control and falling fertility rates and the staunchly anti-progressive and anti-liberal sentiments that rule Russia from Moscow. Russia will not be starting a government-mandated restructuring of society into a ‘vibrant, multicultural, diverse paradise‘ like Britain anytime soon.
I leave you with that thought, dear readers. Study and share the maps and data above; perhaps you can alert some other Westerners to the slow erosion of their civilization in its own homeland.
This article was originally published at Mark Yuray’s blog, Ara Maxima.
Below is the first installment of a three-part series on how we get from stato-national feeling to Pan-Occidental awareness. The second part will be about the “European alibi,” dealing mainly with the wave of anti-European hysteria currently washing through Britain, and the third and last one will be about “reclaiming the Occident,” since there’s a misconception in New Right circles about Europe and the West being antagonistic.
Below is the first installment of a three-part series on how we get from stato-national feeling to Pan-Occidental awareness. The second part will be about the “European alibi,” dealing mainly with the wave of anti-European hysteria currently washing through Britain, and the third and last one will be about “reclaiming the Occident,” since there’s a misconception in New Right circles about Europe and the West being antagonistic.
NATION-STATES AS STEPPING STONES TOWARDS GLOBALISM
I have hesitated before writing about the obscolescence of the Nation-State since I’m not sure that American readers, not to mention their European counterparts, are ready to fully realize its implications. White nationalism is a promising movement, but it is still defined in narrow American terms (“a homeland for White Americans”). On the other side of the ocean, Euro-nationalism is on the rise, but its conceptual framework still relies on Nation-States, which aborts the movement before it can fully develop.
Whether the project is a White Republic in the Pacific Northwest or a Southern Republic in Dixie (the latter being as likely as the restoration of absolute monarchy in Europe), or a “Europe of Nations,” miraculously deprived of extra-European settlers (and with the same failed states as today), nationhood, or rather “nation-statehood,” is still involved, and it is what prevents us from imagining a path out of the present mess. I suggest that, as a vanguard webzine, we get rid of nation-statehood altogether. More practical, grass-roots organizations will have to speak in terms that people will understand, but we are here to coin new terms, forge new concepts, and discard all the irrelevant ones.
Short-term National interests vs. Long-term Western interests
The main problem with the Nation-State is that it negates both what is above itself (race and civilization) and what is beneath itself (ethnicities). When stato-nationalists pay lip service to the “Europe of Nations” mentioned above, what they think of is Nation-States, and they defend Europe only to the extent that European states remain “sovereign,” that is, remain able to betray the European whole at any moment if it is in their short-term, selfish interests. From Francis the 1st allying with Suleiman the Magnificent against the Habsburg Emperor to Germany helping Lenin return to Russia during WW1, stato-nationalism has a clear record of repetitively harming the West. This will continue to happen as long as nations are not submitted to the Western, greater good.
Stato-nationalists have to resort to historical manipulation to justify their position: for them, nations came first, and then they “created” Europe/the West. Actually the reverse is true: Western European nations originate from the Carolingian Empire, which was shared out in 843 A.D. between the three grandsons of Charlemagne. This separation was rendered necessary both because of the dynastic rivalry of Louis the Pious’s sons and because of the linguistic gap between the Latin and Germanic parts of the Empire. One year before the Treaty of Verdun officialized this separation, two of the three sons of Louis the Pious, Charles the Bald and Louis the German, concluded an alliance against their brother Lothair, who was claiming the whole Empire for himself. Charles the Bald, whose troops were Latin-speaking, had to swear an oath in High Old German for Louis the German’s soldiers to understand. Reciprocally, Louis the German swore his oath in Old French. The latter is the earliest known text in this language. From the dislocation of the Western Empire, as it was then named, emerged thus three states. These were Francia Occidentalis (which would become France) and Francia Orientalis (later the Holy Roman Empire, which was Germanic). Lothair kept an awkwardly-shaped strip in the middle, including all the regions European powers would seek to conquer up to WW2: what would later become the Low Countries, Rhineland, Alsace, Switzerland, Northern Italy.
