This article first appeared in the print edition of RADIX Journal (Vol. 1 / 2012)
Much of the debate on the decline of Whites in their traditional homelands centers on “immigration,” and specifically the continuing arrival in the West of large numbers of colored “immigrants” from the poorest regions of the world. But is “immigration” an accurate term for this phenomenon?
Some critics of “immigration” feel the term is euphemistic and prefer to label the phenomenon “invasion.” Guillaume Faye calls it “colonization.” Yet, although the use of alternative terminology is motivated by legitimate concerns with the scale, the permanence, and the non-assimilation associated with modern immigration in the West, neither alternative seems satisfactory.
First, the scale of immigration does not alter the nature of the phenomenon, as the definition of “immigration” still holds so long as it describes individuals moving from one polity to another for purposes of establishing residence. Secondly, length of residence does not transform immigration into something else, as immigration does not exclude, and, indeed, often involves, permanent relocation. Thirdly, assimilation is separate from, and not a condition for, successful immigration, even if it is so for integration. Furthermore, both invaders and colonizers can be immigrants, but immigrants are not necessarily invaders or colonizers (and they are neither if they appeal to the established sovereignty for admission, inclusion, and integration.)
Indeed, “invasion” is wide of the mark. In a geopolitical sense, an invasion is an aggressive military operation aimed at “conquering, liberating, or re-establishing control or authority over a territory, forcing the partition of a country, altering the established government or gaining concessions from said government, or a combination thereof.” In a biological sense, the term still involves aggression. Modern “immigration” in the West, though it may have similar effects, and though some “immigrants” may be aggressive, is neither military in character nor centrally organized—save exceptionally and loosely—by either active or passive encouragement to emigrate and resettle in a specific polity or territory.
“Colonization” is much closer to the mark, but still not on it. The term refers to the establishment of colonies in one territory by people from another territory, but colonies can comprise colonists or colonials, the latter of which is linked to colonialism. In colonialism, a metropole claims sovereignty over the colony, deliberately changing—when the territory is already inhabited—the social structure, government, and economics of the colonized territory. “Immigration” is not “colonization” in this sense. Arguably, “immigrants” into the West have increasingly sought to gain or exert control over the social structure, government, and economics of their host countries, but they are not—save with one exception, mentioned below—subjects of a metropole with a deliberate policy of colonization. The “immigrants” issue from multiple metropoles, which are uncoordinated, geographically dispersed, may be rivals or enemies, and in all but one case operate no policy of colonization, officially or unofficially. Moreover, the so-called “immigrants” are not even coordinated among themselves, beyond temporary subjection by some or exploitation by criminal gangs of human traffickers.The “immigrants” are impelled, not by a single-minded desire to establish or join a colony, but by a variety of individual motives, mostly involving escape from danger or poverty in their native territory and a desire for safety and (above all) economic betterment in a prosperous metropole.
The term “colonization,” however, is not entirely inadequate, for modern “immigration” in the West still involves exogenous strangers colonizing Western polities. This is because, while different from colonialism, structurally the phenomenon remains related to it. A more apt term for the phenomenon of “immigration” would be “settler colonialism,” which can involve settlers from multiple metropoles whose behavior and consciousness is very similar to that of our modern Third World “immigrants”; but the term remains problematic, since it describes projects like Israel today, South Africa up until the early 20th century, and what eventually became the United States, from the 17th century through most of the 19th. Nevertheless, “settler colonialism” is structurally most similar to what is discussed in this essay, however, and provides a sound theoretical basis for what I propose to call, for the purposes of distinction, “settler colonization.”
In this essay, I will first provide a description of settler colonialism as it is currently theorized. I will then show how settler colonialism closely describes modern “immigration” in the West. Next, I will indicate how the Western experience with modern settlers from the Third World differs from that of past settler-colonial projects. Finally, I will suggest possible strategies for combating settler colonization in our hemisphere.
Edward Cavanagh, editor of the Settler Colonial Studies journal, and Lorenzo Veracini, author of Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, define settler colonialism as follows:
Settler colonialism is a global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present. There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends. Not all migrants are settlers; as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settlers come to stay. They are founders of political orders who carry with them a distinct sovereign capacity. And settler colonialism is not colonialism: settlers want Indigenous people to vanish (but can make use of their labour before they are made to disappear). Sometimes settler colonial forms operate within colonial ones, sometimes they subvert them, sometimes they replace them. But even if colonialism and settler colonialism interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other.
In his book, Veracini also ascribes to settler colonialism distinctive characteristics:
- Settler colonialism creates a dual division between itself, exogenous Others, and indigenous Others; these can be either virtuous or degraded.
- Settler colonialism is always virtuous, always forward-moving, conceiving itself and its activity in terms of improvement and progress. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous, but can be either elevated or degraded, while exogenous Others can be selectively included or segregated. However, settler colonialism more easily includes exogenous Others than indigenous Others and routinely fantasizes about exchanging indigenous Others with exogenous Others.
- Inclusion and exclusion operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operate concurrently, without a need for consistency. Yet, while borders are internally porous, they are externally impermeable: settlers can go out, but indigenes cannot get in.
- Settler colonialism involves the settler self undergoing coeval processes of indigenization and exogenization.
- Settler colonialism thus converges with the original society, but the line is never crossed because the distinction needs to remain.
- Settler colonialism dominates in order to transfer (remove); colonialism dominates in order to exploit.
- Settler colonialism tends to underestimate the indigenous in various objective and subjective ways, making the indigenous invisible.
- Settler colonialism, accordingly, subjectively conceives areas to be annexed or opened for settlement as vacant.
- Settler colonialism sees itself as ultimately, if not immediately, autonomous, and therefore resists interference from the metropole; colonialism is subordinate to the metropole.
- Settler colonialism is characterized by an exclusive interpretation of peoplehood, a specific understanding of sovereign capacities and their location, even though settlement itself is messy and most people move individually, “without a conscious determination to establish a new, ideal, society, and with no specific understanding of their own sovereignty.”
- Settler colonialism sees the settler colonial setting as charged with a special regenerative nature.
- Settler colonialism is characterized by the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.
- Settlers come to work and live in peace and see themselves as escaping from violence; a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one.
- Settler colonialism disavows its violent foundation, but peacefulness coexists with violence.
- Settler colonialism suffers from “ongoing concerns with existential threats and a paranoid fear of ultimate decolonization.”
- Settler colonialism has a linear structure, whereas colonialism has a circular structure: for one, the literary metaphor is the Aeneid, for the other, the Odyssey; one involves non-discovery, since settlers simply reproduce their society; the other, discovery, since the discoverer reports back to the metropole; one involves non- encounter with the indigenous (they are invisible, shadows, undercounted, deterritorialized, sojourners, part of the landscape), the other encounter (through exploitation).
- Settler colonialism, because it deterritorializes the indigenous and denies their state-forming capacity, can be superseded only by itself, ending with the complete elimination of the indigenous. In this case, the end is negotiated from within, including complicated and dubious processes of “national reconciliation.” The alternative ending is settler exodus or expulsion. In this case, there is never equality or any subsequent relationship between the indigenous and the settlers; settler colonialism is a winner-takes-all scenario: either the indigenous or the settlers disappear. Colonialism, on the other hand, ends with state formation (by the indigenous), and its end is a negotiation between states (the colonizers’ and the indigenous’).
- Settler independence accelerates the process of nation-building and hence the process of erasure of the indigenous. Even well-meaning acts of reconciliation and incorporation entail the erasure of indigenous forms as it occurs in the context of settlers’ forms.
Settler Colonization in the West
As has been noted, critics of “immigration” in the West have noted its unprecedented scale, its permanent character, and the non-assimilation/non-assimilability of Third World “immigrants.” Among the characteristics of settler colonialism is that settlers come to stay and do not appeal to the established indigenous sovereignty, but rather deny it and seek to remove it in order to replace it with a reproduction or regeneration of their own society. Implied in settler colonialism is scale: settlers may arrive as individual immigrants, but the process of reproduction, removal, and replacement necessitates sufficient scale successfully to neutralise, overcome, and eliminate indigenous resistance.