The Denial of Ethnicities
Petty nationalists often summon, quite hypocritically, the “principle of subsidiarity” to explain why Nation-States have to remain “sovereign.” It is hypocritical because this same principle is not applied within the Nation-State. Let’s take a relaively recent example: in April 2013, there was a referendum in France to determine whether Alsace, France’s Germanic region, could be reunited in one single sub-national entity, instead of being divided between two départements (the French equivalent of U.S. counties).
Marine Le Pen’s Front National campaigned against it because it would “dismember” France, and it even used anti-German and anti-European imagery to make its case. That unfortunate campaign meant that Germanic Alsatians have to remain separated from their German brothers in the name of “France,” an entity that doesn’t mean anything outside the Germanic, Celtic and Latin peoples the royal state had managed to unite while respecting their uniqueness.
Modern Nation-States are based on the denial of ethnicity. Aside from a few cases, most states don’t reflect the ethnic composition of Europe, let alone North America. Ethnicities are scattered in various states (Magyars in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine), or their homeland is divided between more than one state (Catalans, Flemings).
Is there any wonder, then, that Nation-States still exist in the current context of globalization? Far from being fences, Nation-States are actually the stepping stones upon which globalists relied, and still rely, to advance their agenda. I will deal with the European Union in the next installment. I’ll demonstrate how the EU is effectively run by its member-states, proving how stato-nationalists, particularly British nationalists, are deadly wrong on this matter, which they don’t seem to really understand or even know about.
Aside from the European Union, other supra-national organizations gather Nation-States together. The United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the WTO, are funded by Nation-States (which, to this day, are the only entities capable of raising taxes), composed of representatives of those states, and act, when they effectively do so, on behalf of their member states.
It is therefore ironic to see civic nationalists like UKIP’s Farage present the return to “sovereignty” as a matter of national pride for Britain, given that the entire globalistic project was built upon the basis of Nation-States. In Farage’s case, civic nationalism is perfectly compatible with global corporate “free” trade, as he has repeatedly admitted.
But before I move on to the next part, I’d like to conclude the present one with an observation that should be obvious for anyone thinking seriously of these questions: stato-nationalism has already failed, and there is no reason why it would magically succeed in the coming decades. Stato-nationalists, in their propaganda, have to use historic symbols of the division of the West. I can only feel admiration for Joan of Arc, who, when she was only 17, decided to rise up in arms and “chase the English out of France.” As admirable as this historic figure might be, and as necessary as her deeds were in the early 15th century, she obviously belongs in history books as of 2013. The enemy is not “the English,” and what has to be saved and reborn is not a single kingdom, but an entire race and civilization.
The English still pompously celebrate their Waterloo victory by shabbily welcoming continental trains at the eponymous station, but Napoleonic troops are unlikely to invade Britain through the Channel tunnel. Rather, Pakistani gang-rapists, West African soldier-beheaders and Caribbean looters come by plane, and are granted visas by the same state that British nationalists profess to defend.
Where are the Las Navas de Tolosa airports and Lepanto stations in today’s West? Having to raise the question, and even having to explain what these battles were about and why they mattered for the fate of the entire White race, illustrates how far we are from a real Pan-Occidental awareness, and how it will be needed in the times to come.
This article was originally published at AlternativeRight.Com.
“We do not develop the surveillance society in the fight against insecurity, rather, insecurity is used as an excuse to justify the surveillance society.”
Many blame the police for its relative weakness, not to mention its inaction in the fight against insecurity, an inaction that is reflected by crime statistics. But this is misunderstanding the current function of the police. The current function of the police is not to fight insecurity. It is, which is quite different, to control and monitor people. Not just some people, as claimed by the authorities (offenders, criminals, terrorists, etc..), but all of them. Even if the whole country turned into a no-go zone, the surveillance society would keep functioning. The police also know very well what happens in these no-go zones (who does what, when, how, etc..). But it does not intervene. Insecurity is only a pretext. We do not develop the surveillance society in the fight against insecurity, rather, insecurity is used as an excuse to justify the surveillance society. The politicians’ fear, their real fear actually, is not insecurity, but the potential retaliations against insecurity. Against that, they are not kidding. The laws in this area are applied to their full extent. This is the only one area where they are applied, but here they are applied thoroughly. The slightest deviation in this area comes at a high price. Legislation on gun ownership and self-defense has also become very restrictive. The consequence is that acts of self-defense are now increasingly rare. Three years ago [in 2002] a 15-year-old schoolgirl, who was a good student, with no police record, killed her attacker, who was “well-known by the police,” planting him with a knife. The prosecutor incarcerated her at once. “Faced with such a serious act, it was hard not to mark the occasion,” he said. Indeed, this is exceptional. In general, victims do not defend themselves. This is what the prosecutor meant.