In Western Europe this is most apparent in the continuing growth of Islamic formations by immigrant Muslims, who, now numbering in the millions, found and daily operate their own structures in parallel with the indigenous authority. Spread across the regions, but concentrated in metropolitan enclaves, these structures may be physical, such as mosques and madrassas, or they may be legal-theological, such as arbitration tribunals based on Shariah law. Their prosperity benefits from demographic contraction and loss of faith by Europeans, whose churches are gradually converted into mosques; but it is also driven by a will to conquer the land, which, from time to time, find open expression across a range of settings, from the streets to high political office held by Muslims. During the disturbances caused by the publication of a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed in Denmark in 2005, Muslim protesters variously called for Shariah law for the United Kingdom, worldwide domination by Islam, the death or slaughter of those who insult Islam, and the extermination of Europeans. Similarly, in 2008, Labour politician Shahid Malik, former Justice Minister and Minister for Race, Faith and Community Cohesion at the Department for Communities and Local Government, stated at that year’s “Global Peace and Unity” conference, held at the Excel London Centre:
I am proud of the achievements of Muslims in this country from ’97. In 19 97 we got our first Muslim MP. In 20 01 we had two Muslim MPs. In 20 05 we had four Muslim MPs. In ša Allah, in 20 09–10, we’ll have eight Muslim MPs. In 2014 we’ll have sixteen Muslim MPs. At this rate, the whole Parliament will be Muslim! But just to say, in case there are journalists here today, that is not my objective. But you know, we’ ve got four Muslim MPs; there should be twenty Muslim MPs in Parliament. And in ša Allah very shortly we’ll see that. I am confident, as Britain’s first Muslim Minister, that, in ša Allah, in the next thirty years or so, we’ll see a Prime Minister in this country, who happens to share my faith.
Such messages cannot be dismissed as simple expressions of anger or hopeful prognostication. Anger and hope can be expressed in many ways, and it is significant that, rather than calling for respect and toleration of a Muslim minority, the thrust of the messages, be it from protestors or from a Justice Minister, flowed uniformly in the direction of conquest, replacement, and Islamic supremacy.
In the United States, Mexican immigrants of recent decades have a well-documented history of forming their own parallel structures. In their case, it takes the form of businesses, pressure groups, student organizations, printed and electronic media, gangs, and social networks permeating occupations, neighborhoods, and local politics, within which all transactions and interactions are conducted in Spanish. Mexican immigrants, their descendants (including naturalized ones), as well as Mexicans in Mexico, also conceive themselves, even at official government level, as possessing a sovereign capacity as Mexicans—“I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border, that wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico.” A true Mexican immigrant leaves Mexico behind and appeals to the United States government so that he may eventually become an American; a Mexican settler takes Mexico with him, and, though he may take up American citizenship, the latter is done for purely instrumental (e.g., economic) reasons. Some more ideologically racialist Mexicans dream of replacing the United States government with a Chicano superstate to be called “Aztlan.” A more common assumption of Mexican settlers is that part or all of the U.S. will gradually transform into a more lucrative version of their home country.
The process of replacement is made partially invisible by its interaction with a vestigial European settler colonial consciousness: “immigrants” have slowly built their structures largely in the shadows, persistently undercounted and underestimated. This is an instance where settler colonialism and settler colonization interpenetrate.
Third World settlers in the West replicate the dual division of peoples in settler colonial projects, and the relationship between self and other is analogous. Upon arrival, they are faced with indigenous Others, who comprise the majority and are ostensibly the established authority, as well as with exogenous Others, who comprise minorities of fellow travelers and against whom they are now pitted in competition for resources and admission by the established authority. When faced with real or perceived resistance by the indigenous, settlers perceive themselves in a shared predicament with exogenous Others. This makes them more receptive to establishing friendships or alliances with exogenous Others against the indigenous established authority. Said exogenous Others, however, may be found within structures of the established authority itself. Thus, generic pro-“immigrant” pressure groups emerge with the backing of establishment politicians. (As discussed further below, these politicians, though exogenous, may also be or appear to be indigenous.)
The consciousness of settler colonization in the West is always virtuous: settlers seek employment, economic betterment, educational improvement, professional progress, and a peaceful life. Indigenous Others are rarely virtuous: they are racists, bigots, Islamophobes, infidels, faithless, and degenerate. They can, however, be elevated by converting to the settler’s faith and/or cause. They can, by adopting their manners and sensibilities, also be selectively admitted into the settler collective, including through marriage, although this may require conversion. In the latter case, reluctant admission and desire for admission interpenetrate, for the settler, still perceiving himself as less powerful than the indigenous (even if more virtuous), sees acceptance as a gateway for deeper colonization and altering the indigenous society in ways more amenable to his collective (e.g. by campaigning for “anti-racist” legislation). When settlers run for political office, one part of them desires acceptance by the establishment (it is powerful and confers privilege), another desires to change that establishment (it is racist and excludes settlers). It is not gaining admission with a view to assimilating to the indigenous Other, but rather gaining admission with a view to neutralise and/or displace him.
Thus, inclusion by and of the settler and exclusion of the indigenous operate concomitantly, attraction and revulsion operating concurrently and without consistency.
The search for admission, even if without a view to assimilation, does involve a process of indigenization. The indigenous in Europe, because they tend towards individualism and low ethnocentricity, confuse indigenization of the settler with assimilation, not realizing that settlers are ethnocentric collectivists and seek eventually to recast European society in their image. The process of indigenization involves settlers becoming the indigenous, not settlers becoming like the indigenous (even though the former does superficially involve and necessitate the latter to varying degrees.)
A process of exogenization of the settler in relation to the latter’s original society is the other facet of his indigenization in Europe, for as he indigenizes in an alien environment, he also diverges from the members of his race, whom he has left behind. The evolution of past settler colonial projects, particularly those involving multiple races and ethnicities, such as what became the United States, point to the eventual emergence of a sense of peoplehood, albeit qualified by racial or ethnic membership. This means that while the United Kingdom may variously converge with India, Pakistan, Africa, and the Caribbean, settlers from these countries or regions, and more so their descendants, and particularly where they are racially mixed, will not see themselves as subjects or indigenous to those countries and regions, but as British citizens indigenous to Britain, whose heritage goes back to one or more of those countries or regions. It follows from this that while there will be convergence, the line will never be crossed because the distinction will always remain.
While the end result is the transference (removal) of the indigenous, settler colonization in the West coexists with exploitative relationships proper of straight colonialism. It is well known that Third World settlers in the West, even at the appellant stage, take advantage of the indigenous’ welfare state and concessionary provisions, and that these benefits are often a reason for immigrating in the first place; indeed, on the whole, these settlers consume more than they produce. However, exploitation is not limited to scrounging from the indigenous government: it also takes the form of various forms of ethnically organized fraud, such as car crash insurance claim scams, which are run by Muslim gangs, or ethnically organized exploitation, such as pedophilia, also associated with Muslim gangs. So long as the indigenous remain in charge, they remain both an obstacle and a resource.
This is linked both to the subjective underestimation of the indigenous and the conception of Europe as vacant. Although the latter may seem an exaggeration, it is not if we understand ethnocentricity as involving a certain “vacating” (or evacuation) of the Other’s humanity. Third World settlers in the West are by nature highly ethnocentric, at least in relation to the indigenous White majority. The West is thus conceived by settlers primarily as a space, a land, where there are resources and opportunity, not as comprising people just like them who can provide generosity and friendship. The indigenous Westerner, therefore, is vacant, present but absent, a somewhat abstract entity that has to be dealt with, if only because “it” holds the “keys to the kingdom,” but which is otherwise denied and subjectively disappears until the next time “it” gets in the way or the settler realizes he needs something from “it.” The indigenous White majority is essentially part of the landscape, but, as with irredentist Mexican settlers in the United States, it can be seen as sojourners, interlopers, or usurpers.
Both the emergent sense of peoplehood, even if multifarious and complicated by racial and ethnic divides and miscegenation, and the conception of a vacant land of opportunity, are concurrent with autonomy from the originating metropole, and even resistance to its interference. It must be borne in mind that many settlers immigrate as economic or political refugees, and seek to make a new life in the Western El Dorado. Making a new life is another way of saying regeneration; the West, and immigration to the West, are imbued with a regenerative nature. In turn, this regeneration occurs as a dual process, whereby the settler regenerates (that is, generates again) his own society and simultaneously has his life regenerated in (and/or by) the land of opportunity. Given the often dysfunctional nature of Third World societies, this duality would seem to be mutually negating, since the society being regenerated is the society from which the settler fled, and a successful regeneration of that society would impede the successful regeneration of the settler’s life. Indeed, a secure future in the new land is recurrently and dialectically opposed to an uncertain prospect in the old one. But settlers do not require consistency.
Third World settlers immigrating into the West are motivated primarily by the prospect of economic betterment; they have no specific understanding of their sovereignty and neither do they, with the exception of politicized Mexican settlers in the United States, possess a conscious collective will, for settlers move individually, even if they arrive in groups. All the same, as we have seen from the proliferation of parallel substitutive formations by settlers in the West, they do possess the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence.