Éric Werner, Éléments #118, Autumn 2005, pp. 29-30 (translation Roman Bernard)
Generally speaking, the right-wing Baby Boomer is subject to the bourgeois dream, which has been known as the “American dream” since the end of the Second World War: a world of peace, trade, and boredom.
The Generational Problem in Nationalist Movements
The following was delivered as a speech at the second National Policy Institute’s conference, which was held at the Ronald Reagan Building in Washington, DC, on October 26th.
It is not always easy to tell the difference between destiny and randomness.
I discovered the “Alternative Right” three years ago, by a link posted on a Swiss blog. It was a perfect illustration of a famous line in Simon and Garfunkel’s song “Sound of Silence”: “The words of the prophets are written on the subway walls, and tenement halls.”
I was going through a period of questioning at that time. I had been working for a couple of years for the “conservative movement” in Paris and I couldn’t fail to notice that all my efforts had been invested in a cause that was not really mine, that had never really been mine actually.
Until that fateful day of July 2010, I had always centered my attention on France. My only knowledge of the other Western countries was through history books, movies, or touristic trips.
Regarding politics proper, I wasn’t much interested in what was going on outside France. Though I was involved with the Right, I had always been wary of the American Right. For me, being right-wing in America meant worshipping the Holy Scrap (also known as “the Constitution”), waving a stars and stripes flag in the garden of a generic white-picket-fenced house, and making boring, tired jokes about the French who “always surrender.” I had still not digested my dish of freedom fries.
Discovering the Alternative Right was an epiphany for me, as I think the discovery of the European New Right was for many Americans present in this room today. I’m thinking particularly of Richard Spencer and of John Morgan, the editor-in-chief of Arktos Media.
I discovered that though I wasn’t feeling at home in the French “conservative movement,” there were “people like me” on the Web, all over the Western world, who shared my hopes and concerns.
Ironically enough, I even discovered French authors thanks to American publications like AlternativeRight.com or Counter-Currents.com. Of course, the name “Alain de Benoist” was familiar to me, but he was not very popular, let alone read, in my corner of the Right.
Now, it seems that more and more Western people (White people as you say in America) are aware of the fact that what brings them together is much stronger than what divides them. And I’m not only talking about activists like us here. When this British soldier was beheaded in London by two African Muslims last Spring, I could see many manifestations of solidarity by average Western people. It’s something that would have been unthinkable a mere decade ago. As this example shows, reasons for this growing awareness among Western people are often negative ones: Westerners face the same danger of being displaced in their historic homelands.
There are positive reasons, too, the first of which being the fact that we are the heirs of a great civilization. But although it is important to focus on the positive more than on the negative, it’s about a problem that is remarkable but not often commented on that I want to talk today: the generational divide.
When I say that this problem is not often commented on, it is not quite true. Actually, the liberal narrative about generational relationships is that the Baby Boom generation, thanks to a courageous revolution, managed to put an end to an oppressive, reactionary, boring society.
There is some truth to that liberal narrative. But the generational divide applies differently to nationalist movements, and this is what I want to dedicate my attention to today.
More than a generational divide, there is, first off, a generational gap in right-wing movements. If the generation of my grand-parents (born between the two world wars) was rather conservative in the right sense of the word, the Baby Boom generation is, in my experience, much more liberal in its outlook, hence the lack of right-wing activists from this generation. This is what explains “gerontocracy,” i.e. government of the old, in many right-wing movements, especially in Europe.
Even self-defined right-wingers born during the Baby Boom are liberal in their views.