The process of doing so is non-violent, following a legal sequence comprising: appeal to the indigenous authority (for recognition and admission as permanent minorities, and eventually citizens); development of exogenous structures (serving as substitutes to indigenous ones); co-option of indigenous structures (lobbying for concessions, multiculturalism); subversion from without (lobbying for anti-racist legislation); and indigenization (becoming legislators, subversion from within). At the same time, the process coexists with violence, whereby the indigenous are physically attacked or subject to predations (typically muggings, robberies, racially motivated beatings, and rape), or else morally attacked (typically accusations of prejudice and “racism,” and/or “racism” hoaxes).
Conversely, settlers live in paranoid fear. In the West, colored settlers imagine themselves in the midst of indigenous “racists,” in an institutionally “racist” society, even though said society has invited them, granted them recognition, made concessions, opened its labour market to them, accepted them as citizens, elected them into public offices, denounced “racism” in all its forms, swiftly purged “racists” upon detection, and even changed its laws to criminalise “racism” and punish “racists” with added rigor. This may be because settlers both have a well-developed sense of racial identity, because they would never welcome colonization in their traditional homeland, and because they are routinely agitated by ideologically egalitarian fanatics. No matter what gains they make, the fear of “racism” is ever present, and the perceived risk of expulsion (decolonization) ever lingering. In both Europe and the United States, it has happened before: in 1492 (the Spanish Reconquista) and 1954 (Operation Wetback).
Expulsion or a mass exodus would, indeed, be the only way to end Third World settler colonization in the West. Millions of settlers are citizens, many going back several generations, not a few descended from mixed race marriages. Short of expulsion or a mass exodus, the long-term effect of settler colonization, aided by high numbers of incomers and differential fertility favoring the settlers, is the replacement of the indigenous population. The latter will not need to disappear entirely, at least as a biological entity, before being completely dispossessed: even without violence, the indigenous institutions of democracy and equality provide the logic and mechanisms for dispossession. If the majority of people in Britain are Muslim, for example, democracy necessitates that they be proportionally represented in the seats of political, economic, cultural, academic, and institutional power. The historical rarity and fugaciousness of democracy in the Third World, however, suggests that democratic governance would end as soon as it ceases to be useful for the settlers, though this is not to say that the indigenous could not well dispense with it in the face of an immediate existential threat—democracy has proven historically rare and fugacious in the West, too.
Without the complete erasure of the indigenous Westerners, the end of Third World settler colonization in the West would at best imply a dubious procedure of “national reconciliation,” involving negotiation by the indigenous with triumphant settlers from within, and in the context of settlers’ established forms. Most likely, given the multiracial character of settler colonization in the West, is that one ethnicity would gain the ascendancy over all the others, and it would be they who become the new indigenous. The Bantus in South Africa provide a historical example.
Uniqueness of Settler Colonization in the West
Settler colonization in the West is not unique because of its scale or the fact that settlers are poor. Settler colonialist projects have involved large numbers in the past and many of the settlers have been poor—in most cases, they immigrated looking for a better life. The uniqueness of our experience with settler colonization results from the unique features of modern Western societies.
First, it is the colonization of the more powerful by the less powerful, of the former colonialists by the formerly colonized; it is, in other words, a reversion of past colonialism and settler colonialism.
Secondly, this process enjoys the ongoing complicity of the indigenous’ ruling elites, who, wittingly or unwittingly, instigated it in the first place out of a perceived economic need, and have since institutionalized it out of political opportunism, greed, a sense of historical guilt, or befuddlement with an ideology of human universalism. The opening of land to colonists by leaders is not unique: African kings in southern Africa either sold or gave away land to European settlers in exchange for military service during the 19th century. What is unique is the institutionalization of a policy of welcoming settler colonization, supported by a universalist ideology that makes the voluntary transfer of land and sovereignty morally virtuous.
Thirdly, alongside indigenous collaborationism, Third World settler colonization in the West has been catalyzed by both historical events and the existence of a hostile or at least self-serving exogenous minority of very able intellectuals, businessmen, and legislators. The excesses of the National Socialist government in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, Allied victory in World War II, and the moral capital amassed and exploited by Jews—and especially radical Marxist Jews—as a result of well publicized National Socialist persecution, permitted the development of Jewish intellectual movements that subjected traditional European identity and institutions to radical critiques. Their effect was the gradual deprecation of European tradition and racial identity and the development of universalism to its logical extreme. Interacting with guilt as the primary method of social control in the West, this made it possible even for genetically distant immigrants eventually to become legislators because it had become impossible for the indigenous to argue against exclusion based on race.
Fourthly, the sovereignty transfers take a more abstract form than the land leases, cessions, seizure, or annexations that have characterized settler colonialist projects elsewhere. In the West transfers occur at the legal, policy, and moral- philosophical levels; they involve, for example, changes in legislation that privilege settlers over the indigenous, abdication of indigenous racial consciousness as a morally legitimate cognitive structure, or discrimination policies against the indigenous designed disproportionately to enhance settlers’ access to higher education and the job market. Similarly, the emptiness and evacuation of the “land of opportunity” among settlers occurs at a much more abstract level than allowed by indigenous demographic contraction: the Western “land of opportunity” is densely populated and highly developed, so the evacuation is purely subjective. Its closest analogue is modern Israel, where the “promised land” is subjectively emptied by denying Palestinians the same moral and symbolic status as Jews.
Finally, the settler colonization in the West does not involve the ignoring or direct overrunning of the indigenous, but rather an incremental engagement, which runs concomitantly with a process of gradual transformation of the settler from appellant to citizen to legislator, which is, in turn, wrapped up with the process of indigenization already mentioned.
Third World settler colonization of the West is possible only as a result of a uniquely Western ideology (egalitarianism) and an autochthonous political system (democracy), both of which morally and ideologically disarm the indigenous against settler ascendancy and predation.
Ending Settler Colonization
As has been noted, settler colonialism rarely ends, and it is superseded only by itself. After the United States’ independence, the former settlers ceased to be colonials from a distant mother country because their mother country had become the United States. Moreover, the indigenous were in time either displaced or made to disappear entirely, so there was no question of the indigenous regaining their independence and the colonials returning home—as just stated, the latter were at home. Third World settler colonization in the West being analogous, it follows that the crisis faced by Westerners is much more fundamental than simple out-of-control immigration. A polity can exclude immigrants and strip resident immigrants of their citizenship, but settlers are founders of polities, so they cannot be stripped of their own citizenship by the displaced indigenes, since the indigenous sovereignty is not recognized.
It should be apparent that we in the West live still in a time of transition, where immigration coexists with and interpenetrates settler colonization, and where one has not entirely given way to the other. Yet it is already possible for a citizen of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean descent in the United Kingdom to treat, for example, a White South African over the age of 16 immigrating into the island as a foreigner, and to be in a position to grant or deny admittance, even where the South African has blood ties to the island going back thousands of years and was born to United Kingdom citizens. Conversely, it is no longer possible, without an abrogation of modern Westernism’s basic philosophical tenets, suddenly to withdraw citizenship from a United Kingdom resident descended from one or more generations of South Asian or Afro-Caribbean citizens. Even the overnight expulsion of illegal immigrants and the passing of the most restrictive immigration law imaginable in our present ideological context could not deal with this problem. As time passes, the immigration reform debate will become increasingly irrelevant.
Where settler colonialism was terminated or reversed, such as in South Africa after Nelson Mandela, Rhodesia after Robert Mugabe, and Haïti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the measures required were violent and broke (or would have broken had it existed) current international law. Because this law is premised on equality as an absolute moral good, reversing settler colonization in the West would, without first abrogating this law, or else discrediting the moral basis for such body of law, also imply violent and illegal acts. Settler colonization is, after all, a game of erasure: settlers erase or are erased; no ongoing or equitable relationship is possible between settlers and indigenes. And the single biggest impediment to Whites’ avoiding erasure is the hegemonic belief in the West in equality as an absolute moral good, because the latter dictates that settlers be accorded equal rights and privileges to the indigenous (despite settlers being hostile), and because this belief effectively short-circuits the possibility of an opposing belief in the morality of White racial consciousness and preservation.
Whites in Europe and North America, as well as in former colonies in Africa, the South Pacific, and South America, currently lack a moral theory, let alone the legal means (since the latter would stem from the former), with which to justify and secure their continuity. Unless a new moral theory of difference can be formulated to support an ideology and legal framework that both justifies and enables its self-preservation as a unique biological entity in their own homelands, the White race faces complete erasure from the Earth.