The most striking thing that I noticed, in France, Europe and America, was the inability of baby-boomers, even when they see themselves as dissidents, to completely break away from the institutions. The desire of recognition, the fear of social rejection ensure that the right-wing Baby Boomer gives legitimacy to the very institutions that are eager to destroy him.
For instance, right-wing Baby Boomers show a great deal of respect to Academia. They are very proud of their PhDs when they hold them, and when they don’t, they are all the prouder to mention that an author they publish does. They do this at a time when there are PhDs in Queer, Gender, Black, and even Chicano studies in America—and even doctoral students in the hard sciences have been through the PC gauntlet. Is it so important that we focus on degrees? Wouldn’t we be better advised to give as little legitimacy to university degrees as we can, given the circumstances?
This PhD Cult among right-wing Baby Boomers is related to their own rationalistic, scientistic delusions. Since conservatives are outmoded liberals — and many White nationalists are conservatives—they just want to conserve their people as it is, as if it were possible to save said people without becoming a new one in the process — they still believe in the Enlightenment myth that one would just have to show “the truth” to people to gain credibility and support. (And trying — in vain — to gain credibility from an Establishment that despises them is an important trait of right-wing Baby Boomers.)
But this idea that people would just have to know “the truth” to support the cause of saving Western civilization and the White race is fallacious. People have to be inspired rather than convinced, and they won’t be inspired by a set of bell curves, IQ tables, and cranial measurements. Furthermore, it reduces “the truth” to the only things that can be numbered and quantified. The problem with that idea is that our struggle is a qualitative one. We can’t “prove” that architecture has become ugly since the 20th century, for example. Yet it’s something that has to be said.
I mentioned the PhD Cult because it is one of the most obvious problems in right-wing intellectual circles. But this excessive respect of right-wing Baby Boomers is granted to institutions in general, chiefly to the State, the nation-state.
Since I was born in the 1980s, at a time when the main Western countries had already been “enriched” with mass immigration, I understand that it is easier for me to dissociate myself from my own nation-state.
Here, I’m reminded of an American friend I met in Paris a few weeks ago. He was born in the 1960s, and when I mentioned to him the idea of an Ethnostate, he chuckled: for him, up to 10 years ago, he had always considered he was already living in an Ethnostate: the United States.
And in day-to-day life, it remains common to hear people say “we” and “us” when they talk about the state. “We went to Iraq.” “Our troops are bringing democracy there.” “Syria’s chemical weapons threaten us.” I’m using silly examples here to make a point, but if you listen to people around you, you will inevitably notice that they keep saying — and thus thinking — that the state is them. That the state is the nation.
But it’s getting more and more necessary to get rid of this false consciousness. Since the end of the 18th century and the American and French revolutions, the nation-state has monopolized the way Westerners see themselves. This triumph is so complete that even multiculturalists use the nation-state as a comforting reference to impose their dogma to the West. In every Western country, you can hear the same mantra that “Our [national] identity is diversity.”
Some people in our movement suggest that we should likewise use the nation-state as a means to make people aware of our goals. The problem is that we can’t use the same tactic, for two reasons: first, we are obviously not in charge of the state. Second, a strict national consciousness leads to serious errors of interpretation. It is common in countries that used to have colonies and slaves to hear people say that our problems are rooted in colonization and slavery. In my homeland, the troubles with the Algerian community are thus attributed to French colonization and civil war there.
But Sweden, which never had any colony nor slaves, is facing similar, if not graver threats than Britain, America or France. We are not attacked for what our ancestors did, or allegedly did, but for what we are: White, Western people.
From my understanding, it is easier for my generation to see a brother or sister in another Westerner than it is for the former generation, which was born in the aftermath of the Second World War. In France, Front National is still anti-German, as well as it is anti-British and anti-American. But for the young generation, all these grudges are fading into irrelevance. A Briton might dislike the Germans or the French, wrongly or rightly, but those are unlikely to drug and pimp his daughters, behead a soldier in broad daylight, or burn the city down when a drug dealer is killed by the police.
In case you are wondering, I’m talking about things that actually happened in Britain in the last years.
Young Westerners know that they are more and more becoming one nation, the same way that other races, as Jared Taylor had noted in his book White Identity, are more and more seeing themselves as one people when they live in the West.
The right-wing Baby Boomer is not able to fully understand what is happening in other Western countries, since he relies solely on national, liberal media, unlike young right-wingers who get information via alternative, Pan-Western websites. The liberal media gives him a distorted image of reality. As he knows that mainstream journalists are liberal, he basically inverts their depictions of other “far right” movements in other Western countries to make his own opinion of them. Right-wingers, most often, only define themselves in opposition to the Left. What the Left likes, they hate. What the Left loathes, they love. It is thus easy to manipulate them into supporting a controlled opposition, given that their only justification to support is: “Since liberals hate it so much, it must be doing something right.” By this false standard, George W. Bush “was doing something right” when he made up the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to invade this country.
Generally speaking, the right-wing Baby Boomer is subject to the bourgeois dream, which has been known as the “American dream” since the end of the Second World War: a world of peace, trade, and boredom.
Right-wing Baby Boomers share the project of two American politicians (both born before the Baby Boom though), Ron Paul and Pat Buchanan, whose similarities are more important than their differences. Their common motto can best be summed up as “Leave us alone!”
Well, we of the New Guard don’t want to be “left alone.” We want to rule.
We want to rule not only because we want actual power to get ourselves out of the present situation, but because we know that the “leave us alone” idea, which was behind the White flight phenomenon, is precisely what has led us to our current dispossession. Baby Boomers wanted to be “left alone,” so they fled to even further suburbs, moving further and further away from their own responsibilities. It is this process, White flight, that guaranteed that the ongoing dispossession could go on without being too painful.
The “good news” is that it is becoming impossible to continue the White flight process. Rising housing costs, growing gas prices, the concentration of jobs in city centers are putting the bourgeois dream to an end. It is now almost impossible for a generation that can only wait tables after a masters degree to keep fleeing. Problems will have to be faced, and dealt with.
At this point, I realize that I might seem unfair to the previous generation, but keep in mind that Baby Boomers did what everyone else would have done if given the choice. This choice no longer exists. The quiet, suburban life has become impossible for the reasons mentioned before.
What is to be done, then? As of now, nobody—including myself, of course—has a genuine solution to offer. Many in our circles claim that it is “five to midnight,” but I would argue that it is “five past midnight.” Not because it is too late, but because it is too soon. A mere decade ago, many people in this room, including, again, the foolish 20-year-old liberal that I was, were not aware of what was going on. Our awakening is too recent to find political solutions to our current problems now. For politics as we would like it to be to become possible, we have to win the intellectual and cultural battles, which right-wing Baby Boomers have never really considered worth fighting. It is time we do so.
What we can thus do in the meantime is to get intellectually prepared as a movement (for the individual and practical aspects of this preparation, Piero San Giorgio and Jack Donovan are more competent than I am). The first task would be to get rid with intellectual debates dating back to the Cold War, with the false dichotomies between libertarianism and socialism, conservatism and progressivism, etc.
This necessity to go beyond these false dichotomies seems obvious to activists like us, but it is still in these terms that politics are debated today.
When I say that we have to go beyond Left and Right, I don’t mean that we have to reject both notions altogether—our ethno-national project obviously belongs on the Right—but the way they have been defined and falsely opposed for these past 70 years. The alternative is not between the kolkhoz and IKEA, the best reason for that being that the kolkhoz and IKEA are two sides of the same materialistic coin. We have to find a way out of here, a way forward and upward, and that implies rising above these irrelevant debates.
As a radical movement, we need to attract intelligent and educated young men, who are the future.
Crime statistics and differences of achievement between races are important, to be sure, but no snowboarding session on the bell curve will attract young men to us. We need to show them a way out, and thus to remind them of the need to gradually withdraw from the prevailing disorder, but we also have to show them a way into, and that is what the Old Guard has been unable to do so far.
Don’t get me wrong: I’m not trying to bury the Old Guard, or even to dispute its achievements. We wouldn’t be here today if the Old Guard had not taken the first step in the past. But we can’t keep doing the same things for decades.
It is now clear why we want to found a new society; now comes the harder part: what we want and how we are going to achieve it.
The answer is not sure at this point. What is is that the powers of creation, not only of reaction, will have to be summoned.